Summary: DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen refers to her presidential campaign platform as the “Platform for the Coming Decade.” In the section on cross-Strait relations, Tsai denies the existence of a 1992 Consensus. If Tsai Ing-wen is elected, her denial will become an atomic bomb dropped on cross-Strait economic and trade relations. The peaceful and mutually beneficial economic and trade exchanges that the governments and people on both sides of the Strait have enjoyed over the past three years will be destroyed overnight. To no one’s surprise, Mainland officials have already responded. They have said that repudiation of the 1992 Consensus is “unacceptable to the Mainland side.” They have said that if such a policy is implemented, “cross-Strait negotiations will be impossible.”

Full Text below:

DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen refers to her presidential campaign platform as the “Platform for the Coming Decade.” In the section on cross-Strait relations, Tsai denies the existence of the 1992 Consensus. If Tsai Ing-wen is elected, her denial will become an atomic bomb dropped on cross-Strait economic and trade relations. The peaceful and mutually beneficial economic and trade exchanges that the governments and people on both sides of the Strait have enjoyed over the past three years will be destroyed overnight. To no one’s surprise, Mainland officials have already responded. They have said that repudiation of the 1992 Consensus is “unacceptable to the Mainland side.” They have said that if such a policy is implemented, “cross-Strait negotiations will be impossible.”

The Ma administration has been in office three years. During that time, cross-Strait economic exchanges reached yet another milestone. They went from direct links, Mainland tourists visiting Taiwan, liberalization of the financial industry, and Mainland purchasing groups coming to Taiwan, to the signing of ECFA. Cross-Strait economic exchanges were finally normalized. This process, and these results, benefited both sides. The Mainland has undeniably made many concessions to improve relations with Taiwan. Overall, therefore, Taiwan has benefited more.

For example, when the financial tsunami struck, the technology industry on Taiwan stalled. Capacity utilization fell to 30%. Unpaid leaves were widespread. The Mainland launched a four trillion RMB Home Appliances for Rural Families Program. Provincial and municipal governments on the Mainland dispatched swarms of purchasing groups to Taiwan. In a single year they purchased 20 billion USD in home appliances. This was a shot in the arm for ailing industries and enterprises. Allowing Mainland tourists to visit Taiwan led to a tripling in their numbers. Last year the number increased to 1.5 million. The growth rate reached 5%. This enabled last year’s tourism foreign exchange earnings to increase 30%. The signing of ECFA has yielded even more far-reaching benefits. Taiwan benefited from the tariff reduction early harvest list more than the Mainland. The side effects are even more impressive. All in all, the benefits of this wave of deepening cross-Strait trade, amount to an entirely different class of benefits that benefit the common people.

Maintaining good cross-Strait relations and further expanding economic and trade interests is essential to our economic future. It affects the economic interests and lives of everyone. The Mainland’s economic strength is growing. It is now the second largest after the United States. According to forecast by international think tanks, the Mainland may overtake the U.S. as the world’s largest economy as early as 2020, or as late as 2030. People on the Mainland and Taiwan are the same people. We speak the same language. We have the same culture. Given the economic prospects before our noses, how can we not take advantage of them? If we refuse to have any dealings with the Mainland, our economy will fall into an abyss.

Secondly, in recent years the Mainland has become the world’s factory. Seizing “Mainland opportunities” is no longer limited to mastering production factors and plant problems. Seizing Mainland opportunities means opening up one’s markets, building one’s brand, and enhancing one’s businesses and industries. For example, the local Taiwan market has remained small. The financial sector has too many banks. These businesses would have a vastly larger market on the Mainland, enabling them to survive and to thrive.

Thirdly, exports account for about 70% of our gross domestic product (GDP). The Mainland accounts for 40% of all “exports” from Taiwan. Last year, Taiwan enjoyed a 80 billion USD cross-Strait trade surplus. Most companies listed on Taiwan have built factories on the Mainland. For many technology industries, shipments from the Mainland, already exceed 50% to 80%. People say one should not put all one’s eggs in the same basket. But the reality is all our eggs are in one basket. The most important thing is to take good care of that one basket. Tsai Ing-wen’s repudiation of 1992 Consensus runs the risk of destroying this basket.

Finally, the reason Taiwan and the Mainland had to rush the signing of ECFA, was the imminent launch of the ASEAN plus One (ASEAN plus the Mainland) East Asian free trade zone. Had Taiwan been excluded from the world’s largest free trade zone, over half our exports would be affected. Lest we forget, ASEAN plus One was followed by ASEAN plus Three (ASEAN plus Mainland China, Japan, and South Korea). South Korea is Taiwan’s toughest competitor. If cross-Strait relations change, and ECFA cannot integrate Taiwan into the ECFA regional trade zone, exports from Taiwan and the Taiwan economy will be in trouble.

Tsai Ing-wen says ECFA is a fait accompli, and that is why it will be submitted to the people for “democratic approval.” But Tsai Ing-wen does not seem to realize that three years of cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges, and other interests and achievements, are all based on good faith and consensus. Take away this good faith and consensus, and ECFA will be an empty shell. The most important cornerstone of cross-Strait good faith is the 1992 Consensus. Tsai Ing-wen seems to think she can repudiate the 1992 Consensus, but the other side will continue to respond in good faith. She seems to imagine that the other side will do everything according to her play book, and handle cross-Strait economic and trade relations according to her whims. Tsai is either naive and ignorant beyond belief, or is knowingly deceiving the public.

By repudiating the 1992 Consensus, Tsai Ing-wen is gambling with her political future. Motivated by personal beliefs, ideals, ideology, or merely by a desire to consolidate her support among the Green Camp, she is “betting the farm” on cross-Strait relations. But the economy, people’s livelihood, and people’s hopes for cross-Strait harmony, are not chips to be gambled away on the whims of politicians.

蔡英文給兩岸經貿投下原子彈
2011-08-25 中國時報

民進黨主席、總統參選人蔡英文公布的十年政綱兩岸篇中，否認「九二共識」的存在。如果蔡英文當選，這一否認實際上是為兩岸經貿投下一顆原子彈。過去三年，兩岸政府與人民共同努力，營造出的和平前景、經貿往來、利益共享，將全部毀於一旦。不出外界所料的，大陸官方已正式發表回應，除了說不承認九二共識是「大陸方面不能接受的」外，更強調此政策一旦實施，「將導致兩岸協商無法進行」。

馬政府上台後，過去三年，兩岸經貿往來跨入了另一個新里程；從兩岸三通、陸客來台觀光、開放金融產業、大陸採購團來台、到ＥＣＦＡ簽署，兩岸經貿往來可說終於「正常化」。這個過程、這個結果，兩岸互蒙其利，一起受惠；而不能否認的是，大陸官方為了拉近與台灣的關係，而有「讓利」想法，因此整體而言，台灣受益程度又更高。

例如，在金融海嘯狂捲全球時，台灣科技產業陷入停擺困境，產能利用率降到一到三成，無薪假遍及各公司。大陸除了推出四兆人民幣的家電下鄉外，各省市也派出龐大的採購團來台採購，一年的採購金額就逾二百億美元，對國內產業與企業無異雪中送炭。此外，開放陸客來台觀光後，大陸觀光客數字也呈三級跳，去年成長到一五○萬人，成長率高達五成，這也讓我國去年的觀光外匯收入增加了近三成。至於ＥＣＦＡ的簽訂，影響更深遠；除了台灣得到的降稅早收清單多於大陸外，後續帶來的其它效應，更是可觀。綜觀而言，這一波兩岸經貿深化的利益，幾乎可說不同階級者皆有獲利，惠及庶民。

我們要強調的是：維持兩岸良好的關係，進而拓展經貿利益，絕對是台灣未來經濟大戰略上最重點的課題；這也關係著全民的經濟利益與生活。一來，大陸經濟實力與時日增，現在已是僅次於美國的第二大經濟體；依照各國智庫的預測，早則在二○二○年，晚則到二○三○年，大陸就可能超越美國成為全球第一大經濟體。對一個近在咫尺、又同文同種，語言、文化相通，前景看好的經濟體，台灣豈能不好好掌握這個契機？揚棄與其往來，台灣經濟必陷深淵。

二來，大陸近年已由全球工廠轉型為全球市場；掌握「大陸機會」，已不僅是掌握生產要素與工廠的問題，而是開拓市場、建立品牌、提升企業與產業的問題了。例如，國內長久受困於市場小、銀行過多的金融業，就能在大陸找到更大市場，延續拓展企業命脈。

三來，現實上，台灣的出口占國內生產毛額（ＧＤＰ）的七成左右，而台灣出口地區中，大陸就占了四成。台灣去年從兩岸貿易中取得的順差就超過八百億美元，國內上市櫃企業大部分都已在大陸有投資設廠，許多科技產業大陸的出貨量，已超過五成到八成。雖然，許多人都說「雞蛋不能放在同一個籃子裡」，但當現實上我們的雞蛋是高度集中在這個籃子中時，最要緊的就是「好好的顧好這個籃子」。蔡英文的否認九二共識，其實就有「打壞這個籃子」的風險。

最後，我們也要指出，當初台灣急於與大陸簽署ＥＣＦＡ的原因，主要是因應「東協加一」（東協加上大陸）的東亞自由貿易區上路，台灣如果被排拒在此全球最大的自由貿易區之外，則超過五成的出口都受影響。但別忘了，東協加一後接著是「東協加三」（東協加上大陸、日本、南韓）的上路。在台灣最重要的競爭對手南韓加入後，如果兩岸關係生變，台灣無法藉著ＥＣＦＡ融入此區域貿易中，則台灣出口與經濟皆危矣。

蔡英文雖然表示ＥＣＦＡ是既成事實，所以會「循民主程序處理」。但蔡英文似乎不了解，這三年來兩岸經貿的交流往來、及其產生的諸多利益及成果，有許多是基於彼此的善意與共識才取得。如果把這個善意與共識拿掉，ＥＣＦＡ也可以成為一個空殼子。蔡英文在否認兩岸善意產生的最重要基石─「九二共識」後，還期望對岸有善意，且依循她個人的主觀期望，來處理兩岸經貿關係，不是太天真、無知，就是存心欺騙社會大眾。

不論蔡英文是基於個人信念、理想、意識型態，或甚至只是為了鞏固綠營基本盤選票，而提出否認九二共識，都可以說是拿政治前途、兩岸關係去「豪賭一把」；但，台灣的經濟、民眾的生活、兩岸關係前景，都不能被政客當籌碼，放在賭桌上「豪賭一把」！

Summary: DPP Chairman and presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen has unveiled her Political Platform for the Coming Decade. It includes a chapter on “national security and cross-Strait economic exchanges.” In it she resorts to all manner of sophistries to justify her stance on cross-Strait policy. Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP cling to the Resolution on Taiwan’s Future. Do they acknowledge whether the Republic of China is a sovereign and independent nation? Must Taiwan labor under the curse of independence and nation building? Must politicians on Taiwan repeatedly incite unnecessary political controversy? Must they repeatedly undermine cross-Strait peace and prosperity?

Full Text below:

DPP Chairman and presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen has unveiled her Political Platform for the Coming Decade. It includes a chapter on “national security and cross-Strait economic exchanges.” In it she resorts to all manner of sophistries to justify her stance on cross-Strait policy. Key points include: The DPP will accept the already signed cross-Strait trade and economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA). If the DPP returns to power, it will deal with any related issue in accordance with democratic processes and international norms. But the “1992 Consensus” does not exist. Therefore the DPP has no need to either accept it or reject it. Superficially Tsai Ing-wen’s argument may seem sound. But in fact it is self-contradictory and cannot withstand close scrutiny.

Take ECFA for example, The two sides signed a framework agreement in accordance with democratic processes and international norms. First, the agreement was approved by the Legislative Yuan, Second, the agreement between the two sides accorded with World Trade Organization (WTO) principles, and was even submitted to the WTO after signing. Tsai Ing-wen proposes to redo everything the Ma administration already did. She then intends to make it part of her campaign platform. She even intends to make it part of the DPP’s political principles.

Tsai Ing-wen has accused the Ma administration of turning a blind eye to the long term effects of ECFA on Taiwan’s development. She accuses the Ma administration of ignoring the “China Factor.” She says doing so could make it impossible for Taiwan to sign free trade agreements with other important trading partners. But the truth is just the reverse. The Chen regime ruled for eight years. Apart from a handful of diplomatic allies, no other nations signed FTAs with Taipei. By contrast, the Ma administration successfully signed FTAs with many non-allies, all in three short years. Taipei has yet to sign an FTA with Washington. But the sticking point is not any alleged “China Factor.” It is the still unresolved dispute between Taipei and Washington over US beef imports and Clenbuterol.

Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP blasted ECFA, both before and after it was signed. They said it seriously harmed industries on Taiwan. During an interview with the SET channels’s “Taiwan Yes” talk show, Tsai publicly proclaimed that the DPP would launch a referendum drive and allow the people to decide whether they still wanted ECFA. The facts have shown that ECFA has benefitted industries on Taiwan. Beneficiaries include counties headed by the DPP. Tsai Ing-wen must reconcile her current position with past statements. Unfortunately for her, she cannot erase what she said before.

The 1992 Consensus is of supreme importance to cross-Strait relations. But Tsai Ing-wen considers the 1992 Consensus “non-existent.” To her, the 1992 Consensus does not exist. But the 1991 National Unification Guidelines and the 1992 Consensus made the 1993 Koo-Wang Summit possible. This is historical fact. The two sides have set aside their differences, and each side adheres to its own definition of “One China.” Because the two sides had this consensus, peaceful cross-Strait exchanges prevail today.

In fact, the two sides have already held six Chiang-Chen Summits, and signed 15 agreements, including the most important agreement of all, ECFA. Every one of these agreements are predicated upon the 1992 Consensus. To repudiate the 1992 Consensus is to repudiate the very basis of these cross-Strait agreements. Repudiation would threaten existing agreements. Repudiation would also threaten future cross-strait consultations, Repudiation of the 1992 Consensus would repudiate everything that went before. What kind of leader indulges in such myopic thinking?

Tsai Ing-wen told interviewers that “[Mainland] China must consider what kind of relationship it wants to maintain with Taiwan. If [Mainland] China insists that its principles trump all else, it will collide head on with mainstream thinking on Taiwan. Would this be a good thing for [Mainland] China? ” But the reverse is equally true, Tsai Ing-wen should ask herself, “Taiwan must consider what kind of relationship it wants to maintain with Mainland China. If Taiwan insists that its principles trump all else, it will collide head on with mainstream thinking on Mainland China. Would this be a good thing for Taiwan?”

Cross-Strait relations affect both sides. Neither side can expect the other to acquiesce totally to its demands. The 1992 Consensus is the balance point between these two interests. Both sides adhere to their own positions, while setting aside their differences. The DPP insists on rejecting the 1992 Consensus, and butting heads with the Mainland, What good will this do Taiwan? What good will this do peaceful cross-strait exchanges?

Tsai Ing-wen rejects the 1992 Consensus. She says that once she is elected president, she will use the democratic process to establish a new “Taiwanese Consensus” as a basis for cross-Strait talks. She said that creating a domestic consensus is the responsibility of the president. “The president cannot consider only his own party’s interests, nor can he cling to a predetermined position. Quite true. A presidential election is the important democratic institution of all. In 2008, the people elected Ma Ying-jeou president. By doing so, they voted in favor of across the board, peaceful, pragmatic cross-Strait relations, predicated upon the 1992 Consensus. How can Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP consider only her own party’s interests? How can she cling to a predetermined position? How can she presume that the DPP alone represents “mainstream thinking” on Taiwan?

If Tsai Ing-wen is merely confused, then she should refer to former DPP Chairman Shih Ming-teh’s statement. “After half a century of living together, we already have a consensus!” [As Shih Ming-teh sees it] the Republic of China is Taiwan, and Taiwan is the Republic of China. Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP cling to the Resolution on Taiwan’s Future. Do they acknowledge whether the Republic of China is a sovereign and independent nation? Must Taiwan labor under the curse of independence and nation building? Must politicians on Taiwan repeatedly incite unnecessary political controversy? Must they repeatedly undermine cross-Strait peace and prosperity?

闡釋兩岸政策 蔡英文近乎詭辯
2011-08-24 中國時報

民進黨主席、總統參選人蔡英文發表十年政綱「國家安全、兩岸經貿篇」，以一貫近乎詭辯的言詞闡釋她的兩岸政策立場；其重點包括：對已簽署的兩岸經貿合作框架協議（ＥＣＦＡ）概括承受，若執政後將會遵循民主程序及國際規範來處理相關事宜；至於「九二共識」，既不存在，即無接受或否認的問題。表面上看，蔡英文的說法彷彿言之成理，實際上卻前後矛盾，根本無法自圓其說。

以ＥＣＦＡ為例，兩岸簽署此一合作框架協議，是遵循民主程序與國際規範辦理；首先，協議係經立法院認可，其次兩岸依世界貿易組織（ＷＴＯ）原則簽定，且簽定後也已經ＷＴＯ報備。蔡英文重複馬政府已經做完的事，能成為競選政見、乃至民進黨的政綱嗎？

蔡英文又說，馬政府不願面對兩岸簽署ＥＣＦＡ對台灣發展的深遠影響，忽視中國因素可能導致台灣無法與其他重要貿易伙伴洽簽自由貿易協定的事實。但，恰恰相反，扁政府執政八年，除了少數邦交國，同樣簽不成任何ＦＴＡ；反而馬政府三年多來與多個非邦交國的友邦開始協商簽署ＦＴＡ事宜，與美國之間尚未談攏，不是中國因素，而是美國牛與瘦肉精爭議。

兩岸簽署ＥＣＦＡ前後，蔡英文與民進黨舉黨批判，強調對台灣產業危害至深，並在接受三立《大話新聞》訪問時，公開宣示民進黨執政後要發動公投，讓全民決定是否還要ＥＣＦＡ。事實證明，ＥＣＦＡ確實讓台灣產業受惠，受惠者還包括民進黨執政縣市，蔡英文此刻含糊面對她曾經表達過的立場，卻無法抹去她曾經說過的話。

更重要的，對於維繫兩岸關係最重要的「九二共識」，蔡英文認定是「不存在的」。在她的認知中或許沒有「九二共識」這個名詞，但是因為一九九一年的國統綱領和一九九二年的共識，才促成了一九九三的「辜汪會談」，這是「歷史事實」。就內涵上而言，這是兩岸擱置爭議，各自表述「一個中國」；因為有這樣的「共識」，兩岸才能建構出目前和平交流的關係。

事實上，兩岸迄今舉辦六次江陳會談，簽署了十五項協議，包括最重要的ＥＣＦＡ，都是以「九二共識」為基礎、為前提。否認「九二共識」，就是否定了兩岸協議的基礎和前提，不但對現有協議如何繼續執行產生困擾，就未來兩岸可能的協商，形同一筆勾銷，這算什麼領導者的戰略思考？

蔡英文接受媒體訪問時，進一步強調「中國必須思考要跟台灣維持什麼關係？如果中國堅持自己的原則最重要，不惜與台灣人民的主流思想與意志衝突，對中國是不是一件好事」？這個說法反過來同樣成立，蔡英文必須思考，「什麼是對台灣最有利的事，如果堅持自己的想法最重要，不惜與台灣主流思考與利益衝突，對台灣、對民進黨是不是一件好事？」

兩岸關係繫乎兩端，對任何一方來說，都不可能要求對方全面退讓；「九二共識」就是在這樣的互利思考中得到的平衡點，各執立場但放下爭端。拒絕九二共識，堅持爭端，對台灣有什麼好處？對兩岸後後續的和平交流有什麼利基？

否定九二共識的蔡英文要宣示，當選總統後要透過民主機制凝聚的新的「台灣共識」，做為兩岸對談的基礎；她還說，國內共識是總統的責任，「總統不能宥於自己政黨的利益與思考，也不能預設立場。」有道理，總統選舉就是最重要的民主機制，當二○○八年馬英九當選總統的那一刻開始，全民已經用實際行動要求兩岸務實地在九二共識的基礎下全面開展和平關係。蔡英文和民進黨豈能宥於自己政黨的利益和思考，預設立場地認為只有民進黨的主張才是台灣的「主流思想」？

如果蔡英文還是想不清楚，或許應該參考民進黨前主席施明德的論述：「歷經半世紀的共同生活，我們早已磨合出共識了！」中華民國就是台灣，台灣就是中華民國。執著於台灣前途決議文的蔡英文和民進黨，到底承不承認中華民國一直是主權獨立的國家？台灣還需要困在獨立建國的魔咒中，反覆陷入無謂的政治爭議，破壞兩岸已經和平交流的繁榮局面嗎？

Summary: Tsai Ing-wen has unveiled her public education platform. She advocates fast tracking 12-year national education. She advocates a comprehensive community-based system of vocational high schools within eight years. She advocates increasing the percentage of students admitted to public universities by more than half. She advocates minimum quotas and special concessions for local students. If Tsai Ing-wen has her way, universities may soon be community-based. Such an educational platform is worse than devoid of content. It is downright bizarre. How did Tsai Ing-wen arrive at such a bizarre proposal?

Full Text below:

Tsai Ing-wen has unveiled her public education platform. She advocates fast tracking 12-year national education. She advocates a comprehensive community-based system of vocational high schools within eight years. She advocates increasing the percentage of students admitted to public universities by more than half. She advocates minimum quotas and special concessions for local students. If Tsai Ing-wen has her way, universities may soon be community-based.

Not long ago, Tsai Ing-wen was visiting the United Kingdom. She reminded the public on Taiwan that she received a doctorate from the prestigious London School of Economics. She stressed her outstanding international outlook. But predictably, when addressing higher education back home, she adopted an egalitarian outlook, She championed “Nativization” and state sponsored education, She spoke of quotas and preferential treatment, rather than competitiveness. Her double standards were surprising and worrisome.

They were surprising because Tsai Ing-wen is the beneficiary of her education at elite universities, at home and abroad. She ought to know that the nurturing of talent is an extremely complex undertaking. Yet when she addresses higher education on Taiwan, she frames issues in such simplistic terms. She equates increasing enrollment in public institutions with educational reform. In recent years, the supply of higher education has outstripped demand. Quality has steadily fallen. This is deeply worrisome. Irrational, xenophobic, community-based educational policies will only reduce the international competitiveness of students from Taiwan.

Educational policies such as these may be subject to the imperatives of DPP “Nativism,” under which everything must be directed toward the ultimate goal — Taiwan independence. They must move towards “egalitarianism” and away from “elitism.” In fact, charges that higher education on Taiwan is “elitist” are trumped-up. Forcibly altering the educational system in the name of egalitarianism is more likely to sacrifice its essence, and lead to its collapse. Community-based senior high schools may be harmless. But to lump elite schools into the same category clearly represents a naive understanding of egalitarianism. This is especially true for universities. The government should encourage universities to develop their own strengths, instead of binding them hand and feet with all sorts of restrictions.

Over the past half century, Chen Shui-bian, Vincent Siew, Su Tseng-chang and other offspring of farming families have reached the top of the political pyramid, Many entrepreneurs have built empires out of nothing. This means our educational system is an effective channel for social mobility. It enables people who exert the necessary effort, to change their destinies. Nor is that all. It allows them to attend university in foreign lands. It allows young people from Taiwan to experience independent living for the first time. Different towns, different origins, different classes of people communicate with each other in dormitories. Their adaptation, learning, and sharing are important and valuable life experiences. Yet Tsai Ing-wen’s policy would require universities to reserve places for local students. Young people would hide out at home for four more years, What will become of those experiences of living abroad and learning from others? Should slots for NTU be reserved for children of Da-an District residents? If so, then what will become of the desired balance between urban and rural areas?

DPP Nativism depicts venturing abroad and foreign competition as a brutal and traumatic experience, It does everything in its power to defend against them. It discourages students from venturing out into the world. It prevents students from the Chinese mainland from coming to Taiwan to compete against them. It attempts to establish a safe haven, sequestered far from the world outside. Competition today is globalized. If we attempt to create a sterile classroom, if we insist on perceiving examinations and competition as snakes and scorpions, what will happen to the international competitiveness of the next generation on Taiwan?

Take Tsai Ing-wen, for example. Her father left his native Chaochou in Pingtung during his youth, and made his fortune in Taipei, As a result, Tsai Ing-wen grew up in Taipei and successfully found her way into National Taiwan University, Cornell University, the London School of Economics, and is now waging a campaign for the presidency. That is social mobility. Tsai Ing-wen still considers herself a native of Chaochou. But would she have preferred that her father had not left home? Would she have preferred attending a community college in Pingtung? She told students at Chungsham Girls High School that she “never attended an elite school.” That was hypocritical beyond belief. She was the beneficiary of abundant opportunities for upward mobility. Yet her educational policy would reduce and even eliminate such opportunities for for others. The contradiction is too glaring for wordss.

When the DPP was in power, it introduced its “five year, fifty billion” plan to establish world-class universities on Taiwan. The plan grossly misallocated resources. But at least it recognized the importance of national competitiveness. Tsai Ing-wen’s educational platform, on the other hand, offers only such simplistic ideas as community colleges, egalitarianism, and exemption from testing. It promises to implement 12 year national education within eight years, but cannot tell us how it will get there, or how it will be paid for. Apparently Tsai intends to treat education as yet another social welfare program. .

Such an educational platform is worse than devoid of content. It is downright bizarre. How did Tsai Ing-wen arrive at such a bizarre proposal?

奇怪，蔡英文為何會這樣想？
【聯合報╱社論】
2011.08.23 02:26 am

蔡英文公布教育政綱，除主張加速推動十二年國教，八年內高中職要全面社區化；她也主張增加公立大學學生比率到半數以上，並要求公立大學提供一定名額及優惠給在地學生。在蔡英文眼中，大學教育似乎也必須朝「社區化」發展。

不久前，蔡英文才走訪英國，提醒台灣民眾她是名校倫敦大學政經學院畢業的博士，無非在強調自己具有出眾的國際觀。孰料，回頭面對本國高等教育問題，她採取的卻是「平均主義」策略，要走「在地化」、「公立化」路線，談的是保障名額及優惠待遇，而不是競爭力。她的雙重標準，委實令人訝異，也令人擔心。

令人訝異的是，她在國內外菁英大學受益良多，應知人才的打造是一件複雜萬端的「百年樹人」工程；為何自己談論起台灣的高教，竟用如此簡單的眼光來衡量，以為增加公立院校招生就是改革。令人擔心的則是，台灣近年高教因大量供過於求，品質正逐漸降低；若再用莫名所以的理念迫使其走向「社區化」、「排外化」，台灣學生的國際競爭力恐將更矮人一截。

其所以端出這樣的教育政綱，或許是受到民進黨「本土化」眼光的侷限，一切都要朝末端拉扯，而走向以「平均主義」牽制或取代「菁英主義」的極端思維。事實上，把台灣的高等教育視為「菁英主義」，根本是莫須有的罪名；要用「平均主義」來強行改造教育體系的結構，更可能導致其本質精神的瓦解。試想，高中職要社區化容或無妨，但要把明星學校既有的光榮都一起推平，那就顯然是幼稚的平均主義。大學更是如此，政府要鼓勵的是大學創造自己的長處和特色，而不是設定各種限制，讓它們更難自由行動。

過去半世紀，諸如陳水扁、蕭萬長、蘇貞昌等農家子弟都登上政治頂峰，多少企業家白手起家打出天下，表示我們的教育體系是一個有效的「社會流動」管道，讓努力的人可以改變自己的命運和出身。不僅如此，到異鄉上大學，也是台灣年輕人體驗獨立生活的重要起步。不同鄉鎮、不同出身、不同科別的人在宿舍裡彼此交流、適應、學習及分享，是人生重要且美好的經驗。依照蔡英文的政綱，若大學都要保留名額給在地生，年輕人可以繼續在家鄉窩四年，那麼，異地生活、同儕交流等人生際遇要從何而來？台大的名額，需要保留給大安區的子弟嗎？那還談什麼平衡城鄉差距？

民進黨的本土化論述，把出外打拚、外來競爭形容成殘酷及可怕的經驗，所以要盡力提供本地生保護，不僅避免學生離鄉背井，更要防止陸生來台構成競爭。然而，他們想要構築的那個安樂世界，與真實的世界卻有莫大的差距。當競爭已經進入全球化時代，如果我們還企圖打造無菌室教育，視考試與競爭如蛇蠍，台灣下一代的國際競爭力將何等令人憂心？

以蔡英文為例，她的父親早年離開故鄉屏東潮州到台北打天下，所以在台北生長的蔡英文得以一路順利讀進台大、康乃爾、倫敦大學，以至於今要參選總統，這就是社會流動的功能。蔡英文還記得自己是潮州人，但她會希望父親當年不要離開老家，或自己也只能在屏東上大學嗎？從這個角度看，她在中山女中向她的高中學妹聲稱自己「從沒上過明星學校」，不僅太過矯情，也分明是言不由衷。她自己享受了向上流動的美好機遇，但她構想的教育政綱卻是要減緩及消除這樣的流動機會，也太矛盾了。

民進黨執政時推出「五年五百億」計畫，要打造世界一流的頂尖大學，雖嚴重扭曲了資源的利用，卻至少還知道國家競爭力的重要。但在蔡英文的教育政綱裡，看到的卻只有社區化、平均化、免試化的簡單思維，包括要在八年內速成的十二年國教都無法陳述具體步驟和財源，只怕是把教育大計當成社會福利來辦了。

這樣的政綱，已不止是空心不空心，而是邏輯怪誕，思維畸形。不禁要問：奇怪，蔡英文為何會這樣想？

Summary: President Ma is in the final stages of his current term. His team of advisors must show the same determination they did three years ago, when they safely led Taiwan through the financial tsunami. They must ensure a 5% growth rate at all cost. This is not just about ensuring economic growth rates. It is about ensuring one’s political legacy. it is about ensuring confidence, security, and stability. And finally, it is about ensuring a second term.

Full Text below:

Dark clouds menace the presidential election, The DGBAS has just announced its economic forecast for the next two years. The result is a preliminary report card on President Ma’s first four-year term. Overall economic growth has been positive according to three criteria, and negative according to one. On the whole, gains have exceeded losses. But the economic growth rate this year was 4.81%, not the hoped for 5%. Next year’s estimate is for 4.58%, even worse than this year. President Ma’s economic advisors and policies have scored a partial victory. They need to work harder, and achieve more. The January 2012 Presidential Election is five months away. The Ma administration still has time to reach its 5% goal, and add a little extra luster to its report card.

There are many ways to produce a good economic policy report card. One way is to introduce a large number of policies. Another is to amend a large number of regulations. Still another is to complete a large number of public works projects. Politicians usually cite the most favorable indicators. But no matter which indicators they cite, they will only be part of the picture. In the end, one must reevaluate one’s larger goal. What is this larger goal? It is the same goal that every government pursues, every waking moment of the day. It is economic growth, price stability, reduced unemployment, higher average incomes, and greater equality.

President Ma and his economic advisors have a good idea where they are headed. For example, real gross domestic product (GDP) may reach 15.6 trillion NT next year, a 19% increase over 13.2 trillion NT figure in 2008. That averages out to about 4.45% a year. The financial tsunami had a huge impact. The economy declined, but commodity prices remained stable despite huge increases in the price of international oil and raw materials. Over four years the increases were kept under 2% a year. The Ma administration’s record has been remarkable. The aggregate price index, the pain index, and the unemployment rate, have all fallen over the last two years. But they are still higher than when President Ma took office. Consider national income. This year the gross national product per capita (GNP) will exceed 20,000 USD. Next year it will reach new highs. Incomes have increased. Income distribution, which affects social stability. also improved last year. The gap between the highest and lowest incomes shrank 6.19 times.

But a political record is not graded purely on the basis of policy direction. One has a responsibility to meet one’s initial targets. The former represents a policy choice, The latter reflects the level of effort. By this standard President Ma’s campaign established a “viable economy” policy blueprint. It included industry deregulation, the normalization of cross-Strait economic and trade relations, and the 12 “I-Taiwan” infrastructure projects. He unquestionably moved Taiwan in the right direction. But the government still has a long way to go before it achieves its “6:3:3″ goals, These include a 6% average annual economic growth rate, a 3% unemployment rate, and a 30,000 USD per capita GNP after eight years in office. The Ma administration’s efforts are inadequate. The public knows that the administration is not to blame for the European and US financial crisis. But the Ma administration cannot use this as an excuse to rest on its laurels.

The global economy is in chaos. The US economy risks going into recession. The European sovereign debt crisis is entering a new wave of turmoil. The Chinese mainland is feeling the after-effects of gradually tightening monetary policy. Japan is undergoing reconstruction following the Fukushima nuclear plant disaster, and coping with the strong Japanese yen. Nouriel Roubini, aka Dr. Doom, predicted a perfect storm by 2013. That storm seems to be gathering even now. Over 60% of Taiwan’s trade is with these four economies. Harsh challenges threaten from without. In the short term, the government most needs to guard against international stock market collapse, and the ripple effect on the Taiwan stock market. Superficially it is concerned about the stock price index. But in essence, its real concern is financial system liquidity and stability. The real economy must not be dragged down by the financial crisis.

The domestic situation is hardly optimistic. Private sector consumer confidence has been undermined by the global stock market crash. Over the past two years, the only factor that has maintained momentum in private consumption has been Mainland tourism to Taiwan. During the first half this declined. The second half shows no signs of improvement. People have already scaled back investments due to the vagaries of the international economy. Public construction projects are nearing completion. ECFA, which exerted an impact for almost a full year, has not inspired much desire to invest in Taiwan. Domestic demand has cooled, making the already slow pace of recovery even slower. If events continue to develop the way they have, they will further weaken consumption and investor confidence, creating a vicious circle. Confidence is defined as expectation of future economic growth. It manifests in the moment, Strong confidence in the economy has a multiplier effect. Therefore, the government must not overlook the warning signs of weakening domestic demand. It must increase domestic demand to increase confidence. This is the government’s top economic policy priority.

President Ma is in the final stages of his current term. His team of advisors must show the same determination they did three years ago, when they safely led Taiwan through the financial tsunami. They must ensure a 5% growth rate at all cost. This is not just about ensuring economic growth rates. It is about ensuring one’s political legacy. it is about ensuring confidence, security, and stability. And finally, it is about ensuring a second term.

保五 保政績 保信心 保穩定
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.08.22

在總統大選戰雲密布之際，行政院主計處公布了今、明兩年的最新經濟預測，為馬總統這一任四年經濟施政做出了初步成績單。總括來說，經濟成長率三正一負，得多於失；但今年經濟成長率百分之四‧八一，未能保五，明年預估百分之四‧五八，比今年更差，顯示馬總統的財經政策及團隊似乎只打了半場好球，後繼有些乏力。距明年一月總統選舉投票日還有五個月，馬政府仍有足夠的時間再衝刺保五目標，為這份成績單添上光采。

經濟施政成績單可以有很多種，推出多少政策是一種，檢修多少法規是一種，做了多少公共建設也是一種，政治人物通常是選用最有利於己的指標；但無論那一種，都只是局部的呈現，最終還是要回歸總目標的檢驗；而這個總目標，正是任何國家無時無刻不在追求的目標，那就是經濟成長、物價穩定、失業減少、所得成長及平均分配等五項。

就此而言，馬總統及其行政團隊大致達成「方向性」的要求。例如明年實質國內生產毛額（ＧＤＰ）可達十五‧六兆元，比二○○八年就任當年的十三‧一兆元，增加約百分之十九，平均每年約百分之四‧四五，儘管其間經歷了金融海嘯的巨大撞擊，使經濟一度衰退；物價則在國際油價及原物料大漲的環境下保持了穩定，四年間每年漲幅都穩穩控在百分之二以下，馬政府表現可圈可點；與物價合計組成痛苦指數的失業率，近兩年已下降，但仍高於馬總統上任之時；在國民所得方面，今年平均每人國民生產毛額（ＧＮＰ）將跨越二萬美元大關，明年再挑戰新高；在所得增加的同時，影響社會安定的所得分配，去年也獲得改善，最高最低所得差距倍數縮小到六‧一九倍。

不過，施政績效的檢視不只是方向性的達成，亦不能忽視初始預期目標賦予的執行責任，前者代表的是政策方針的選擇，後者反映的是努力程度。準此而言，馬總統競選時訂下的「活力經濟」政策藍圖，包括產業政策鬆綁、兩岸經貿關係正常化、愛台十二項建設等，確是推動台灣經濟前進的正確方向；但距離與這些政策對應的「六三三」目標，政府還有長路要走，包括平均每年經濟成長率百分之六、失業率百分之三及八年後平均每人ＧＮＰ三萬美元等，顯示馬政府團隊的執行力及努力程度都不夠；儘管人民能夠體諒源自歐美的金融海嘯衝擊是非戰之罪，馬政府卻不能以此為藉口而自滿於現狀。

尤其，目前全球經濟、金融情勢混亂不堪，美國經濟再次衰退的風險如影隨形、歐洲主權債務危機又將進入新一波還債高峰的動盪期、中國大陸貨幣政策緊縮的後遺症逐步發酵，災後重建中的日本亦正與日圓強升的衝擊搏鬥，新末日博士羅比尼之前預言的二○一三年「完美風暴」儼然已正匯聚之中，台灣對這四大經濟體的貿易依存度逾六成，外部的嚴酷挑戰已在眼前；但短期面，政府最需嚴防的是國際股市崩跌對台股的波及效應，其形式上關注的雖是股價指數，但實質上須確保的是金融體系的流動性及穩定性，以避免實體經濟遭受金融周轉不順的拖累。

目前內部情勢也無一樂觀，民間消費信心已因全球股災而受到打擊，近兩年維繫民間消費動力於不墜的大陸民眾來台觀光，上半年更已出現衰退，下半年也尚無起色；投資方面，民間已因國際景氣變幻莫測而縮手，擴大公共建設計畫則進入尾聲，而生效快滿一年的兩岸經濟協議（ＥＣＦＡ）也沒有激起明顯的投資台灣意願。國內需求的降溫，讓本已緩慢復甦的步伐走得更沈重；若任令其發展下去，更會反向削弱消費、投資信心，形成惡性循環。信心是對未來經濟成長的預期，並實踐於當下，其強弱會對經濟產生自我實現的加乘力量，因此，政府不能輕忽內需轉弱的警訊，拚內需以振信心，已是政府經濟施政首要之務。

進入馬總統本屆任期的最後階段，行政團隊必須再次拿出三年前帶領台灣安度金融海嘯的決心，全力衝刺保五目標，因為這不僅是在保經濟成長率，更在保政績、保信心、保穩定，以及保下一個任期。

Summary: The number of Mainland tourists visiting Taiwan has fallen off recently as a result of the recession. Group tours were once filled to overflowing. But second quarter numbers have fallen off sharply, The numbers for the newly implemented Free and Independent Travel Policy are also much lower than expected. What is the problem? So far the government and the tourism industry haven’t a clue. That may be the most serious problem of all.

Full Text below:

The number of Mainland tourists visiting Taiwan has fallen off recently as a result of the recession. Group tours were once filled to overflowing. But second quarter numbers have fallen off sharply, The numbers for the newly implemented Free and Independent Travel Policy are also much lower than expected. What is the problem? So far the government and the tourism industry haven’t a clue. That may be the most serious problem of all.

The number of Mainland tourists visiting Taiwan as part of group tours fell off this spring. The tourism industry inititally attributed the decline to the overly restrictive nature of group tours, Cutthroat competition within the travel industry also led to lowball bids and poor service, Therefore observers predicted that large numbers of Mainland tourists would switch to individual travel under the Free and Independent Travel Policy Act. The Free and Independent Travel Policy Act went into effect in June. But by the end of the month, only 500 tourists had arrived on Taiwan, only slightly more than the quota for a single day. The assumption that tourists would switch from group tours to individual tourism the Free and Independent Travel Policy was apparently mistaken.

Tourism Bureau officials believe the main reasons for the decline are the plasticizing agent scandal and Alishan train accidents. Overcrowding at the National Palace Museum and other attractions have also dampened visitor interest. Indeed, transportation safety, service quality, as well as Taiwan’s overall credibilty and image, are all factors that have affected visitor interest. Taiwan opened itself up to Mainland tourism only three years ago. Has fatigue already set in after such a brief period? Is Mainland tourism to Taiwan merely a flash in the pan? If that is the case, then the quality of our tourism services and tourism facilities are substandard and not sustainable in the long term. Are these factors sufficient to explain the decline in Mainland tourism to Taiwan? If not, what other factors are there?

Mainland tourists have never come to Taiwan purely for the sake of tourism. For Mainland tourists, Taiwan’s primarly selling point is the 50 year long separation between the two sides. Relatives and friends can now be reunified. They can experience the economic and social contrast between democracy and authoritarianism. They can satisfly their curiosity about each other, learn about each other, learn from each other, compete against each other, amidst a “quasi-divided” state of affairs. Two years ago Taiwan opened itself up to Mainland tourism. Mainland tourists replaced Japanese tourists as Taiwan’s most important source of tourism revenue. Why? Because many Mainland tourists want to see with their own eyes the symbolic differences between the two sides that have resulted from a half-century of separation. They want to experience for themselves another model of development for the Chinese people. Therefore, if we insist on seeing Mainland tourists to Taiwan merely as “business opportunities,” we will inevitably make the mistake of focusing on short term profits.

Cross-Strait exchanges involve the more complex problem of politics. This has two aspects. On Taiwan, the opposition DPP opposes opening the island to Mainland tourism. Not everyone agrees that is a good thing. Not everyone is happy about it. As a result, Mainland tourists are strictly limited in their movements. They are not permitted to leave their tour groups. Free movement is prohibited. Travel agents are made liable for any violations. This discriminates against Mainland tourists. It also encourages the tourism industry to find ways to evade system oversight. We want the business opportunities afforded by Mainland tourists. But we refuse to offer Mainland tourists reasonable treatment. Alas, the government is utterly oblivious about its own internal contradictions. It is even less interested in seeking ways to remedy the situation.

Mainland tourists visiting Taiwan also involve a hidden variable in cross-Strait political relations. To a considerable extent, cross-Strait policy requires Beijing’s cooperation, and its belief in the Ma administration’s good faith. This however, forces the administration to exercise greater discretionary authority in response to the gray area. For example, rumor has it that the first 200 visitors traveling under the Free and Independent Travel Policy were mobilized by the Beijing authorities, If true, this cannot help but distort the nature of what ensues. Also, election season is approaching. The government has asked Beijing to reduce the number of political and business visits, in order to avoid harming the ruling party’s election prospects, Such a move is highly artificial. Many Mainland visitors want to come to Taiwan to witness the elections, “up close and personal,” But they are forbidden to do so out of political considerations. Outsiders cannot see what is going on behind the scenes. This makes finding a remedy even more difficult.

Mainland visitors to Taiwan can help the two sides understand each other, This is indisputable. But government and business choose to see the matter as nothing more than business. The government boasts about waves of tourists spreading money around. Businesses think only of Mainland tourists’ immense purchasing power. Both value only group size, purchasing power, and making a fast buck. As for how to provide the commensurate services, how to showcase Taiwan’s sophistication, how to to leave a good impression, those are matters they cannot be bothered with.

The plasticizer scandal severely damaged Taiwan’s image. The Alishan train accidents and Suhua Highway accidents have also dampened tourist enthusiasm, But a far more serious is Mainland tourists who have concluded that “Taiwanese are no longer honest.” When they return to the Mainland and speak of their disillusionment, more and more people will have second thoughts. Tourism industry insiders on Taiwan have expressed regrets over the self-destructive myopia of their industry peers, including hotels and stores. Can a market that kills the goose that lays the golden egg have a future?

The number of Mainland visitors has decline, But if they enjoy greater freedom of movement, if they can travel in greater safety, if they can have more fun, that may not be a bad thing. Taiwanese visitors to the Mainland have also experienced incidents in which they were treated as “dai bao” (clueless tourists). Who wants such unpleasant experiences repeated with Mainland tourists to Taiwan? More importantly, Mainland tourists’ fascination with Taiwan must not be destroyed by businessmen interested only in making a fast buck. Perhaps Taipei and Beijing have not had sufficient time to implement their plans. But they must, if tourism exchanges are to enhance mutual understanding.

陸客來台不能只論「商機」
【聯合報╱社論】
2011.08.19 02:26 am

最近陸客來台出現衰退現象，不僅原來爆滿的旅行團第二季起大幅退燒，新開放的「自由行」人數亦遠低於預期。其中癥結究竟為何，政府和旅行業者至今都還說不出所以然，這恐怕才是更嚴重的問題。

今春陸客旅遊團來台人數驟降，當時旅行業研判，認為是團體旅遊限制太多，加上業者低價搶客導致旅遊品質不佳，因此預期許多陸客將大量轉向自由行。然而，驗證六月底自由行開放一個月來台人數才五百多人，僅略高於一天的開放量，足見「自由行取代團遊」的說法尚難立足。

觀光局官員則認為，這主要是受塑化劑風波及阿里山火車翻覆事件的衝擊，包括故宮等景點過度擁擠也敗壞參觀遊興。的確，交通安全、旅遊品質乃至台灣整體誠信形象，都是影響遊興的深層因素；但台灣開放陸客觀光不過三年，如果歷經短暫的曇花一現即進入了疲怠期，則不啻顯示我們的觀光軟硬體架構不堪一擊。若這些因素仍不足以解釋全部的現象，那麼陸客來台的減退，還有什麼可能的原因？

從本質而言，陸客來台從來不是一種純純粹粹的觀光活動。對陸客而言，台灣的賣點主要是建立在兩岸五十年分隔的對應關係上，由此衍生出親友的離散再重聚、民主與威權體制的對比、經濟體質與社會價值的差異等，彼此在「分而不裂」的關係中互相好奇、參照、學習與競爭。在開放觀光兩年後，陸客即取代日本成為台灣最重要的客源，原因在此。許多陸客來台，是想要親眼見證兩岸分治半世紀的各種象徵、傳說與差異，乃至體驗華人社會的另一種發展模式。因此，若把陸客來台定位為「觀光商機」，勢必因著眼於近利而產生偏差。

兩岸交流更複雜的面向是政治。這又可以分成兩方面來看：在台灣內部，因為在野黨的反對，開放陸客並不是全台同感欣然的共識；也因此，政策上要對陸客活動嚴格設限，防範脫隊、禁止自由行動、對旅行社課以重責。這不僅是對陸客的歧視，也讓台灣對觀光出現目的與手段背離的管理：既想要陸客的商機，又不給其合理的旅遊待遇。遺憾的是，政府對此矛盾毫無自覺，更遑論有何改進的機制。

此外，在兩岸政治關係上，也潛藏著陸客來台觀光的一個隱性變數。現行的兩岸政策某種程度是倚賴北京對馬政府的「善意」配合，但這也增加了行政操縱的模糊地帶。例如，據傳首批自由行旅客中有兩百人是北京所動員，不免使盛事失真；再如近期大選逼近，我方主動要求對岸政商減少來訪，以免因故波及執政黨選情，操作也顯得極不自然。相對的，不少陸客希望此時來台見識選戰交鋒，卻可能因政治考量而無法獲准。正因為外界無法窺知其間的操作，也使得對症下藥越發困難。

陸客來台有助兩岸的多面向交流和理解，這是不爭的事實；但在實務面，不論政府或業者卻都只把此事當成「商機」操作：政府誇示的是龐大觀光人潮的擴散效益，業者心動的是陸客強大的購買力。也因此，雙方重視的就是出團人數、購買金額，如何讓對方掏出荷包。至於如何提供相稱的服務，如何表現台灣的氣質，如何留下美好的印象，都難以顧及。

塑化劑風暴重創台灣的品質形象，阿里山和蘇花高的交通事故也會讓觀光客卻步，但這些都比不上來台陸客覺得「台灣人不再誠實」來得嚴重。因為他們帶回去的失望評價，將使更多人觀望不前。聽國內旅行業對同業、飯店、賣場的短視作風發出「自作孽」的感嘆，一個殺雞取卵的市場，如何會近悅遠來？又如何能經營長久？

陸客人數減少，若能換得更多自由行動、更多旅遊安全及樂趣，未嘗不是件好事。台灣人遊大陸，也經歷過「呆胞」的階段，誰希望不愉快的經驗在陸客身上重演？重要的是，陸客來台的興致，不能毀在第一線商人的唯利是圖，或者兩岸政府言不及行的操作上，這樣，觀光交流才有增進理解的意義。

Summary: In response to repeated public exhortations, DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen has finally unveiled the first plank in her “Platform for the Coming Decade.” In the section on taxes, Tsai Ing-wen has promised that if she is elected president, and the DPP wins an absolute majority in the legislature, the DPP will reduce the deficit by half in four years, and balance the budget in eight years. Tsai Ing-wen has boldly proposed fiscal reform. For this she deserves praise. But what specifically has she proposed? Can her proposal negotiate Taiwan’s populist political gauntlet, particularly the DPP’s? It will be interesting to see.

Full Text below:

In response to repeated public exhortations, DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen has finally unveiled the first plank in her “Platform for the Coming Decade.” In the section on taxes, Tsai Ing-wen has promised that if she is elected president, and the DPP wins an absolute majority in the legislature, the DPP will reduce the deficit by half in four years, and balance the budget in eight years. Tsai Ing-wen has boldly proposed fiscal reform. For this she deserves praise. But what specifically has she proposed? Can her proposal negotiate Taiwan’s populist political gauntlet, particularly the DPP’s? It will be interesting to see.

Recent opinion polls show Tsai Ing-wen’s momentum fading. Even if James Soong runs for president, and the Blue Camp falls prey to internal divisions, Tsai Ing-wen’s momentum will be insufficient. If anything, she risks marginalization. Party insiders are extraordinarily anxious. They fear Tsai Ing-wen has no idea how to run a campaign. Many people have even suggested that Tsai Ing-wen learn at the feet of Chen Shui-bian. They have urged her to adopt Ah-Bian’s “divide and conquer,” Blue vs. Green campaign methods. So far, Tsai Ing-wen has resisted the temptation. She has kept the election focused on public policy, For Taiwan’s election climate, this can be considered a small step forward.

Political candidates have a responsibility to maintain a constructive election climate. Tsai Ing-wen has finally set forth a substantive policy proposal. Now it must undergo public scrutiny.

Compared to the United States and Europe, the Republic of China is not on the verge of a financial crisis. If we go strictly by the book, the national debt has yet to exceed the statutory limit of 40% of gross domestic product. Some financial and economic experts fear that if the 13 trillion NT in hidden debt is included, the Republic of China’s national debt will reach astronomical proportions. Even more worrisome than the huge national debt is the Republic of China’s 11.9% tax rate, This is lower even than Singapore’s, famous for its low tax rate. The annual budget deficit is now 240 billion NT. Such a financial arrangement is unsustainable in the long term.

During its eight years in power, the Democratic Progressive Party increased the national debt by one trillion two hundred billion NT. Since the KMT returned to power three years ago, the national debt has increased nearly one trillion three hundred billion NT. The increase in the national debt accelerated. The 8/8 Floods and the financial tsunami reduced government revenue and increased government expenditures. The government’s frequent tax cuts have worsened the debt crisis. The problem is that whenever the issue of tax cuts comes up, both the ruling and opposition parties, which usually fight each other tooth and nail, immediately sing the exact same tune. For example, the government’s proposal that the sales tax be raised was put on indefinite hold. But the ruling and opposition parties both jumped on the business tax cuts bandwagon. They outbid each other, and abruptly cut the business tax rate from 25% to 17%.

During an interview last week, Premier Wu Den-yih lamented that the Republic of China’s tax rate is far too low. But at the same time the public wants everything other nations have to offer. They want social welfare as comprehensive as those in Scandinavia. The government can only do its best. Premier Wu understands the fiscal structure issues, but cannot carry out fiscal reforms. The ruling party is clearly not above reproach.

Tsai Ing-wen has proposed balancing the budget. Her promises must be subject to the same scrutiny. With this plank in its campaign platform, the DPP has vowed to reduce the budget deficit, But it failed to specify how. What precisely does it intend to do? Does it intend to increase taxes? Or does it intend to reduce expenditures? The DPP’s Platform for the Coming Decade has done nothing but proclaim a goal. It has said nothing about how to achieve it.

Fiscal policy proposals cannot be discussed in isolation. They must be discussed alongside government spending. The social welfare plank in the Platform for the Coming Decade will be announced on Friday. Based on past remarks by Tsai Ing-wen, one of the DPP’s highest priorities is the establishment of an extensive social welfare system. But the DPP has never had the guts to call for a tax increase. Therefore what is all this talk about defict reduction, except hot air?

In fact, the DPP Central Standing Committee has just adopted a resolution. it has decided to increase subsidies to elderly farmers 1000 dollars, It has increased the subsidy from 6000 NT per month to 7000 NT per month. This will increase the burden on the state treasury by 8.4 billion NT. Throughout the process, the DPP has never explained where it would obtain the funds. It has never considered reintegrating the subsidies for elderly farmers into the national pension system. Its proposal is pure populism, utterly bereft of fiscal discipline.

Neither the KMT nor the DPP have any qualms about issuing rubber checks to cover subsidies for elderly farmers. Tseng Chen-wei, a fiscal affairs expert says, “When it comes to taxation and fiscal affairs, there is no distinction between the ruling and opposition parties.” This is the sad truth about populist politics on Taiwan. The ruling and opposition parties understand the problem. But they have no desire to work together to solve the problem. Just the opposite. Extreme political polarization has encouraged both the ruling and opposition parties to outbid each other, to buy off voters for short term electoral advantage. In the long term of course, we will all have to pay the price.

In fact, behind Tsai Ing-wen’s proposal for a balance budget, lies the concept of intergenerational equity. Birth rates are declining. The heavy burden of debt accumulated by this generation will be borne by the next generation. Is the DPP sincere about the concept of intergenerational equity? If it is, why wait until a DPP candidate is elected president and DPP legislators constitute an absolute majority in the legislature? Shouldn’t the DPP practice what it preaches, here and now?

改掉民粹 才能解決巨額國債問題
2011-08-18 中國時報

各界千呼萬喚，民進黨總統參選人蔡英文終於推出「十年政綱」第一道菜，在財稅篇中，蔡英文承諾，只要總統勝選、國會過半，民進黨將在四年內達成赤字減半、八年達到財政平衡的目標。蔡英文勇於提出改革財政的主張，值得肯定；但是具體做法為何？能否扺擋台灣政治、尤其是民進黨的民粹傾向，都相當值得觀察。

近來蔡英文民調、聲勢下挫，即使宋楚瑜出馬、藍營內鬨，都無法拉抬蔡英文氣勢，反而出現邊緣化危機；黨內異常焦慮，擔心蔡英文不懂選舉，甚至有不少人建議蔡英文向陳水扁取經，採取扁式割裂藍綠的選舉作風。目前，蔡英文尚能抗拒這種誘惑，讓選舉停留在公共政策的討論；就台灣的選舉文化而言，可說是進了一小步。

當然，維持良好的選舉文化，是政治人物的基本道德，蔡英文終於推出實質政見，就必須接受各界的詳細檢視。

和美國、歐洲相比，台灣現階段並未面臨迫在眉睫的財政危機；就帳面上來看，國債尚未超過法定的國內生產毛額百分之四十上限。有財政學者憂心，如果加上十三兆的隱藏性債務，台灣國債可能已達天文數；不過，比巨額國債更令人擔憂的是，台灣租稅負擔率只有百分之十一點九，比低稅率的新加坡還要低，每年的預算赤字就高達二千五百億，長期來看，這樣的財政結構不可能支撐。

事實上，民進黨八年執政增加一兆二千億國債，國民黨重返執政三年來，也已增加近一兆三千億，國債加速度增加，除了八八風災、金融風暴導致政府稅收減少、支出增加外，政府頻頻減稅，更讓債務危機雪上加霜。問題是，只要談到減稅，一向鬥得你死我活的朝野政黨，馬上就有志一同；例如，政府原先調升營業稅的主張遲遲沒下文，但針對調降營所稅，朝野卻大方送禮，競相加碼，從百分之二十五，一下子就降到百分之十七。

行政院長吳敦義上周接受專訪時感嘆，台灣的稅賦負擔偏低，但每樣事都想要國際最好的，社福水準想和北歐一樣，政府只能盡量努力；由此可見，吳揆並非不了解財政結構困境，但就是無法貫徹財政改革，執政黨確有可議之處。

在這樣的背景下，蔡英文提出財政平衡的政見，同樣要接受言行是否一致的考驗。在這份政見中，民進黨雖矢言降低財政赤字，卻並未提出具體做法；究竟要增加哪些稅收、減少哪些支出，民進黨的十年政綱除了宣言式的目標外，並未具體說明項目。

事實上，財政政見絕對不可能獨立，必須和政府支出一起討論；十年政綱中的社福篇，將於周五公布，依蔡英文過去的言論，民進黨執政後仍以建構社福體系為優先目標。但民進黨一樣不敢喊加稅，如此一來，要談降低赤字，豈非緣木求魚？

事實上，民進黨中常會日前才通過決議，決定調高老農津貼一千元，從每月六千元增為七千元，國庫為此又將增加八十四億。在整個過程中，民進黨未交代財源，不考慮老農津貼回歸國民年金體制，形同只有民粹主張，完全不見財政紀律。

持平而言，有關老農津貼加碼等濫開支票做法，國民黨和民進黨一樣毫不手軟；就如同財政學者曾巨威所說，「在租稅和財政問題，我們沒有在野黨和執政黨的分別」。這是台灣民粹政治的可悲，朝野政黨並非不了解問題所在，但卻不願合作解決問題，反而因為極端對立的政治氣氛，讓朝野政黨競相加碼籠絡選民，短期也許有選舉利益，但長期大家都會受害。

事實上，蔡英文財政平衡的主張背後，有著世代公平的理念；因為這一代累積的債務，在少子化的趨勢下，下一代將背負更沉重的包袱。民進黨若要真誠的實踐世代公平的理念，不用等到「當選總統、國會過半」，現在就必須提出言行一致的政見主張。

Summary: Recently, middle-aged DPP members have repeatedly expressed reservations about Tsai Ing-wen. Former legislator Julian Kuo said Tsai Ing-wen’s cross-Strait policy is “too abstract.” Former MAC Vice Chairman You Ying-long said that an election campaign without Chen Shui-bian is “very boring.” You also criticized current party leaders, saying they failed to inspire a “sense of pride” among the people of Taiwan. Former Chen Shui-bian Office Director Chen Song-shan was even more blunt. He said Tsai Ing-wen’s “Plaftorm for the Coming Decade” is probably a “hollow political platform.”

Full Text below:

Recently, middle-aged DPP members have repeatedly expressed reservations about Tsai Ing-wen. Former legislator Julian Kuo said Tsai Ing-wen’s cross-Strait policy is “too abstract.” Former MAC Vice Chairman You Ying-long said that an election campaign without Chen Shui-bian is “very boring.” You also criticized current party leaders, saying they failed to inspire a “sense of pride” among the people of Taiwan. Former Chen Shui-bian Office Director Chen Song-shan was even more blunt. He said Tsai Ing-wen’s “Plaftorm for the Coming Decade” is probably a “hollow political platform.”

That middle-aged Green Camp supporters have expressed such doubts about Tsai Ing-wen is not surprising. In fact, those outside the Green Camp have long felt that Tsai Ing-wen is guilty of “policy ambiguity.” They voiced many of these same criticisms long ago. Now these same doubts are being voiced within the Green Camp. Now the public sees how anxious and conflicted middle-aged DPP supporters feel. Some middle-aged DPP supporters are even openly expressing “nostalgia” for Chen Shui-bian. They are clearly far more conflicted about the direction Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP are taking than the general population.

Tsai Ing-wen joined the party relatively recently, in 2004. She never participated in the street protests and violent clashes during the DPP’s wild days. She has no trouble drawing a line between herself and that period of DPP history. Therefore, in the eyes of the general public, she has a unique appeal. This chairman has been a party member for only seven years. She is about to name a mysterious person with no party affiliation as her vice presidential runnng mate. Suppose the two are lucky enough to win next year? Will the Democratic Progressive Party be hijacked by these two strangers? This is a concern shared by many within the Green Camp. Even Taiwan independence elder Koo Kuan-min objects to Tsai Ing-wen’s cross-Strait policy, saying it “lacks content.” Clearly the vacuum at the heart of Tsai Ing-wen’s political platform has many people worried. The Blue Camp has Blue Camp worries. The Green Camp has Green Camp worries.

Tsai Ing-wen’s vagueness and ambiguity is puzzling. What exactly is her problem? Is it that she “does not want to express her position?” Or is it that she simply “cannot express her position?” Is she maintaining a low profile merely to leave as much room as possible for the imagination? Or is she remaining ambiguous merely to avoid criticism and to avoid provoking a backlash inside and outside the party? If so, her lack of specificity is understandable. But perhaps her lack of specificity is merely high-profile posturing. Perhaps her campaign committee cannot think of a reasonable response? If so, her artful dodging deserves the epithet, “kong xin cai,” or “hollow at the center Tsai,” a pun on the word for water spinach. Real world evidence suggests the latter is more likely.

Over the past few days, a number of middle-aged DPP insiders have attacked Tsai Ing-wen. This phenomenon is worth pondering. Tsai Ing-wen won her party’s nomination through fierce competition. She forced the party princes and Taiwan independence elders into silence. But many party insiders were part of the student movement. They consider themselves war veterans. To win votes, the DPP is afraid to say what it stands for. They consider this intolerable. Worst of all, they have been sidelined during the campaign. They cannot hear what plays the coach is shouting. They cannot see the numbers on the green flag. Naturally they are plagued with doubts.

These middle-aged DPP supporters are expressing reservations about Tsai Ing-wen. One point must not be ignored. During their conversations they have expressed nostalgia for Chen Shui-bian. They feel Tsai Ing-wen is less able to rally the troops than Chen Shui-bian. Julian Kuo said that Tsai Ing-wen’s “policy is hazy, voters are few, and the mood is indifferent.” He said she should study “A-Bian’s Art of War,” and generate a little excitement. You Ying-long was more blunt. He said “Chen Shui-bian enabled the people of Taiwan to feel proud, very proud.” He said those who control the party machinery, but who distance themselves from Ah-Bian, are “definitely lost, confused people. They are people who are holding Taiwan back from its destiny.”

We do not know why Tsai Ing-wen has failed to win the hearts of these middle-aged DPP insiders. But You Ying-long’s remarks suggest that three years in the political wilderness has taught the DPP nothing. Chen Shui-bian was notorious for his rampant corruption and disastrous policies. How could You Ying-long possibly boast that Chen Shui-bian enabled the people of Taiwan to feel proud? He could only do so by totally blanking out Chen Shui-bian’s crimes against the people. Elections in which Chen Shui-bian ran as a candidate may have been “more interesting.” But lest we forget, Chen Shui-bian’s campaign approach was “winning is everything, therefore win by any means available.” He ignored the consequences, and the price paid by society. If DPP insiders are still waxing nostalgic over those days, what does that say about the future of our democracy?

A wave of criticism against Tsai has been followed by a wave of nostalgia for Ah-Bian. This suggests a sense of loss among these middle-aged DPP insiders. They cannot forget the glory days, when they followed Chen Shui-bian into battle. But they have also blanked out the shame and dishonor Chen Shui-bian brought upon their party. They wring their hands. They fear the DPP has lost its direction. But in their desperation they seek answers in the wrong places. In fact, the problem is not limited to middle-aged DPP insiders. This is a problem that plagues the DPP as a whole. Tsai Ing-wen’s prevarication and equivocation, also reflect this problem.

Middle-aged Green Camp supporters have reservations about Tsai Ing-wen. In fact, everyone in the DPP seeks answers to this problem. But unless they can be honest about their eight years of corruption and scandal, answers will not be forthcoming.

民進黨中生代對蔡英文的質疑
【聯合報╱社論】
2011.08.17 03:03 am

民進黨中生代最近連續對蔡英文提出質疑。前立委郭正亮認為，蔡英文的兩岸政策「太抽象」；陸委會前副主委游盈隆認為沒有陳水扁的選舉「很無趣」，並批當今黨內領導人無法帶來台灣人的「光榮感」；前扁辦主任陳淞山則直言，蔡英文的十年政綱恐將淪為「空心政見」。

綠營中生代對蔡英文發出這樣的疑問，並不奇怪；事實上，外界對蔡英文一貫保持的「政見模糊」，早提過許多批評。比較有趣的是，從這些來自綠營內部的質疑，人們也看到了民進黨中生代內心的焦慮和矛盾；尤其，當若干中生代竟開始公開「懷念」陳水扁，可見他們對蔡英文乃至民進黨走向的迷惘，比一般民眾深得多。

蔡英文二○○四年才入黨，由於不曾參加過民進黨草莽年代的激烈衝撞或街頭抗爭，她可以輕易切割民進黨的歷史沾染，也因此在一般民眾眼中有一種恍惚的魅力。然而，這位黨齡才七年的主席，又準備選擇一位神祕的無黨籍搭檔代表民進黨出征；就算兩人明年幸運打下了天下，未來民進黨會不會被這對陌生人「金蟬脫殼」，這恐怕是很多綠營人士心中的憂慮。連獨派大老辜寬敏都嫌蔡英文的兩岸政策「沒內容」，可見蔡英文政見之「空洞」確讓各方不安；只是藍營有藍營的不安，綠營有綠營的不安。

更耐人尋味的是，蔡英文的含混模糊，究竟是「不願說」、「無法說」，或者是根本「說不出來」？如果她的低調曖昧，目的是在保持一個比較大的想像空間，避免過度具體的主張反而引發黨內外的批評及反彈，或許還能理解。但如果她裝腔作勢的抽象高調，其實只是因為自己和團隊找不到合理與正當的對策；那麼，她的造作閃躲，恐怕就是名副其實的「空心菜」了。就現實觀察，後者的可能性似乎還高一些。

幾日內，連續多名黨內中生代向蔡英文發難，是值得玩味的現象。蔡英文經激烈的提名爭逐勝出，迫使民進黨「天王」和「大老」的一代喪失了發言資格；但不少學運世代出身、且自認有過戰功的中生代，卻不能忍受民進黨為了選舉竟扭曲到連政策都不敢說清楚。尤其，他們在選戰中被推到邊緣位置，聽不到主帥營帳呼喊的是什麼口令，看不清綠旗上打的是什麼字號，當然有滿腹疑問要發。

在觀察這些中生代質疑蔡英文時，不可忽略的一點是，他們在言談中流露出來的對陳水扁的懷念，包括對蔡英文造勢能力遠不及阿扁的擔心。郭正亮說，蔡英文「政策霧濛濛，選民稀落落，選戰冷颼颼」，應借鏡「阿扁兵法」炒熱選情。游盈隆的說法更露骨，他聲稱「阿扁讓身為台灣人感到很光榮、很驕傲」，還說那些掌握黨機器卻切割阿扁的人，「絕對是迷惘、糊塗的人，是耽誤台灣前途的人」。

我們不知道蔡英文為何抓不住這些黨內中生代的心，但游盈隆的說法，似顯示三年多的政黨輪替對民進黨沒產生任何警惕作用。否則，阿扁的貪腐誤國惡名舉世皆知，游盈隆怎還能說出阿扁讓台灣人感到驕傲的話來？的確，有陳水扁的選舉會比較「有趣」；但別忘了，阿扁的渾身解數，都是建立在「只求勝選、不擇手段」的前提上，也因而不顧後果、不計社會代價。如果今天還在追思緬懷那樣的政治氛圍，台灣的民主如何會有進境？

隨著這股「批蔡」潮而湧至的「懷扁」風，反映的是民進黨一批中生代的嚴重失落感。他們不能忘情自己追隨陳水扁征戰的榮光，卻略過了阿扁給民進黨帶來的可恥和不名譽；他們掛慮著民進黨可能失去了方向，但眼光卻是在錯誤的舊日中尋找答案。這其實不止是綠營中生代的問題，恐怕也是整個民進黨的逃避與徬徨情結；而蔡英文的支吾曖昧，亦是反映了其中的一隅。

綠營中生代對蔡英文的質疑，其實是整個民進黨要共同回答的事。但如果不能誠實面對執政八年的腐敗和醜陋，誰又能幫他們找到答案？

Summary: Supreme Court Judge Hsiao Yang-kui’s son was involved in hit and run accident. Hsiao was suspended for six months, then applied for reinstatement. At the urging of the Judicial Yuan, he was reinstated but also forced to retire. If a judge is found guilty of exerting undue influence, he may no longer preside over court cases. Society considers this necessary, and so it must be. Hsiao Yang-kui inititally sought reinstatement in order to return to his job. But he was forced into retirement by public pressure.

Full Text below:

Supreme Court Judge Hsiao Yang-kui’s son was involved in hit and run accident. Hsiao was suspended for six months, then applied for reinstatement. At the urging of the Judicial Yuan, he was reinstated but also forced to retire. If a judge is found guilty of exerting undue influence, he may no longer preside over court cases. Society considers this necessary, and so it must be. Hsiao Yang-kui inititally sought reinstatement in order to return to his job. But he was forced into retirement by public pressure.

Undue influence undermines justice. For the credibility of the court system, it is lethal. Historically, only three categories of people have been able to influence the court system. They are those who wield political influence, those who wield administrative authority, and judges, prosecutors, and other court system insiders.

Take those who wield political influence. The most famous example occurred in 1994. Lin Ping-kun, a Member of the Legislature, was a suspect in the China Petroleum wastewater scandal. KMT Secretary-General Hsu Shui-teh telephoned the President of the Taipei District Court, Hu Chih-chung. He asked Hu to delay announcement of the verdict, and allow additional time for deliberation. He even joked that the courts were run by the KMT.

During the 1990s, Tainan District Court Judge Hsieh Shuo-jung, going strictly by the book, submitted the verdict for the Tainan County Nan Kunshen Dai Tianfu slander case to another judge for review. President Wang Hsing-jen then “communicated” with Hsieh Shuo-jung. Hsieh secretly recorded their conversation, including Wang’s remark, “Why is the sentence so harsh?” Once the truth emerged, the public was outraged. The President of the Judicial Yuan transferred Wang to a court in another jurisdiction. The system by which other judges would review the verdict before it was announced was subsequently abolished.

As democracy matures, those able to exert political influence and wield administrative authority find themselves less able to influence the court system. Ironically, officials within the court system have come to consider the lobbying of court system officials as “no big deal.” Hsiao Yang-kui exerted undue influence on behalf of his son. He remained on suspension until he qualified for reinstatement. From this we can see the implicit standards officials within the court system hold, and how remote their notion of justice is from that of the public.

Hsiao Yang-kui feared that his son, who was studying law, would end up with a criminal record, that he would be washed out during the oral examination stage. Hsiao exerted undue influence in the hope of obtaining a not guilty verdict. His efforts led to a first instance guilty verdict with a suspended sentence. But Hsiao was not satisfied. He made another attempt during the second instance trial. He was determined to get a not guilty verdict. Hsiao’s conduct revealed his implicit attitudes. As Hsiao saw it, he was, after all, not guilty of corruption. What father wouldn’t do everything in his power to protect his own child? What’s wrong with Hsiao putting in a good word for his son? Judges who exerted undue influence in the past received a slap on the wrist. Others who exerted undue influence received nothing more than a demerit. So what if Hsiao was forced to retire. He was disciplined for exerting undue influence on behalf of his son, nothing more.

These are the implicit attitudes of officials within judicial circles. Their attitudes are utterly incomprehensible to those outside judicial circles. Hsiao is implicitly inculcating such attitudes in his own son. He is characterizing the exertion of undue influence as “removing obstacles.” He has put his selfish interests above the interests of justice. He has set the worst possible example. Whether a judge is corrupt is hardly the standard by which judicial conduct should be evaluated. Not being corrupt hardly merits a medal. Not being corrupt does not confer the right to grant special treatment to other court system insiders. A Supreme Court judgeship is a high honor and a weighty responsibility. How can we allow it to become synonymous with the exertion of undue influence in first and second instance court cases?

In the past, the punishment for undue influence was a slap on the wrist. But that was then. This is now. Today that cannot be our standard of reference. The exertion of undue influence constitues a fundamental perversion of justice. Judges who have knowingly exerted undue influence, must step down. There is nothing more to discuss. Even political parties and executive branch officials may not exert undue influence on the court system. How can judges be permitted to cite personal relationships as a justification for undue influence and backroom deals?

What defendant is not someone’s son or daughter? Most people count themselves lucky if they can find a competent lawyer, and have their case adjudicated by a fair-minded judge. Officials within the court system cover up for their fellows, yet act as if they have done nothing wrong. What kind of attitude is that?

Hsiao Yang-kui had the temerity to thumb his nose at the public, and to ignore the law. He dared to do so because the civil service disciplinary committee merely imposed a six month suspension, before reinstating him as a judge. Fellow judges, particularly judges his age, overtly or covertly covered up for him. They argued that undue influence exerted on behalf of one’s own child did not warrant a major demerit. This enabled Hsiao to evince utter contempt for public sentiment.

This climate of hypocrisy dulled their sense of the evil of undue influence. It diminished court system officials’ sense of shame. It frittered away the victories won by court system officials along the way. These court system officials rid the court system of undue influence exerted by those with political influence and administrative authority, only to have the court system become the private instrument of decadent judges. These decadent judges trample over the Judges Law, whose purpose is to safeguard judicial independence. The Judges Law, which liberated judges from the constraints of the civil service system, now enables them to cover up each others’ crimes.

When the Supreme Court addressed the Hsiao Yang-kui undue influence case, it cited an ancient proverb, to rally public sentiment. It urged the public not to “yield to human passions, give free reign to joy and anger, indulge in cronyism, fear bold and heroic gestures, feel anxiety about disasters.” It urged the public to unite to establish a system of justice worthy of emulation. It said that such a system would not happen by itself. It would have to be created incrementally, through case law, and that reinstating Hsiao Yang-kui would be the ideal beginning.

A Supreme Court judge decided to exert undue influence. It matter not for whom it was done. It was a perversion of justice. If the court system wants public respect, judges must be impartial guardians of justice. No one may be permitted to exert undue influence on the court system. If Hsiao Yang-kui cannot abide by the law, if his fellow judges persist in covering for him, then the entire system has degenerated. In which case, how can anyone still believe in it? The courts must not be operated by political parties. Nor can the courts become judges’ private fiefdom. Judges must never forget that the source of their judical authority is the public. There is no room for private interests.

蕭仰歸惜未在第一時間申請退休
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.08.16

最高法院法官蕭仰歸為兒子的肇事逃逸案關說，休職半年期滿依法申請復職，在司法院極力勸說下，終於以復職同時退休收場。法官關說，就該離開審判工作的社會通念價值，於焉實現；可惜的是，蕭仰歸的原意在復職續任，退休則是出於輿論壓力。

關說，是破壞公平、司法公信的殺手。歷來可以輕易穿透司法的關說，不外乎三大力量，政治力關說、行政力關說，以及法官、檢察官等自己人的關說。

政治力關說，最有名的是八十三年間，國民黨秘書長許水德為涉入中油廢水弊案的立委林炳坤，打電話給台北地方法院院長胡致中，希望案子不要馬上宣判，能再開辯論，以致法院被譏為是國民黨開的。

也是八十年間，台南地方法院法官謝說容，依規定在宣判前將台南縣南鯤鯓代天府謗誹糾紛案判決書送閱，院長王興仁即找謝法官「溝通」，謝偷偷錄音，錄到王說「怎麼判這麼重」；此事爆出後，社會譁然。司法院後來將王調到其他法院，候補法官事前送閱判決書的制度更因此廢止。

隨著民主政治的成熟，政黨關說、行政關說勢力不再；但奇怪的是，司法界自己人的關說，反而被司法人認為「沒什麼」。從蕭仰歸為子關說案發生、休職到申請復職過程，就可看出司法界所呈現的「潛價值」，與民間實為天差地別。

蕭仰歸是因擔心學法的兒子留下前科，將來在口試中被刷掉，乃以關說「拚無罪」，關說完一審，有罪但得緩刑，猶不滿意，再試二審，非達無罪目的不可。支撐蕭的「潛價值」包括：蕭又沒有貪瀆，哪個父親不護子，蕭為兒子說一下情，有什麼關係；過去司法官關說，罰得都不重，為別人關說，都只記過，蕭為兒子受休職懲戒，足矣。

這些司法圈內的潛價值，實難見容於司法圈外：蕭不啻為教育兒子以關說「清除障礙」，將個人的前途價值，凌駕於司法公義之上，作了最壞的示範。其實，不貪瀆是法官應備的基本操守，並非榮譽勳章或「圖利」自己人的免死金牌；最高法院法官的名銜隆重，怎可輕賤成為個案穿梭一、二審的招牌？

對於關說，過去罰得輕，有時代背景之故，不應作為如今處罰的參考值。關說的行為破壞了司法公正的基本面，法官明知故犯，理應退場，無可商量。連政黨、行政力都不能關說司法，憑什麼法官獨可以人情為藉口，進行暗室交易？

更何況，哪一個被告不是父母親的子女；一般人能夠找到好律師，拜拜祈求遇到好法官，就算福氣；司法人幫司法人拚無罪，卻理直氣壯，這是那門子的「福利」？

蕭仰歸膽敢無憚社會觀感，恃法而行，因先有公務員懲戒委員會僅處以休職，給蕭復職之權，後有同儕法官，尤其是同齡法官或明或暗的相挺。為子關說非大過的鄉愿人情，讓蕭可以無視外界指責的風雨。

但也正是此種鄉愿氣候，弱化了關說之惡，削去司法人的恥感，更糟蹋了司法一路以來，好不容易才擺脫政治力、行政力的成果，致司法淪為法官相護的私人工具，踐踏「法官法」為維護審判獨立，將法官抽離於公務員系統之外的用心。

最高法院處理蕭仰歸關說案時，曾引古訓勉勵大家，不要「徇人情、任喜怒、黨親昵、畏豪雄、顧禍害」，共同形塑更理想的司法典範。典範不會自然生成，必須從個案實踐累積，那麼，蕭仰歸復職案就是最好的開始。

最高法院法官從起心動念到進行關說，無論為誰，都已褻瀆司法。司法要讓人瞧得起，法官必須戒慎恐懼地共同守護公正的信念，誰都不能關說。如果蕭仰歸做不到，同儕法官還要呵護容忍，形同集體淪落，則誰還敢相信司法？法院不是政黨開的，當然也不是法官可以妄自據地為王的自家大院；法官別忘了審判權力的源泉是來自公眾的託付，絕對沒有私用的空間。

Summary: The truth has finally emerged. James Soong has gradually revealed his full agenda. One. Consider the presidential election. His key objective is to topple Ma Ying-jeou. He is even willing to replace him with Tsai Ing-wen. Two. Consider the legislative elections. His key objective is to increase the number of seats held by the DPP. This will increase the People First Party’s chances of becoming the “swing vote.”

Full Text below:

The truth has finally emerged. James Soong has gradually revealed his full agenda. One. Consider the presidential election. His key objective is to topple Ma Ying-jeou. He is even willing to replace him with Tsai Ing-wen. Two. Consider the legislative elections. His key objective is to increase the number of seats held by the DPP. This will increase the People First Party’s chances of becoming the “swing vote.”

Consider the presidential election. James Soong has no chance of replacing Ma Ying-jeou. Even if Ma Ying-jeou is toppled as a result of James Soong’s election bid, Tsai Ing-wen would become president, not James Soong. Consider the legislative elections. The People First Party campaign would substantially reduce the number of seats held by the KMT, and substantially increase in the number of seats held by the DPP. The PFP is unlikely to win many seats for itself. Now consider the following.

James Soong is out to get Ma Ying-jeou, plain and simple. He feels slighted and neglected. As a result, he is angry with Ma, and seeks revenge. In order to disguise Soong’s personal vendetta, and to give it a veneer of rationality, the Soong camp is denouncing Ma, accusing him of “wreakng havoc upon the nation.” It is disguising its personal vendetta as a quest for justice. Soong has been sniping at Ma relentlessly. He insists that Taiwan’s most serious problem is a lack of “leadership.” He says Ma Ying-jeou lacks the vision required by a commander in chief. He says “Ma is even worse than the Taiwan Affairs Office,” Every word Soong utters suggests that “He can be replaced.” Soong has urged immediate changes to the presidential election rules. To win, a candidate must win by an absolute majority. Soong is implying that he could then enter the race without fear that he would become a “spoiler.” Most amusing of all is Soong’s pretense of selflessness. He even urged Su Tseng-chang to run. That way both candidates could pursue their own agendas. In his quest for the presidency, James Soong has thought of everything. Unfortunately his quest for the presidency, is either the ravings of a lunatic or mere wishful thinking.

Consider the legislative elections. Consider the People First Party’s first wave of nominations. Consider its alleged future waves of nominations. As we have seen, James Soong’s key objective is to increase the number of Democratic Progressive Party legislators. The first wave of PFP nominations clearly targeted districts in which the Blue Camp is weak, or in which its leads only by the slimmest of margins. The People First Party insists on nominating candidates to these districts. It clearly wants the DPP to win. Because if the PFP merely nominates a few candidates to districts where the Blue Camp commands a huge advantage, it will merely replace a few KMT candidates. It will merely replace a few KMT legislative seats. But the PFP is fielding candidates in districts where the going is tough for the Blue Camp. That is the only way Soong can increase the number of DPP seats. That is the way he can increase the chances of the People First Party commanding the “swing vote.” This is James Soong’s underhanded and ruthless strategy vis a vis the legislative elections.

As noted above, suppose James Soong’s key goal is to topple Ma and replace him as president. Unless he is elected president, he has not fulfilled this ambition. But James Soong stands no chance of being elected president. He can hardly acknowledge that “The real purpose behind my presidential bid is to ensure a Tsai Ing-wen victory.”

But if Soong is not running for president, that casts doubt on the PFP’s bid for legislative seats. One. Suppose the People First Party is nominating legislative candidates left and right, but Soong does not run for president. Soong will not replace Ma as president. At most, Tsai will replace Ma as president. Fielding legislative candidates will not help Soong topple Ma and take his place. Two. Suppose the People First Party nominates legislative candidates left and right. Suppose it increases the number of DPP seats in the legislature, but fails to improve election prospects for the PFP. The Blue Camp will lose. The Green Camp will receive a windfall. The Orange Camp will gain nothing. The People First Party will not benefit. The consequences will harm the entire nation. What would be the point?

James Soong can do little good, but he can inflict much harm. He must decide whether he wishes to play a destructive or constructive role during this election. After all, the KMT and Ma Ying-jeou are evenly matched against the DPP and Tsai Ing-wen. James Soong may hate Ma. He may oppose Ma. he may long to topple Ma. But if he cannot replace Ma after toppling him, he must explain himself. The alternatives are the KMT and Ma Ying-jeou and the DPP and Tsai Ing-wen. So why does he insist on toppling the KMT and Ma Ying-jeou, thereby ensuring a victory for Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP? Is James Soong’s real purpose to topple Ma and ensure a victory for Tsai?

In sum, if Soong is running for president in order to topple Ma and replace him, then his indiscriminate legislative nominations have some justification, They represent an attempt to topple the Ma administration as a whole. But what if James Soong does not intend to run for president? What if he is merely using PFP legislative bids to undermine the Blue Camp and benefit the Green Camp, merely out of spite, and does not even benefit the Orange Camp? What if he cannot topple Ma and replace him as president? What if society pays the price for his divisive tactics? If Soong does not run for president, he must explain himself. Why the indiscriminate legislative nominations, clearly intended to ensure a DPP victory? James Soong may be a willing Green Camp tool. He may be willing to topple Ma and divide the Blue Camp, But People First Party legislative candidates need not become James Soong’s tools, merely so that he may vent his spleen against Ma Ying-jeou.

The election has begun. On the one hand, James Soong, who is not running for president, has latched onto Ma Ying-jeou and is haranguing him on a daily basis. On the other hand, the PFP is fielding legislative candidates, thereby ensuring DPP victories. What an absurd scenario. James Soong is riding a tiger. He cannot get off. But his followers, PFP legislative candidates, can refuse to be his tools.

宋若不選總統，為何立委烽火提名？
【聯合報╱社論】 2011.08.15

圖窮匕現，宋楚瑜的心計，透過他累積的表述，已經完整顯露：一、在總統選舉中，他的核心目標是想拉下馬英九，即使用蔡英文拉下馬英九亦不違所願；二、在立委選舉中，他的手段則是以全力設法增加民進黨的當選名額為主要目標，俾相對增加親民黨成為「關鍵少數」的機率。

就總統選舉言，宋楚瑜絕無取代馬英九的可能性，馬英九即使因宋參選而被拉下，當選的也一定是蔡英文，而非宋楚瑜；就立委選舉言，則親民黨最大的戰果也將是大幅拉下國民黨的席位，相對即大幅增加了民進黨的名額，但親民黨能當選的席次極低。以下，進一步析論：

宋楚瑜完全是衝著馬英九而來的。他因自認受馬冷落漠視，而爆發反馬仇馬的報復怒火；接著，為了掩飾及合理化此種私怨，宋營斥馬為「禍國殃民」，將私仇轉為公義。日來，宋楚瑜不斷批馬，直指台灣最嚴重的問題就是「領導」，又稱馬英九無三軍統帥的見識，再指「馬辦不如台辦」，字字句句皆是「彼可取而代之」；宋又主張，應當立即將總統選舉改為「絕對多數制」，意謂如此他參選即無罣礙。最令人發噱的是：宋為表示無私，還要蘇貞昌也來參選總統，這樣就能各遂所願。宋楚瑜將自己的總統之路規劃至如此面面俱到的地步，若不是瘋言囈語，亦是太過一廂情願！

再談立委選舉。從親民黨首波提名名單，及聲稱仍將多波提名，就可看出，宋楚瑜的首要目標是要增加民進黨當選立委的名額；首波提名在許多藍營明明已居劣勢或領先極微的地區，親民黨也硬要提名，即擺明了一定要拱民進黨當選的態勢。因為，親民黨若只在少數幾個藍軍具巨幅優勢的地區提名，頂多只能取代國民黨，減少國民黨的立委席次而已；但唯有在藍軍艱困地區「遍地烽火」地大量提名，才能增加民進黨的席位，俾相對增加親民黨成為「關鍵少數」的機率。這就是宋楚瑜在立委選舉既毒又狠的大戰略。

據上所論，宋楚瑜若以「倒馬而取代之」為核心目標，則除非他當選總統，不能遂此心志；但宋楚瑜又絕無當選總統的可能性，他總不能以「我參選總統是要蔡英文當選」向社會交代吧？

然而，宋若不參選總統，則其立委選舉的布局即殊堪質疑：一、親民黨若僅「烽火提名」立委，但宋楚瑜不選總統，則一定不會導致「宋上馬下」的結果，頂多造成「馬下蔡上」；因此，以參選立委來「倒馬扶宋」，這顯然是文不對題。二、親民黨參選立委，倘若是「烽火提名」，所追求的是「增加民進黨席次的效果」大於「親民黨當選的效果」，亦即損藍、利綠、橘又吃不到，則親民黨未獲其利，整個政局卻將承負其後果，試問所為何來？

宋楚瑜絕無可能跳脫「成事不足，敗事有餘」的侷限；他必須決定，是否要在這場選舉中，扮演一個對大局只有「破壞性」而全無「建設性」的角色。畢竟，這是一場「國民黨馬英九」及「民進黨蔡英文」兩黨雙英相爭的五五波惡戰；宋楚瑜可以仇馬反馬倒馬，但若他自己不可能倒馬取而代之，則他必須解釋，為何在「國民黨馬英九」與「民進黨蔡英文」的相對選擇中，他一定要拉垮國民黨及馬英九，而協助保送民進黨及蔡英文？難道倒馬挺蔡竟是宋楚瑜的核心戰略目標？

總之，宋若親自參選總統，以「馬下宋上」為目標，則其「烽火提名」的立委布局即具合理正當性，反正就是要拉垮馬政權罷了！但若宋楚瑜不參選總統，卻在立委選舉中操弄「損藍、利綠，橘吃不到」的報復手段，這其實無法實現「倒馬扶宋／馬下宋上」的目標，反而令社會承受撕裂的後果。因而，宋若不參選總統，他就必須解釋為何要在立委選舉「烽火提名」，擺明了以保送民進黨為主要目標？即使宋楚瑜自甘被綠營利用為倒馬、撕裂藍的工具，親民黨欲參選立委者也不一定要自甘淪為宋楚瑜洩忿發飆的工具。

試想：選戰開火後，倘若一方面看到不參選總統的宋楚瑜每天盯著馬英九開罵，另一方面又看到親民黨在立委選區中擺明了以保送民進黨當選為主要任務，這是如何荒謬怪誕的場景？宋楚瑜已騎虎難下，但他的立委選舉追隨者可以選擇不被利用。

Summary: Political appointees on Taiwan have long been subject to political interference and the bureaucratization of the administrative process. Sean Chen, Lee Hong-yuan, and others, represent the emergence of a new breed of political appointee, Their professionalism and courage have provided the cabinet with new drive. The cabinet needs more courageous and prudent cabinet officials, We hope such people will be given more room to develop.

Full Text below:

Under Vice Premier Sean Chen’s leadership, yesterday government bonds caught fire. Using a paltry 10 billion NT, Chen boosted the index 400 points. This lifted Taiwan stocks out of the global recession. The timing, technique, and results, prove that his move was a success, Sean Chen’s reputation for expertise and professionalism is well-deserved.

Heavy handed government intervention has been much too common on Taiwan. Shrewdly capable political appointees such as Sean Chen are rare. Much more common are fence-sitters and Yes Men. Power has shifted back and forth between the Blue Camp and the Green Camp. During the Chen Shui-bian era, cabinet reshuffles were routine. Political appointees were treated like domestics. Political affiliation trumped all. Professionalism was swept away. The Ma administration was unimaginative in its political appointments. It could not decide whether to trust technocrats or academics. Cabinet members were often unclear about the administration’s policy direction. Sean Chen however, was a cabinet official capable of both offense and defense. A political appointee able to assume responsibility during a crisis is rare indeed.

Compared to other financial and economic experts in the cabinet, Sean Chen and Central Bank President Perng Huai-nan are more trusted by the public. They are skilled professionals who respect the line between public and private, and who have an easy manner about them. Their reputations are well deserved and were earned over time. Therefore, when they are ordered into battle during a crisis, they have a calming effect. Take the recent stock market crash for example, The TAIEX was dragged down by international panic inspired by the US debt crisis. Taiwan’s economic fundamentals are not a problem. But people felt the heat. President Ma’s repeated reassurances rang hollow. Sean Chen used government bonds as leverage. He called on banks and corporations holding stocks to support the market. With minimal effort, he stopped the bleeding, He bolstered the confidence of 8 million investors.

The government intervenes in the stock market from time to time, But an intervention as adroit as this is rare. Consider Sean Chen’s approach. He did not bang the drums. He did not threaten businesses. He did not disseminate superfluous public propaganda. He quietly noted the underlying trend, He locked onto his target. He waited for the opportunity to strike, Sure enough, his aim was true, He prevented foreign vultures from swooping in. Amidst this international disaster, a shrewd and courageous political appointee successfully dodged a stock market crisis, He did not even need to make use of the national security funds. He has earned our respect.

Besides Sean Chen, a few other political appointees have caught the public eye. The most notable example, is Lee Hong-yuan, who joined the cabinet this spring as Chairman of the Council of Public Works. Immediately upon taking office, he reviewed and canceled unnecessary public construction. He canceled 50 boondoggles in two months. These projects were destined for perpetually unoccupied “Mosquito Hall” status. In an even more proactive move, he launched a plan to remedy land subsidence in the Yunlin and Chaiyi regions. He intends to seal one thousand wells within the decade, in order to prevent the continued subsidence of the high-speed railway, and for that matter, the entire western half of the island.

Interestingly enough, work will conclude on New Year’s Day next year. Lee Hong-yuan was originally a fill-in. But for this very reason, he has been able to make full use of his water resources and engineering expertise, He has given new meaning to the job description. Unlike past chairmen, he need fuss over the details or quality of public works. Instead, he can view these projects from a more elevated perspective, and reconsider their necessity, He can confront the land management crisis from the perspective of long term sustainability. The pressure of his short term, has paradoxically enabled him to transcend the constraints of his position. It has enabled him to tackle more urgent problems that confront the nation.

Bureaucratic inertia is inherent in the government’s division of labor. Normally, no government agency would take the initiative to highlight problems such as “mosquito halls” and regional subsidence, let alone propose improvements. Normally, by the time a problem becomes known, it is invariably too late. Lee Hong-yuan took the initiative to study the issue. He even provided solutions to each problem. Such courageous political appointees have established a new paradigm. They have provided the cabinet with forward momentum. Lee Hong-yuan’s term may be over in only 275 days. But the contribution he has made far exceeds those who merely sit at their desk reviewing documents.

The Executive Yuan has been discussing the tax burden and 12-year compulsory education. Cabinet members have offered different views on these subjects. This is a good sign. From one perspective, the agencies in charge must be able to withstand internal challenges. Only then can they suggest better policies to the public. From another perspective, cabinet members with different professional backgrounds challenging each other, enables them to be less egocentric in their thinking, to learn from each and to think more innovatively. Stirring things up within the cabinet may help reinvigorate it, and win it greater public approval. Premier Wu should encourage these development. He must not deliberately suppress them.

Political appointees on Taiwan have long been subject to political interference and the bureaucratization of the administrative process. Sean Chen, Lee Hong-yuan, and others, represent the emergence of a new breed of political appointee, Their professionalism and courage have provided the cabinet with new drive. The cabinet needs more courageous and prudent cabinet officials, We hope such people will be given more room to develop.

內閣新典型：從陳?到李鴻源
【聯合報╱社論】
2011.08.12 03:16 am

在副閣揆陳?領軍下，政府基金前天適時護盤點火，僅用了區區一百億元的彈藥，即拉升了四百多點指數，使台股率先擺脫國際盤的大崩跌泥淖。從時機、手法和成效看，這都是一次成功的出擊，證明陳?的專業和穩健名不虛傳。

在政治力的過度干預下，多年來，台灣已不容易看到精明幹練又能發揮所長的政務官；大家更常見的，是觀風望向、聽命行事的閣員，在藍綠的潮起潮落中浮沉。陳水扁時代，把內閣改組當成家常便飯，政務官被當成家臣使喚，政治掛帥，專業毀棄。馬政府的用人，在技術官僚與學者之間游移，開創性不強，有些閣員有時連政策都說不清楚；也因此，像陳?這樣能攻能守、臨危堪擔當大任的政務官，實屬難得。

相對於其他財經閣員，陳?和央行總裁彭淮南之所以深受社會信任，主要是他們不僅嫺熟專業，且公私分明，行事穩健圓熟，累積了長期口碑。因此，他們在緊要關頭受命上陣，就能發揮安定人心的作用。以這次股災為例，台股是遭美債引發的國際恐慌所累，並非經濟基本面出了問題；但當火燒眉毛，馬總統的信心喊話已告失靈。陳?以政府基金為槓桿，號召銀行團及企業庫藏股共同護盤，用最小的力氣，止住台股的失血，也穩住了八百萬股民的信心。

政府干預股市時有所聞，但手法像這次這麼乾淨俐落，卻是罕見。觀察陳?的作法，他沒有敲鑼打鼓，沒有向企業威逼利誘，也不向民眾作無謂的喊話；他只是默默觀察盤勢，鎖定目標，伺機發動，果然彈無虛發，也阻止了外資禿鷹趁亂掠奪。在這場國際性的災難中，一個政務官憑其智勇成功征服了股災，甚至未動用到國安基金，值得喝采。

除了陳?，最近人們也看到了一些不一樣的政務官身影。最顯著的例子，是今年春天才加入內閣行列的李鴻源。李鴻源的職務是公共工程會主委，但他一上任，率先執行的任務，卻是檢視並淘汰不必要的公共建設，兩個月即擋下五十多件可能成為「蚊子館」的建設案。他更主動出擊，對雲嘉地層下陷的問題提出搶救計劃，要在十年內封掉千口井，以阻止高鐵乃至整個西部繼續沉陷。

有趣的是，工程會明年元旦即將裁撤，李鴻源入閣原屬過渡；但也正因為如此，他妥善利用自己的水利與工程專才，為這個角色注入截然不同的意義。他不像以往的主委那樣關注公共工程的細節或品質，而以更高的視野去反省這些工程的必要性，同時以永續經營的觀點來面對國土的危機。任期的迫促，反而激發他跨出職務的局限，主動迎戰國家更急切的問題。

試想，若依政府體制的慣性分工，蚊子館的誕生、區域性的地層下陷等問題，幾乎不會有任何單位願主動指出問題，遑論提議改善；俟問題爆發，總是已經太遲。李鴻源不僅主動探討問題，更逐一提供解決對策；如此勇於任事的政務官，除締造了一種新的典型，也為內閣提供了前進的動力。李鴻源的任期雖只有兩百七十多天，但他留下的貢獻，絕對比那些只坐在辦公室批公文的閣員多。

最近，行政院會在討論租稅負擔及十二年國教方案時，都出現了閣員不同意見的交鋒，這是相當可喜的現象。從一方面看，主管部會要禁得起內部的挑戰，才可能向人民提出更完善的政策；從另一方面看，不同專業的閣員相互質疑、切磋，有助於活化決策思維，祛除本位主義。內閣這樣的激盪效應，其實比起死氣沉沉的虛假和諧更能贏得社會迴響；吳揆應該多加鼓勵，而不必刻意抑制。

在台灣政務官因政治干預而走向「行政官僚化」後，如今陳?和李鴻源等新類型政務官的出現，以專業和膽識為內閣注入了新的動力。內閣需要更多這樣有勇有謀的閣員，也期待這樣的人才得到更大的發揮空間。