Commemorate 228: But What are We Commemorating?

Commemorate 228: But What are We Commemorating?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 27, 2009

It’s 228 again, i.e., February 28, the anniversary of the 228 Incident of 1947. This is the Ma administration’s first 228. President Ma has ordered the 228 Foundation’s 1.5 billion NT budget unfrozen, and plans drawn up for a national grade memorial hall.

Ma Ying-jeou feels bound by a deep sense of “original sin.” His heartfelt desire to admit wrongdoing and apologize for 228 is palpable. Alas, he has never offered a balanced and objective assessment of 228. Meanwhile the Green Camp’s calculated hate-mongering has ripped society apart. It has absolutely no intention of getting to the truth of the 228 Incident.

The 228 Incident is a political Gordian Knot, primarily because the truth has not been established. The ruling and opposition parties have remained bound by a variety of false and discredited explanations. Each side has its own prejudices. Each maintains its own position. Without a truthful explanation of 228, how can we commemorate 228?

Let’s examine several explanations for the 228 Incident. One. The KMT’s explanation. Initially the KMT considered 228 taboo. The KMT’s explanation has been revised repeatedly. For example, Chinese Communists and Taiwan Communists took part in the 228 Incident, They were the best organized and most effective fighting force. But the KMT considered this part of the historical record taboo. It was afraid to lump Chinese Communists and Taiwan Communists together with the people of Taiwan. Over the past two decades, Lee Teng-hui tried to reestablish the historical facts. But because he himself was a part of the reunification vs. independence struggle, he too failed to lead the public out of this spiritual prison. Now Ma Ying-jeou is in office. He is the product of 228 reconciliation. But as mentioned earlier, although Ma earnestly seeks reconciliation, he lacks the ability to get at the truth.

Two. Beijing’s explanation. From the beginning Beijing has viewed the 228 Incident as an extension of the civil war between the KMT and the CCP. It claims that mainland Chinese Communists and Taiwan Communists stood united, and constituted the main force of the 228 resistance army. Beijing commemorated the 228 Incident each year. Only when it was recast as an “ethnic” struggle over reunification vs. independence, did Beijing’s commemoration of the event become more low-keyed, or even cease.

Three. The “228 Victim’s Families” explanation. The death of their relatives cut them to the quick. It is natural for them to feel wronged and to want revenge. Over the past 60 years some have found peace. But others remain caught up in their grief. This has led to a variety of explanations. Today these rank among the chief explanations for 228.

Four. The “375 Landlords and Japanese Imperial Subjects” explanation. Workers’ and peasants’ class consciousness during Japanese occupation was one of the pillars of the opposition movement. Two large organizations, the Cultural Association and the Farmers Cooperative were socialist oriented. Their protests were an important part of the 228 incident. The KMT government disappointed the public. Elderly sharecroppers experienced hardship and anxiety. Taiwan Retrocession failed to imbue the public with a feeling of genuine citizenship. Ironically, over the past several decades, most of the political spin on the 228 Incident has been orchestrated by descendants of 375 landlords and Japanese Imperial Subjects. They have exploited resentments arising from 228 in order to exact revenge on behalf of 375 landlords and Japanese Imperial Subjects. How can their explanations of 228 not lead to distortions of the truth?

The most influential explanation of the incident, and also the most distorted explanation, is the Taiwan Independence or DPP explanation. This explanation asserts that the 228 Incident was an anti-KMT movement, an anti-mainlander movement, an anti-China movement, therefore it is a Taiwan independence movement. It has linked Taiwan independence to the 228 Incident. From an historical and factual perspective, this “explanation” is sheer fabrication. It has no basis in reality. In 1947, when the 228 Incident erupted, Taiwan independence was not even an issue. Commemoration of the 228 Incident today hardly requires advocacy of Taiwan independence. One. This distorted explanation of the historical reality of 228 eradicates or downplays the role of the Chinese Communists in 228. It drops the civil war between the KMT and CCP down the memory hole. Two. The Taiwan independence movement denies the Chinese Communists any role in the 228 Incident. It blanks out the class consciousness of workers and peasants during the 228 Incident. Descendants of 375 landlords and Japanese Imperial Subjects would later arrogate to themselves the right to interpret the 228 Incident. This is why to this day the Democratic Progressive Party remains a phony champion of socialism.

The moral of the 228 Incident is that incompetent rule harms the people. It forces them to rebel. But the specific reasons are complex and varied. Naturally our analysis of the various explanations is much too sketchy. Besides, more explanations of 228 have been offered. We merely wish to stress that each explanation is custom tailored, hence defective. That is why we must seek a comprehensive explanation, a true explanation. To ask people to commemorate 228 in the absence of a true explanation, a full explanation, is to ask people to kowtow before false idols fabricated by political charlatans.

In commemorating 228, we must reject the notion that of “mainlanders” are somehow riddled with “Original Sin,” or that we must overthrow the Republic of China. This is not a truthful explanation of 228. Only a false explanation of 228 demands “ethnic” strife and Taiwan independence. In order to commemorate 228, isn’t it necessary to first establish the facts surrounding 228?

Merely bowing and scraping and apologizing, without telling the whole story, will merely add fuel to the fire. It will merely play into continuing efforts to incite hatred. It will not establish the truth.

紀念二二八，但全貌真相是什麼？
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.02.27 03:56 am

又到二二八。這是馬政府的第一個二二八，馬總統指示，二二八基金會預算總額十五億元解凍，並研籌「國家級」紀念館。

馬英九深受「原罪感」的綑縛，他對二二八認錯道歉的心意可感，卻迄無能力為二二八建立一個平衡的全論述；相對而言，綠營的政治操作，則以累積仇恨與撕裂社會為能事，亦迄無意願為二二八建立一個真論述。

二二八迄今仍是一個難解的政治繩結，主要是因二二八的真論述及全論述迄未建立，朝野始終陷於各種偽論述及殘論述之中，各懷成見、各執一詞所致。但若不能為二二八建立一個全論述及真論述，如何紀念二二八？

以下略論二二八的各種版本。先說國民黨版：最早，國民黨視二二八為禁忌，其用於政治操作的版本亦多經剪裁。僅舉一例，二二八事件中，中共與台共頗具角色，可謂是最具組織及武鬥最慘烈的勢力，但國民黨視此一部分史實為忌諱，唯恐將中共台共劃成與台灣人民同一邊。至近二十年來，李登輝雖曾嘗試還原史實，卻因後來自陷於統獨族群鬥爭，遂亦未能帶領國人走出心靈困境；及至馬英九出線，本即是二二八和解的產物，但如前所述，馬雖「和」意甚誠，卻似仍缺「解」的能力。

再說北京的版本：北京自始即將二二八視為國共鬥爭的延伸戰線。自認中共及台共非但站在台灣人民的統一戰線，且是二二八反抗義軍的主力。北京往昔年年大事紀念二二八，直至台灣內部的二二八論述轉向統獨族群內鬥，倡獨反統，北京的紀念活動始趨低調，甚至停息。

此外，亦有「二二八受難者家屬」的版本：由於親人死難，椎心刺骨，自有雪冤復仇的情愫；六十餘年來，有些人的思考尋得昇華，但有些人仍深陷傷痛，於是形成各種論述，如今亦是二二八的重要版本。另有「三七五地主及皇民」的版本：工農階級意識是日據時代政治反對運動的一大支柱。兩大組織，文化協會及農民組合，皆具社會主義色彩；因而，此類抗議思想亦是台灣民間在二二八事件中的重要內涵。換句話說，二二八事件當年，國民黨政府所以令人民失望，其中亦有老佃儂的愁苦與既光復卻仍沒有「真國民感」的悲憤。諷刺的是，此後數十年來，二二八的論述，卻是由三七五地主及皇民後裔勢力所主導，標舉二二八的仇怨，其實是為三七五地主及皇民復仇；這樣的二二八論述，如何能不扭曲？

對二二八事件影響最大卻亦是最扭曲的版本，則是台獨版或民進黨版。此版二二八論述的主體是：二二八→反國民黨→反外省人→反中國→所以要台獨。將二二八與台獨聯結，就史實論，根本是杜撰偽造，在現實上亦無邏輯可言。在二二八當年，台獨絕非主題；如今紀念二二八，亦不必然就應主張台獨。簡略而言，此一版本扭曲了二二八的二大史實：一、抹去或淡化中共台共在二二八的角色，使國共內戰的主線消失。二、因台獨諱言中共台共在二二八的角色，遂使二二八的工農階級意識未能凸顯，嗣後更被三七五地主及皇民之後裔主導了二二八的詮釋權；這亦是民進黨迄今仍是一個「偽社會主義者」的原因。

二二八的主體是失政傷民、官逼民反；但其錯綜複雜的內外因素，亦是經緯萬端。當然，此處對各種版本的解析太過簡略，且二二八亦不止這幾種版本而已；在此想要強調的是，各種版本均有剪裁、均有缺陷，所以必須設法建立一個全版本、真版本。若無真版本、全版本，卻謂要紀念二二八，那豈不是要叫人們向騙徒政客製造的偽神假廟磕頭頂禮？

紀念二二八，就要聲討外省人的「原罪」，就要推翻中華民國，這不是真版本；紀念二二八，就要撕裂族群，就要主張台獨，這也是偽論述。談紀念二二八，難道不應首先還原二二八的全貌真相嗎？

只會鞠躬道歉，不是全版本；只會挑撥仇恨，更不是真版本。

Commemorate 228: But What are We Commemorating?

Commemorate 228: But What are We Commemorating?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 27, 2009

It’s 228 again, i.e., February 28, the anniversary of the 228 Incident of 1947. This is the Ma administration’s first 228. President Ma has ordered the 228 Foundation’s 1.5 billion NT budget unfrozen, and plans drawn up for a national grade memorial hall.

Ma Ying-jeou feels bound by a deep sense of “original sin.” His heartfelt desire to admit wrongdoing and apologize for 228 is palpable. Alas, he has never offered a balanced and objective assessment of 228. Meanwhile the Green Camp’s calculated hate-mongering has ripped society apart. It has absolutely no intention of getting to the truth of the 228 Incident.

The 228 Incident is a political Gordian Knot, primarily because the truth has not been established. The ruling and opposition parties have remained bound by a variety of false and discredited explanations. Each side has its own prejudices. Each maintains its own position. Without a truthful explanation of 228, how can we commemorate 228?

Let’s examine several explanations for the 228 Incident. One. The KMT’s explanation. Initially the KMT considered 228 taboo. The KMT’s explanation has been revised repeatedly. For example, Chinese Communists and Taiwan Communists took part in the 228 Incident, They were the best organized and most effective fighting force. But the KMT considered this part of the historical record taboo. It was afraid to lump Chinese Communists and Taiwan Communists together with the people of Taiwan. Over the past two decades, Lee Teng-hui tried to reestablish the historical facts. But because he himself was a part of the reunification vs. independence struggle, he too failed to lead the public out of this spiritual prison. Now Ma Ying-jeou is in office. He is the product of 228 reconciliation. But as mentioned earlier, although Ma earnestly seeks reconciliation, he lacks the ability to get at the truth.

Two. Beijing’s explanation. From the beginning Beijing has viewed the 228 Incident as an extension of the civil war between the KMT and the CCP. It claims that mainland Chinese Communists and Taiwan Communists stood united, and constituted the main force of the 228 resistance army. Beijing commemorated the 228 Incident each year. Only when it was recast as an “ethnic” struggle over reunification vs. independence, did Beijing’s commemoration of the event become more low-keyed, or even cease.

Three. The “228 Victim’s Families” explanation. The death of their relatives cut them to the quick. It is natural for them to feel wronged and to want revenge. Over the past 60 years some have found peace. But others remain caught up in their grief. This has led to a variety of explanations. Today these rank among the chief explanations for 228.

Four. The “375 Landlords and Japanese Imperial Subjects” explanation. Workers’ and peasants’ class consciousness during Japanese occupation was one of the pillars of the opposition movement. Two large organizations, the Cultural Association and the Farmers Cooperative were socialist oriented. Their protests were an important part of the 228 incident. The KMT government disappointed the public. Elderly sharecroppers experienced hardship and anxiety. Taiwan Retrocession failed to imbue the public with a feeling of genuine citizenship. Ironically, over the past several decades, most of the political spin on the 228 Incident has been orchestrated by descendants of 375 landlords and Japanese Imperial Subjects. They have exploited resentments arising from 228 in order to exact revenge on behalf of 375 landlords and Japanese Imperial Subjects. How can their explanations of 228 not lead to distortions of the truth?

The most influential explanation of the incident, and also the most distorted explanation, is the Taiwan Independence or DPP explanation. This explanation asserts that the 228 Incident was an anti-KMT movement, an anti-mainlander movement, an anti-China movement, therefore it is a Taiwan independence movement. It has linked Taiwan independence to the 228 Incident. From an historical and factual perspective, this “explanation” is sheer fabrication. It has no basis in reality. In 1947, when the 228 Incident erupted, Taiwan independence was not even an issue. Commemoration of the 228 Incident today hardly requires advocacy of Taiwan independence. One. This distorted explanation of the historical reality of 228 eradicates or downplays the role of the Chinese Communists in 228. It drops the civil war between the KMT and CCP down the memory hole. Two. The Taiwan independence movement denies the Chinese Communists any role in the 228 Incident. It blanks out the class consciousness of workers and peasants during the 228 Incident. Descendants of 375 landlords and Japanese Imperial Subjects would later arrogate to themselves the right to interpret the 228 Incident. This is why to this day the Democratic Progressive Party remains a phony champion of socialism.

The moral of the 228 Incident is that incompetent rule harms the people. It forces them to rebel. But the specific reasons are complex and varied. Naturally our analysis of the various explanations is much too sketchy. Besides, more explanations of 228 have been offered. We merely wish to stress that each explanation is custom tailored, hence defective. That is why we must seek a comprehensive explanation, a true explanation. To ask people to commemorate 228 in the absence of a true explanation, a full explanation, is to ask people to kowtow before false idols fabricated by political charlatans.

In commemorating 228, we must reject the notion that of “mainlanders” are somehow riddled with “Original Sin,” or that we must overthrow the Republic of China. This is not a truthful explanation of 228. Only a false explanation of 228 demands “ethnic” strife and Taiwan independence. In order to commemorate 228, isn’t it necessary to first establish the facts surrounding 228?

Merely bowing and scraping and apologizing, without telling the whole story, will merely add fuel to the fire. It will merely play into continuing efforts to incite hatred. It will not establish the truth.

紀念二二八，但全貌真相是什麼？
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.02.27 03:56 am

又到二二八。這是馬政府的第一個二二八，馬總統指示，二二八基金會預算總額十五億元解凍，並研籌「國家級」紀念館。

馬英九深受「原罪感」的綑縛，他對二二八認錯道歉的心意可感，卻迄無能力為二二八建立一個平衡的全論述；相對而言，綠營的政治操作，則以累積仇恨與撕裂社會為能事，亦迄無意願為二二八建立一個真論述。

二二八迄今仍是一個難解的政治繩結，主要是因二二八的真論述及全論述迄未建立，朝野始終陷於各種偽論述及殘論述之中，各懷成見、各執一詞所致。但若不能為二二八建立一個全論述及真論述，如何紀念二二八？

以下略論二二八的各種版本。先說國民黨版：最早，國民黨視二二八為禁忌，其用於政治操作的版本亦多經剪裁。僅舉一例，二二八事件中，中共與台共頗具角色，可謂是最具組織及武鬥最慘烈的勢力，但國民黨視此一部分史實為忌諱，唯恐將中共台共劃成與台灣人民同一邊。至近二十年來，李登輝雖曾嘗試還原史實，卻因後來自陷於統獨族群鬥爭，遂亦未能帶領國人走出心靈困境；及至馬英九出線，本即是二二八和解的產物，但如前所述，馬雖「和」意甚誠，卻似仍缺「解」的能力。

再說北京的版本：北京自始即將二二八視為國共鬥爭的延伸戰線。自認中共及台共非但站在台灣人民的統一戰線，且是二二八反抗義軍的主力。北京往昔年年大事紀念二二八，直至台灣內部的二二八論述轉向統獨族群內鬥，倡獨反統，北京的紀念活動始趨低調，甚至停息。

此外，亦有「二二八受難者家屬」的版本：由於親人死難，椎心刺骨，自有雪冤復仇的情愫；六十餘年來，有些人的思考尋得昇華，但有些人仍深陷傷痛，於是形成各種論述，如今亦是二二八的重要版本。另有「三七五地主及皇民」的版本：工農階級意識是日據時代政治反對運動的一大支柱。兩大組織，文化協會及農民組合，皆具社會主義色彩；因而，此類抗議思想亦是台灣民間在二二八事件中的重要內涵。換句話說，二二八事件當年，國民黨政府所以令人民失望，其中亦有老佃儂的愁苦與既光復卻仍沒有「真國民感」的悲憤。諷刺的是，此後數十年來，二二八的論述，卻是由三七五地主及皇民後裔勢力所主導，標舉二二八的仇怨，其實是為三七五地主及皇民復仇；這樣的二二八論述，如何能不扭曲？

對二二八事件影響最大卻亦是最扭曲的版本，則是台獨版或民進黨版。此版二二八論述的主體是：二二八→反國民黨→反外省人→反中國→所以要台獨。將二二八與台獨聯結，就史實論，根本是杜撰偽造，在現實上亦無邏輯可言。在二二八當年，台獨絕非主題；如今紀念二二八，亦不必然就應主張台獨。簡略而言，此一版本扭曲了二二八的二大史實：一、抹去或淡化中共台共在二二八的角色，使國共內戰的主線消失。二、因台獨諱言中共台共在二二八的角色，遂使二二八的工農階級意識未能凸顯，嗣後更被三七五地主及皇民之後裔主導了二二八的詮釋權；這亦是民進黨迄今仍是一個「偽社會主義者」的原因。

二二八的主體是失政傷民、官逼民反；但其錯綜複雜的內外因素，亦是經緯萬端。當然，此處對各種版本的解析太過簡略，且二二八亦不止這幾種版本而已；在此想要強調的是，各種版本均有剪裁、均有缺陷，所以必須設法建立一個全版本、真版本。若無真版本、全版本，卻謂要紀念二二八，那豈不是要叫人們向騙徒政客製造的偽神假廟磕頭頂禮？

紀念二二八，就要聲討外省人的「原罪」，就要推翻中華民國，這不是真版本；紀念二二八，就要撕裂族群，就要主張台獨，這也是偽論述。談紀念二二八，難道不應首先還原二二八的全貌真相嗎？

只會鞠躬道歉，不是全版本；只會挑撥仇恨，更不是真版本。

Taiwan’s Economy Cannot Withstand the Impact of ASEAN Plus One

Taiwan’s Economy Cannot Withstand the Impact of ASEAN Plus One
China Times Daily editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 26, 2009

Businesses, think tanks, and political parties have all presented their positions on whether Taipei should sign a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) with Beijing. In order to understand why both industries and the government feel such an urgent need to promote CECA, we must begin by looking at global economic trends.

In 2001, the mainland and Taiwan became part of the World Trade Organization (WTO). We initially assumed that under the WTO’s multilateral agreements, our foreign trade would enjoy considerable protection. But negotiations over the Doha Agreements have remained stalled. Instead, regional economic interests have come to the fore. Two to three hundred governments have signed regional economic agreements with each other. The one that affects the Republic of China most is the East Asian Free Trade Zone, better known as ASEAN Plus One (ASEAN Plus Beijing) to be signed in January next year, or possibly ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN plus Beijing, Tokyo, and Seoul).

Once the East Asia Free Trade Zone becomes official, most products traded within the region will be tariff free. Economies within the region will of course benefit. But those outside may be severely harmed. Taiwan’s economy will bear the brunt of the impact. Most Taiwan companies’ exports go to the mainland. Together with Hong Kong, the mainland accounts for nearly 40% of our exports. ASEAN accounts for over 10%. Once Taiwan is excluded from the East Asian Free Trade Area, over half of Taiwan’s exports will be affected. If ASEAN Plus Three becomes a reality, exports to Japan and Korea, amounting to 10%, will bring the affected total to 60%.

This is a low margin era. Most businesses enjoy only single digit profit margins. Our competitors will pay no tariffs, while we are subjected to tariffs of 10% on textiles and 6.5% on petrochemical products. For manufacturers the danger is not thinner margins or fewer orders, the danger is having to close up shop after being eliminated from the market.

In the middle and long term, in order to maintain their profits and to survive, businesses will be forced to uproot themselves and relocate. They will be forced to invest and set up factories inside the East Asia Free Trade Zone. Investment and employment opportunities on Taiwan will sharply decline.

Can our economy withstand such an impact? The East Asian Free Trade Zone will soon be established. Economists’ estimates of its impact on our economy may vary. But all agree that economic growth is declining while unemployment is rising. Regardless, the negative impact is not something the public wants to see. Nor is it something our constitutionally weakened economy can sustain. Once the negative impact is felt, those harmed will not be limited to industry. The economy as a whole and everyone in it will suffer.

Put simply, signing CECA is of the utmost urgency. The reason is not to strengthen economic and trade relations with the mainland, but to alleviate the negative impact of the East Asia Free Trade Zone on our economy. It is easy for politicians to demagogue the issue. But if the opposition DPP and TSU want to oppose CECA, they must offer us a viable alternative. They must tell us how to alleviate the destructive impact of the East Asia Free Trade Zone on our economy.

Let’s get back to basics, to people’s fundamental interests and to the public welfare. Comparative advantage and bilateral trade can create greater economic benefits. Some people want to open Taiwan up to more mainland products. This will severely impact Taiwan, and is clearly contrary to the principle of comparative advantage. A previous wave of raw material price increases triggered inflation. Before that the world enjoyed low-inflation economic growth. They could buy cheaper goods. They benefitted from newcomers joining the ranks of global production, including the mainland,

Now let’s look at the changes in Taiwan’s industrial base over the past twenty years. Companies producing labor-intensive, low value-added goods, were weeded out or relocated. The resources were made available to high-end, high value-added products, making possible today’s Silicon Island. Globalization is subjecting Taiwan’s businesses to global purchasing pressure and peer competition. Refuse to make use of the mainland’s resources and markets, and one will find it difficult to survive in the global market. Industry trends over the past few years bears this out.

In short, the most pressing challenge for our economy is coping with ASEAN Plus One once it is initiated in January. The export competitiveness of our businesses has fallen sharply. Our economy faces marginalization. CECA is the most realistic solution. Opposition parties are worried about sovereignty and terminology. This is understandable. But solutions can be found during negotiations. To stubbornly dig in one’s heels, while failing to alleviate the economic pressures caused by ASEAN Plus One is flagrantly irresponsible. We hope the ruling party will address internal differences and concerns. We hope it will make every effort to resolve and accommodate differences. It should also use the political opposition as the “bad cop,” in order to fight for better terms.

中時電子報
中國時報 　2009.02.26
社論－台灣經濟禁不起「東協加一」的重擊
本報訊

為了是否該推動與大陸簽訂ＣＥＣＡ（綜合性經濟合作協定），從企業、經濟智庫、到各政黨，紛紛發言各陳己見。在此，我們必須從全球性的經濟趨勢發展談起，才能了解企業與政府，為了對推動ＣＥＣＡ有如此深的迫切、焦慮感。

當二○○一年，兩岸都加入世界貿易組織（ＷＴＯ）後，原本以為在ＷＴＯ加權下，我國的對外經貿可在多邊協定下享有相當的利益保障。但近年杜哈談判受阻停滯，反而是區域經濟利益興起，各國彼此簽訂的區域經濟協定已達二、三百件之多；而其中，對我國影響最巨大者，即是明年元月上路的「東協加一」（東協加大陸）或「東協加三」（東協加大陸、日本、韓國）的東亞自由貿易區。

在東亞自由貿易區正式上路後，區域內大部分產品的關稅都將降為零，區內各國當然因此受惠，但區外國家卻可能大受打擊，台灣是首當其衝。大陸已是台灣出口比重最高地區，加上香港後占我國出口比重近四成，東協也占一成多，因此一旦台灣被排拒在東亞自由貿易區之外，代表我國超過五成的出口都會受影響。如果是「加三」，再加上一成的對日、韓出口，那就是六成多的出口都受影響。

而在這個微利時代，企業獲利大都只有個位數，如果競爭對手是零關稅，我國則要被課以十％以上（紡織業）、六．五％（石化業）不等的關稅，對廠商而言，不是獲利降低多少，也不是訂單減少多少成的問題，而根本是生死淘汰的問題了。

更中長期影響則是：企業為維繫原有在東亞自由貿易區的市場，並保有獲利以生存，必然「連根拔起」，前往區域內的國家投資設廠，台灣的投資與就業機會必然銳減。

試問：台灣經濟禁得起這一重擊嗎？學界對東亞自由貿易區上路後，對台灣經濟的影響之估算，雖然有不同的數字，但一致指出是讓經濟成長率下降、失業升高。無論最後的負面影響多大，都不是國人所樂見，更非已體質虛弱的台灣經濟所能承受。一旦負面影響出現，受傷者不僅企業，而是台灣經濟與全體國民。

用最簡單與最直接的話來說，簽訂ＣＥＣＡ有急迫性，為的不是加強與大陸的經貿關係，而是為了突破與化解東亞自由貿易區對我經濟的負面影響。政治人物噴口水容易，在野黨如果強力反對，那就該為台灣指出一條可行的明路，告訴大家如何突破與化解東亞自由貿易區成型後對台灣經濟的殺傷力。

如果回歸最基本的經濟利益與國民福祉看，兩國貿易的比較利益原則，原本就可創造經濟體更大的利益。部分人士一味以開放更多大陸產品將對台灣造成重創，顯然有違此比較利益原則。在前波因原物料高漲引發的通膨發生前，全球都享有低通膨的經濟成長，民眾可購買更低廉的商品，其實就是受惠於包括大陸在內的後進國家的加入全球生產行列。

再回頭看過去廿年台灣的產業變遷，也是不斷把勞力密集、低附加價值的商品、較虛弱的產業淘汰外移，釋出的資源則發展更高階、附加價值大的產品，也因此能成就今日的矽島之名。更何況，全球化的今日，台灣企業面對全球買主的壓力與同行的競爭，不思更進一步利用大陸的資源與市場，就很難立足全球市場。過去幾年企業的發展與布局，即證明這點。

簡言之，台灣經濟最迫在眉梢的問題，就是要突破明年元月東協加一上路後，台灣企業出口競爭力的大幅下滑、台灣經濟邊緣化的危機與壓力。ＣＥＣＡ是一個目前最可能的答案。在野黨擔心主權、名稱問題，可以理解，也可以在談判中尋求解決，但一味反對、卻提不出其它化解東協加一產生的經濟壓力之方式，就顯得相當不負責。而對執政黨，我們也期望能正視內部可能的分歧與疑慮，盡力化解與包容；同時，更善引這股反對力量為談判籌碼，為台灣爭取更好的條件。

Taiwan’s Economy Cannot Withstand the Impact of ASEAN Plus One

Taiwan’s Economy Cannot Withstand the Impact of ASEAN Plus One
China Times Daily editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 26, 2009

Businesses, think tanks, and political parties have all presented their positions on whether Taipei should sign a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) with Beijing. In order to understand why both industries and the government feel such an urgent need to promote CECA, we must begin by looking at global economic trends.

In 2001, the mainland and Taiwan became part of the World Trade Organization (WTO). We initially assumed that under the WTO’s multilateral agreements, our foreign trade would enjoy considerable protection. But negotiations over the Doha Agreements have remained stalled. Instead, regional economic interests have come to the fore. Two to three hundred governments have signed regional economic agreements with each other. The one that affects the Republic of China most is the East Asian Free Trade Zone, better known as ASEAN Plus One (ASEAN Plus Beijing) to be signed in January next year, or possibly ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN plus Beijing, Tokyo, and Seoul).

Once the East Asia Free Trade Zone becomes official, most products traded within the region will be tariff free. Economies within the region will of course benefit. But those outside may be severely harmed. Taiwan’s economy will bear the brunt of the impact. Most Taiwan companies’ exports go to the mainland. Together with Hong Kong, the mainland accounts for nearly 40% of our exports. ASEAN accounts for over 10%. Once Taiwan is excluded from the East Asian Free Trade Area, over half of Taiwan’s exports will be affected. If ASEAN Plus Three becomes a reality, exports to Japan and Korea, amounting to 10%, will bring the affected total to 60%.

This is a low margin era. Most businesses enjoy only single digit profit margins. Our competitors will pay no tariffs, while we are subjected to tariffs of 10% on textiles and 6.5% on petrochemical products. For manufacturers the danger is not thinner margins or fewer orders, the danger is having to close up shop after being eliminated from the market.

In the middle and long term, in order to maintain their profits and to survive, businesses will be forced to uproot themselves and relocate. They will be forced to invest and set up factories inside the East Asia Free Trade Zone. Investment and employment opportunities on Taiwan will sharply decline.

Can our economy withstand such an impact? The East Asian Free Trade Zone will soon be established. Economists’ estimates of its impact on our economy may vary. But all agree that economic growth is declining while unemployment is rising. Regardless, the negative impact is not something the public wants to see. Nor is it something our constitutionally weakened economy can sustain. Once the negative impact is felt, those harmed will not be limited to industry. The economy as a whole and everyone in it will suffer.

Put simply, signing CECA is of the utmost urgency. The reason is not to strengthen economic and trade relations with the mainland, but to alleviate the negative impact of the East Asia Free Trade Zone on our economy. It is easy for politicians to demagogue the issue. But if the opposition DPP and TSU want to oppose CECA, they must offer us a viable alternative. They must tell us how to alleviate the destructive impact of the East Asia Free Trade Zone on our economy.

Let’s get back to basics, to people’s fundamental interests and to the public welfare. Comparative advantage and bilateral trade can create greater economic benefits. Some people want to open Taiwan up to more mainland products. This will severely impact Taiwan, and is clearly contrary to the principle of comparative advantage. A previous wave of raw material price increases triggered inflation. Before that the world enjoyed low-inflation economic growth. They could buy cheaper goods. They benefitted from newcomers joining the ranks of global production, including the mainland,

Now let’s look at the changes in Taiwan’s industrial base over the past twenty years. Companies producing labor-intensive, low value-added goods, were weeded out or relocated. The resources were made available to high-end, high value-added products, making possible today’s Silicon Island. Globalization is subjecting Taiwan’s businesses to global purchasing pressure and peer competition. Refuse to make use of the mainland’s resources and markets, and one will find it difficult to survive in the global market. Industry trends over the past few years bears this out.

In short, the most pressing challenge for our economy is coping with ASEAN Plus One once it is initiated in January. The export competitiveness of our businesses has fallen sharply. Our economy faces marginalization. CECA is the most realistic solution. Opposition parties are worried about sovereignty and terminology. This is understandable. But solutions can be found during negotiations. To stubbornly dig in one’s heels, while failing to alleviate the economic pressures caused by ASEAN Plus One is flagrantly irresponsible. We hope the ruling party will address internal differences and concerns. We hope it will make every effort to resolve and accommodate differences. It should also use the political opposition as the “bad cop,” in order to fight for better terms.

中時電子報
中國時報 　2009.02.26
社論－台灣經濟禁不起「東協加一」的重擊
本報訊

為了是否該推動與大陸簽訂ＣＥＣＡ（綜合性經濟合作協定），從企業、經濟智庫、到各政黨，紛紛發言各陳己見。在此，我們必須從全球性的經濟趨勢發展談起，才能了解企業與政府，為了對推動ＣＥＣＡ有如此深的迫切、焦慮感。

當二○○一年，兩岸都加入世界貿易組織（ＷＴＯ）後，原本以為在ＷＴＯ加權下，我國的對外經貿可在多邊協定下享有相當的利益保障。但近年杜哈談判受阻停滯，反而是區域經濟利益興起，各國彼此簽訂的區域經濟協定已達二、三百件之多；而其中，對我國影響最巨大者，即是明年元月上路的「東協加一」（東協加大陸）或「東協加三」（東協加大陸、日本、韓國）的東亞自由貿易區。

在東亞自由貿易區正式上路後，區域內大部分產品的關稅都將降為零，區內各國當然因此受惠，但區外國家卻可能大受打擊，台灣是首當其衝。大陸已是台灣出口比重最高地區，加上香港後占我國出口比重近四成，東協也占一成多，因此一旦台灣被排拒在東亞自由貿易區之外，代表我國超過五成的出口都會受影響。如果是「加三」，再加上一成的對日、韓出口，那就是六成多的出口都受影響。

而在這個微利時代，企業獲利大都只有個位數，如果競爭對手是零關稅，我國則要被課以十％以上（紡織業）、六．五％（石化業）不等的關稅，對廠商而言，不是獲利降低多少，也不是訂單減少多少成的問題，而根本是生死淘汰的問題了。

更中長期影響則是：企業為維繫原有在東亞自由貿易區的市場，並保有獲利以生存，必然「連根拔起」，前往區域內的國家投資設廠，台灣的投資與就業機會必然銳減。

試問：台灣經濟禁得起這一重擊嗎？學界對東亞自由貿易區上路後，對台灣經濟的影響之估算，雖然有不同的數字，但一致指出是讓經濟成長率下降、失業升高。無論最後的負面影響多大，都不是國人所樂見，更非已體質虛弱的台灣經濟所能承受。一旦負面影響出現，受傷者不僅企業，而是台灣經濟與全體國民。

用最簡單與最直接的話來說，簽訂ＣＥＣＡ有急迫性，為的不是加強與大陸的經貿關係，而是為了突破與化解東亞自由貿易區對我經濟的負面影響。政治人物噴口水容易，在野黨如果強力反對，那就該為台灣指出一條可行的明路，告訴大家如何突破與化解東亞自由貿易區成型後對台灣經濟的殺傷力。

如果回歸最基本的經濟利益與國民福祉看，兩國貿易的比較利益原則，原本就可創造經濟體更大的利益。部分人士一味以開放更多大陸產品將對台灣造成重創，顯然有違此比較利益原則。在前波因原物料高漲引發的通膨發生前，全球都享有低通膨的經濟成長，民眾可購買更低廉的商品，其實就是受惠於包括大陸在內的後進國家的加入全球生產行列。

再回頭看過去廿年台灣的產業變遷，也是不斷把勞力密集、低附加價值的商品、較虛弱的產業淘汰外移，釋出的資源則發展更高階、附加價值大的產品，也因此能成就今日的矽島之名。更何況，全球化的今日，台灣企業面對全球買主的壓力與同行的競爭，不思更進一步利用大陸的資源與市場，就很難立足全球市場。過去幾年企業的發展與布局，即證明這點。

簡言之，台灣經濟最迫在眉梢的問題，就是要突破明年元月東協加一上路後，台灣企業出口競爭力的大幅下滑、台灣經濟邊緣化的危機與壓力。ＣＥＣＡ是一個目前最可能的答案。在野黨擔心主權、名稱問題，可以理解，也可以在談判中尋求解決，但一味反對、卻提不出其它化解東協加一產生的經濟壓力之方式，就顯得相當不負責。而對執政黨，我們也期望能正視內部可能的分歧與疑慮，盡力化解與包容；同時，更善引這股反對力量為談判籌碼，為台灣爭取更好的條件。

How Would the DPP Have People Respond to ASEAN Plus Three?

How Would the DPP Have People Respond to ASEAN Plus Three?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 25, 2009

Last weekend the Presidential Office and the Straits Exchange Foundation held a Conference on Financial and Economic Affairs, and a Conference on National Affairs. The question of whether the Taipei and Beijing should sign a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) led to yet another confrontation between the ruling and opposition parties. The government intends to promote CECA. The Democratic Progressive Party and Taiwan Solidarity Union vehemently oppose it.

In fact, ASEAN plus One, the One being Beijing, or ASEAN plus Three, the Three being Beijing, Tokyo, and Seoul, all came into being during the Democratic Progressive Party’s eight year regime. An Internet search will show that during this eight-year period, both ruling and opposition party cognoscenti were aware of the situation. Even the Chen administration’s economic and trade officials and research organizations issued stern warnings. But during its eight years in power, the DPP government deliberately sat on this life and death issue. It never warned the public about the dangers or put the issue up for public discussion. The situation has deteriorated to where it is now a matter of extreme urgency. The DPP not only refuses to apologize to the public for the past eight years, all it is willing to do is say “No!”

Next year ASEAN plus One will implement mutual exemption of tariffs. In 2012 ASEAN plus Three will do the same. The population of ASEAN plus Three totals two billion. It will be the world’s most populous free trade body. If it develops into ASEAN plus Six, adding India, Australia, and New Zealand, its population will total 3.1 billion, over half the world. Taipei has close economic and trade ties to these Asia-Pacific nations. Exports and trade with them constitute over half of Taiwan’s total exports and trade. We have to ask the DPP: If the public on Taiwan is excluded from an economic framework consisting of two to three billion people, does it have any chance of survival?

The Democratic Progressive Party may object to CECA. But it cannot deny the impact of ASEAN plus N on Taiwan’s economic lifeblood. Therefore if the Democratic Progressive Party want to oppose CECA, it must offer the people an alternative.

The Democratic Progressive Party’s fatal illness is that when asked to offer strategies for the nation’s survival, it knows only how to say no. It is unable to offer any viable alternatives. For example, the DPP knows only how to repudiate the Republic of China, even when it is obvious that Taiwan Independence and the establishment of a Nation of Taiwan is not a viable alternative. Today, the Democratic Progressive Party opposes CECA. But it hasn’t offered the public any alternative. Are we to understand that the DPP’s “alternative” is Taiwan Independence and the establishment of a Nation of Taiwan?

Does the DPP intend to oppose CECA regardless of the consequences? Or is it willing to conditionally endorse CECA? For example, is the DPP opposed only to articles within CECA that it says “harm our sovereignty?” Is it willing to endorse CECA upon the condition that it does not “harm our sovereignty?” Is the DPP willing to endorse CECA on the express or tacit understanding that Beijing will not prevent Taipei’s participation in ASEAN or Taipei’s signing of FTAs with other nations, and that CECA will not run the risk of tying Taipei’s hands. The DPP need no longer play the role of “Mr. No.” It should consider playing a positive role, one that will win it points. If it wants to keep saying no, the Democratic Progressive Party must offer a viable alternative. It cannot “just say no.”

Tsai Ing-wen said that CECA is not merely an economic and trade issue, that it is also a political issue involving sovereignty. But CECA is not a political issue. It is fundamentally an economic and trade issue. The Republic of China’s sovereignty has often been distorted. This is so without CECA. It is not any more so with CECA. Put simply, as long as CECA does not specify reunification or One Country, Two Systems, as long as after signing CECA, the Republic of China continues to elect its own President, as long as the Legislative Yuan continues operating, business as usual, as long as the Judicial Yuan remains open for business, how exactly does CECA “harm our sovereignty?” If CECA helps Taipei avoid the risk of economic and trade marginalization, and allows it to participate in ASEAN plus N or the East Asian Economic Community, isn’t it “increasing our sovereignty?”

CECA is not something that sprang out of a rock. It is an issue the DPP has attempted to squash for eight years. The Democratic Progressive Party was in power for eight years. It committed the colossal blunder of ignoring a problem, thereby allowing it to grow. Does it still insist on severing economic and trade links between Taipei and ASEAN?

The Democratic Progressive Party may object to CECA. But it must offer a responsible alternative. Please do not tell us that alternative is Taiwan independence. Because that will make our participation in ASEAN plus N even less likely!

民進黨應告訴國人如何因應東協加三
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.02.25 02:29 am

上周末的府會財經會議與民間國是會議，竟使兩岸是否簽訂ＣＥＣＡ（綜合性經濟合作協定），演成朝野下一波政治對決的主題。政府宣示將推動ＣＥＣＡ，民進黨及台聯則強烈反對。

其實，「東協加一」（加中國），或「東協加三」（加中、日、韓），皆是在民進黨主政八年期間，由萌芽、發展，至成形；只要上網搜尋，即知在這八年期間，朝野有識之士早已對此有所警覺，扁政府的經貿主管及研究單位亦不斷發出強烈警訊；但是，民進黨政府在這八年中卻始終故意隱藏攸關國家生死的此一議題，亦即從未警示國人並訴諸公共討論。如今，情勢已經惡化至燃眉之急，民進黨非但未對過去八年的貽誤向國人表達歉意，竟仍然只是一句：「反對！」

東協加一將在明年全面互免關稅，東協加三則在二○一二年；東協加三總人口達二十億，將是全球人口最多的自由貿易體；倘若再繼續發展成東協加六（再加印度、澳、紐），則人口將達三十一億，已逾全球半數。何況，台灣素與這些亞太國家有密切的經貿互動，無論出口或貿易總額均超越台灣全額之半。我們要問民進黨：台灣若被排除在這個二十億或三十億人口的經濟架構之外，還有沒有活命？

民進黨可以反對ＣＥＣＡ，但不能否認「東協加Ｎ」對台經貿命脈的影響。所以，民進黨若反對ＣＥＣＡ，就應告訴國人：替代策略何在？

民進黨的膏肓之患在於：對於國家生存路線，只會作負面論述，卻不能提出可行的替代方案。例如，民進黨只會否定中華民國，但其台獨建國卻分明不是可行的替代方案。如今，民進黨又要反對ＣＥＣＡ，但亦未告訴國人其替代方案是什麼？難道還是台獨建國？

民進黨難道無論如何都要反對ＣＥＣＡ？還是可以有條件地贊同ＣＥＣＡ？比如說，民進黨是否只是反對ＣＥＣＡ附加「傷害主權」的條款，但在「主權」不受傷害下即可同意ＣＥＣＡ？或者，民進黨亦可主張，兩岸簽定ＣＥＣＡ，應附有不阻擋台灣參與東協或與其他國家締結ＦＴＡ的明文或默契，而不使兩岸ＣＥＣＡ發生綑綁台灣的風險。我們認為，在ＣＥＣＡ這個議題上，民進黨不必再扮演「絕對負面」的消極角色，而可嘗試扮演為ＣＥＣＡ加分避險的積極角色。倘若仍一味反對，民進黨即須拿出可行的替代方案，不能空言反對。

蔡英文說，ＣＥＣＡ不只是一個經貿議題，也是一個牽涉主權的政治議題；但ＣＥＣＡ也畢竟不是一政治議題，而在根本上仍是一個經貿議題。誠然，中華民國的主權頗受扭曲，無ＣＥＣＡ已是如此，有ＣＥＣＡ則應力求勿加重扭曲。直截而言，只要ＣＥＣＡ不以統一或一國兩制為條件；且只要簽訂ＣＥＣＡ後，中華民國仍然直選總統，國會照常運作，法院照樣開門，則ＣＥＣＡ如何「傷害」主權？何況，倘若能借ＣＥＣＡ突破台灣經貿地位邊緣化的危機，亦即能參與東協加Ｎ（或構想中的「東亞經濟共同體」），則豈非「主權」的加分？

ＣＥＣＡ不是一個突然從石頭縫裡迸出的新議題，而其實是一個民進黨逃避掩藏了八年的潛議題。民進黨執政八年，犯下了聽任危機坐大卻置之不理的大錯，如今難道仍要蠻橫力主台灣與東亞經貿就此脫勾？

民進黨可以反對ＣＥＣＡ，但必須負責任地提出替代可行方案。不過，可別告訴我們，那個方案仍是台灣獨立建國；因為，那就更不可能參與東協加Ｎ了！

How Would the DPP Have People Respond to ASEAN Plus Three?

How Would the DPP Have People Respond to ASEAN Plus Three?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 25, 2009

Last weekend the Presidential Office and the Straits Exchange Foundation held a Conference on Financial and Economic Affairs, and a Conference on National Affairs. The question of whether the Taipei and Beijing should sign a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) led to yet another confrontation between the ruling and opposition parties. The government intends to promote CECA. The Democratic Progressive Party and Taiwan Solidarity Union vehemently oppose it.

In fact, ASEAN plus One, the One being Beijing, or ASEAN plus Three, the Three being Beijing, Tokyo, and Seoul, all came into being during the Democratic Progressive Party’s eight year regime. An Internet search will show that during this eight-year period, both ruling and opposition party cognoscenti were aware of the situation. Even the Chen administration’s economic and trade officials and research organizations issued stern warnings. But during its eight years in power, the DPP government deliberately sat on this life and death issue. It never warned the public about the dangers or put the issue up for public discussion. The situation has deteriorated to where it is now a matter of extreme urgency. The DPP not only refuses to apologize to the public for the past eight years, all it is willing to do is say “No!”

Next year ASEAN plus One will implement mutual exemption of tariffs. In 2012 ASEAN plus Three will do the same. The population of ASEAN plus Three totals two billion. It will be the world’s most populous free trade body. If it develops into ASEAN plus Six, adding India, Australia, and New Zealand, its population will total 3.1 billion, over half the world. Taipei has close economic and trade ties to these Asia-Pacific nations. Exports and trade with them constitute over half of Taiwan’s total exports and trade. We have to ask the DPP: If the public on Taiwan is excluded from an economic framework consisting of two to three billion people, does it have any chance of survival?

The Democratic Progressive Party may object to CECA. But it cannot deny the impact of ASEAN plus N on Taiwan’s economic lifeblood. Therefore if the Democratic Progressive Party want to oppose CECA, it must offer the people an alternative.

The Democratic Progressive Party’s fatal illness is that when asked to offer strategies for the nation’s survival, it knows only how to say no. It is unable to offer any viable alternatives. For example, the DPP knows only how to repudiate the Republic of China, even when it is obvious that Taiwan Independence and the establishment of a Nation of Taiwan is not a viable alternative. Today, the Democratic Progressive Party opposes CECA. But it hasn’t offered the public any alternative. Are we to understand that the DPP’s “alternative” is Taiwan Independence and the establishment of a Nation of Taiwan?

Does the DPP intend to oppose CECA regardless of the consequences? Or is it willing to conditionally endorse CECA? For example, is the DPP opposed only to articles within CECA that it says “harm our sovereignty?” Is it willing to endorse CECA upon the condition that it does not “harm our sovereignty?” Is the DPP willing to endorse CECA on the express or tacit understanding that Beijing will not prevent Taipei’s participation in ASEAN or Taipei’s signing of FTAs with other nations, and that CECA will not run the risk of tying Taipei’s hands. The DPP need no longer play the role of “Mr. No.” It should consider playing a positive role, one that will win it points. If it wants to keep saying no, the Democratic Progressive Party must offer a viable alternative. It cannot “just say no.”

Tsai Ing-wen said that CECA is not merely an economic and trade issue, that it is also a political issue involving sovereignty. But CECA is not a political issue. It is fundamentally an economic and trade issue. The Republic of China’s sovereignty has often been distorted. This is so without CECA. It is not any more so with CECA. Put simply, as long as CECA does not specify reunification or One Country, Two Systems, as long as after signing CECA, the Republic of China continues to elect its own President, as long as the Legislative Yuan continues operating, business as usual, as long as the Judicial Yuan remains open for business, how exactly does CECA “harm our sovereignty?” If CECA helps Taipei avoid the risk of economic and trade marginalization, and allows it to participate in ASEAN plus N or the East Asian Economic Community, isn’t it “increasing our sovereignty?”

CECA is not something that sprang out of a rock. It is an issue the DPP has attempted to squash for eight years. The Democratic Progressive Party was in power for eight years. It committed the colossal blunder of ignoring a problem, thereby allowing it to grow. Does it still insist on severing economic and trade links between Taipei and ASEAN?

The Democratic Progressive Party may object to CECA. But it must offer a responsible alternative. Please do not tell us that alternative is Taiwan independence. Because that will make our participation in ASEAN plus N even less likely!

民進黨應告訴國人如何因應東協加三
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.02.25 02:29 am

上周末的府會財經會議與民間國是會議，竟使兩岸是否簽訂ＣＥＣＡ（綜合性經濟合作協定），演成朝野下一波政治對決的主題。政府宣示將推動ＣＥＣＡ，民進黨及台聯則強烈反對。

其實，「東協加一」（加中國），或「東協加三」（加中、日、韓），皆是在民進黨主政八年期間，由萌芽、發展，至成形；只要上網搜尋，即知在這八年期間，朝野有識之士早已對此有所警覺，扁政府的經貿主管及研究單位亦不斷發出強烈警訊；但是，民進黨政府在這八年中卻始終故意隱藏攸關國家生死的此一議題，亦即從未警示國人並訴諸公共討論。如今，情勢已經惡化至燃眉之急，民進黨非但未對過去八年的貽誤向國人表達歉意，竟仍然只是一句：「反對！」

東協加一將在明年全面互免關稅，東協加三則在二○一二年；東協加三總人口達二十億，將是全球人口最多的自由貿易體；倘若再繼續發展成東協加六（再加印度、澳、紐），則人口將達三十一億，已逾全球半數。何況，台灣素與這些亞太國家有密切的經貿互動，無論出口或貿易總額均超越台灣全額之半。我們要問民進黨：台灣若被排除在這個二十億或三十億人口的經濟架構之外，還有沒有活命？

民進黨可以反對ＣＥＣＡ，但不能否認「東協加Ｎ」對台經貿命脈的影響。所以，民進黨若反對ＣＥＣＡ，就應告訴國人：替代策略何在？

民進黨的膏肓之患在於：對於國家生存路線，只會作負面論述，卻不能提出可行的替代方案。例如，民進黨只會否定中華民國，但其台獨建國卻分明不是可行的替代方案。如今，民進黨又要反對ＣＥＣＡ，但亦未告訴國人其替代方案是什麼？難道還是台獨建國？

民進黨難道無論如何都要反對ＣＥＣＡ？還是可以有條件地贊同ＣＥＣＡ？比如說，民進黨是否只是反對ＣＥＣＡ附加「傷害主權」的條款，但在「主權」不受傷害下即可同意ＣＥＣＡ？或者，民進黨亦可主張，兩岸簽定ＣＥＣＡ，應附有不阻擋台灣參與東協或與其他國家締結ＦＴＡ的明文或默契，而不使兩岸ＣＥＣＡ發生綑綁台灣的風險。我們認為，在ＣＥＣＡ這個議題上，民進黨不必再扮演「絕對負面」的消極角色，而可嘗試扮演為ＣＥＣＡ加分避險的積極角色。倘若仍一味反對，民進黨即須拿出可行的替代方案，不能空言反對。

蔡英文說，ＣＥＣＡ不只是一個經貿議題，也是一個牽涉主權的政治議題；但ＣＥＣＡ也畢竟不是一政治議題，而在根本上仍是一個經貿議題。誠然，中華民國的主權頗受扭曲，無ＣＥＣＡ已是如此，有ＣＥＣＡ則應力求勿加重扭曲。直截而言，只要ＣＥＣＡ不以統一或一國兩制為條件；且只要簽訂ＣＥＣＡ後，中華民國仍然直選總統，國會照常運作，法院照樣開門，則ＣＥＣＡ如何「傷害」主權？何況，倘若能借ＣＥＣＡ突破台灣經貿地位邊緣化的危機，亦即能參與東協加Ｎ（或構想中的「東亞經濟共同體」），則豈非「主權」的加分？

ＣＥＣＡ不是一個突然從石頭縫裡迸出的新議題，而其實是一個民進黨逃避掩藏了八年的潛議題。民進黨執政八年，犯下了聽任危機坐大卻置之不理的大錯，如今難道仍要蠻橫力主台灣與東亞經貿就此脫勾？

民進黨可以反對ＣＥＣＡ，但必須負責任地提出替代可行方案。不過，可別告訴我們，那個方案仍是台灣獨立建國；因為，那就更不可能參與東協加Ｎ了！

Wu Shu-chen Gives the Political Donation Law a Slap in the Face

Wu Shu-chen Gives the Political Donation Law a Slap in the Face
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 24, 2009

The Political Donation Law has been stalled in the Legislative Yuan for years. Now, finally, the Control Yuan has made public a list of political contributors. This has subjected the campaign contributions of corporate contributors to Blue and Green political parties and presidential candidates to the bright glare of the sun. Ironically, within 24 hours, Wu Shu-chen made a second revelation. She reportedly blew the whistle on 20 major contributors, who made three billion in campaign contributions. More importantly, Wu Shu-chen’s hidden books were never reported to the Control Yuan, making clear her contempt for the law. For all intents and purposes, she gave the Political Donation Law a hard slap in the face.

In fact, ever since Chen’s secret overseas money-laundering accounts were revealed last August 14, Chen Shui-bian has used campaign contributions to shield himself from prosecution. From the beginning he has insisted that money transferred overseas was leftover campaign contributions. In response to the Lungtan Corruption scandal, Chen Shui-bian referred to the money he received as “campaign contributions,” and disowned all responsibility for it. A law ostensibly intended to make campaign contributions transparent, has become a tool for corruption. Where did our Political Donation Law go wrong?

Since the nineties, in pace with a raised political consciousness, the public has expressed its distaste for money politics. But apart from the Public Servant Property Declaration Act, other bills such as the Sunshine Law have failed to make it through the legislature. It was only in 2004, during President Chen Shui-bian’s re-election campaign, that suspicions arose regarding Chen Yu-hao’s campaign contributions to Chen Shui-bian. Ah-Bian and Ah-Chen flatly denied, again and again, that they had taken any money from Chen Yu-hao. Chen Shui-bian gave orders that Chen faction members of the Legislative Yuan sponsor a “stringent” Political Donation Law. Wu Shu-chen recently confessed to receiving billions in campaign contributions from conglomerates, many following Chen’s “re-election” in 2004. Obviously, Ah-Bian and Ah-Chen never gave the Political Donation Law a second thought. Worse, they turned the Political Donation Law into a fig leaf to cover the Chen family’s criminal activities.

Of course, the bosses of financial conglomerates in doubt about asking prices began delivering hundreds of millions to the president’s official residence. They even deposited money in Chen’s overseas accounts. To call these “campaign contributions” is more than a little far-fetched. Ah-Bian and Ah-Chen, in an attempt to paint others as black as himself, argued that these financial conglomerates gave even more to the KMT, but prosecutors have chosen to prosecute only them! What can we blame, but a Political Donation Law that has great ambitions but little ability.

Republic of China election campaigns, particularly presidential campaigns, are extremely expensive. The Political Donation Law stipulates that individuals may not contribute more than 100,000 NT in any given year. Profit-making enterprises may not contribute more than one million NT. Legislators did not set such stringent standards out of political idealism. In fact the complete lack of stringent standards was one of the preconditions for passage of the Political Donation Law.

In 1974 the United States “Federal Election Campaign Law” established a “Federal Election Commission.” Commission members have professional staff and the right to investigate. Only that enables it to investigate false declarations. By contrast, look at our own Political Donation Law. The Control Yuan is charged with investigating campaign contributions. Control Yuan members have the right to investigate. But more than a few public officials have admitted both publicly and privately that the amount they declared is less than half of what they received. But has the Control Yuan investigated or prosecuted a single one of these?

And even if the Control Yuan decided to get tough, what tools does it have at hand? False declarations of campaign contributions by dishonest politicians and political parties, is punishable by a maximum of fine of 1,000,000 NT, approximately 30,000 US. Such a slap on the wrist provides politicians with a reason to lie, thereby breaking the law. Dlections are hotly contested on Taiwan. Therefore politicians have few scruples about fund-raising. Only then can they have access to immense political and economic benefits. After all, no one makes a serious effort to check. And in the event one is unlucky enough to be found out, the fine is a mere 1,000,000 NT. Politicians, know how to read a balance sheet, and have little trouble deciding which way to go.

Politicians are highly adaptable creatures. No matter how airtight the law might be, they will find loopholes, they will find a backdoor. In the painful aftermath of the Watergate scandal, the US decided to pass the “Federal Election Campaign Law.” As we can see from this brief history, campaign reform is useless. The law is constantly rewritten. Election expenses increase geometrically. Obama’s fund-raising has once again broken previous records.

Therefore, experts who have studied campaign contributions say the key to reform is transparency. Setting ultra-high standards is not as good as conceding that modest campaign contributions are a necessary evil, and adopting more realistic contribution limits. But false declarations must be severely punished. The Political Donation Law must no longer be a hypocritical law, a way for Ah-Bian and Ah-Chen to get off scot-free. These are factors the legislators amending the law must consider.

中時電子報
中國時報 　2009.02.24
社論－吳淑珍狠狠打了政治獻金法一個耳光
本報訊

政治獻金法立法多年後，監察院終於公布政治捐款專戶，讓各大企業捐助藍綠政黨及總統候選人的政治獻金，可以接受陽光的檢驗。諷刺的是，不到二十四小時，吳淑珍第二次陳報狀曝光，據傳共抖出二十位金主、三十億政治獻金；更重要的是，吳淑珍這本黑帳，從未向監察院申報，擺明完全視法律於無物，形同狠狠的打了政治獻金法一個耳光。

事實上，去年八月十四日扁海外洗錢密帳曝光以來，陳水扁就是援引政治獻金為自己辯護；一開始，他表示，這些匯往海外的錢，都是選舉結餘款，面對龍潭案的貪汙事證，陳水扁也以政治獻金推得一乾二淨。一部應該讓政治透明乾淨的法律，最後竟成為貪汙犯的藉口，我們的政治獻金法究竟出了什麼問題？

九○年代以來，隨著民主意識高漲，黑金政治深受民眾詬病，但是除了公職人員財產申報法外，政治獻金法等相關陽光法案，卻遲遲未能完成立法。一直到二○○四年，陳水扁競選總統連任時，面對收受陳由豪政治獻金疑雲，扁、珍不但多次斷然否認曾拿過陳由豪的錢，更在陳水扁命令下，在立法院由扁系立委提出並通過這一部「高標準」的政治獻金法；觀諸吳淑珍近來自承收受財團數十億政治獻金，其中不少是在二○○四年連任後發生，扁、珍心目中不但從無政治獻金法，政治獻金法更淪為掩護扁家犯罪的遮羞布。

當然，有對價嫌疑的金控大老闆紛紛送錢進官邸，動輒上億，甚至匯錢到海外帳戶，硬要說這些錢是政治獻金，未免太牽強。但是，為何扁珍可以振振有詞的說，這些財團送給國民黨更多，天下烏鴉一般黑，卻選擇性只辦他們一家人!我們這一部眼高手低的政治獻金法，難辭其咎。

以台灣選舉、尤其是總統選舉競選經費之龐大，政治獻金法卻規定，個人對參選人每年捐贈總額不得超過十萬元，營利事業不得超過一百萬。立委諸公定下如此嚴格的標準，並非著眼於政治清明的理想，事實上，整部政治獻金法，完全欠缺讓此一高標準實現的條件。

舉例言之，美國一九七四年的《聯邦選舉競選法》修正案中，特別設立「聯邦選舉委員會」，該委員會具調查權及專業幕僚，才可能落實對不實申報的查核；反觀我們的政治獻金法，受理政治獻金之申報機關是監察院，監委具調查權，而且負責公職人員財產申報，但是，自政治獻金法實施以來，不少立委公開私下都曾表示，他們申報的數字，不足實收的二分之一，但可曾見到監察院調查或處罰任何一個案例？

而即使監察院真的決定動大刀懲處，又有何工具可用？不誠實申報政治獻金的政治人物及政黨，只要面對最多一百萬元的行政罰鍰；如此不痛不癢的罰則，形同鼓勵政治人物說謊、進而犯法，因為，以台灣選舉競爭之激烈，政治人物當然寧願無所顧忌的募款，可以獲取龐大的政經利益；反正，不會有人認真去查，真的不幸被查到了，罰鍰不過一百萬。最具經濟理性的政客們，怎麼會不知道如何算這筆帳！

當然，政客是最具適應力的動物，再如何先進的政治獻金法制，他們都可以找到漏洞、繞道而行。美國在水門事件之後痛下決心立法的《聯邦選舉競選法》，就可以看出這一段獻金法制的「改革無用史」，法不斷的訂定，選舉經費也跟著等比級數上升，歐巴馬的募款經費再次破了前人的記錄。

因此，研究政治獻金的專家們建議，改革的核心在陽光及透明。與其定下超高標準防堵，還不如適度的承認政治獻金是必要之惡，採取較務實的捐款上限，但如果不誠實申報，將面臨嚴重的刑責。要讓我們的政治獻金法不再是一部偽善的法律，或成為扁珍脫罪的藉口，這些是立委諸公未來修法必須考慮的方向。

Wu Shu-chen Gives the Political Donation Law a Slap in the Face

Wu Shu-chen Gives the Political Donation Law a Slap in the Face
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 24, 2009

The Political Donation Law has been stalled in the Legislative Yuan for years. Now, finally, the Control Yuan has made public a list of political contributors. This has subjected the campaign contributions of corporate contributors to Blue and Green political parties and presidential candidates to the bright glare of the sun. Ironically, within 24 hours, Wu Shu-chen made a second revelation. She reportedly blew the whistle on 20 major contributors, who made three billion in campaign contributions. More importantly, Wu Shu-chen’s hidden books were never reported to the Control Yuan, making clear her contempt for the law. For all intents and purposes, she gave the Political Donation Law a hard slap in the face.

In fact, ever since Chen’s secret overseas money-laundering accounts were revealed last August 14, Chen Shui-bian has used campaign contributions to shield himself from prosecution. From the beginning he has insisted that money transferred overseas was leftover campaign contributions. In response to the Lungtan Corruption scandal, Chen Shui-bian referred to the money he received as “campaign contributions,” and disowned all responsibility for it. A law ostensibly intended to make campaign contributions transparent, has become a tool for corruption. Where did our Political Donation Law go wrong?

Since the nineties, in pace with a raised political consciousness, the public has expressed its distaste for money politics. But apart from the Public Servant Property Declaration Act, other bills such as the Sunshine Law have failed to make it through the legislature. It was only in 2004, during President Chen Shui-bian’s re-election campaign, that suspicions arose regarding Chen Yu-hao’s campaign contributions to Chen Shui-bian. Ah-Bian and Ah-Chen flatly denied, again and again, that they had taken any money from Chen Yu-hao. Chen Shui-bian gave orders that Chen faction members of the Legislative Yuan sponsor a “stringent” Political Donation Law. Wu Shu-chen recently confessed to receiving billions in campaign contributions from conglomerates, many following Chen’s “re-election” in 2004. Obviously, Ah-Bian and Ah-Chen never gave the Political Donation Law a second thought. Worse, they turned the Political Donation Law into a fig leaf to cover the Chen family’s criminal activities.

Of course, the bosses of financial conglomerates in doubt about asking prices began delivering hundreds of millions to the president’s official residence. They even deposited money in Chen’s overseas accounts. To call these “campaign contributions” is more than a little far-fetched. Ah-Bian and Ah-Chen, in an attempt to paint others as black as himself, argued that these financial conglomerates gave even more to the KMT, but prosecutors have chosen to prosecute only them! What can we blame, but a Political Donation Law that has great ambitions but little ability.

Republic of China election campaigns, particularly presidential campaigns, are extremely expensive. The Political Donation Law stipulates that individuals may not contribute more than 100,000 NT in any given year. Profit-making enterprises may not contribute more than one million NT. Legislators did not set such stringent standards out of political idealism. In fact the complete lack of stringent standards was one of the preconditions for passage of the Political Donation Law.

In 1974 the United States “Federal Election Campaign Law” established a “Federal Election Commission.” Commission members have professional staff and the right to investigate. Only that enables it to investigate false declarations. By contrast, look at our own Political Donation Law. The Control Yuan is charged with investigating campaign contributions. Control Yuan members have the right to investigate. But more than a few public officials have admitted both publicly and privately that the amount they declared is less than half of what they received. But has the Control Yuan investigated or prosecuted a single one of these?

And even if the Control Yuan decided to get tough, what tools does it have at hand? False declarations of campaign contributions by dishonest politicians and political parties, is punishable by a maximum of fine of 1,000,000 NT, approximately 30,000 US. Such a slap on the wrist provides politicians with a reason to lie, thereby breaking the law. Dlections are hotly contested on Taiwan. Therefore politicians have few scruples about fund-raising. Only then can they have access to immense political and economic benefits. After all, no one makes a serious effort to check. And in the event one is unlucky enough to be found out, the fine is a mere 1,000,000 NT. Politicians, know how to read a balance sheet, and have little trouble deciding which way to go.

Politicians are highly adaptable creatures. No matter how airtight the law might be, they will find loopholes, they will find a backdoor. In the painful aftermath of the Watergate scandal, the US decided to pass the “Federal Election Campaign Law.” As we can see from this brief history, campaign reform is useless. The law is constantly rewritten. Election expenses increase geometrically. Obama’s fund-raising has once again broken previous records.

Therefore, experts who have studied campaign contributions say the key to reform is transparency. Setting ultra-high standards is not as good as conceding that modest campaign contributions are a necessary evil, and adopting more realistic contribution limits. But false declarations must be severely punished. The Political Donation Law must no longer be a hypocritical law, a way for Ah-Bian and Ah-Chen to get off scot-free. These are factors the legislators amending the law must consider.

中時電子報
中國時報 　2009.02.24
社論－吳淑珍狠狠打了政治獻金法一個耳光
本報訊

政治獻金法立法多年後，監察院終於公布政治捐款專戶，讓各大企業捐助藍綠政黨及總統候選人的政治獻金，可以接受陽光的檢驗。諷刺的是，不到二十四小時，吳淑珍第二次陳報狀曝光，據傳共抖出二十位金主、三十億政治獻金；更重要的是，吳淑珍這本黑帳，從未向監察院申報，擺明完全視法律於無物，形同狠狠的打了政治獻金法一個耳光。

事實上，去年八月十四日扁海外洗錢密帳曝光以來，陳水扁就是援引政治獻金為自己辯護；一開始，他表示，這些匯往海外的錢，都是選舉結餘款，面對龍潭案的貪汙事證，陳水扁也以政治獻金推得一乾二淨。一部應該讓政治透明乾淨的法律，最後竟成為貪汙犯的藉口，我們的政治獻金法究竟出了什麼問題？

九○年代以來，隨著民主意識高漲，黑金政治深受民眾詬病，但是除了公職人員財產申報法外，政治獻金法等相關陽光法案，卻遲遲未能完成立法。一直到二○○四年，陳水扁競選總統連任時，面對收受陳由豪政治獻金疑雲，扁、珍不但多次斷然否認曾拿過陳由豪的錢，更在陳水扁命令下，在立法院由扁系立委提出並通過這一部「高標準」的政治獻金法；觀諸吳淑珍近來自承收受財團數十億政治獻金，其中不少是在二○○四年連任後發生，扁、珍心目中不但從無政治獻金法，政治獻金法更淪為掩護扁家犯罪的遮羞布。

當然，有對價嫌疑的金控大老闆紛紛送錢進官邸，動輒上億，甚至匯錢到海外帳戶，硬要說這些錢是政治獻金，未免太牽強。但是，為何扁珍可以振振有詞的說，這些財團送給國民黨更多，天下烏鴉一般黑，卻選擇性只辦他們一家人!我們這一部眼高手低的政治獻金法，難辭其咎。

以台灣選舉、尤其是總統選舉競選經費之龐大，政治獻金法卻規定，個人對參選人每年捐贈總額不得超過十萬元，營利事業不得超過一百萬。立委諸公定下如此嚴格的標準，並非著眼於政治清明的理想，事實上，整部政治獻金法，完全欠缺讓此一高標準實現的條件。

舉例言之，美國一九七四年的《聯邦選舉競選法》修正案中，特別設立「聯邦選舉委員會」，該委員會具調查權及專業幕僚，才可能落實對不實申報的查核；反觀我們的政治獻金法，受理政治獻金之申報機關是監察院，監委具調查權，而且負責公職人員財產申報，但是，自政治獻金法實施以來，不少立委公開私下都曾表示，他們申報的數字，不足實收的二分之一，但可曾見到監察院調查或處罰任何一個案例？

而即使監察院真的決定動大刀懲處，又有何工具可用？不誠實申報政治獻金的政治人物及政黨，只要面對最多一百萬元的行政罰鍰；如此不痛不癢的罰則，形同鼓勵政治人物說謊、進而犯法，因為，以台灣選舉競爭之激烈，政治人物當然寧願無所顧忌的募款，可以獲取龐大的政經利益；反正，不會有人認真去查，真的不幸被查到了，罰鍰不過一百萬。最具經濟理性的政客們，怎麼會不知道如何算這筆帳！

當然，政客是最具適應力的動物，再如何先進的政治獻金法制，他們都可以找到漏洞、繞道而行。美國在水門事件之後痛下決心立法的《聯邦選舉競選法》，就可以看出這一段獻金法制的「改革無用史」，法不斷的訂定，選舉經費也跟著等比級數上升，歐巴馬的募款經費再次破了前人的記錄。

因此，研究政治獻金的專家們建議，改革的核心在陽光及透明。與其定下超高標準防堵，還不如適度的承認政治獻金是必要之惡，採取較務實的捐款上限，但如果不誠實申報，將面臨嚴重的刑責。要讓我們的政治獻金法不再是一部偽善的法律，或成為扁珍脫罪的藉口，這些是立委諸公未來修法必須考慮的方向。

A Bad Law is Not The Law

A Bad Law is Not The Law
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 23, 2009

Two years ago, one million people took to the streets to denounce corruption and demand that Ah-Bian step down. Prosecutors charged them with violating the Parade and Assembly Law. Yesterday the Taipei District Court Full Court pronounced Shih Ming-teh, Jane Tin-jie, Wei Qian Feng, Fan Ke-qin, Yao Li-ming, and 16 others not guilty. The legislature is considering amending the law. The court’s ruling show how the Parade and Assembly Law has become an obstacle to the rule of law.

The court’s not guilty ruling may have take some legal experts by surprise. They may even had take many of the defendants by surprise. One of the greatest challenges for the rule of law is the existence of a bad law. Is a bad law still the law? Or is a bad law not a law? In the West this philosophy of law dilemma has been debated for nearly a thousand years. Under such circumstances, judges must decide what constitutes a just ruling. In this case the Taipei District Court’s three judges found the defendants not guilty. Their ruling implied that the Parade and Assembly Law was a bad law. But since the Legislative Yuan is amending the law, the trial court should not pre-empt it. Although the defendants asked the Grand Justices for a ruling on the constitutionality of the Parade and Assembly Law, the District Court did not stop its indictment proceedings. The judges adopted a conservative approach in dealing with their own constitutional review function. They dealt with the enforcement dilemma created by a bad law by presuming it was constitutional. They did not shirk their responsibility to be an impartial referee.

The Parade and Assembly Law is a bad law, not because some pundits have jumped to this conclusion, but ruling party succession leads to rival political parties taking turns making the identical accusations. Although this law purports to protect of freedom of assembly, it establishes all sorts of technical obstacles to freedome of assembly. In particular, it targets political rallies and marches. This case makes this unmistakably clear. The government agency in charge did not permit the Red Shirt Army to march because the Red Shirt Army had political motives, and was not merely participating in National Day celebrations. The agency’s reasoning was inconsistent with due process. The way the Parade and Assembly Law is enforced makes it clear its intent was to limit political demonstrations. It doesn’t matter if the demonstration is peaceful. Obviously a Parade and Assembly Law intended to suppress political expression conflicts with freedom of assembly and speech, core values guaranteed by the constitution. That is why the Parade and Assembly Law is a bad law that a nation under the rule of law cannot tolerate.

To peacefully assemble or march to express one’s views about society or the government, is a legitimate activity that a democratic system must respect. Government should take the initiative to provide timely and appropriate venues for the public to peacefully exercise their right of public assembly. The more people assemble peacefully, the more obvious it is the system has political legitimacy. Millions of people taking to the streets may upset those in power. But those in power feeling upset is no reason to prohibit peaceful assembly. Over one million Red Shirt Army members repeatedly gathered on the streets of Taipei. Every time they concluded their activities peacefully. They were a model of mature large-scale political assembly. A handful of technical violations warrant, at best, a few fines. When the public protested against those in power, they weren’t necessarily repudiating the lawful authority of the ruling administration. Once the ruling administration steps down, the Red Shirt Army’s charges of corruption can be verified by means of the judicial process. Sure enough, their charges turned out to be neither groundless nor unfounded.

If corrupt rulers have yet to be convicted of corruption, yet the government suppresses peaceful protest, that proves the Parade and Assembly Law is a bad law that cannot be tolerated under constitutional government.

The courts once held that although the Parade and Assembly Law was a bad law, it was still the law. They imprisoned many people they shouldn’t have. This time the court used its judgment. It applied the principle of proportionality. It refused to use a bad law to imprison political dissidents. It was a rare case of a double negative making a positive. If people understand how the protection of fundamental rights prevents the abuse of power and safeguards constitutional government. they will affirm the ruling. They will not challenge the court’s decision. They will not cling to the outdated notion that a bad law is still the law. They will not prolong the political evil known as the Parade and Assembly Law.

The District Court ruling was well written. We look forward to the legislative branch reviewing and amending the Parade and Assembly Law as soon as possible. We would also remind public leaders that mass movements are unpredictable. Public leaders must exercise self-restraint, and help to maintain social order. Freedom of speech and social order are both rights protected by constitutional government. You can have your cake and eat it too. The court must stay the course, and have the guts to uphold justice. We hope the Legislative Yuan will follow the example set by the court when it acquitted the defendants. We hope it will swiftly pass an amendment, putting an end to the Parade and Assembly Law.

中時電子報
中國時報 　2009.02.23
社論－肯定一樁彰顯惡法非法的判決
本報訊

兩年前百萬紅衫軍群眾上街反貪倒扁遊行，遭到檢方以違反集遊法的罪名起訴，日昨台北地方法院合議庭宣判，施明德、簡錫?、魏千峰、范可欽、姚立明等十六人均無罪。正待立法院研議修法的集遊法，因為此項法院裁判，正好彰顯其已成為法治進步的絆腳石。

法院這項無罪判決，或許令一些法界人士感到意外，甚至超出諸多當事者的料想。此中對法治最大的挑戰，就是司法面對一部惡法，究竟該是以惡法亦法，還是惡法非法？這是在西方辯論達千年的法律哲學問題，必須要在法院法官決定什麼是「正義」的裁判過程中做取捨。本案由台北地院三位法官組成的合議庭做成的無罪判決，在判決當中含蓄地表達了集遊法可能是一部惡法，但應由立法院儘速從事修法審議，不應由個案審判的法院越俎代庖的意思。雖然本案中被告曾聲請大法官解釋集遊法違反憲法，地方法院並未停止訴訟程序；法官以保守而審慎的態度面對自身違憲審查功能，優先使用合憲解釋的方法處理惡法帶來的執法難題，但也不致違背司法交付正義裁判的責任。

集遊法是一部惡法，絕不只是來自輿論的輕率評價，而是政黨輪替的過程中，輪流下野的政黨異口同聲的指責。此法雖號稱是以保障集會遊行自由為其宗旨，卻設下種種技術障礙壓抑集會遊行活動，尤其以政治群眾集會遊行做為主要防範箝制的對象。此點在本案中展露無遺。法院認為主管機關以紅衫群眾活動具有政治意圖，與單純參與國慶活動有別，所以不許遊行。此一裁決不僅不符正當程序，也證實了現行集遊法下的執法行為，正是在限制政治意圖的遊行活動。一部不問手段是否和平，概以抑制政治意圖為能事的集遊法，當然牴觸了憲法保障集會遊行與言論自由的核心價值；說它是法治國家不容許存在的惡法，道理正在於此。

和平從事集會遊行，向政府或社會表達公民意見，是民主政治中必須受到尊重的正當活動。政府應主動提供適時且適當的場地促使集會遊行權利的和平行使。參加和平集會遊行的人數愈多，民主正當性愈益明顯；百萬人上街雖然必定使得執政者感到震懾，但是執政者的震懾，不是不許和平集會遊行的理由。紅衫群眾數以十萬、百萬計的人口幾度出現在台北街頭，每次又均能以和平的方式收場，其實堪稱大規模政治性集會遊行的成熟範例。若干技術性的違規舉動，充其量只該是施以行政罰而施以刑罰的理由。當年群眾對於執政者貪腐的抗議，未必非法否定執政者的合法統治；直到執政者下台之後，才有機會逐漸在司法的程序中驗證紅衫遊行控訴貪腐，既非空穴來風，也非杞人憂天。

現在如果貪腐的執政者尚未定罪，卻要用刑罰率先制裁和平遊行的抗議者，就足以證明集遊法確是一部絕不能見容於民主憲政的惡法了。

集遊惡法過去在法院的案例之中，受到惡法亦法的觀念作崇，曾使許多不該坐牢的人們坐牢，這次法院以清明的智慧，妥善運用比例原則，拒絕使用惡法繩之不該下獄的政治異議人士，是司法一次難得的擾亂反正。人們如果對於撐持民主憲政、保障基本權利、防止權力濫用的信念有所認識，就該給予極大的肯定，而不是帶著惡法亦惡的思想餘緒，質疑法院的判決，加深集遊惡法的政治罪孽。

地方法院的判決書寫得好，一面期待立法部門盡速審查集遊法的修正草案，一面提醒發起群眾集會遊行的社會意見領袖，瞭解群眾活動的不可預測性，應充分自制，配合維持社會秩序和平。言論自由與社會和平，是民主憲政保障集會遊行權利，可以兼得的魚與熊掌，集遊法見不及此，法院則持平穩重，發揮了司法正義應有的道德勇氣。希望立法院能在無罪判決聲中，見賢思齊，加速修法，結束集遊惡法肆虐的時代。

A Bad Law is Not The Law

A Bad Law is Not The Law
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 23, 2009

Two years ago, one million people took to the streets to denounce corruption and demand that Ah-Bian step down. Prosecutors charged them with violating the Parade and Assembly Law. Yesterday the Taipei District Court Full Court pronounced Shih Ming-teh, Jane Tin-jie, Wei Qian Feng, Fan Ke-qin, Yao Li-ming, and 16 others not guilty. The legislature is considering amending the law. The court’s ruling show how the Parade and Assembly Law has become an obstacle to the rule of law.

The court’s not guilty ruling may have take some legal experts by surprise. They may even had take many of the defendants by surprise. One of the greatest challenges for the rule of law is the existence of a bad law. Is a bad law still the law? Or is a bad law not a law? In the West this philosophy of law dilemma has been debated for nearly a thousand years. Under such circumstances, judges must decide what constitutes a just ruling. In this case the Taipei District Court’s three judges found the defendants not guilty. Their ruling implied that the Parade and Assembly Law was a bad law. But since the Legislative Yuan is amending the law, the trial court should not pre-empt it. Although the defendants asked the Grand Justices for a ruling on the constitutionality of the Parade and Assembly Law, the District Court did not stop its indictment proceedings. The judges adopted a conservative approach in dealing with their own constitutional review function. They dealt with the enforcement dilemma created by a bad law by presuming it was constitutional. They did not shirk their responsibility to be an impartial referee.

The Parade and Assembly Law is a bad law, not because some pundits have jumped to this conclusion, but ruling party succession leads to rival political parties taking turns making the identical accusations. Although this law purports to protect of freedom of assembly, it establishes all sorts of technical obstacles to freedome of assembly. In particular, it targets political rallies and marches. This case makes this unmistakably clear. The government agency in charge did not permit the Red Shirt Army to march because the Red Shirt Army had political motives, and was not merely participating in National Day celebrations. The agency’s reasoning was inconsistent with due process. The way the Parade and Assembly Law is enforced makes it clear its intent was to limit political demonstrations. It doesn’t matter if the demonstration is peaceful. Obviously a Parade and Assembly Law intended to suppress political expression conflicts with freedom of assembly and speech, core values guaranteed by the constitution. That is why the Parade and Assembly Law is a bad law that a nation under the rule of law cannot tolerate.

To peacefully assemble or march to express one’s views about society or the government, is a legitimate activity that a democratic system must respect. Government should take the initiative to provide timely and appropriate venues for the public to peacefully exercise their right of public assembly. The more people assemble peacefully, the more obvious it is the system has political legitimacy. Millions of people taking to the streets may upset those in power. But those in power feeling upset is no reason to prohibit peaceful assembly. Over one million Red Shirt Army members repeatedly gathered on the streets of Taipei. Every time they concluded their activities peacefully. They were a model of mature large-scale political assembly. A handful of technical violations warrant, at best, a few fines. When the public protested against those in power, they weren’t necessarily repudiating the lawful authority of the ruling administration. Once the ruling administration steps down, the Red Shirt Army’s charges of corruption can be verified by means of the judicial process. Sure enough, their charges turned out to be neither groundless nor unfounded.

If corrupt rulers have yet to be convicted of corruption, yet the government suppresses peaceful protest, that proves the Parade and Assembly Law is a bad law that cannot be tolerated under constitutional government.

The courts once held that although the Parade and Assembly Law was a bad law, it was still the law. They imprisoned many people they shouldn’t have. This time the court used its judgment. It applied the principle of proportionality. It refused to use a bad law to imprison political dissidents. It was a rare case of a double negative making a positive. If people understand how the protection of fundamental rights prevents the abuse of power and safeguards constitutional government. they will affirm the ruling. They will not challenge the court’s decision. They will not cling to the outdated notion that a bad law is still the law. They will not prolong the political evil known as the Parade and Assembly Law.

The District Court ruling was well written. We look forward to the legislative branch reviewing and amending the Parade and Assembly Law as soon as possible. We would also remind public leaders that mass movements are unpredictable. Public leaders must exercise self-restraint, and help to maintain social order. Freedom of speech and social order are both rights protected by constitutional government. You can have your cake and eat it too. The court must stay the course, and have the guts to uphold justice. We hope the Legislative Yuan will follow the example set by the court when it acquitted the defendants. We hope it will swiftly pass an amendment, putting an end to the Parade and Assembly Law.

中時電子報
中國時報 　2009.02.23
社論－肯定一樁彰顯惡法非法的判決
本報訊

兩年前百萬紅衫軍群眾上街反貪倒扁遊行，遭到檢方以違反集遊法的罪名起訴，日昨台北地方法院合議庭宣判，施明德、簡錫?、魏千峰、范可欽、姚立明等十六人均無罪。正待立法院研議修法的集遊法，因為此項法院裁判，正好彰顯其已成為法治進步的絆腳石。

法院這項無罪判決，或許令一些法界人士感到意外，甚至超出諸多當事者的料想。此中對法治最大的挑戰，就是司法面對一部惡法，究竟該是以惡法亦法，還是惡法非法？這是在西方辯論達千年的法律哲學問題，必須要在法院法官決定什麼是「正義」的裁判過程中做取捨。本案由台北地院三位法官組成的合議庭做成的無罪判決，在判決當中含蓄地表達了集遊法可能是一部惡法，但應由立法院儘速從事修法審議，不應由個案審判的法院越俎代庖的意思。雖然本案中被告曾聲請大法官解釋集遊法違反憲法，地方法院並未停止訴訟程序；法官以保守而審慎的態度面對自身違憲審查功能，優先使用合憲解釋的方法處理惡法帶來的執法難題，但也不致違背司法交付正義裁判的責任。

集遊法是一部惡法，絕不只是來自輿論的輕率評價，而是政黨輪替的過程中，輪流下野的政黨異口同聲的指責。此法雖號稱是以保障集會遊行自由為其宗旨，卻設下種種技術障礙壓抑集會遊行活動，尤其以政治群眾集會遊行做為主要防範箝制的對象。此點在本案中展露無遺。法院認為主管機關以紅衫群眾活動具有政治意圖，與單純參與國慶活動有別，所以不許遊行。此一裁決不僅不符正當程序，也證實了現行集遊法下的執法行為，正是在限制政治意圖的遊行活動。一部不問手段是否和平，概以抑制政治意圖為能事的集遊法，當然牴觸了憲法保障集會遊行與言論自由的核心價值；說它是法治國家不容許存在的惡法，道理正在於此。

和平從事集會遊行，向政府或社會表達公民意見，是民主政治中必須受到尊重的正當活動。政府應主動提供適時且適當的場地促使集會遊行權利的和平行使。參加和平集會遊行的人數愈多，民主正當性愈益明顯；百萬人上街雖然必定使得執政者感到震懾，但是執政者的震懾，不是不許和平集會遊行的理由。紅衫群眾數以十萬、百萬計的人口幾度出現在台北街頭，每次又均能以和平的方式收場，其實堪稱大規模政治性集會遊行的成熟範例。若干技術性的違規舉動，充其量只該是施以行政罰而施以刑罰的理由。當年群眾對於執政者貪腐的抗議，未必非法否定執政者的合法統治；直到執政者下台之後，才有機會逐漸在司法的程序中驗證紅衫遊行控訴貪腐，既非空穴來風，也非杞人憂天。

現在如果貪腐的執政者尚未定罪，卻要用刑罰率先制裁和平遊行的抗議者，就足以證明集遊法確是一部絕不能見容於民主憲政的惡法了。

集遊惡法過去在法院的案例之中，受到惡法亦法的觀念作崇，曾使許多不該坐牢的人們坐牢，這次法院以清明的智慧，妥善運用比例原則，拒絕使用惡法繩之不該下獄的政治異議人士，是司法一次難得的擾亂反正。人們如果對於撐持民主憲政、保障基本權利、防止權力濫用的信念有所認識，就該給予極大的肯定，而不是帶著惡法亦惡的思想餘緒，質疑法院的判決，加深集遊惡法的政治罪孽。

地方法院的判決書寫得好，一面期待立法部門盡速審查集遊法的修正草案，一面提醒發起群眾集會遊行的社會意見領袖，瞭解群眾活動的不可預測性，應充分自制，配合維持社會秩序和平。言論自由與社會和平，是民主憲政保障集會遊行權利，可以兼得的魚與熊掌，集遊法見不及此，法院則持平穩重，發揮了司法正義應有的道德勇氣。希望立法院能在無罪判決聲中，見賢思齊，加速修法，結束集遊惡法肆虐的時代。