A Modus Vivendi Does Not Equal A Diplomatic Truce

A Modus Vivendi Does Not Equal A Diplomatic Truce
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 29, 2008

President Ma Ying-jeou has made a number of low-key visits and given a number of talks, including one on Kinmen. These talks have revealed the new tone of Ma’s diplomacy. They have also conveyed his hopes for “Cross-Strait Peace, Diplomatic Truce” to Beijing. But Beijing blocked Taipei’s attempt to become a WHA observer in May and recent attempts by Taipei’s allies to help us join United Nations agencies. This tells us that if Taipei is the only party serious about a Modus Vivendi and a Diplomatic Truce, then its efforts are in vain.

President Ma took advantage of his visit to elaborate on his Modus Vivendi. Reconciliation and cooperation would replace scorched-earth confrontation. It would establish a new diplomatic strategy, even as it attempted to expand Taipei’s breathing space. But President Ma’s remark that Taipei probably wouldn’t be able to increase the number of its allies was inappropriate and incomprehensible.

Taipei has long been mired in a diplomatic dilemma. Its sovereignty, dignity, and international breathing space have long been suppressed. The public on Taiwan yearns for international recognition. It hopes the nation’s sovereignty will be respected and recognized. Is that wrong? We want to fly our own flag. We want to call our nation by her official name. Is that wrong? If a foreign country truly identifies with the Republic of China, and hopes to establish diplomatic relations with us, should we refuse? Do we still want the international community to recognize us as a nation?

Ma’s Modus Vivendi will avoid wasting resources in a diplomatic tug of war. The public on Taiwan detests checkbook diplomacy. The international community views it with a jaundiced eye as well. Obsolete practices should be discarded. The current cross-Strait atmosphere is one of reconciliation. Beijing has temporarily stopped crowding Taipei’s international space. Taipei has gotten a temporary respite from nations attempting to play Taipei against Beijing.

But this is a fragile state of affairs. It could change at any time. If we cease defending our sovereignty, if we cease fighting for our survival, we will have bound our own hands and feet in advance, without receiving anything concrete in return. For a vulnerable nation faced with a powerful enemy, fighting for its survival, this is too naive and too risky.

Take for example participation in this year’s United Nations activities. We have made a strategic adjustment. No more high-profile attempts to join the UN under the name Taiwan, as either a member or an observer. Instead, we seek merely to join peripheral organizations. Compared to the past, this is a comparatively pragmatic approach. Taipei must first interact with the international community. Only then will it receive international support. But such interaction is bound to test Beijing’s bottom line. After all, if international organizations open their doors to Taipei, that will directly impact Beijing’s One China Policy. The One China Policy is flexible when applied to cross-Strait interaction, but not when applied to the international community. This is no surprise. Noisy attempts to “Join the UN” met with failure. Current low-key, pragmatic attempts to join peripheral organizations have met with the same results. This shows that for the moment at least, Beijing has no intention of yielding ground.

It has no intention of responding to the Ma administration’s pragmatic approach to United Nations membership. This means that even if Taipei adopts a lower profile, in the short term at least, it will receive little in return. Joining the United Nations is difficult. We don’t need to be in a hurry to fight the toughest battles.

That does not mean however that we can relax our defense of the Republic of China’s sovereignty. Sovereignty is not a bargaining chip. Sovereignty is non-negotiable. The legitimate defense of sovereignty must not be confused with reckless provocations on behalf of Taiwan independence. If any high-ranking government officials are entertaining thoughts of bargaining away our sovereignty, then they are neglecting their duties, betraying the nation’s interests, and betraying the public trust. If the Republic of China’s survival is undermined, the results may be irremediable. Those in power must be judicious.

The new administration has been in office for three months. The larger environment has undergone a downturn. Only the lifting of controls on cross-Strait exchanges has yielded immediate and tangible results. As a result, the public may be too eager to accommodate Beijing. If the Ma administration is overly dependent upon Beijing’s goodwill, it may become confused about what is in the national interest. At the very least, it may confuse the public and the international community.

No high-ranking government official is willing to sacrifice the Republic of China’s sovereignty. But when it comes to the details, it is better to be safe than sorry. We must hold on to our chips. Our backs are to the wall. We cannot blindly trust the other side’s goodwill. Since Ma Ying-jeou became president, he has actively promoted cross-Strait reconciliation. But we must be prepared. No matter how good cross-Strait relations may be, irreconcilable conflicts remain. There will inevitably be confrontation and even conflict. President Ma Ying-jeou must show the public on Taiwan his determination. The public must believe he knows how to deal with Beijing, and is able to defend the Republic of China’s sovereignty and national interests.

中時電子報
中國時報 　2008.08.29
爭取外交空間 非休兵才有活路
中時社論

馬 英九總統先後藉著低調出訪，金門談話等作為，不僅展現了新的外交基調，也一定程度向大陸傳達了企望「兩岸和平、外交休兵」的理念，然而從今年五月提案成為 ＷＨＡ觀察員，到最近友邦提案讓台灣參與聯合國機構，中國都一概封殺。這意味不論是「活路外交」還是「外交休兵」，如果只有台灣這一邊表達善意，恐怕依舊 是徒勞無功。

馬總統先前藉出訪之便，曾闡述了其「活路外交」理念。其中揭示的以和解合作取代焦土對抗，確實為外交提出新的策略方向，為台灣日漸窒息的國際空間找到新的開拓機會。然而，由馬總統之口親自說出台灣未來可能不會再增加邦交國，卻是極不適宜而且令人難以理解的。

台 灣一直處於外交困境，主權尊嚴及國際生存空間受到嚴重封殺打壓，民眾長期以來始終渴望國際社會承認我們的國家地位。一個國家希望主權地位受到尊重與認可， 有什麼不對？我們希望自己國家的國旗能飄揚、國名能被正式使用，難道錯了嗎？萬一有某個國家真的認同台灣，有意和我國建交，而且沒有獅子大開口，難道我們 要拒絕嗎？到底在國際社會中，還要不要人家承認我們是個國家？

「活路外交」主張不要虛耗資源進行外交角力，那是沒 錯，台灣民眾厭惡銀彈外交，國際社會的觀感也不佳，舊有的作法確實應該改弦易轍。在目前兩岸和解的大氣氛下，中共暫時放緩壓縮台灣國際空間的動作，對企圖 兩頭喊價的國家冷淡以對，台灣得以稍有喘息，的確也是事實，但這個事實存在得非常脆弱，隨時可以消失。我們如果就此停下在國際間捍衛主權、爭取生存的動 作，還沒得到具體獲利就先自縛手腳，對於一個面對強敵陷於生存危機中的弱勢國家，這恐怕太天真也太冒險了一點。

以今 年參與聯合國的活動為例，策略上已經都做了調整，不再高調地要求以台灣名義加入成為會員或觀察員，而是尋求參與外圍周邊組織的機會。相較於過往，這已經是 比較務實的作法，因為台灣必須先建立與國際社會的綿密互動，才能爭取更多國際支持。只不過這勢必將對中共的底線形成嚴酷考驗，畢竟在國際組織中替台灣開一 扇門，就會直接衝擊到中共的一中政策，而一中政策的彈性現在還只存在於兩岸互動間，並沒有應用在國際社會上。而情勢發展也確實沒有令人意外，昔日敲鑼打鼓 要「入聯」不成，如今低調務實的尋求參與專門機構照樣不成，充分顯示北京現階段似乎無意以任何善意，來回應馬政府在參與聯合國上的務實調整。這也意味，就 算台灣在參與聯合國上放低姿態，恐怕短期內換不到什麼，只是聯合國本來就是高難度挑戰，我們也不必先忙著撿硬仗來打。

不 過，這絕不意味著我們在捍衛台灣主權上有絲毫的放鬆，主權是不能拿來當籌碼的，維護主權的動作亦然。對於主權的正當防衛，不能與昔日冒進的台獨挑釁混為一 談。如任何政府高層存有這樣想法，不但是對自己職責的輕忽怠惰，更將是對國家利益及人民付託的嚴重背叛。而且，台灣的國際生存如果因此而受到傷害，其結果 可能無法彌補，當政者不可不慎。

新政府成立三個月，在大環境的不景氣下，只有兩岸鬆綁交流活絡看得到立即成效。但也因為如此，有時給人政績似乎全靠對岸配合埋單的感覺。如果馬政府太依賴中共的善意，可能會導致國家利益的優先順序遭到混淆，或至少讓民眾及國際社會有混淆之感。

我 們相信政府高層沒有人願意犧牲台灣主權，但在許多細節的處理上，必須步步為營慎重以對，不能在手上不留籌碼、背後毫無退路的狀況下，一股腦地信賴對方的善 意。馬英九就任總統以來，積極推動兩岸和解，但大家必須有心理準備，兩岸目前再怎麼交好，有些基本矛盾終究存在，還是會有出現對立甚至直接衝突的時候。馬 英九總統必須向台灣民眾展示決心，讓大家相信，他能夠和中共打交道，更能夠捍衛台灣的主權利益。

A Modus Vivendi Does Not Equal A Diplomatic Truce

A Modus Vivendi Does Not Equal A Diplomatic Truce
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 29, 2008

President Ma Ying-jeou has made a number of low-key visits and given a number of talks, including one on Kinmen. These talks have revealed the new tone of Ma’s diplomacy. They have also conveyed his hopes for “Cross-Strait Peace, Diplomatic Truce” to Beijing. But Beijing blocked Taipei’s attempt to become a WHA observer in May and recent attempts by Taipei’s allies to help us join United Nations agencies. This tells us that if Taipei is the only party serious about a Modus Vivendi and a Diplomatic Truce, then its efforts are in vain.

President Ma took advantage of his visit to elaborate on his Modus Vivendi. Reconciliation and cooperation would replace scorched-earth confrontation. It would establish a new diplomatic strategy, even as it attempted to expand Taipei’s breathing space. But President Ma’s remark that Taipei probably wouldn’t be able to increase the number of its allies was inappropriate and incomprehensible.

Taipei has long been mired in a diplomatic dilemma. Its sovereignty, dignity, and international breathing space have long been suppressed. The public on Taiwan yearns for international recognition. It hopes the nation’s sovereignty will be respected and recognized. Is that wrong? We want to fly our own flag. We want to call our nation by her official name. Is that wrong? If a foreign country truly identifies with the Republic of China, and hopes to establish diplomatic relations with us, should we refuse? Do we still want the international community to recognize us as a nation?

Ma’s Modus Vivendi will avoid wasting resources in a diplomatic tug of war. The public on Taiwan detests checkbook diplomacy. The international community views it with a jaundiced eye as well. Obsolete practices should be discarded. The current cross-Strait atmosphere is one of reconciliation. Beijing has temporarily stopped crowding Taipei’s international space. Taipei has gotten a temporary respite from nations attempting to play Taipei against Beijing.

But this is a fragile state of affairs. It could change at any time. If we cease defending our sovereignty, if we cease fighting for our survival, we will have bound our own hands and feet in advance, without receiving anything concrete in return. For a vulnerable nation faced with a powerful enemy, fighting for its survival, this is too naive and too risky.

Take for example participation in this year’s United Nations activities. We have made a strategic adjustment. No more high-profile attempts to join the UN under the name Taiwan, as either a member or an observer. Instead, we seek merely to join peripheral organizations. Compared to the past, this is a comparatively pragmatic approach. Taipei must first interact with the international community. Only then will it receive international support. But such interaction is bound to test Beijing’s bottom line. After all, if international organizations open their doors to Taipei, that will directly impact Beijing’s One China Policy. The One China Policy is flexible when applied to cross-Strait interaction, but not when applied to the international community. This is no surprise. Noisy attempts to “Join the UN” met with failure. Current low-key, pragmatic attempts to join peripheral organizations have met with the same results. This shows that for the moment at least, Beijing has no intention of yielding ground.

It has no intention of responding to the Ma administration’s pragmatic approach to United Nations membership. This means that even if Taipei adopts a lower profile, in the short term at least, it will receive little in return. Joining the United Nations is difficult. We don’t need to be in a hurry to fight the toughest battles.

That does not mean however that we can relax our defense of the Republic of China’s sovereignty. Sovereignty is not a bargaining chip. Sovereignty is non-negotiable. The legitimate defense of sovereignty must not be confused with reckless provocations on behalf of Taiwan independence. If any high-ranking government officials are entertaining thoughts of bargaining away our sovereignty, then they are neglecting their duties, betraying the nation’s interests, and betraying the public trust. If the Republic of China’s survival is undermined, the results may be irremediable. Those in power must be judicious.

The new administration has been in office for three months. The larger environment has undergone a downturn. Only the lifting of controls on cross-Strait exchanges has yielded immediate and tangible results. As a result, the public may be too eager to accommodate Beijing. If the Ma administration is overly dependent upon Beijing’s goodwill, it may become confused about what is in the national interest. At the very least, it may confuse the public and the international community.

No high-ranking government official is willing to sacrifice the Republic of China’s sovereignty. But when it comes to the details, it is better to be safe than sorry. We must hold on to our chips. Our backs are to the wall. We cannot blindly trust the other side’s goodwill. Since Ma Ying-jeou became president, he has actively promoted cross-Strait reconciliation. But we must be prepared. No matter how good cross-Strait relations may be, irreconcilable conflicts remain. There will inevitably be confrontation and even conflict. President Ma Ying-jeou must show the public on Taiwan his determination. The public must believe he knows how to deal with Beijing, and is able to defend the Republic of China’s sovereignty and national interests.

中時電子報
中國時報 　2008.08.29
爭取外交空間 非休兵才有活路
中時社論

馬 英九總統先後藉著低調出訪，金門談話等作為，不僅展現了新的外交基調，也一定程度向大陸傳達了企望「兩岸和平、外交休兵」的理念，然而從今年五月提案成為 ＷＨＡ觀察員，到最近友邦提案讓台灣參與聯合國機構，中國都一概封殺。這意味不論是「活路外交」還是「外交休兵」，如果只有台灣這一邊表達善意，恐怕依舊 是徒勞無功。

馬總統先前藉出訪之便，曾闡述了其「活路外交」理念。其中揭示的以和解合作取代焦土對抗，確實為外交提出新的策略方向，為台灣日漸窒息的國際空間找到新的開拓機會。然而，由馬總統之口親自說出台灣未來可能不會再增加邦交國，卻是極不適宜而且令人難以理解的。

台 灣一直處於外交困境，主權尊嚴及國際生存空間受到嚴重封殺打壓，民眾長期以來始終渴望國際社會承認我們的國家地位。一個國家希望主權地位受到尊重與認可， 有什麼不對？我們希望自己國家的國旗能飄揚、國名能被正式使用，難道錯了嗎？萬一有某個國家真的認同台灣，有意和我國建交，而且沒有獅子大開口，難道我們 要拒絕嗎？到底在國際社會中，還要不要人家承認我們是個國家？

「活路外交」主張不要虛耗資源進行外交角力，那是沒 錯，台灣民眾厭惡銀彈外交，國際社會的觀感也不佳，舊有的作法確實應該改弦易轍。在目前兩岸和解的大氣氛下，中共暫時放緩壓縮台灣國際空間的動作，對企圖 兩頭喊價的國家冷淡以對，台灣得以稍有喘息，的確也是事實，但這個事實存在得非常脆弱，隨時可以消失。我們如果就此停下在國際間捍衛主權、爭取生存的動 作，還沒得到具體獲利就先自縛手腳，對於一個面對強敵陷於生存危機中的弱勢國家，這恐怕太天真也太冒險了一點。

以今 年參與聯合國的活動為例，策略上已經都做了調整，不再高調地要求以台灣名義加入成為會員或觀察員，而是尋求參與外圍周邊組織的機會。相較於過往，這已經是 比較務實的作法，因為台灣必須先建立與國際社會的綿密互動，才能爭取更多國際支持。只不過這勢必將對中共的底線形成嚴酷考驗，畢竟在國際組織中替台灣開一 扇門，就會直接衝擊到中共的一中政策，而一中政策的彈性現在還只存在於兩岸互動間，並沒有應用在國際社會上。而情勢發展也確實沒有令人意外，昔日敲鑼打鼓 要「入聯」不成，如今低調務實的尋求參與專門機構照樣不成，充分顯示北京現階段似乎無意以任何善意，來回應馬政府在參與聯合國上的務實調整。這也意味，就 算台灣在參與聯合國上放低姿態，恐怕短期內換不到什麼，只是聯合國本來就是高難度挑戰，我們也不必先忙著撿硬仗來打。

不 過，這絕不意味著我們在捍衛台灣主權上有絲毫的放鬆，主權是不能拿來當籌碼的，維護主權的動作亦然。對於主權的正當防衛，不能與昔日冒進的台獨挑釁混為一 談。如任何政府高層存有這樣想法，不但是對自己職責的輕忽怠惰，更將是對國家利益及人民付託的嚴重背叛。而且，台灣的國際生存如果因此而受到傷害，其結果 可能無法彌補，當政者不可不慎。

新政府成立三個月，在大環境的不景氣下，只有兩岸鬆綁交流活絡看得到立即成效。但也因為如此，有時給人政績似乎全靠對岸配合埋單的感覺。如果馬政府太依賴中共的善意，可能會導致國家利益的優先順序遭到混淆，或至少讓民眾及國際社會有混淆之感。

我 們相信政府高層沒有人願意犧牲台灣主權，但在許多細節的處理上，必須步步為營慎重以對，不能在手上不留籌碼、背後毫無退路的狀況下，一股腦地信賴對方的善 意。馬英九就任總統以來，積極推動兩岸和解，但大家必須有心理準備，兩岸目前再怎麼交好，有些基本矛盾終究存在，還是會有出現對立甚至直接衝突的時候。馬 英九總統必須向台灣民眾展示決心，讓大家相信，他能夠和中共打交道，更能夠捍衛台灣的主權利益。

The New Administration’s First One Hundred Days:

The New Administration’s First One Hundred Days:
Just Squeaking By
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 28, 2008

The Ma administration has been in office for nearly 100 days. It has undergone three months of turmoil. President Ma Ying-jeou and Premier Liu Chao-hsuan’s satisfaction ratings have rebounded significantly from a month ago. But given the larger economic picture and the market outlook, the Ma administration has little cause for joy.

According to a recent China Times poll, Ma Ying-jeou’s approval rating jumped 10 percentage points, to 46 percent. Liu Chao-hsuan’s approval rating also reached a new high at 42 percent. Public confidence in his administration rose to 59 percent. But 42 percent of the public remained unhappy with his cabinet’s performance. Among his cabinet members, Minister of Justice Wang Ching-feng received the highest approval rating. The logical conclusion is that the Ma administration’s and Liu cabinet’s increased approval ratings reflect increased dissatisfaction with the Chen family’s money-laundering scandals. The public supports the Ma administration primarily because they want clean government and prosecution of corruption. But the economic downturn is also a reason for the Chen Shui-bian administration’s downfall. For the public on Taiwan, scandals must be investigated. But the economy must also be revived. After all, the economy is the peoples’ lifeline.

Unfortunately the Council for Economic Planning has issued a “blue light” warning for July, indicating an economic recession. Leading economic indicators show an integrated score of 107.4. Since last November we have experienced nine consecutive months of decline. July export orders fell to an annual rate of only 50.52 percent. Orders from mainland China fell 1.73 percent, establishing record lows for recent years. Given these figures, one can hardly expect the public to be pleased with the government’s handling of the economy.

During the Liu cabinet’s first month in office, it declared its determination to implement the Ma administration’s policies. It promised to increase economic growth to 6 percent. Three months later, this check has bounced. Liu Chao-hsuan admitted bluntly, “Since we cannot achieve it, all we can do is explain why not.” Why isn’t the economy growing as fast as predicted before the presidential election? One. Global growth is slower than expected. This includes the US subprime mortgage crisis, which has had more serious repercussions than expected. Two. Mainland tourism to Taiwan. Domestic consumption has not been as great as expected. Policies to stimulate domestic demand will require more time to take effect. Unfortunately time waits for no man. Premier Liu is a smart man. He is well aware of his situation. Ma Ying-jeou can’t give Liu much more leeway during Ma’s first term.

The Liu cabinet took office two months ago. It hastily responded to rising oil prices. It got its lumps attempting to curb inflation. Liu set a six month deadline for himself when he introduced his budget and policy measures. Soon afterwards, the typhoon season began. Premier Liu was forced to deal with flood control problems that have been out of control for years. He revised his six-month budget and policy plans, and started over, determined to take a longer term approach to problems. This time he gave his cabinet and the administration a one and a half year time frame. Frankly, both the six month and one and a half year time frames are bizarre and unprecedented. The Chen Shui-bian administration set for itself five year and eight year time frames, and would have preferred time frames that stretched past 2008 or even 2012.

Liu Chao-hsuan doesn’t have as much time to spare. The Liu cabinet’s department heads are seasoned veterans who have returned to the battlefield for one last battle. They cannot allow themselves that much time. The county magistrate and city mayor elections will be held next year. The legislative elections will be held the year after that. Premier Liu’s cabinet can serve only as Ma Ying-jeou’s vanguard. After that, the baton gets passed to a “Committee to Re-elect the President.” But if the vanguard has nothing to show, it will be impossible for any re-election committee to win a second term. The challenges the Liu cabinet faces are daunting.

How much has the Liu cabinet done over the past three months? Actually, quite a bit. It has allowed direct cross-Strait weekend flights, something prohibited for the past eight years. It has allowed mainland tourists to visit Taiwan. It has lifted the cap on mainland-bound investments. It has allowed Taiwan businesses to return to Taiwan and list their companies on the Taiwan stock exchange. Unfortunately cross-Strait economic policy has failed to achieve the expected results. Merely loosening cross-strait restrictions on the economy has a limited impact. Does the administration have another card it can play? So far, we see nothing. Premier Liu has been in office nearly 100 days. He told the media that after the Olympics he would start anew, implementing policies much more rapidly. Premier Liu knows that if cross-Strait policy measures can be implemented more swiftly than in the past, the economic situation may improve more swiftly than originally expected. The question is, can they be? What if the mainland economy declines following the Beijing Olympics? For the moment we can’t say. The only certainty is that if the Liu cabinet bases its economic performance exclusively on uncertain mainland factors, the risk is considerable.

The Ma administration’s polls numbers have rebounded this month. The Legislative Yuan has adjourned. The Chen family’s money-laundering scandal has erupted. The Liu cabinet is outside the storm circle. But the Legislative Yuan will convene again in September. The Liu cabinet will inevitably have to face these problems. Only alleviating the domestic and international factors behind Taiwan’s economic slump will win public applause.

中國時報 　2008.08.28
百日新政 只能算勉強及格
中時社論

馬政府執政即將屆滿一百日，走過波折的三個多月，比諸前一個月的慘況，不論是馬英九總統或劉兆玄內閣的整體施政滿意度，都有明顯回升，但對比整體經濟情勢和市景情況，馬政府實在沒有太多高興的理由。

根據本報最近所做的民調，馬英九的聲望跳升十個百分點，達到四六％，閣揆劉兆玄滿意度也創下四二％的新高。同時，國人對馬政府信心增強至五九％，但還是有四二％的民眾，對行政團隊的績效感到失望。而閣員中，人氣指數最高的則是法務部長王清峰，合理推斷馬政府、劉內閣滿意度的提升，很大部分是拜扁家洗錢案所賜。清廉政府查弊肅貪，正是馬政府獲得人民支持的關鍵；但是，經濟低迷、民生不振，也是扁政府下台的原因。對台灣人民而言，弊案當然要查，但是，經濟豈能不振！畢竟經濟才是台灣的命脈。

偏偏經建會才公布的七月份景氣燈號轉入代表低迷的藍燈，其中可判斷未來景氣走勢的領先指標綜合分數一○ 七．四，是自去年十一月起，連續第九個月下滑。七月外銷訂單年增率降到只有五．五二％，來自中國大陸的訂單更遽降為一．七三％，均創下近年新低，從這些數字看來，要民眾對政府施政感到滿意，當然困難。

劉內閣就任第一個月，就表明要以落實馬政策為優先要務，三個月過去，六％經濟成長率的承諾，就是第一張的跳票。劉兆玄坦言，「達不到也只能向人民說清楚。」台灣景氣為何未如總統大選前所呈現的一派樂觀？一方面，國際情勢比預期更要走緩，包括美國次貸及二房等風波，導致後續影響比預期中嚴重；二方面，陸客來台、內需消費等都不如預期，擴大內需要相關政策措施，距離發酵出一點成果還需要時間。只是，時間不等人，劉揆是聰明人，他太清楚自己的定位，在馬英九首任任期裡，也沒有太多時間可以分配給他。

這樣說吧，劉內閣就任前兩個月，手忙腳亂因應油物價高漲，抑制通膨就讓劉揆滿頭包，當時他推出的預算和政策措施都是以「半年」為期；緊接著，颱風季節開始，劉揆又忙不迭地處理長年失控的治水大問題，修正了半年預算和政策計畫，重新調整腳步，要從「長期深耕」的角度出發，這個時候他給自己和閣員的施政計畫是以「一年半」為期。坦白講，不論是半年為期或者一年半為度，都是歷屆內閣從未有的怪現象，不要推太遠，就拿扁政府歷任閣揆來說吧，所有的施政計畫不是五年就是八年，恨不能一切計畫能橫跨二○○八，甚至二○一二。

劉兆玄沒這個時間，劉內閣裡以「老兵最後一役」而復出江湖的部會首長們，也沒給自己這個時間，面對明後年接踵而來的縣市長和立委選舉，劉內閣只能是馬英九的先鋒部隊，接下來的就得是「連任部隊」，但是，先鋒部隊若打不下成績，連任部隊想延續或創造戰果都是不可能的事，劉內閣的挑戰可想而知。

這三個月來，劉內閣做了多少事呢？其實不少，可以看到的，過去八年始終開放不了的兩岸周末直航包機、大陸觀光客來台、赴大陸投資上限，乃至台商回台掛牌上市都依序開放，但以兩岸政策為主軸思考的經濟牌，顯然沒達到預期成果。講穿了，兩岸鬆綁勢在必行，但只有兩岸鬆綁對台灣整體經濟依舊有限，政府還有沒有第二張牌？或其他配套？截至目前為止，還看不出跡象。劉揆在就任一百天前夕，接受各家媒體訪問強調奧運之後，很多東西會重新開始，有些事情會進行得更快速。簡言之，劉揆的認知裡，如果兩岸相關的政策措施能比過去三個月更加速進行，原來不如預期的景氣狀況應該就能有效改善。問題是，如果不能呢？如果中國經濟在京奧之後也開始下滑呢？所有的如果，此刻都沒有答案，唯一可確知的是，如果劉內閣把績效建立在不確定的大陸因素上，風險只會更高。

馬政府民調回升的這一個月，立法院休會，扁家洗錢案爆發，劉內閣得以在暴風圈之外，然而，九月立法院即將開議，劉內閣無可避免地還是要面對這些問題，只有有效緩解台灣經濟不振的內外因素，才能真正獲得民眾的掌聲。

The New Administration’s First One Hundred Days:

The New Administration’s First One Hundred Days:
Just Squeaking By
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 28, 2008

The Ma administration has been in office for nearly 100 days. It has undergone three months of turmoil. President Ma Ying-jeou and Premier Liu Chao-hsuan’s satisfaction ratings have rebounded significantly from a month ago. But given the larger economic picture and the market outlook, the Ma administration has little cause for joy.

According to a recent China Times poll, Ma Ying-jeou’s approval rating jumped 10 percentage points, to 46 percent. Liu Chao-hsuan’s approval rating also reached a new high at 42 percent. Public confidence in his administration rose to 59 percent. But 42 percent of the public remained unhappy with his cabinet’s performance. Among his cabinet members, Minister of Justice Wang Ching-feng received the highest approval rating. The logical conclusion is that the Ma administration’s and Liu cabinet’s increased approval ratings reflect increased dissatisfaction with the Chen family’s money-laundering scandals. The public supports the Ma administration primarily because they want clean government and prosecution of corruption. But the economic downturn is also a reason for the Chen Shui-bian administration’s downfall. For the public on Taiwan, scandals must be investigated. But the economy must also be revived. After all, the economy is the peoples’ lifeline.

Unfortunately the Council for Economic Planning has issued a “blue light” warning for July, indicating an economic recession. Leading economic indicators show an integrated score of 107.4. Since last November we have experienced nine consecutive months of decline. July export orders fell to an annual rate of only 50.52 percent. Orders from mainland China fell 1.73 percent, establishing record lows for recent years. Given these figures, one can hardly expect the public to be pleased with the government’s handling of the economy.

During the Liu cabinet’s first month in office, it declared its determination to implement the Ma administration’s policies. It promised to increase economic growth to 6 percent. Three months later, this check has bounced. Liu Chao-hsuan admitted bluntly, “Since we cannot achieve it, all we can do is explain why not.” Why isn’t the economy growing as fast as predicted before the presidential election? One. Global growth is slower than expected. This includes the US subprime mortgage crisis, which has had more serious repercussions than expected. Two. Mainland tourism to Taiwan. Domestic consumption has not been as great as expected. Policies to stimulate domestic demand will require more time to take effect. Unfortunately time waits for no man. Premier Liu is a smart man. He is well aware of his situation. Ma Ying-jeou can’t give Liu much more leeway during Ma’s first term.

The Liu cabinet took office two months ago. It hastily responded to rising oil prices. It got its lumps attempting to curb inflation. Liu set a six month deadline for himself when he introduced his budget and policy measures. Soon afterwards, the typhoon season began. Premier Liu was forced to deal with flood control problems that have been out of control for years. He revised his six-month budget and policy plans, and started over, determined to take a longer term approach to problems. This time he gave his cabinet and the administration a one and a half year time frame. Frankly, both the six month and one and a half year time frames are bizarre and unprecedented. The Chen Shui-bian administration set for itself five year and eight year time frames, and would have preferred time frames that stretched past 2008 or even 2012.

Liu Chao-hsuan doesn’t have as much time to spare. The Liu cabinet’s department heads are seasoned veterans who have returned to the battlefield for one last battle. They cannot allow themselves that much time. The county magistrate and city mayor elections will be held next year. The legislative elections will be held the year after that. Premier Liu’s cabinet can serve only as Ma Ying-jeou’s vanguard. After that, the baton gets passed to a “Committee to Re-elect the President.” But if the vanguard has nothing to show, it will be impossible for any re-election committee to win a second term. The challenges the Liu cabinet faces are daunting.

How much has the Liu cabinet done over the past three months? Actually, quite a bit. It has allowed direct cross-Strait weekend flights, something prohibited for the past eight years. It has allowed mainland tourists to visit Taiwan. It has lifted the cap on mainland-bound investments. It has allowed Taiwan businesses to return to Taiwan and list their companies on the Taiwan stock exchange. Unfortunately cross-Strait economic policy has failed to achieve the expected results. Merely loosening cross-strait restrictions on the economy has a limited impact. Does the administration have another card it can play? So far, we see nothing. Premier Liu has been in office nearly 100 days. He told the media that after the Olympics he would start anew, implementing policies much more rapidly. Premier Liu knows that if cross-Strait policy measures can be implemented more swiftly than in the past, the economic situation may improve more swiftly than originally expected. The question is, can they be? What if the mainland economy declines following the Beijing Olympics? For the moment we can’t say. The only certainty is that if the Liu cabinet bases its economic performance exclusively on uncertain mainland factors, the risk is considerable.

The Ma administration’s polls numbers have rebounded this month. The Legislative Yuan has adjourned. The Chen family’s money-laundering scandal has erupted. The Liu cabinet is outside the storm circle. But the Legislative Yuan will convene again in September. The Liu cabinet will inevitably have to face these problems. Only alleviating the domestic and international factors behind Taiwan’s economic slump will win public applause.

中國時報 　2008.08.28
百日新政 只能算勉強及格
中時社論

馬政府執政即將屆滿一百日，走過波折的三個多月，比諸前一個月的慘況，不論是馬英九總統或劉兆玄內閣的整體施政滿意度，都有明顯回升，但對比整體經濟情勢和市景情況，馬政府實在沒有太多高興的理由。

根據本報最近所做的民調，馬英九的聲望跳升十個百分點，達到四六％，閣揆劉兆玄滿意度也創下四二％的新高。同時，國人對馬政府信心增強至五九％，但還是有四二％的民眾，對行政團隊的績效感到失望。而閣員中，人氣指數最高的則是法務部長王清峰，合理推斷馬政府、劉內閣滿意度的提升，很大部分是拜扁家洗錢案所賜。清廉政府查弊肅貪，正是馬政府獲得人民支持的關鍵；但是，經濟低迷、民生不振，也是扁政府下台的原因。對台灣人民而言，弊案當然要查，但是，經濟豈能不振！畢竟經濟才是台灣的命脈。

偏偏經建會才公布的七月份景氣燈號轉入代表低迷的藍燈，其中可判斷未來景氣走勢的領先指標綜合分數一○ 七．四，是自去年十一月起，連續第九個月下滑。七月外銷訂單年增率降到只有五．五二％，來自中國大陸的訂單更遽降為一．七三％，均創下近年新低，從這些數字看來，要民眾對政府施政感到滿意，當然困難。

劉內閣就任第一個月，就表明要以落實馬政策為優先要務，三個月過去，六％經濟成長率的承諾，就是第一張的跳票。劉兆玄坦言，「達不到也只能向人民說清楚。」台灣景氣為何未如總統大選前所呈現的一派樂觀？一方面，國際情勢比預期更要走緩，包括美國次貸及二房等風波，導致後續影響比預期中嚴重；二方面，陸客來台、內需消費等都不如預期，擴大內需要相關政策措施，距離發酵出一點成果還需要時間。只是，時間不等人，劉揆是聰明人，他太清楚自己的定位，在馬英九首任任期裡，也沒有太多時間可以分配給他。

這樣說吧，劉內閣就任前兩個月，手忙腳亂因應油物價高漲，抑制通膨就讓劉揆滿頭包，當時他推出的預算和政策措施都是以「半年」為期；緊接著，颱風季節開始，劉揆又忙不迭地處理長年失控的治水大問題，修正了半年預算和政策計畫，重新調整腳步，要從「長期深耕」的角度出發，這個時候他給自己和閣員的施政計畫是以「一年半」為期。坦白講，不論是半年為期或者一年半為度，都是歷屆內閣從未有的怪現象，不要推太遠，就拿扁政府歷任閣揆來說吧，所有的施政計畫不是五年就是八年，恨不能一切計畫能橫跨二○○八，甚至二○一二。

劉兆玄沒這個時間，劉內閣裡以「老兵最後一役」而復出江湖的部會首長們，也沒給自己這個時間，面對明後年接踵而來的縣市長和立委選舉，劉內閣只能是馬英九的先鋒部隊，接下來的就得是「連任部隊」，但是，先鋒部隊若打不下成績，連任部隊想延續或創造戰果都是不可能的事，劉內閣的挑戰可想而知。

這三個月來，劉內閣做了多少事呢？其實不少，可以看到的，過去八年始終開放不了的兩岸周末直航包機、大陸觀光客來台、赴大陸投資上限，乃至台商回台掛牌上市都依序開放，但以兩岸政策為主軸思考的經濟牌，顯然沒達到預期成果。講穿了，兩岸鬆綁勢在必行，但只有兩岸鬆綁對台灣整體經濟依舊有限，政府還有沒有第二張牌？或其他配套？截至目前為止，還看不出跡象。劉揆在就任一百天前夕，接受各家媒體訪問強調奧運之後，很多東西會重新開始，有些事情會進行得更快速。簡言之，劉揆的認知裡，如果兩岸相關的政策措施能比過去三個月更加速進行，原來不如預期的景氣狀況應該就能有效改善。問題是，如果不能呢？如果中國經濟在京奧之後也開始下滑呢？所有的如果，此刻都沒有答案，唯一可確知的是，如果劉內閣把績效建立在不確定的大陸因素上，風險只會更高。

馬政府民調回升的這一個月，立法院休會，扁家洗錢案爆發，劉內閣得以在暴風圈之外，然而，九月立法院即將開議，劉內閣無可避免地還是要面對這些問題，只有有效緩解台灣經濟不振的內外因素，才能真正獲得民眾的掌聲。

The Southern Front and the Taiwan Independence Treasury

The Southern Front and the Taiwan Independence Treasury
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 27, 2008

Chen Shui-bian said that when he applied for State Affairs Fund reimbursements, he submitted personal invoices. He said he did so for the sake of the “Southern Front Project.” At the time the DPP maintained that “A Bian is innocent.” But A Bian’s latest explanation is even more outrageous. Chen Shui-bian and his amen corner are telling us that the vast sums transferred to the Chen family’s overseas accounts amount to a “Taiwan independence treasury,” and that freezing these accounts is an attempt to throttle the Taiwan independence movement.

Chen Shui-bian and the Green Camp face a money-laundering scandal. They are responding to the crisis in two ways: One. They are attempting to diminish their feelings of guilt. Two. They are attempting to create moral justifications.

One. The Chen family has referred to the funds in a number of different ways. Wu Shu-chen says it is all “Chen family money.” Chen Chih-chung says they are wedding gifts. Huang Jui-ching says the money belongs to her father, Huang Bai-lu. Today however, everyone says the money is “leftover campaign funds.” The current spin takes into account a number of legal considerations. But its primary political appeal is that it conceptually launders “Chen family money” and converts it into what the Green Camp can begin to think of as “our money.”

Chen Hsing-yu threw a public tantrum, saying Taiwan independence needs money, election campaigns need money. What she meant was that the money was not dirty. It has a sacred purpose. The money already spent may or may not have been spent legitimately. But how is the Chen familly going to explain away the money transferred overseas? According to Chen Shui-bian, “The money was transferred out of the country by Wu Shu-chen. I knew nothing about it.” But he added “I know Wu Shu-chen did not transfer the funds out of the country for the Chen family. It was to be used for international diplomacy on behalf of Taiwan, after I left office.”

First Chen said “I knew nothing about it.” Then he said “I know the money was to be used for international diplomacy on behalf of Taiwan.” Taiwan independence leaders are not calling Chen Shui-bian on his self-contradictory lies. Astonishingly enough, they have hitched a ride on them, and developed their previously mentioned “Taiwan independence treasury” thesis. The Chen family has also taken advantage of the situation to convert “Chen family money” into “our money.” In this deluded, self-induced hypnotic state, Chen Shui-bian and Deep Green leaders’ feelings of guilt have rapidly diminished. Their feelings of moral rectitude have been rapidly enhanced. If Chen Shui-bian takes the next step and donates the funds to the Green Camp, the Green Camp will find it even easier to defend their “Taiwan independence treasury.”

Two. The DPP Central Standing Committee has set the tone. Chen’s prosecution for corruption is to be spun as “the Kuomintang and [mainland] China colluding to persecute Chen Shui-bian and the DPP.” In other words, in order to oppose mainland China and the KMT, one must support A Bian. Chen Shui-bian has launched an all-out counteroffensive. He is no longer saying “I did something the law does not allow. I shamed Taiwan.” Instead he rails against a “political vendetta,” against a campaign to “exterminate his entire family,” and against a “Cultural Revolution-style political struggle.” Chen Shui-bian has totally sidelined Tsai Ing-wen and other “non-mainstream” elements within the DPP. Kao Chun-min of the Presbyterian Church has given Chen’s “counteroffensive against a political vendetta” his seal of approval. One pastor said: “If we can forgive Chen Chin-hsing, why can’t we forgive Chen Shui-bian?” He conveniently forgot that Chen Chin-hsing was tried by the nation’s legal system, and donated his organs after his execution for kidnapping and multiple murders. Does Chen Shui-bian really want to be compared to Chen Chin-hsing?

Three. Chen Shui-bian has repeatedly pointed the finger at Lee Teng-hui. He said Lee transferred 70 million NT in public funds into the account of the Taiwan Comprehensive Research Institute, and one billion NT overseas. Chen is extending his battlelines. He is also attempting to undermine Lee Teng-hui’s status as the standard-bearer for the Taiwan independence movement. A simple quid pro quo has been struck. Chen Shui-bian is supporting independence because he lusts after wealth. Taiwan independence leaders are supporting A Bian because they lust after Taiwan independence.

The leadership of the Taiwan independence movement and the DPP have actually decided to use the “Southern Front Project” and “Taiwan independence treasury” lies to deceive themselves and others. By unconditionally supporting Chen Shui-bian, they have exposed the moral bankruptcy of the Taiwan independence movement and the DPP.

The Taiwan independence movement has reached the stage where its concepts, its conduct, its image have all been discredited. In fact, Chen Shui-bian bears the greatest responsibility for the movement’s decline. Yet Taiwan independence leaders continue to support A Bian. They refer to a non-existent “Taiwan independence treasury.” They maintain that “Chen Shui-bian knew nothing.” They maintain that “Wu Shu-chen did it all on her own.” They are attempting to diminish their collective feeling of guilt. They are attempting to enhance their collective feeling of moral rectitude. What is this, if not the setting of the sun? What is this, if not the end of the road?

The DPP’s tone, meanwhile, is not being set by Tsai Ing-wen, but by Kao Chun-ming. The DPP has again been hijacked by Chen Shui-bian and the Taiwan independence movement. Tsai Ing-wen has been undermined and marginalized. The DPP has become Chen Shui-bian’s lackey, despite the fact that Chen Shui-bian is no longer a party member. DPP leaders are using the pretext that the “KMT is colluding with [mainland] China to persecute Chen,” and that “Taiwanese are being bullied” to justify supporting A Bian. They are attempting to diminish their collective feeling of guilt. They are attempting to enhance their collective feeling of moral rectitude. What is this, if not self-deception?

In fact, ever since the January legislative elections and the March presidential election, the consensus is that Chen Shui-bian’s brand of Taiwan independence is the least appealing form of Taiwan independence. The consensus is that the DPP which has been hijacked by Chen Shui-bian is the least sympathetic form of the Democratic Progressive Party. For the past several months, the public has assumed that the Taiwan independence movement and the Democratic Progressive Party would distance themselves from Chen Shui-bian and undergo a metamorphisis. No one expected them to permit Chen Shui-bian to hijack them again.

When the money-laundering scandal first erupted, Taiwan independence elder Huang Chao-tang said “We hope Chen Shui-bian vanishes from the face of the earth forever!” But Chen Shui-bian has not vanished. He now looms above Huang Chao-tang, awaiting his apology.

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【聯合報╱社論】
2008.08.27 06:42 am

陳水扁說，他用私人發票報銷國務費，是為了運作「南線專案」；當時，民進黨說：「相信阿扁的清白。」如今則更加離譜，陳水扁及其支持者，似在設法將陳家匯到國外的巨款定義為「台獨金庫」，「查封」金庫就是要斬斷台獨的生機。

陳水扁及綠營面對洗錢風暴，其危機處理的主軸有二：一、降低犯罪感；二、虛構道德性。篇幅所限，試舉三例：

一、陳家原本對錢的性質有多種說法，吳淑珍歸納為「都是陳家的錢」，陳致中稱是結婚禮金，黃睿靚說是爸爸黃百祿的錢；但這些說法如今全部串供成「選舉剩餘款」。此一說詞，當然有諸多訴訟伎倆方面的考慮，但其主要政治訴求，就是要將「陳家的錢」，在綠營的觀念上，變成「大家的錢」。

陳幸妤發飆說，台獨要用錢，選舉也要用錢；她的意思是說，這不是髒錢，而是有神聖的用途；然而，用掉的錢也許有正當性，但匯出的錢又該如何解釋？根據陳水扁的說法，「錢都是吳淑珍匯出去的，我一概不知」；但是，他又說：「我知道吳淑珍把錢匯出不是要給陳家用，而是為了我卸任後用於台灣的國際外交工作。」

於是，獨派遂不問陳水扁「匯出一概不知」與「我知錢要用於台灣外交」的自毀性謊言，竟然順勢發展出前述「台獨金庫」的理論；而陳家的說詞，也順勢從「陳家的錢」改口變成「大家的錢」。在這種自欺欺人的自我催眠狀態中，陳水扁及深綠陣營的犯罪感快速下降，道德感則迅速提升；陳水扁可望進一步承諾將那些錢奉獻給綠營，綠營則更能義正詞嚴地捍衛「台獨金庫」。

二、民進黨中常會已經定調，謂此次是「國民黨與中國聯手迫害陳水扁與民進黨」，換句話說，為了反中國與反國民黨，必須挺扁。陳水扁更已展開全面反撲，他不再說「我做了法律不許可的事，使台灣蒙羞」，而指控這是「政治追殺／抄家滅族／文革式的鬥爭」。至此，陳水扁已經完全踢開了蔡英文等民進黨的「非主流派」；他藉長老教會的高俊明來為這場「反追殺大反撲」背書。有位牧師說：「可以原諒陳進興，為何不可原諒陳水扁？」但是，陳進興在國家體制上接受了法律的審判，在個人良知上捐贈了器官，請問陳水扁與陳進興如何相比？

三、陳水扁幾度將矛頭指向李登輝，指李將七千萬元公帑轉給台綜院，又匯出十億元到國外。這一方面是想延伸戰線，另一方面又進一步摧毀李登輝回復為台獨旗手的可能性，則「陳水扁因貪挺獨／台獨因獨挺扁」的情勢，便可更單純化及鞏固化。

台獨及民進黨的領導階層，竟然用「南線專案」及「台獨金庫」這類謊言來自欺欺人，用以力挺陳水扁，充分暴露了台獨與民進黨的空虛與危機。

就台獨言。台獨走到今日「理念／操作／形象」俱毀的地步，陳水扁其實是最大罪人。台獨如今竟然用「台獨金庫」、「扁皆不知」、「全是吳淑珍一人所為」這類說詞來挺扁，來降低集體的「犯罪感」，及提升集體的「道德性」，倘非日暮途窮，何以致此？

就民進黨言。為民進黨定調者，不是蔡英文，而是高俊明。整個民進黨又被陳水扁及台獨挾持，蔡英文已經空洞化、邊緣化，民進黨成了「沒有陳水扁的陳水扁附庸」。民進黨以「國民黨與中國聯手迫害」、「台灣人被欺負」來做為挺扁的藉口，以降低集體的「犯罪感」，及提升集體的「道德性」，這難道不是自欺欺人？

其實，自一月立委選舉、三月總統大選迄今，主流民意皆認為「陳水扁操作的台獨」是最難苟同的「台獨」，「陳水扁挾持的民進黨」是最不可同情的「民進黨」。幾個月來，國人以為台獨與民進黨皆能擺脫陳水扁而脫胎換骨，豈料如今雙雙又被陳水扁挾持？

台獨大老黃昭堂在洗錢案爆發時曾說：「希望阿扁從這個世界上消失！」然而，陳水扁並未消失，如今他又站在黃昭堂仰視的制高點上，垂聽黃昭堂向他道歉。

The Southern Front and the Taiwan Independence Treasury

The Southern Front and the Taiwan Independence Treasury
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 27, 2008

Chen Shui-bian said that when he applied for State Affairs Fund reimbursements, he submitted personal invoices. He said he did so for the sake of the “Southern Front Project.” At the time the DPP maintained that “A Bian is innocent.” But A Bian’s latest explanation is even more outrageous. Chen Shui-bian and his amen corner are telling us that the vast sums transferred to the Chen family’s overseas accounts amount to a “Taiwan independence treasury,” and that freezing these accounts is an attempt to throttle the Taiwan independence movement.

Chen Shui-bian and the Green Camp face a money-laundering scandal. They are responding to the crisis in two ways: One. They are attempting to diminish their feelings of guilt. Two. They are attempting to create moral justifications.

One. The Chen family has referred to the funds in a number of different ways. Wu Shu-chen says it is all “Chen family money.” Chen Chih-chung says they are wedding gifts. Huang Jui-ching says the money belongs to her father, Huang Bai-lu. Today however, everyone says the money is “leftover campaign funds.” The current spin takes into account a number of legal considerations. But its primary political appeal is that it conceptually launders “Chen family money” and converts it into what the Green Camp can begin to think of as “our money.”

Chen Hsing-yu threw a public tantrum, saying Taiwan independence needs money, election campaigns need money. What she meant was that the money was not dirty. It has a sacred purpose. The money already spent may or may not have been spent legitimately. But how is the Chen familly going to explain away the money transferred overseas? According to Chen Shui-bian, “The money was transferred out of the country by Wu Shu-chen. I knew nothing about it.” But he added “I know Wu Shu-chen did not transfer the funds out of the country for the Chen family. It was to be used for international diplomacy on behalf of Taiwan, after I left office.”

First Chen said “I knew nothing about it.” Then he said “I know the money was to be used for international diplomacy on behalf of Taiwan.” Taiwan independence leaders are not calling Chen Shui-bian on his self-contradictory lies. Astonishingly enough, they have hitched a ride on them, and developed their previously mentioned “Taiwan independence treasury” thesis. The Chen family has also taken advantage of the situation to convert “Chen family money” into “our money.” In this deluded, self-induced hypnotic state, Chen Shui-bian and Deep Green leaders’ feelings of guilt have rapidly diminished. Their feelings of moral rectitude have been rapidly enhanced. If Chen Shui-bian takes the next step and donates the funds to the Green Camp, the Green Camp will find it even easier to defend their “Taiwan independence treasury.”

Two. The DPP Central Standing Committee has set the tone. Chen’s prosecution for corruption is to be spun as “the Kuomintang and [mainland] China colluding to persecute Chen Shui-bian and the DPP.” In other words, in order to oppose mainland China and the KMT, one must support A Bian. Chen Shui-bian has launched an all-out counteroffensive. He is no longer saying “I did something the law does not allow. I shamed Taiwan.” Instead he rails against a “political vendetta,” against a campaign to “exterminate his entire family,” and against a “Cultural Revolution-style political struggle.” Chen Shui-bian has totally sidelined Tsai Ing-wen and other “non-mainstream” elements within the DPP. Kao Chun-min of the Presbyterian Church has given Chen’s “counteroffensive against a political vendetta” his seal of approval. One pastor said: “If we can forgive Chen Chin-hsing, why can’t we forgive Chen Shui-bian?” He conveniently forgot that Chen Chin-hsing was tried by the nation’s legal system, and donated his organs after his execution for kidnapping and multiple murders. Does Chen Shui-bian really want to be compared to Chen Chin-hsing?

Three. Chen Shui-bian has repeatedly pointed the finger at Lee Teng-hui. He said Lee transferred 70 million NT in public funds into the account of the Taiwan Comprehensive Research Institute, and one billion NT overseas. Chen is extending his battlelines. He is also attempting to undermine Lee Teng-hui’s status as the standard-bearer for the Taiwan independence movement. A simple quid pro quo has been struck. Chen Shui-bian is supporting independence because he lusts after wealth. Taiwan independence leaders are supporting A Bian because they lust after Taiwan independence.

The leadership of the Taiwan independence movement and the DPP have actually decided to use the “Southern Front Project” and “Taiwan independence treasury” lies to deceive themselves and others. By unconditionally supporting Chen Shui-bian, they have exposed the moral bankruptcy of the Taiwan independence movement and the DPP.

The Taiwan independence movement has reached the stage where its concepts, its conduct, its image have all been discredited. In fact, Chen Shui-bian bears the greatest responsibility for the movement’s decline. Yet Taiwan independence leaders continue to support A Bian. They refer to a non-existent “Taiwan independence treasury.” They maintain that “Chen Shui-bian knew nothing.” They maintain that “Wu Shu-chen did it all on her own.” They are attempting to diminish their collective feeling of guilt. They are attempting to enhance their collective feeling of moral rectitude. What is this, if not the setting of the sun? What is this, if not the end of the road?

The DPP’s tone, meanwhile, is not being set by Tsai Ing-wen, but by Kao Chun-ming. The DPP has again been hijacked by Chen Shui-bian and the Taiwan independence movement. Tsai Ing-wen has been undermined and marginalized. The DPP has become Chen Shui-bian’s lackey, despite the fact that Chen Shui-bian is no longer a party member. DPP leaders are using the pretext that the “KMT is colluding with [mainland] China to persecute Chen,” and that “Taiwanese are being bullied” to justify supporting A Bian. They are attempting to diminish their collective feeling of guilt. They are attempting to enhance their collective feeling of moral rectitude. What is this, if not self-deception?

In fact, ever since the January legislative elections and the March presidential election, the consensus is that Chen Shui-bian’s brand of Taiwan independence is the least appealing form of Taiwan independence. The consensus is that the DPP which has been hijacked by Chen Shui-bian is the least sympathetic form of the Democratic Progressive Party. For the past several months, the public has assumed that the Taiwan independence movement and the Democratic Progressive Party would distance themselves from Chen Shui-bian and undergo a metamorphisis. No one expected them to permit Chen Shui-bian to hijack them again.

When the money-laundering scandal first erupted, Taiwan independence elder Huang Chao-tang said “We hope Chen Shui-bian vanishes from the face of the earth forever!” But Chen Shui-bian has not vanished. He now looms above Huang Chao-tang, awaiting his apology.

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從「南線專案」到「台獨金庫」！
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.08.27 06:42 am

陳水扁說，他用私人發票報銷國務費，是為了運作「南線專案」；當時，民進黨說：「相信阿扁的清白。」如今則更加離譜，陳水扁及其支持者，似在設法將陳家匯到國外的巨款定義為「台獨金庫」，「查封」金庫就是要斬斷台獨的生機。

陳水扁及綠營面對洗錢風暴，其危機處理的主軸有二：一、降低犯罪感；二、虛構道德性。篇幅所限，試舉三例：

一、陳家原本對錢的性質有多種說法，吳淑珍歸納為「都是陳家的錢」，陳致中稱是結婚禮金，黃睿靚說是爸爸黃百祿的錢；但這些說法如今全部串供成「選舉剩餘款」。此一說詞，當然有諸多訴訟伎倆方面的考慮，但其主要政治訴求，就是要將「陳家的錢」，在綠營的觀念上，變成「大家的錢」。

陳幸妤發飆說，台獨要用錢，選舉也要用錢；她的意思是說，這不是髒錢，而是有神聖的用途；然而，用掉的錢也許有正當性，但匯出的錢又該如何解釋？根據陳水扁的說法，「錢都是吳淑珍匯出去的，我一概不知」；但是，他又說：「我知道吳淑珍把錢匯出不是要給陳家用，而是為了我卸任後用於台灣的國際外交工作。」

於是，獨派遂不問陳水扁「匯出一概不知」與「我知錢要用於台灣外交」的自毀性謊言，竟然順勢發展出前述「台獨金庫」的理論；而陳家的說詞，也順勢從「陳家的錢」改口變成「大家的錢」。在這種自欺欺人的自我催眠狀態中，陳水扁及深綠陣營的犯罪感快速下降，道德感則迅速提升；陳水扁可望進一步承諾將那些錢奉獻給綠營，綠營則更能義正詞嚴地捍衛「台獨金庫」。

二、民進黨中常會已經定調，謂此次是「國民黨與中國聯手迫害陳水扁與民進黨」，換句話說，為了反中國與反國民黨，必須挺扁。陳水扁更已展開全面反撲，他不再說「我做了法律不許可的事，使台灣蒙羞」，而指控這是「政治追殺／抄家滅族／文革式的鬥爭」。至此，陳水扁已經完全踢開了蔡英文等民進黨的「非主流派」；他藉長老教會的高俊明來為這場「反追殺大反撲」背書。有位牧師說：「可以原諒陳進興，為何不可原諒陳水扁？」但是，陳進興在國家體制上接受了法律的審判，在個人良知上捐贈了器官，請問陳水扁與陳進興如何相比？

三、陳水扁幾度將矛頭指向李登輝，指李將七千萬元公帑轉給台綜院，又匯出十億元到國外。這一方面是想延伸戰線，另一方面又進一步摧毀李登輝回復為台獨旗手的可能性，則「陳水扁因貪挺獨／台獨因獨挺扁」的情勢，便可更單純化及鞏固化。

台獨及民進黨的領導階層，竟然用「南線專案」及「台獨金庫」這類謊言來自欺欺人，用以力挺陳水扁，充分暴露了台獨與民進黨的空虛與危機。

就台獨言。台獨走到今日「理念／操作／形象」俱毀的地步，陳水扁其實是最大罪人。台獨如今竟然用「台獨金庫」、「扁皆不知」、「全是吳淑珍一人所為」這類說詞來挺扁，來降低集體的「犯罪感」，及提升集體的「道德性」，倘非日暮途窮，何以致此？

就民進黨言。為民進黨定調者，不是蔡英文，而是高俊明。整個民進黨又被陳水扁及台獨挾持，蔡英文已經空洞化、邊緣化，民進黨成了「沒有陳水扁的陳水扁附庸」。民進黨以「國民黨與中國聯手迫害」、「台灣人被欺負」來做為挺扁的藉口，以降低集體的「犯罪感」，及提升集體的「道德性」，這難道不是自欺欺人？

其實，自一月立委選舉、三月總統大選迄今，主流民意皆認為「陳水扁操作的台獨」是最難苟同的「台獨」，「陳水扁挾持的民進黨」是最不可同情的「民進黨」。幾個月來，國人以為台獨與民進黨皆能擺脫陳水扁而脫胎換骨，豈料如今雙雙又被陳水扁挾持？

台獨大老黃昭堂在洗錢案爆發時曾說：「希望阿扁從這個世界上消失！」然而，陳水扁並未消失，如今他又站在黃昭堂仰視的制高點上，垂聽黃昭堂向他道歉。

How Can They Pass All Blame onto Wu Shu-chen?

How Can They Pass All Blame onto Wu Shu-chen?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 26, 2008

When First Son Chen Chih-chung and First Daughter in Law Huang Jui-ching’s returned to Taiwan, they spoke to the media. Their manner was composed as they swore that they were merely figureheads for dummy accounts, that Chen’s mother Wu Shu-chen handled all the money within the family, and that his father knew nothing. Everyone, including Chen Shui-bian, concerned parties, Chen Chih-chung, and Huang Jui-ching told the same story. They repeatedly emphasized that Wu Shu-chen was in charge of all the money within the Chen family. No one else in the family knew anything whatsoever.

If the prosecution and the public swallow their story, then Chen Shui-bian, former head of state, former spiritual leader of the Green Camp, along with the young, eager to learn Chen Chih-chung and his wife, may get off scot-free. According to those close to Chen Shui-bian, Wu Shu-chen’s health is extremely poor. If these cases go to court, would she be able to withstand the strain? Or would it be a recapitulation of the State Affairs Expenses case, during which she repeatedly applied for sick leave? If she cannot stand trial, how can the overseas money-laundering investigation proceed? Furthermore, Wu Shu-chen is not a government official. Even assuming prosecutors track down the funds, what then? Whose money is it? Is it Wu Shu-chen’s dowry? is it Huang Jui-ching and Chen Chih-chung’s wedding gifts? Is it Huang Jui-ching’s father Huang Bailu’s investments? Is it Chen Shui-bian’s leftover campaign funds? Chen Shui-bian or Chen Shui-bian’s family may have overseas accounts. They may have disappointed their supporters and damaged Chen’s image as the “Son of Taiwan” But the prosecution might not be able to prove that the funds in these accounts were acquired illegally. Even if Chen is fined, his losses will not be that great.

Therefore, as far as protecting Chen Shui-bian and the DPP is concerned, allowing Wu Shu-chen alone to shoulder all political and legal responsibility is definitely the least costly alternative. Is this the former First Family’s damage control strategy? The public cannot be sure. The public however cannot help but be flabbergasted watching Chen Chih-chung and Huang Jui-ching coldly push all responsibility onto Chen Chih-chung’s mother Wu Shu-chen.

The public is baffled. Chen Chih-chung is preparing to study for a Juris Doctor degree. He has to be aware of the complex political and legal consequences of his family’s involvement in offshore accounts or even suspected money-laundering cases. If Wu Shu-chen was the only person who knew all the facts, then the responsibility and pressure she will have to bear will be immense. Given her physical and mental condition, how can her son and daughter-in-law display such cavalier indifference to her circumstances? How can Chen Chih-chung and Huang Jui-ching remain so calm, so matter of fact, so unconcerned? Knowing full well that Chen Chih-chung’s mother is in big trouble, how can they remain at such ease? If the Chen family can teach their children to remain so calm, so masterful, then they truly are a breed apart.

By contrast, Chen Hsing-yu, another of Chen Shui-bian’s children, threw a fit of hysteria. This left the public wondering. The differences between the members of this family truly are great. One throws a public fit even before matters have come clear. The other acts as if nothing is the matter even as the money-laundering scandal looms ever larger, and shifts all responsibility onto his physically frail mother.

If the overseas accounts really were masterminded from beginning to end by Wu Shu-chen alone, then Wu Shu-chen will know no peace from this day forward. She has no idea how many times she will be forced to appear in court, how many times she will be denounced by strangers. Wouldn’t Chen Chih-chung and Huang Jui-ching be reluctant? Wouldn’t they be upset? But they weren’t. This young couple revealed no such emotions whatsoever, leaving people utterly baffled. Were they really that cold-blooded? Or had they rehearsed their response in advance, resulting in their on the scene reaction? Their statements were a little too perfect. Their extraordinary calm was a dead giveaway, because it was too far removed from a natural human responses.

Secondly, Wu Shu-chen can’t even appear in court for questioning. The sums involved are immense. She must control their source of origin, the amounts paid out, determine which elections need how much support. To properly allocate all these funds is a complex task. How much energy does it require? Wu Shu-chen may be smart. Her mind may be sharp. But how could her physical health possibly withstand the strain? If on the other hand, she is able to assume responsibility for such complex financial issues, such as which funds to transfer where, which shell company to open where, that means she has energy to spare. In which case, how difficult can it be to appear in court?

Furthermore, this is hardly Chen Shui-bian’s first election. Would he really not know the amount of funds remaining following each campaign? He was able to say without hesitation that he contributed three to four hundred million dollars to the DPP. Would he really not know the amount left over after each campaign? Where they eventually wound up? Would he not care? Would he not be curious? Supporters donated the funds to Chen Shui-bian, not to Wu Shu-chen. Campaign subsidies are distributed to candidates. If Chen Shui-bian was totally indifferent to their fate, wouldn’t he be just a little irresponsible? How many families on Taiwan transfer billions of dollars overseas, without the husband knowing anything about it? Is this even the least bit credible?

These overseas accounts all had to be handled by Chen Chih-chung and Huang Jui-ching. They saw hundreds of millions in funds transferred here and there. They never once asked Chen Chih-chung’s mother what they were all about? They never once mentioned the matter to Chen Chih-ching’s father? Chen Shui-bian never knew anything? Wow, this family’s security measures certainly are tight. Chen Chih-chung and Huang Jui-ching help his mother Wu Shu-chen open overseas accounts and make overseas deposits, but say nothing about them. Yet Chen Shui-bian shares all sorts of sensitive information relating to party comrades’ campaign funds with his son and daughter in law? And yet Chen Shui-bian told his daughter, who has never gotten involved in politics, how much he gave this person and that, inspiring Chen Hsing-yu to cry out on his behalf? Just exactly what sort of secrets cannot be spoken of in the Chen Shui-bian home? The answer is apparently beyond the comprehension of us mere mortals. What can one say, except that this is a strange family indeed!

中時電子報
中國時報 　2008.08.26
他們何以能冷靜的全推給扁嫂？
中時社論

陳致中、黃睿靚夫婦返台後，對著媒體大抒己見，態度輕鬆自若地說自己只是人頭，家中所有的錢都是由母親吳淑珍主管，父親什麼都不知道；從陳水扁自己、相關人士到陳致中、黃睿靚，眾人可說口徑都相當一致，不斷強調的就是陳家的錢都是吳淑珍在管，家裡沒有別人知道來龍去脈。

如 果這個說法為檢方、社會大眾採信，曾經擔任國家元首、身為綠營精神領袖的陳水扁，以及年輕向學、前途一片大好的陳致中夫婦或許就可以全身而退；而據親扁人 士指出吳淑珍的身體健康極差，未來如果又要因相關案件頻上法庭，她熬得下去嗎？會不會又像國務機要費的案子一樣，一路請假到底，如果是這樣，海外洗錢案怎 麼繼續查下去呢？再說，吳淑珍又沒有公務人員身分，就算查到了又能怎麼樣呢？這些錢到底是吳淑珍的嫁妝、陳致中黃睿靚結婚時的禮金、黃睿靚父親黃百祿的投 資、又或者是選舉結餘款，只要檢方無法證明這些海外帳戶裡的錢是非法所得，就算陳水扁或者陳水扁家族有海外帳戶，讓支持者失望、讓他的「台灣之子」形象受 損，或者補點罰款，其他的，畢竟損失不大啊！

所以，從保護陳水扁甚至於民進黨的角度來說，讓吳淑珍一個人一肩扛起所有的政治與法律責任， 的確是「成本最低」的一個選擇。然而，姑且不論這是不是陳水扁家族以及者支持者「損害控制」的策略，看到陳致中和黃睿靚這對夫妻幾乎是完全不帶感情地全往 媽媽吳淑珍身上推，真的還是讓人感到十分訝異。

首先讓人不解的是，陳致中是準備要念法律博士的人，他不可能不知道這次家族涉及的海外帳戶 甚至疑似洗錢一案，後續的政治、法律問題有多複雜繁瑣，如果確實所有的事都只有吳淑珍一個人知道，那她未來將要承受多大的責任和壓力，以吳淑珍的身心狀 況，身為兒子、媳婦的人難道一點都不會為媽媽擔心嗎？為什麼陳致中和黃睿靚可以表現的如此平靜、說得如此理所當然，沒有一點憂慮神色？在明知媽媽麻煩大了 的情況下，還可以如此泰然自若，陳家能把孩子教得這麼冷靜、這麼有大將之風，實有過人之處。

但是對照陳水扁的另一個孩子陳幸妤的歇斯底裡，卻又不得讓人納悶，這家人的差異還真的很大：一個在事情還沒太明朗化前就已公開抓狂，另一個則是在洗錢風暴愈滾愈大之際，還可像沒事人一樣，侃侃而談地把責任全推給身體羸弱的媽媽。

試 想，如果這整起事件真的從頭尾都只有吳淑珍一個人在操盤，那就意謂著吳淑珍此後的日子不平靜了，她不知道要上幾次法庭，她要面對多少人的指責甚至咒罵…想 到這裡，陳致中和黃睿靚應該會不捨吧，會不安吧，沒有！這對年輕夫婦完全沒有這方面的表現。這實在讓人不解，是他們太冷酷了呢，還是這些應對場面早已演練 過了，以致於臨場反應、用字遣詞幾達爐火純青。但他們的過於鎮定反而是一大破綻，因為太不合人情。

其次，吳淑珍連出庭應訊都沒有辦法承 受，這些金額龐大的資金，她既要管各路不同來源是怎麼來的，又要管要給誰多少，哪個人選舉需要多少錢，要妥善發落，這是多麼複雜的工作，需要多少能量才能 辦得好；吳淑珍或許頭腦非常精明、心細如絲，但她的身體健康狀況能承受嗎？她既能總攬如此複雜的財務問題，還要決定把錢匯到哪裡，在哪裡開個紙上公司什麼 的，顯見精力不差，那當時出個一、兩次庭，有那麼難嗎？

再者，陳水扁不是第一次選舉，他會不知道每次選會有結餘款，他都能夠那麼明確地說 出捐給了民進黨有三．四億元，他會不知道歷次選舉有結餘，這些結餘的下落到底如何，他會不關心、不好奇嗎？支持者是捐款給陳水扁不是捐給吳淑珍，選舉的補 助款是發給候選人的，陳水扁完全不聞不問，會不會太不負責任了一點？台灣有幾個家庭可以匯幾億元到國外，然後做老公的人還一點都不知情？這合理嗎？

這 些海外帳戶的開戶、轉帳都需要陳致中與黃睿靚辦理手續，眼看著幾億的錢轉來轉去，他們不但不會開口問一下媽媽這是怎麼回事，甚至在這過程中，連對老爸提一 下都沒有，以致於陳水扁說他這一路以來什麼都不知道，哇，這家人的「保密防諜」也未免做得太嚴密了吧。陳致中、黃睿靚幫媽媽吳淑珍開戶、轉帳都不講，陳水 扁卻跟兒女大談理當是同黨同志間敏感話題的選舉款，跟向來不涉政治的兒女講給了這個人多少錢、給了那個人多少錢，讓陳幸妤為老爸猛抱屈。到底在陳水扁家什 麼才是「不能說的祕密」，恐怕不能以常理判斷；只能說，這家人還真的很奇特！

How Can They Pass All Blame onto Wu Shu-chen?

How Can They Pass All Blame onto Wu Shu-chen?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 26, 2008

When First Son Chen Chih-chung and First Daughter in Law Huang Jui-ching’s returned to Taiwan, they spoke to the media. Their manner was composed as they swore that they were merely figureheads for dummy accounts, that Chen’s mother Wu Shu-chen handled all the money within the family, and that his father knew nothing. Everyone, including Chen Shui-bian, concerned parties, Chen Chih-chung, and Huang Jui-ching told the same story. They repeatedly emphasized that Wu Shu-chen was in charge of all the money within the Chen family. No one else in the family knew anything whatsoever.

If the prosecution and the public swallow their story, then Chen Shui-bian, former head of state, former spiritual leader of the Green Camp, along with the young, eager to learn Chen Chih-chung and his wife, may get off scot-free. According to those close to Chen Shui-bian, Wu Shu-chen’s health is extremely poor. If these cases go to court, would she be able to withstand the strain? Or would it be a recapitulation of the State Affairs Expenses case, during which she repeatedly applied for sick leave? If she cannot stand trial, how can the overseas money-laundering investigation proceed? Furthermore, Wu Shu-chen is not a government official. Even assuming prosecutors track down the funds, what then? Whose money is it? Is it Wu Shu-chen’s dowry? is it Huang Jui-ching and Chen Chih-chung’s wedding gifts? Is it Huang Jui-ching’s father Huang Bailu’s investments? Is it Chen Shui-bian’s leftover campaign funds? Chen Shui-bian or Chen Shui-bian’s family may have overseas accounts. They may have disappointed their supporters and damaged Chen’s image as the “Son of Taiwan” But the prosecution might not be able to prove that the funds in these accounts were acquired illegally. Even if Chen is fined, his losses will not be that great.

Therefore, as far as protecting Chen Shui-bian and the DPP is concerned, allowing Wu Shu-chen alone to shoulder all political and legal responsibility is definitely the least costly alternative. Is this the former First Family’s damage control strategy? The public cannot be sure. The public however cannot help but be flabbergasted watching Chen Chih-chung and Huang Jui-ching coldly push all responsibility onto Chen Chih-chung’s mother Wu Shu-chen.

The public is baffled. Chen Chih-chung is preparing to study for a Juris Doctor degree. He has to be aware of the complex political and legal consequences of his family’s involvement in offshore accounts or even suspected money-laundering cases. If Wu Shu-chen was the only person who knew all the facts, then the responsibility and pressure she will have to bear will be immense. Given her physical and mental condition, how can her son and daughter-in-law display such cavalier indifference to her circumstances? How can Chen Chih-chung and Huang Jui-ching remain so calm, so matter of fact, so unconcerned? Knowing full well that Chen Chih-chung’s mother is in big trouble, how can they remain at such ease? If the Chen family can teach their children to remain so calm, so masterful, then they truly are a breed apart.

By contrast, Chen Hsing-yu, another of Chen Shui-bian’s children, threw a fit of hysteria. This left the public wondering. The differences between the members of this family truly are great. One throws a public fit even before matters have come clear. The other acts as if nothing is the matter even as the money-laundering scandal looms ever larger, and shifts all responsibility onto his physically frail mother.

If the overseas accounts really were masterminded from beginning to end by Wu Shu-chen alone, then Wu Shu-chen will know no peace from this day forward. She has no idea how many times she will be forced to appear in court, how many times she will be denounced by strangers. Wouldn’t Chen Chih-chung and Huang Jui-ching be reluctant? Wouldn’t they be upset? But they weren’t. This young couple revealed no such emotions whatsoever, leaving people utterly baffled. Were they really that cold-blooded? Or had they rehearsed their response in advance, resulting in their on the scene reaction? Their statements were a little too perfect. Their extraordinary calm was a dead giveaway, because it was too far removed from a natural human responses.

Secondly, Wu Shu-chen can’t even appear in court for questioning. The sums involved are immense. She must control their source of origin, the amounts paid out, determine which elections need how much support. To properly allocate all these funds is a complex task. How much energy does it require? Wu Shu-chen may be smart. Her mind may be sharp. But how could her physical health possibly withstand the strain? If on the other hand, she is able to assume responsibility for such complex financial issues, such as which funds to transfer where, which shell company to open where, that means she has energy to spare. In which case, how difficult can it be to appear in court?

Furthermore, this is hardly Chen Shui-bian’s first election. Would he really not know the amount of funds remaining following each campaign? He was able to say without hesitation that he contributed three to four hundred million dollars to the DPP. Would he really not know the amount left over after each campaign? Where they eventually wound up? Would he not care? Would he not be curious? Supporters donated the funds to Chen Shui-bian, not to Wu Shu-chen. Campaign subsidies are distributed to candidates. If Chen Shui-bian was totally indifferent to their fate, wouldn’t he be just a little irresponsible? How many families on Taiwan transfer billions of dollars overseas, without the husband knowing anything about it? Is this even the least bit credible?

These overseas accounts all had to be handled by Chen Chih-chung and Huang Jui-ching. They saw hundreds of millions in funds transferred here and there. They never once asked Chen Chih-chung’s mother what they were all about? They never once mentioned the matter to Chen Chih-ching’s father? Chen Shui-bian never knew anything? Wow, this family’s security measures certainly are tight. Chen Chih-chung and Huang Jui-ching help his mother Wu Shu-chen open overseas accounts and make overseas deposits, but say nothing about them. Yet Chen Shui-bian shares all sorts of sensitive information relating to party comrades’ campaign funds with his son and daughter in law? And yet Chen Shui-bian told his daughter, who has never gotten involved in politics, how much he gave this person and that, inspiring Chen Hsing-yu to cry out on his behalf? Just exactly what sort of secrets cannot be spoken of in the Chen Shui-bian home? The answer is apparently beyond the comprehension of us mere mortals. What can one say, except that this is a strange family indeed!

中時電子報
中國時報 　2008.08.26
他們何以能冷靜的全推給扁嫂？
中時社論

陳致中、黃睿靚夫婦返台後，對著媒體大抒己見，態度輕鬆自若地說自己只是人頭，家中所有的錢都是由母親吳淑珍主管，父親什麼都不知道；從陳水扁自己、相關人士到陳致中、黃睿靚，眾人可說口徑都相當一致，不斷強調的就是陳家的錢都是吳淑珍在管，家裡沒有別人知道來龍去脈。

如 果這個說法為檢方、社會大眾採信，曾經擔任國家元首、身為綠營精神領袖的陳水扁，以及年輕向學、前途一片大好的陳致中夫婦或許就可以全身而退；而據親扁人 士指出吳淑珍的身體健康極差，未來如果又要因相關案件頻上法庭，她熬得下去嗎？會不會又像國務機要費的案子一樣，一路請假到底，如果是這樣，海外洗錢案怎 麼繼續查下去呢？再說，吳淑珍又沒有公務人員身分，就算查到了又能怎麼樣呢？這些錢到底是吳淑珍的嫁妝、陳致中黃睿靚結婚時的禮金、黃睿靚父親黃百祿的投 資、又或者是選舉結餘款，只要檢方無法證明這些海外帳戶裡的錢是非法所得，就算陳水扁或者陳水扁家族有海外帳戶，讓支持者失望、讓他的「台灣之子」形象受 損，或者補點罰款，其他的，畢竟損失不大啊！

所以，從保護陳水扁甚至於民進黨的角度來說，讓吳淑珍一個人一肩扛起所有的政治與法律責任， 的確是「成本最低」的一個選擇。然而，姑且不論這是不是陳水扁家族以及者支持者「損害控制」的策略，看到陳致中和黃睿靚這對夫妻幾乎是完全不帶感情地全往 媽媽吳淑珍身上推，真的還是讓人感到十分訝異。

首先讓人不解的是，陳致中是準備要念法律博士的人，他不可能不知道這次家族涉及的海外帳戶 甚至疑似洗錢一案，後續的政治、法律問題有多複雜繁瑣，如果確實所有的事都只有吳淑珍一個人知道，那她未來將要承受多大的責任和壓力，以吳淑珍的身心狀 況，身為兒子、媳婦的人難道一點都不會為媽媽擔心嗎？為什麼陳致中和黃睿靚可以表現的如此平靜、說得如此理所當然，沒有一點憂慮神色？在明知媽媽麻煩大了 的情況下，還可以如此泰然自若，陳家能把孩子教得這麼冷靜、這麼有大將之風，實有過人之處。

但是對照陳水扁的另一個孩子陳幸妤的歇斯底裡，卻又不得讓人納悶，這家人的差異還真的很大：一個在事情還沒太明朗化前就已公開抓狂，另一個則是在洗錢風暴愈滾愈大之際，還可像沒事人一樣，侃侃而談地把責任全推給身體羸弱的媽媽。

試 想，如果這整起事件真的從頭尾都只有吳淑珍一個人在操盤，那就意謂著吳淑珍此後的日子不平靜了，她不知道要上幾次法庭，她要面對多少人的指責甚至咒罵…想 到這裡，陳致中和黃睿靚應該會不捨吧，會不安吧，沒有！這對年輕夫婦完全沒有這方面的表現。這實在讓人不解，是他們太冷酷了呢，還是這些應對場面早已演練 過了，以致於臨場反應、用字遣詞幾達爐火純青。但他們的過於鎮定反而是一大破綻，因為太不合人情。

其次，吳淑珍連出庭應訊都沒有辦法承 受，這些金額龐大的資金，她既要管各路不同來源是怎麼來的，又要管要給誰多少，哪個人選舉需要多少錢，要妥善發落，這是多麼複雜的工作，需要多少能量才能 辦得好；吳淑珍或許頭腦非常精明、心細如絲，但她的身體健康狀況能承受嗎？她既能總攬如此複雜的財務問題，還要決定把錢匯到哪裡，在哪裡開個紙上公司什麼 的，顯見精力不差，那當時出個一、兩次庭，有那麼難嗎？

再者，陳水扁不是第一次選舉，他會不知道每次選會有結餘款，他都能夠那麼明確地說 出捐給了民進黨有三．四億元，他會不知道歷次選舉有結餘，這些結餘的下落到底如何，他會不關心、不好奇嗎？支持者是捐款給陳水扁不是捐給吳淑珍，選舉的補 助款是發給候選人的，陳水扁完全不聞不問，會不會太不負責任了一點？台灣有幾個家庭可以匯幾億元到國外，然後做老公的人還一點都不知情？這合理嗎？

這 些海外帳戶的開戶、轉帳都需要陳致中與黃睿靚辦理手續，眼看著幾億的錢轉來轉去，他們不但不會開口問一下媽媽這是怎麼回事，甚至在這過程中，連對老爸提一 下都沒有，以致於陳水扁說他這一路以來什麼都不知道，哇，這家人的「保密防諜」也未免做得太嚴密了吧。陳致中、黃睿靚幫媽媽吳淑珍開戶、轉帳都不講，陳水 扁卻跟兒女大談理當是同黨同志間敏感話題的選舉款，跟向來不涉政治的兒女講給了這個人多少錢、給了那個人多少錢，讓陳幸妤為老爸猛抱屈。到底在陳水扁家什 麼才是「不能說的祕密」，恐怕不能以常理判斷；只能說，這家人還真的很奇特！

The Marginalization of Tsai Ing-wen

The Marginalization of Tsai Ing-wen
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 25, 2008

The DPP Central Standing Committee has resolved that the party will participate in the August 30 “One Hundred Day’s Roar” protest march. This development has at least three implications for the DPP.

One. The Central Standing Committee maintains that Chen Shui-bian’s prosecution is a case of the “Kuomintang and [mainland] China colluding to persecute the DPP and Taiwan.” It intends to rationalize its conduct as “Supporting A Bian means Loving Taiwan. Loving Taiwan means Supporting A Bian.”

Two. The protest march is being led by pro-independence elements. Rival elements within the Democratic Progressive Party who consider the timing “inopportune,” and believe that the party ought to “live to fight another day,” are in the minority and on the defensive. This shows that the DPP remains under the sway of pro-independence elements. The DPP did not participate in the August 9 Taiwan church group demonstration and the August 20 Taiwan Solidarity Union demonstration against Ma Ying-jeou. Yet it remains committed to independence and is unable to prevent itself from being hijacked by pro independence elements.

Three. Most importantly, the situation shows that the DPP hyas repudiate Tsai Ing-wen’s new ideas and new direction. Tsai Ying-wen’s leadership has being marginalized. Tsai Ing-wen has bowed to pressure to participate in the march. This shows that Tsai Ing-wen is unable to lead the DPP. This shows that she and the DPP have already been hijacked by Chen Shui-bian and pro-independence elements.

The most shameful response of the Green Camp and the DPP following the outbreak of the Chen Shui-bian money-laundering scandal, was to feign surprise and shock, to pretend they had suddenly awoken from a dream, and to declare: “Who knew Chen Shui-bian was like this?”

Even Tsai Ing-wen played along. “So the rumors were true!” In fact, Chen’s Taiwan Development Corporation scandal, SOGO scandal, State Expenses scandal, long ago exposed Chen Shui-bian’s shameless and despicable conduct. Pro-independence forces within the Democratic Progressive Party have long maintained that A Bian was innocent, and argued that “Supporting A Bian means Loving Taiwan. Loving Taiwan means Supporting A Bian.” Did they really not know what kind of person Chen Shui-bian was?

Now that Chen Shui-bian’s money-laundering scandals have been exposed, the Democratic Progressive Party and pro independence elements are feigning surprise and shock, and acting as if they had suddenly awakened from a dream. Some want him to “vanish from the face of the earth.” Some want him to commit hara kiri or drown himself in the ocean. Even Tsai Ing-wen went along with the pretense, saying “So the rumors were true.” In fact of course Chen Shui-bian is still the same old Chen Shui-bian he always was. The only difference is some supporters think it’s time the DPP changed its tune and disassociated itself from Chen Shui-bian.

Who could have guessed that following a bout of political wrangling, the DPP would again decide to take to the streets on August 30? The “non-mainstream faction” within the DPP which wants to disassociate itself from greed, independence, and Chen Shui-bian has lost the struggle to change the party line. The KMT underwent an internal struggle between “mainstream” and “non-mainstream” factions. Then Party Chairman Lee Teng-hui represented the “mainstream.” Tsai Ing-wen by contrast, does not represent the “mainstream.” Her direction for the party has been repudiated. Her leadership has been marginalized. She represents the “non-mainstream.”

Why is the DPP protesting? For whom is it protesting? The theme of the August 30 protest march is “defending sovereignty, filling bellies, and demanding sunshine.” Defending sovereignty has reportedly been changed to “defending democracy.” Filling bellies has reportedly been changed to “defending the people’s livelihood.” Demanding sunshine, i.e., demanding a sunshine policy, was added at the last minute. What we would like to know is, why was “defending sovereignty” changed to “defending democracy?” What was the DPP attempting to evade? Whether Ma Ying-jeou is leaning toward Beijing can be debated. But what grounds to Taiwan independence elements have to demand the “defense of Taiwan’s sovereignty?” As for “filling bellies,” the Democratic Progressive Party wants blame Taiwan’s economic plight on the KMT, which took office only 100 days ago. Shouldn’t the DPP take a hard look at its long held policy of “Support A Bian, even if it means starving to death?” As far as “demanding sunshine” is concerned, the least the DPP can do is not spin Chen Shui-bian’s prosecution for corruption as “political persecution by the Kuomintang and [mainland] China.” The least the DPP can do is revoke Chen Shui-bian’s party membership.

Chen Shui-bian has spun his criminal prosecution as “political persecution.” The August 30 protest march has already become a “Supporting A Bian means Loving Taiwan. Loving Taiwan means Supporting A Bian” demonstration. The protest march proves two things. One, that Taiwan independence forces have already made a comeback, and two, that Tsai Ing-wen has already been marginalized.

The public on Taiwan already knows the DPP’s logic like the back of its hand. The DPP is using “loving Taiwan” as cover for “supporting A Bian.” It is using “protesting against Ma” as cover for “supporting independence.” Plus ca change, plus c’est la meme chose. You can’t teach an old dog new tricks. Marchers might not utter a single slogan in support of A Bian. But they will not be able to conceal their support for A Bian in the guise of “opposition to political persecution.” Marchers might not wave a single banner in support of Taiwan independence. But they will not be able to conceal the fact that Taiwan independence elements have hijacked the DPP and Tsai Ing-wen. The mainstream faction consists of Chen Shui-bian and Taiwan independence elements. They may or may not constitute a numerical majority. The non-mainstream faction consists of Tsai Ing-wen and others. They may or may not constitute a numerical minority. The protest march is in fact an arena for Green Camp infighting — one in which the mainstream faction has already crushed the non-mainstream faction.

This is extremely unfair to Tsai Ing-wen. The DPP has made her chairperson, in name only. It is not helping her achieve her political goals. This is a harsh test for Tsai Ing-wen. The Tsai Ing-wen who will take to the streets on August 30 will not be the real Tsai Ing-wen.

蔡英文的邊緣化與空洞化
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.08.25 03:41 am

民進黨中常會決議，維持參加八三○大遊行。此一發展，對民進黨而言，至少有三項意義：

一、中常會強勢意見認為，陳水扁的案子是「國民黨與中國一起修理民進黨與台灣」，遂又將情勢合理化為「挺扁愛台／愛台挺扁」。

二、此次遊行由獨派主持，民進黨內主張「時機不宜／擇期再戰」的聲音成為弱勢意見，足徵民進黨的主體仍然被獨派盤踞。否則，八月九日台教會及八月二十日台聯皆曾有嗆馬示威，民進黨何以未參加，而如今卻唯獨不能排除獨派的挾持？

三、最重要的是，此一情勢顯示蔡英文欲主張的新理念、新路線已告空洞化，蔡英文的領導地位也告邊緣化。蔡英文向這次大遊行低頭，已不可能「領導」民進黨，而民進黨與蔡英文皆已被扁系與獨派挾持。

陳水扁洗錢案爆發後，綠營及民進黨最可恥的反應是故作「恍然大悟」或「大夢初醒」之狀，而謂：「誰知陳水扁竟然是這樣一個人！」

連蔡英文都說：「過去的傳聞原來是真的！」其實，陳家在台開案、SOGO案、國務機要費案的種種情節，早已將陳水扁貪腐無恥、猥瑣卑鄙的人格暴露無遺，民進黨及獨派卻始終「相信阿扁的清白」，並大玩「挺扁愛台／愛台挺扁」的手法，難道他們當時不知陳水扁是個什麼貨色？

如今，到了陳水扁爆出洗錢醜聞，民進黨及獨派中有些人卻突然故作「恍然大悟／大夢初醒」之狀；有人要他「從這個世界消失」，有人叫他切腹跳海；連蔡英文都說「傳聞原來是真的」。其實，陳水扁依然是那個陳水扁，只是這些改變口氣的人認為，這也許正是民進黨改變戲路、與扁切割的時機。

豈料，經過一番「運作」，八三○還是要上街，民進黨內欲與「貪／獨／扁」切割的「非主流派」，在黨內的路線鬥爭中敗下陣來。昔日國民黨出現「主流／非主流」之爭，黨主席李登輝是「主流派」；但蔡英文如今在黨內卻不是「主流」，她的路線理念空洞化，領導地位邊緣化，她是「非主流」。

為何遊行？為誰遊行？八三○大遊行的主題是：「護主權（已改成護民主？）／顧肚子（改成護民生？）／要陽光（臨時追加的項目）」。試問：顧主權為何要改成顧民主？是為了閃避什麼？馬英九是否傾中當然應接受公評，但台獨若仍然主張「顧台灣國的主權」，請問正當性何在？再說顧肚子，民進黨欲將造成台灣今日經濟困境的責任全部諉諸就職一百天的國民黨之前，是否應先自省過去八年「肚子扁扁／要挺阿扁」的罪愆？至於要陽光，起碼不能把司法訴究陳水扁貪汙說成是「國民黨與中國迫害陳水扁」吧？起碼總該開除陳水扁的黨籍吧？

陳水扁將情勢定性為「政治追殺」，八三○遊行也已演成「挺扁愛台／愛台挺扁」的大遊行，亦是展現台獨東山再起的大遊行，更不啻是宣告蔡英文空洞化與邊緣化的大遊行！

民進黨的邏輯八股，國人早已瞭若指掌。用「愛台」來美化「挺扁」，用「嗆馬」來裝飾「挺獨」；萬變不離其宗，如今更是老狗變不出新把戲。這次大遊行，即使未聞一句挺扁口號，但已不能掩飾「反追殺／反迫害」的擁扁訴求；即使未見一幅台獨旗幟，卻也不能改變民進黨及蔡英文仍受台獨挾持的事實。這場大遊行其實是綠營內鬥的舞台，亦即是台獨及扁系主流派（支持者人數未必居多數），壓倒了蔡英文等非主流派（支持人數未必居少數）的勝利大遊行。

這對蔡英文極不公平，民進黨給了她主席的虛名，卻不能支持她實踐她的理念路線；這對蔡英文更是嚴酷考驗，八三○上了街，蔡英文已非蔡英文！

The Marginalization of Tsai Ing-wen

The Marginalization of Tsai Ing-wen
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
August 25, 2008

The DPP Central Standing Committee has resolved that the party will participate in the August 30 “One Hundred Day’s Roar” protest march. This development has at least three implications for the DPP.

One. The Central Standing Committee maintains that Chen Shui-bian’s prosecution is a case of the “Kuomintang and [mainland] China colluding to persecute the DPP and Taiwan.” It intends to rationalize its conduct as “Supporting A Bian means Loving Taiwan. Loving Taiwan means Supporting A Bian.”

Two. The protest march is being led by pro-independence elements. Rival elements within the Democratic Progressive Party who consider the timing “inopportune,” and believe that the party ought to “live to fight another day,” are in the minority and on the defensive. This shows that the DPP remains under the sway of pro-independence elements. The DPP did not participate in the August 9 Taiwan church group demonstration and the August 20 Taiwan Solidarity Union demonstration against Ma Ying-jeou. Yet it remains committed to independence and is unable to prevent itself from being hijacked by pro independence elements.

Three. Most importantly, the situation shows that the DPP hyas repudiate Tsai Ing-wen’s new ideas and new direction. Tsai Ying-wen’s leadership has being marginalized. Tsai Ing-wen has bowed to pressure to participate in the march. This shows that Tsai Ing-wen is unable to lead the DPP. This shows that she and the DPP have already been hijacked by Chen Shui-bian and pro-independence elements.

The most shameful response of the Green Camp and the DPP following the outbreak of the Chen Shui-bian money-laundering scandal, was to feign surprise and shock, to pretend they had suddenly awoken from a dream, and to declare: “Who knew Chen Shui-bian was like this?”

Even Tsai Ing-wen played along. “So the rumors were true!” In fact, Chen’s Taiwan Development Corporation scandal, SOGO scandal, State Expenses scandal, long ago exposed Chen Shui-bian’s shameless and despicable conduct. Pro-independence forces within the Democratic Progressive Party have long maintained that A Bian was innocent, and argued that “Supporting A Bian means Loving Taiwan. Loving Taiwan means Supporting A Bian.” Did they really not know what kind of person Chen Shui-bian was?

Now that Chen Shui-bian’s money-laundering scandals have been exposed, the Democratic Progressive Party and pro independence elements are feigning surprise and shock, and acting as if they had suddenly awakened from a dream. Some want him to “vanish from the face of the earth.” Some want him to commit hara kiri or drown himself in the ocean. Even Tsai Ing-wen went along with the pretense, saying “So the rumors were true.” In fact of course Chen Shui-bian is still the same old Chen Shui-bian he always was. The only difference is some supporters think it’s time the DPP changed its tune and disassociated itself from Chen Shui-bian.

Who could have guessed that following a bout of political wrangling, the DPP would again decide to take to the streets on August 30? The “non-mainstream faction” within the DPP which wants to disassociate itself from greed, independence, and Chen Shui-bian has lost the struggle to change the party line. The KMT underwent an internal struggle between “mainstream” and “non-mainstream” factions. Then Party Chairman Lee Teng-hui represented the “mainstream.” Tsai Ing-wen by contrast, does not represent the “mainstream.” Her direction for the party has been repudiated. Her leadership has been marginalized. She represents the “non-mainstream.”

Why is the DPP protesting? For whom is it protesting? The theme of the August 30 protest march is “defending sovereignty, filling bellies, and demanding sunshine.” Defending sovereignty has reportedly been changed to “defending democracy.” Filling bellies has reportedly been changed to “defending the people’s livelihood.” Demanding sunshine, i.e., demanding a sunshine policy, was added at the last minute. What we would like to know is, why was “defending sovereignty” changed to “defending democracy?” What was the DPP attempting to evade? Whether Ma Ying-jeou is leaning toward Beijing can be debated. But what grounds to Taiwan independence elements have to demand the “defense of Taiwan’s sovereignty?” As for “filling bellies,” the Democratic Progressive Party wants blame Taiwan’s economic plight on the KMT, which took office only 100 days ago. Shouldn’t the DPP take a hard look at its long held policy of “Support A Bian, even if it means starving to death?” As far as “demanding sunshine” is concerned, the least the DPP can do is not spin Chen Shui-bian’s prosecution for corruption as “political persecution by the Kuomintang and [mainland] China.” The least the DPP can do is revoke Chen Shui-bian’s party membership.

Chen Shui-bian has spun his criminal prosecution as “political persecution.” The August 30 protest march has already become a “Supporting A Bian means Loving Taiwan. Loving Taiwan means Supporting A Bian” demonstration. The protest march proves two things. One, that Taiwan independence forces have already made a comeback, and two, that Tsai Ing-wen has already been marginalized.

The public on Taiwan already knows the DPP’s logic like the back of its hand. The DPP is using “loving Taiwan” as cover for “supporting A Bian.” It is using “protesting against Ma” as cover for “supporting independence.” Plus ca change, plus c’est la meme chose. You can’t teach an old dog new tricks. Marchers might not utter a single slogan in support of A Bian. But they will not be able to conceal their support for A Bian in the guise of “opposition to political persecution.” Marchers might not wave a single banner in support of Taiwan independence. But they will not be able to conceal the fact that Taiwan independence elements have hijacked the DPP and Tsai Ing-wen. The mainstream faction consists of Chen Shui-bian and Taiwan independence elements. They may or may not constitute a numerical majority. The non-mainstream faction consists of Tsai Ing-wen and others. They may or may not constitute a numerical minority. The protest march is in fact an arena for Green Camp infighting — one in which the mainstream faction has already crushed the non-mainstream faction.

This is extremely unfair to Tsai Ing-wen. The DPP has made her chairperson, in name only. It is not helping her achieve her political goals. This is a harsh test for Tsai Ing-wen. The Tsai Ing-wen who will take to the streets on August 30 will not be the real Tsai Ing-wen.

蔡英文的邊緣化與空洞化
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.08.25 03:41 am

民進黨中常會決議，維持參加八三○大遊行。此一發展，對民進黨而言，至少有三項意義：

一、中常會強勢意見認為，陳水扁的案子是「國民黨與中國一起修理民進黨與台灣」，遂又將情勢合理化為「挺扁愛台／愛台挺扁」。

二、此次遊行由獨派主持，民進黨內主張「時機不宜／擇期再戰」的聲音成為弱勢意見，足徵民進黨的主體仍然被獨派盤踞。否則，八月九日台教會及八月二十日台聯皆曾有嗆馬示威，民進黨何以未參加，而如今卻唯獨不能排除獨派的挾持？

三、最重要的是，此一情勢顯示蔡英文欲主張的新理念、新路線已告空洞化，蔡英文的領導地位也告邊緣化。蔡英文向這次大遊行低頭，已不可能「領導」民進黨，而民進黨與蔡英文皆已被扁系與獨派挾持。

陳水扁洗錢案爆發後，綠營及民進黨最可恥的反應是故作「恍然大悟」或「大夢初醒」之狀，而謂：「誰知陳水扁竟然是這樣一個人！」

連蔡英文都說：「過去的傳聞原來是真的！」其實，陳家在台開案、SOGO案、國務機要費案的種種情節，早已將陳水扁貪腐無恥、猥瑣卑鄙的人格暴露無遺，民進黨及獨派卻始終「相信阿扁的清白」，並大玩「挺扁愛台／愛台挺扁」的手法，難道他們當時不知陳水扁是個什麼貨色？

如今，到了陳水扁爆出洗錢醜聞，民進黨及獨派中有些人卻突然故作「恍然大悟／大夢初醒」之狀；有人要他「從這個世界消失」，有人叫他切腹跳海；連蔡英文都說「傳聞原來是真的」。其實，陳水扁依然是那個陳水扁，只是這些改變口氣的人認為，這也許正是民進黨改變戲路、與扁切割的時機。

豈料，經過一番「運作」，八三○還是要上街，民進黨內欲與「貪／獨／扁」切割的「非主流派」，在黨內的路線鬥爭中敗下陣來。昔日國民黨出現「主流／非主流」之爭，黨主席李登輝是「主流派」；但蔡英文如今在黨內卻不是「主流」，她的路線理念空洞化，領導地位邊緣化，她是「非主流」。

為何遊行？為誰遊行？八三○大遊行的主題是：「護主權（已改成護民主？）／顧肚子（改成護民生？）／要陽光（臨時追加的項目）」。試問：顧主權為何要改成顧民主？是為了閃避什麼？馬英九是否傾中當然應接受公評，但台獨若仍然主張「顧台灣國的主權」，請問正當性何在？再說顧肚子，民進黨欲將造成台灣今日經濟困境的責任全部諉諸就職一百天的國民黨之前，是否應先自省過去八年「肚子扁扁／要挺阿扁」的罪愆？至於要陽光，起碼不能把司法訴究陳水扁貪汙說成是「國民黨與中國迫害陳水扁」吧？起碼總該開除陳水扁的黨籍吧？

陳水扁將情勢定性為「政治追殺」，八三○遊行也已演成「挺扁愛台／愛台挺扁」的大遊行，亦是展現台獨東山再起的大遊行，更不啻是宣告蔡英文空洞化與邊緣化的大遊行！

民進黨的邏輯八股，國人早已瞭若指掌。用「愛台」來美化「挺扁」，用「嗆馬」來裝飾「挺獨」；萬變不離其宗，如今更是老狗變不出新把戲。這次大遊行，即使未聞一句挺扁口號，但已不能掩飾「反追殺／反迫害」的擁扁訴求；即使未見一幅台獨旗幟，卻也不能改變民進黨及蔡英文仍受台獨挾持的事實。這場大遊行其實是綠營內鬥的舞台，亦即是台獨及扁系主流派（支持者人數未必居多數），壓倒了蔡英文等非主流派（支持人數未必居少數）的勝利大遊行。

這對蔡英文極不公平，民進黨給了她主席的虛名，卻不能支持她實踐她的理念路線；這對蔡英文更是嚴酷考驗，八三○上了街，蔡英文已非蔡英文！