The Tax Reform Commission’s Ad Hoc Tax Cuts are A Sham

The Tax Reform Commission’s Ad Hoc Tax Cuts are A Sham
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 30, 2008 　

The Executive Yuan Tax Reform Commission will meet this Thursday for the second time. Reportedly, it will propose a variety of tax cuts. These tax cuts would go into effect once the Statute for Upgrading Industries has been sunsetted. Treasury officials said these programs will be submitted to the Tax Reform Commission no later than the end of the year.

What’s baffling is that even after the Statute for Upgrading Industries is sunsetted, no consensus will exist regarding which items, such as research and innovation, will remain tax exempt. This makes it difficult to estimate how much tax revenues will increase once the Statute for Upgrading Industries is sunsetted. Since the revenue forecast is uncertain, how can one estimate how much to cut taxes? Even assuming one ends up with a surplus after the Statute for Upgrading Industries is sunsetted, why is it being used to cut inheritance taxes and business taxes? Why not cut stock transaction taxes and business taxes? How do Treasury officials know that these changes will be submitted to the Tax Reform Commission “no later than the end of the year?” The Ministry of Finance announced the Tax Reform Commission’s direction and timetable for the next half-year even before the Tax Reform Commission had time to hold its first formal meeting. No wonder the private sector Tax Reform Union says the Tax Reform Commission is a sham.

Actually, when Premier Liu Chao-hsuan had breakfast with business tycoons last Wednesday, he had already announced a number of Tax Reform Commission “conclusions.” Premier Liu said that cutting inheritance taxes and business taxes was the government’s intention and the government’s policy. The relevant tax cuts would be confirmed within three to six months. Premier Liu even said, “The Tax Reform Commission’s conclusions will not disappoint.” The Premier’s statement of course came from the Ministry of Finance’s chief of staff. How did the Ministry of Finance know in advance what the Tax Reform Commission’s conclusions would be, whether they would disappoint, and how soon they would arrive at a conclusion? The public’s views on tax reform are diametrically opposed to the government’s. Some people propose cutting business taxes and inheritance taxes. Others propose keeping them the same. Given the government’s tax goals, tax reform is essentially a zero-sum game. One person’s gain is another person’s loss. If the intent of tax reform is to ensure that the captains of industry and commerce are happy, then the private sector Tax Reform Union will inevitably be disappointed. The conclusions of the Tax Reform Commission’s future meetings, were announced in advance, by the Executive Yuan. They were not discussed by the Tax Reform Commission. The Executive Yuan did not talk to Tax Reform Commission consultants. Tax Reform Commission consultants were not asked their opinion. These commission members and consultants have all been silenced. Doesn’t this prove the meeting was a sham?

The Ministry of Finance predicted that the Tax Reform Commission would cut business taxes and inheritance taxes. It also knew in advance that stock transaction taxes would not be on the agenda. An appropriate cut in capital gains tax, along with a cut in stock transaction tax would be enormously helpful to small investors. It would only have had a minor impact on wealthy investors. Besides, the capital gains tax may help wealthy businessmen avoid taxes, and is also to blame for the current, unequal tax burden. Yet TSMC CEO Morris Chang has yet again proposed imposing a capital gains tax. The Ministry of Finance however, says that is not part of its plans. The Executive Yuan also has no response. Why does the Executive Yuan respond warmly to some demands put forth by industry and trade leaders, but stonewall when it comes to others? A breakfast meeting with industry and trade leaders, making so many conflicting demands, miraculously settled a whole range of tax reform issues. Doesn’t this prove the meeting was a sham?

Last Thursday the entire cabinet went up Yangminshan to undergo group training. Premier Liu said that henceforth the Executive Yuan would function normally. It would stop running around attempting to put out fires. We agree with his thinking. Tax policy and tax planning should be handled in just such a manner. Although different taxes are subject to different laws and regulations, they are inextricably linked. They must not be dealt with piecemeal, one at a time. Property taxes in particular, require normalcy and a strategic plan. They must not be dealt with on an ad hoc basis. If the Ministry of Finance and the Tax Reform Commission are serious about carrying out Premier Liu’s plans, they must first abandon their piecemeal approach to tax reform. They should not rush to introduce piecemeal tax reform at a news conference or a breakfast with trade and industry leaders. In fact, one of the original reasons for establishing a Tax Reform Commission was to stop making piecemeal reforms and draw up comprehensive plans. Once the Tax Reform Commission has been established, the Executive Yuan or the Ministry of Finance, when confronted by conflicting demands, need only say “All these issues are being deliberated” and “A comprehensive solution will be announced next summer.” It should not panic every time someone complains, leaving itself a nervous wreck.

Tax Reform Commission members have been made officials of every economics and finance related cabinet. Many former ministers experienced in tax policy, industry and trade leaders, and elected officials meanwhile, have been relegated to the status of advisors. Three oddly titled “Highest Advisors,” with limited authority have been named. A bloated commission, with over 40 legislators, wealthy businessmen, scholars, ministers, spokespersons for disadvantaged groups, will be given to sharp differences in views. The Ministry of Finance is continuing its guerrilla attacks. The private sector Tax Reform Union and members of the public have blasted the Tax Reform Commission. They consider the commission a sham. We do not want to be pessimistic. But when we consider the Executive Yuan and the Ministry of Finance’s recent statements and the organization’s redundant nature, we can’t help worrying about its future.

中時電子報
中國時報 　2008.07.30
賦改會打減稅游擊戰 就是玩假的
中時社論

　行政院賦稅改革委員會第二次會議，將於本周四召開。據報導，會中將提出促產條例落日後的種種降稅方案。財政部官員說，這些方案最慢年底提報賦改會確認。

　 令人困惑的是，促產條例落日之後究竟還有哪些免稅項目（例如研發創新）保留，賦改會都還沒共識，當然也就難以估算會因促產落日而增加多少稅收。既然稅收預 估不確定，又要如何估算降稅的幅度呢？就算促產條例落日多出來一筆稅收，又為什麼是用來降遺贈稅與營所稅？為什麼不是用來降證交稅、營業稅？財政部官員又 如何知道這些變動方向「最慢年底」會由賦改會通過呢？財政部在賦改會正式開會做第一次討論前，就事先宣布賦改會半年後的改革方向與時間表，也難怪民間稅改 聯盟要批評：賦改會是玩假的。

　其實，在上周三行政院長劉兆玄與工商鉅子早餐會時，就已經宣示了若干賦改會的「結論」。劉院長指出，遺贈 稅、營所稅往下調，是政府的方向也是政策，若干調稅案三至六個月就會確定。劉院長甚至表示：「賦改會的結論，不會讓你們失望。」行政院長的發言，當然是來 自財政部的幕僚。奇怪的是，賦改會的結論如何、會不會令人失望、多久之後會做成結論，財政部何以事前預知？民間目前對稅改的意見南轅北轍，有人主張降營所 稅與遺贈稅，也有人主張不降。在給定的國家稅收目標下，稅目稅率的改革幾乎像是一個零和賽局─有人高興就有人失望。如果稅改的方向是保證讓工商大老闆高 興，那就一定會讓民間稅改聯盟失望。賦改會未來開會的結論，行政院先行宣布，沒有經委員會討論、沒有諮議該會諮議委員、沒有詢問該會顧問，這些委員與顧問 卻人人噤聲，這像不像是玩假的？

　財政部不但能預知調降營所稅與遺贈稅的賦改會結論，也事前對資本利得稅表示並非規畫議題。開徵資本利得 稅如果與適當的免稅額搭配，並同時減降證交稅，那麼對於大多數散戶投資人而言，都絕對是利多，只對於富人大戶有影響。此外，資本利得稅徒然造成富商巨賈方 便的避稅管道，也是當前租稅負擔不均的罪魁禍首。但是，在台積電張忠謀再次主張課徵資本利得稅之後，財政部卻表示這不在規畫之中，而行政院長對此也沒有任 何回應。我們不了解，為什麼工商大老的某些要求，行政院就熱情回應，而其他要求就冷凍處理？如果一次工商早餐會冷熱之間就搞定了這麼多稅改議題，這像不像 是玩假的？

　在上周四行政院全體閣員上山「集訓」之前，劉院長表示他以後要打正規戰，不要再陷在游擊戰的泥淖之中；我們非常同意這樣的布 局與思考。就稅制稅政的規畫而言，它是最適合正規作戰的。租稅稅目雖然雜列在不同的法規之中，但彼此之間牽一髮而動全身，不宜片面地、切割地宣布。租稅變 動更要有正規軍的全面戰略觀念，而不可沉溺於局部的叢林戰役。如果財政部與賦改會要認真執行、貫徹劉院長的正規軍作戰計畫，就該率先拋棄切割式變動稅目稅 率的思考，不要急著在一次次記者會或工商大老餐敘時，推出零碎的稅改議題。其實，成立賦改會的原始目的之一，就是要暫停各方片斷支節的降稅要求，而做全面 的規畫。在賦改會成立後，行政院或財政部面對外界需索，就只能說「一切都在整體研議」、「明年夏天會推出整套方案」等說明，而不該如響斯應、東叩西鳴，自 亂陣腳。

　賦改會的委員會納入了所有的財經閣員，卻把許多租稅資歷豐富的歷任部長、工商大老、民意代表列為諮詢委員。在委員之外，又加上 了三位名稱怪異、功能有限的「最高顧問」。這麼一個四十餘人的龐大會議，裡面有立委、富商、學者、部長、弱勢代表，陣容龐大臃腫。賦改會內意見差異尖銳， 外則由財政部不斷事先宣告游擊戰戰場。民間稅改聯盟和輿論最近一直在批評賦改會，認為這個會是玩假的。我們不想做這樣悲觀的推論，但是看看行政院與財政部 最近的發言，再端詳該會疊床架屋的組織設計，我們真的開始憂慮這個委員會未來的走向。

The Tax Reform Commission’s Ad Hoc Tax Cuts are A Sham

The Tax Reform Commission’s Ad Hoc Tax Cuts are A Sham
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 30, 2008 　

The Executive Yuan Tax Reform Commission will meet this Thursday for the second time. Reportedly, it will propose a variety of tax cuts. These tax cuts would go into effect once the Statute for Upgrading Industries has been sunsetted. Treasury officials said these programs will be submitted to the Tax Reform Commission no later than the end of the year.

What’s baffling is that even after the Statute for Upgrading Industries is sunsetted, no consensus will exist regarding which items, such as research and innovation, will remain tax exempt. This makes it difficult to estimate how much tax revenues will increase once the Statute for Upgrading Industries is sunsetted. Since the revenue forecast is uncertain, how can one estimate how much to cut taxes? Even assuming one ends up with a surplus after the Statute for Upgrading Industries is sunsetted, why is it being used to cut inheritance taxes and business taxes? Why not cut stock transaction taxes and business taxes? How do Treasury officials know that these changes will be submitted to the Tax Reform Commission “no later than the end of the year?” The Ministry of Finance announced the Tax Reform Commission’s direction and timetable for the next half-year even before the Tax Reform Commission had time to hold its first formal meeting. No wonder the private sector Tax Reform Union says the Tax Reform Commission is a sham.

Actually, when Premier Liu Chao-hsuan had breakfast with business tycoons last Wednesday, he had already announced a number of Tax Reform Commission “conclusions.” Premier Liu said that cutting inheritance taxes and business taxes was the government’s intention and the government’s policy. The relevant tax cuts would be confirmed within three to six months. Premier Liu even said, “The Tax Reform Commission’s conclusions will not disappoint.” The Premier’s statement of course came from the Ministry of Finance’s chief of staff. How did the Ministry of Finance know in advance what the Tax Reform Commission’s conclusions would be, whether they would disappoint, and how soon they would arrive at a conclusion? The public’s views on tax reform are diametrically opposed to the government’s. Some people propose cutting business taxes and inheritance taxes. Others propose keeping them the same. Given the government’s tax goals, tax reform is essentially a zero-sum game. One person’s gain is another person’s loss. If the intent of tax reform is to ensure that the captains of industry and commerce are happy, then the private sector Tax Reform Union will inevitably be disappointed. The conclusions of the Tax Reform Commission’s future meetings, were announced in advance, by the Executive Yuan. They were not discussed by the Tax Reform Commission. The Executive Yuan did not talk to Tax Reform Commission consultants. Tax Reform Commission consultants were not asked their opinion. These commission members and consultants have all been silenced. Doesn’t this prove the meeting was a sham?

The Ministry of Finance predicted that the Tax Reform Commission would cut business taxes and inheritance taxes. It also knew in advance that stock transaction taxes would not be on the agenda. An appropriate cut in capital gains tax, along with a cut in stock transaction tax would be enormously helpful to small investors. It would only have had a minor impact on wealthy investors. Besides, the capital gains tax may help wealthy businessmen avoid taxes, and is also to blame for the current, unequal tax burden. Yet TSMC CEO Morris Chang has yet again proposed imposing a capital gains tax. The Ministry of Finance however, says that is not part of its plans. The Executive Yuan also has no response. Why does the Executive Yuan respond warmly to some demands put forth by industry and trade leaders, but stonewall when it comes to others? A breakfast meeting with industry and trade leaders, making so many conflicting demands, miraculously settled a whole range of tax reform issues. Doesn’t this prove the meeting was a sham?

Last Thursday the entire cabinet went up Yangminshan to undergo group training. Premier Liu said that henceforth the Executive Yuan would function normally. It would stop running around attempting to put out fires. We agree with his thinking. Tax policy and tax planning should be handled in just such a manner. Although different taxes are subject to different laws and regulations, they are inextricably linked. They must not be dealt with piecemeal, one at a time. Property taxes in particular, require normalcy and a strategic plan. They must not be dealt with on an ad hoc basis. If the Ministry of Finance and the Tax Reform Commission are serious about carrying out Premier Liu’s plans, they must first abandon their piecemeal approach to tax reform. They should not rush to introduce piecemeal tax reform at a news conference or a breakfast with trade and industry leaders. In fact, one of the original reasons for establishing a Tax Reform Commission was to stop making piecemeal reforms and draw up comprehensive plans. Once the Tax Reform Commission has been established, the Executive Yuan or the Ministry of Finance, when confronted by conflicting demands, need only say “All these issues are being deliberated” and “A comprehensive solution will be announced next summer.” It should not panic every time someone complains, leaving itself a nervous wreck.

Tax Reform Commission members have been made officials of every economics and finance related cabinet. Many former ministers experienced in tax policy, industry and trade leaders, and elected officials meanwhile, have been relegated to the status of advisors. Three oddly titled “Highest Advisors,” with limited authority have been named. A bloated commission, with over 40 legislators, wealthy businessmen, scholars, ministers, spokespersons for disadvantaged groups, will be given to sharp differences in views. The Ministry of Finance is continuing its guerrilla attacks. The private sector Tax Reform Union and members of the public have blasted the Tax Reform Commission. They consider the commission a sham. We do not want to be pessimistic. But when we consider the Executive Yuan and the Ministry of Finance’s recent statements and the organization’s redundant nature, we can’t help worrying about its future.

中時電子報
中國時報 　2008.07.30
賦改會打減稅游擊戰 就是玩假的
中時社論

　行政院賦稅改革委員會第二次會議，將於本周四召開。據報導，會中將提出促產條例落日後的種種降稅方案。財政部官員說，這些方案最慢年底提報賦改會確認。

　 令人困惑的是，促產條例落日之後究竟還有哪些免稅項目（例如研發創新）保留，賦改會都還沒共識，當然也就難以估算會因促產落日而增加多少稅收。既然稅收預 估不確定，又要如何估算降稅的幅度呢？就算促產條例落日多出來一筆稅收，又為什麼是用來降遺贈稅與營所稅？為什麼不是用來降證交稅、營業稅？財政部官員又 如何知道這些變動方向「最慢年底」會由賦改會通過呢？財政部在賦改會正式開會做第一次討論前，就事先宣布賦改會半年後的改革方向與時間表，也難怪民間稅改 聯盟要批評：賦改會是玩假的。

　其實，在上周三行政院長劉兆玄與工商鉅子早餐會時，就已經宣示了若干賦改會的「結論」。劉院長指出，遺贈 稅、營所稅往下調，是政府的方向也是政策，若干調稅案三至六個月就會確定。劉院長甚至表示：「賦改會的結論，不會讓你們失望。」行政院長的發言，當然是來 自財政部的幕僚。奇怪的是，賦改會的結論如何、會不會令人失望、多久之後會做成結論，財政部何以事前預知？民間目前對稅改的意見南轅北轍，有人主張降營所 稅與遺贈稅，也有人主張不降。在給定的國家稅收目標下，稅目稅率的改革幾乎像是一個零和賽局─有人高興就有人失望。如果稅改的方向是保證讓工商大老闆高 興，那就一定會讓民間稅改聯盟失望。賦改會未來開會的結論，行政院先行宣布，沒有經委員會討論、沒有諮議該會諮議委員、沒有詢問該會顧問，這些委員與顧問 卻人人噤聲，這像不像是玩假的？

　財政部不但能預知調降營所稅與遺贈稅的賦改會結論，也事前對資本利得稅表示並非規畫議題。開徵資本利得 稅如果與適當的免稅額搭配，並同時減降證交稅，那麼對於大多數散戶投資人而言，都絕對是利多，只對於富人大戶有影響。此外，資本利得稅徒然造成富商巨賈方 便的避稅管道，也是當前租稅負擔不均的罪魁禍首。但是，在台積電張忠謀再次主張課徵資本利得稅之後，財政部卻表示這不在規畫之中，而行政院長對此也沒有任 何回應。我們不了解，為什麼工商大老的某些要求，行政院就熱情回應，而其他要求就冷凍處理？如果一次工商早餐會冷熱之間就搞定了這麼多稅改議題，這像不像 是玩假的？

　在上周四行政院全體閣員上山「集訓」之前，劉院長表示他以後要打正規戰，不要再陷在游擊戰的泥淖之中；我們非常同意這樣的布 局與思考。就稅制稅政的規畫而言，它是最適合正規作戰的。租稅稅目雖然雜列在不同的法規之中，但彼此之間牽一髮而動全身，不宜片面地、切割地宣布。租稅變 動更要有正規軍的全面戰略觀念，而不可沉溺於局部的叢林戰役。如果財政部與賦改會要認真執行、貫徹劉院長的正規軍作戰計畫，就該率先拋棄切割式變動稅目稅 率的思考，不要急著在一次次記者會或工商大老餐敘時，推出零碎的稅改議題。其實，成立賦改會的原始目的之一，就是要暫停各方片斷支節的降稅要求，而做全面 的規畫。在賦改會成立後，行政院或財政部面對外界需索，就只能說「一切都在整體研議」、「明年夏天會推出整套方案」等說明，而不該如響斯應、東叩西鳴，自 亂陣腳。

　賦改會的委員會納入了所有的財經閣員，卻把許多租稅資歷豐富的歷任部長、工商大老、民意代表列為諮詢委員。在委員之外，又加上 了三位名稱怪異、功能有限的「最高顧問」。這麼一個四十餘人的龐大會議，裡面有立委、富商、學者、部長、弱勢代表，陣容龐大臃腫。賦改會內意見差異尖銳， 外則由財政部不斷事先宣告游擊戰戰場。民間稅改聯盟和輿論最近一直在批評賦改會，認為這個會是玩假的。我們不想做這樣悲觀的推論，但是看看行政院與財政部 最近的發言，再端詳該會疊床架屋的組織設計，我們真的開始憂慮這個委員會未來的走向。

President Ma’s State Visits and the Meaning of Diplomatic Truce

President Ma’s State Visits and the Meaning of Diplomatic Truce
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 29, 2008

In mid-August President Ma Ying-jeou will visit Paraguay and the Dominican Republic. This will be his first trip outside the country after becoming president. During this trip he can realize his concept of a “diplomatic truce.” The outcome will be an important indicator of his policy’s success or failure.

The Ma administration’s biggest difference with the Chen administration, is that the Ma administration is not irreconciliably hostile towards mainland China. Ma hopes to dissolve cross-Strait confrontation, promote cooperation, and increase Taiwan’s room for development. On the diplomatic front, Ma has renounced his predecessor’s “scorched earth diplomacy,” which only wound up burning the ROC’s fingers. Nor is Ma adopting his predecessor’s “transit diplomacy,” which abused the hospitality of our diplomatic allies. Ma’s visits are no longer subterfuges. They are merely means of facilitating his transit through the United States. They are unlike Chen’s visits, which squandered energy and resources merely to upgrade Chen’s city of transit and duration of transit.

This change is correct. The Chen Shui-bian administration turned “transit diplomacy” from a positive into a negative. Besides allowing Chen to bask in glory, it had no real diplomatic function. Chen Shui-bian’s plane was parked on the tarmac. By sheer coincidence, Air Force One, the U.S. President’s plane, parked next to it. Chen chose to play up this triviality, as if it had some sort of special political significance. This sort of “transit diplomacy” has become a self-deceptive, nauseating farce. The result has been the breakdown of mutual trust and serious damage to Taipei-Washington relations. With each transit, Chen Shui-bian’s treatment went from bad to worse. It went from being invited to baseball games and steak dinners, to being shunted off to Alaska to endure the cold arctic winds. Taipei-Washington relations are warming up again. It might be better not to put invest too much emotion into Ma’s upcoming transit through the US. Allow it to be remain a plain and simple transit, and allow people to catch their breath.

A “diplomatic truce” is not fruit one can pick off a tree. The Ma administration must have no illusions about that.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Francisco Ou’s basic direction is correct. His long struggle to maintain diplomatic relations in Latin America, has made him deeply aware that vicious cross-Strait diplomatic struggles have left both sides wounded. They have wasted resources. They make no sense. They have harmed our international image. He believes that whether we have 23 or 30 allies makes little difference. Quarrels in international organizations over nomenclature and protocol have paralyzed ROC diplomacy, and have been of little help to the people. These concepts, coming from a veteran diplomat, are more avant garde, innovative, and pragmatic than the public on Taiwan is accustomed to.

The problem is it takes two to Tango. A truce requires both sides to lay down their arms. In the cross-Strait diplomatic war, Taipei finds itself at a major disadvantage. Past investments of resources were intended to prevent the total loss of sovereignty and international living space. Our survival hung by a thread. We had no capital to squander, or latitude for mistakes.

In the absence of specific concessions by Beijing, it is too early for Taipei to declare a truce. Doing so may inflict serious harm upon ourselves. Even if Beijing were to fall asleep at the wheel and lose several allies, it wouldn’t harm their international stature. Taipei, by contrast, is hanging on for dear life. If 23 allies are reduced to 13 allies, or 3 allies, this could delegitimize us as a regime. This has already become an international law issue. Beijing has power. Once we make concessions, they may counterattack. If the ROC pulls back its line of defense, regaining ground may be even more difficult.

Therefore, we hope that before any “diplomatic truce” is implemented, we focus on communication and persuasion, and not make costly unilateral concessions. After all, this is another way to safeguard our national sovereignty and survival. We must never confuse means with ends.

President Ma’s trip is hardly a junket. First, he must consolidate Taiwan’s diplomatic standing in Latin America. He must improve the ROC’s image, which has been tainted by numerous bribery scandals. Since President Ma has an aptitude for foreign relations, he can be an effective PR man. He can win the support of Latin American allies. He can even win the support of local populations. Cross-Strait relations have been signifcantly improved. Beijing wants the Olympic Games to be a total success, and is worried about negative developments. This is an ideal opportunity for the ROC to strengthen its diplomatic hand.

President Ma must also improve communications with the United States. As a result of the new administration taking office, cross-Strait relations are no longer on red alert. But the closer Taipei and Beijing get. the bigger the problem for the United States. Washington is no longer as sure as it once was whether Taipei is on its side, or Beijing’s side. President Ma has not made his position clear. So far the new administration’s policy is giving people the impression that it is leaning all the way toward Beijing, without any reservations or safeguards.

But the United States is Taiwan’s most important supporter, militarily, economically, and diplomatically. Ever since reports of frozen arms sales, the United States has been waiting for the Ma administration to give the US an accounting. If he has a chance, during his transit through the United States, President Ma can do much in this respect. He can also help the public on Taiwan better understand. The President is someone who must take on major tasks. Instead of worrying about such details as saving money on charter flights, he should spend his energy thinking about the direction in which the nation must develop.

中時電子報
中國時報 　2008.07.29
從馬總統出訪談「外交休兵」的真義
中時社論

　馬英九總統將於八月中旬率團訪問巴拉圭和多明尼加，這是他就任總統後的首次出國，也是一次實踐「外交休兵」理念的出訪。後續發展結果如何，將具有重要的指標意義。

　馬政府和扁政府最大的不同，在於對中國不再採取全面敵對的態度，希望化解兩岸對立增進合作，進一步促成台灣更大的發展空間。在外交方面，揚棄到處放火最後把自己燒得焦頭爛額的「烽火外交」，也不再走喧賓奪主用過境待遇自吹自擂的「過境外交」老路，轉而將出訪單純化，過境美國時以便利、自然為主，不會像過去那樣用盡力氣耗費資源在禮遇、停留地點與天數、會晤層級上。

　這項改變是正確的，因為過去扁政府已經把「過境外交」的價值從正操作到負，最後除了自己往自己臉上貼金之外，在外交上已經沒有實質功能了。當扁搭乘的專機在停機坪上恰巧停在美國總統專機「空軍一號」的旁邊，都可以被渲染成別具政治意義，這種過境外交已經變成了自欺欺人的噁心鬧劇。尤其最後台美關係因互信破裂而嚴重毀損，陳水扁的過境待遇跟著每下愈況，從看棒球、吃牛排淪落到在阿拉斯加「閃」冬風，如今台美關係重起爐灶，元首過境這檔子事，不妨先卸下過多的政治負載，讓它回歸單純與理性，對大家都是一種喘息。

　然而，「外交休兵」並不是束手就擒，馬政府可千萬不要搞錯了。

　外交部長歐鴻鍊提出的理念基本方向是對的，他長年在拉美固守邦交，深感兩岸外交惡鬥讓雙方都受害，浪費資源又毫無意義，而且傷害國際形象。他認為，邦交國是廿三還是卅個，並沒有太多差別；在國際組織爭吵名稱與儀節，既癱瘓了台灣的外交，也無法替人民帶來幫助。這些觀念雖出自一位老外交官之口，和社會習慣的思路相比，卻是比較前進創新且務實的。

　問題在於一個巴掌拍不響，要休兵，得雙方都放下武器。在兩岸的外交戰中，台灣處於嚴重不利局勢，之前之所以投注大量資源心力，也是為了避免岌岌可危的主權地位與國際生存空間被完全吞噬掉。這是千鈞一髮的求生，沒有太多揮霍或犯錯的本錢。

　在沒有得到中共具體讓步之前，台灣太早即自行休兵，可能會對自己造成嚴重的傷害。因為中共外交對台部門即使睡個幾年覺，就算丟了幾個邦交國吧，也無損於其舉足輕重的國際地位；但台灣的外交版圖可是寸土寸金，每一寸都在咽喉上。廿三個邦交國如果掉到十三或三個，是否還能構成合法政權的定義，已經會成為國際法上需要爭辯的議題了。而且，中共以其實力，讓步之後很容易就能反攻，台灣的陣線如果後退了，要再搶回可就難上加難。

　因此，我們希望「外交休兵」在付諸實行前，要先把重點放在理念溝通與說服上，不能變成不划算的片面退讓。畢竟這是用另一種方式來維護國家主權與生存機會，手段與目的之間的從屬位階不能混淆。

　馬總統此行並不輕鬆，首先，他必須鞏固台灣在拉美的外交地盤，改善因多項獻金醜聞而被汙名化的台灣形象。馬總統個人既有涉外的能力，希望他能多多替台灣做有效的公關工作，爭取拉美友邦的民意支持，甚至去當地民間「long stay」搏感情也可以。現在兩岸關係大為改善，中共又力求奧運圓滿成功而投鼠忌器，正是台灣趁隙補強外交陣地的絕佳時機。

　馬總統另外一件要做的事，是加強與美國的溝通。兩岸關係固然因新政府上台而暫時解除警報，但台灣和中共愈走愈近，對美國來說，也是一個大問題。因為台灣現在到底屬於自己這一邊、還是中共那一邊，已經不如過去那麼有把握了。偏偏馬總統一直沒有提出個清楚的論述，新政府至今的施政也讓人覺得向中共一路倒，沒有自我校正或警惕的機制。

　但無論在軍事、經濟或國際空間上，美國都是台灣的最重要支持，從傳出凍結軍售之說以來，美國都在等待馬政府給個說法。如果有機會的話，這次過境美國時，馬總統倒是可以在這方面多多釋疑，順便也讓台灣民眾有更多了解。總統是要做大事的人，與其在搭包機省錢之類的小細節上斤斤計較，不如把心力花在經營國家發展的大方向。

President Ma’s State Visits and the Meaning of Diplomatic Truce

President Ma’s State Visits and the Meaning of Diplomatic Truce
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 29, 2008

In mid-August President Ma Ying-jeou will visit Paraguay and the Dominican Republic. This will be his first trip outside the country after becoming president. During this trip he can realize his concept of a “diplomatic truce.” The outcome will be an important indicator of his policy’s success or failure.

The Ma administration’s biggest difference with the Chen administration, is that the Ma administration is not irreconciliably hostile towards mainland China. Ma hopes to dissolve cross-Strait confrontation, promote cooperation, and increase Taiwan’s room for development. On the diplomatic front, Ma has renounced his predecessor’s “scorched earth diplomacy,” which only wound up burning the ROC’s fingers. Nor is Ma adopting his predecessor’s “transit diplomacy,” which abused the hospitality of our diplomatic allies. Ma’s visits are no longer subterfuges. They are merely means of facilitating his transit through the United States. They are unlike Chen’s visits, which squandered energy and resources merely to upgrade Chen’s city of transit and duration of transit.

This change is correct. The Chen Shui-bian administration turned “transit diplomacy” from a positive into a negative. Besides allowing Chen to bask in glory, it had no real diplomatic function. Chen Shui-bian’s plane was parked on the tarmac. By sheer coincidence, Air Force One, the U.S. President’s plane, parked next to it. Chen chose to play up this triviality, as if it had some sort of special political significance. This sort of “transit diplomacy” has become a self-deceptive, nauseating farce. The result has been the breakdown of mutual trust and serious damage to Taipei-Washington relations. With each transit, Chen Shui-bian’s treatment went from bad to worse. It went from being invited to baseball games and steak dinners, to being shunted off to Alaska to endure the cold arctic winds. Taipei-Washington relations are warming up again. It might be better not to put invest too much emotion into Ma’s upcoming transit through the US. Allow it to be remain a plain and simple transit, and allow people to catch their breath.

A “diplomatic truce” is not fruit one can pick off a tree. The Ma administration must have no illusions about that.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Francisco Ou’s basic direction is correct. His long struggle to maintain diplomatic relations in Latin America, has made him deeply aware that vicious cross-Strait diplomatic struggles have left both sides wounded. They have wasted resources. They make no sense. They have harmed our international image. He believes that whether we have 23 or 30 allies makes little difference. Quarrels in international organizations over nomenclature and protocol have paralyzed ROC diplomacy, and have been of little help to the people. These concepts, coming from a veteran diplomat, are more avant garde, innovative, and pragmatic than the public on Taiwan is accustomed to.

The problem is it takes two to Tango. A truce requires both sides to lay down their arms. In the cross-Strait diplomatic war, Taipei finds itself at a major disadvantage. Past investments of resources were intended to prevent the total loss of sovereignty and international living space. Our survival hung by a thread. We had no capital to squander, or latitude for mistakes.

In the absence of specific concessions by Beijing, it is too early for Taipei to declare a truce. Doing so may inflict serious harm upon ourselves. Even if Beijing were to fall asleep at the wheel and lose several allies, it wouldn’t harm their international stature. Taipei, by contrast, is hanging on for dear life. If 23 allies are reduced to 13 allies, or 3 allies, this could delegitimize us as a regime. This has already become an international law issue. Beijing has power. Once we make concessions, they may counterattack. If the ROC pulls back its line of defense, regaining ground may be even more difficult.

Therefore, we hope that before any “diplomatic truce” is implemented, we focus on communication and persuasion, and not make costly unilateral concessions. After all, this is another way to safeguard our national sovereignty and survival. We must never confuse means with ends.

President Ma’s trip is hardly a junket. First, he must consolidate Taiwan’s diplomatic standing in Latin America. He must improve the ROC’s image, which has been tainted by numerous bribery scandals. Since President Ma has an aptitude for foreign relations, he can be an effective PR man. He can win the support of Latin American allies. He can even win the support of local populations. Cross-Strait relations have been signifcantly improved. Beijing wants the Olympic Games to be a total success, and is worried about negative developments. This is an ideal opportunity for the ROC to strengthen its diplomatic hand.

President Ma must also improve communications with the United States. As a result of the new administration taking office, cross-Strait relations are no longer on red alert. But the closer Taipei and Beijing get. the bigger the problem for the United States. Washington is no longer as sure as it once was whether Taipei is on its side, or Beijing’s side. President Ma has not made his position clear. So far the new administration’s policy is giving people the impression that it is leaning all the way toward Beijing, without any reservations or safeguards.

But the United States is Taiwan’s most important supporter, militarily, economically, and diplomatically. Ever since reports of frozen arms sales, the United States has been waiting for the Ma administration to give the US an accounting. If he has a chance, during his transit through the United States, President Ma can do much in this respect. He can also help the public on Taiwan better understand. The President is someone who must take on major tasks. Instead of worrying about such details as saving money on charter flights, he should spend his energy thinking about the direction in which the nation must develop.

中時電子報
中國時報 　2008.07.29
從馬總統出訪談「外交休兵」的真義
中時社論

　馬英九總統將於八月中旬率團訪問巴拉圭和多明尼加，這是他就任總統後的首次出國，也是一次實踐「外交休兵」理念的出訪。後續發展結果如何，將具有重要的指標意義。

　馬政府和扁政府最大的不同，在於對中國不再採取全面敵對的態度，希望化解兩岸對立增進合作，進一步促成台灣更大的發展空間。在外交方面，揚棄到處放火最後把自己燒得焦頭爛額的「烽火外交」，也不再走喧賓奪主用過境待遇自吹自擂的「過境外交」老路，轉而將出訪單純化，過境美國時以便利、自然為主，不會像過去那樣用盡力氣耗費資源在禮遇、停留地點與天數、會晤層級上。

　這項改變是正確的，因為過去扁政府已經把「過境外交」的價值從正操作到負，最後除了自己往自己臉上貼金之外，在外交上已經沒有實質功能了。當扁搭乘的專機在停機坪上恰巧停在美國總統專機「空軍一號」的旁邊，都可以被渲染成別具政治意義，這種過境外交已經變成了自欺欺人的噁心鬧劇。尤其最後台美關係因互信破裂而嚴重毀損，陳水扁的過境待遇跟著每下愈況，從看棒球、吃牛排淪落到在阿拉斯加「閃」冬風，如今台美關係重起爐灶，元首過境這檔子事，不妨先卸下過多的政治負載，讓它回歸單純與理性，對大家都是一種喘息。

　然而，「外交休兵」並不是束手就擒，馬政府可千萬不要搞錯了。

　外交部長歐鴻鍊提出的理念基本方向是對的，他長年在拉美固守邦交，深感兩岸外交惡鬥讓雙方都受害，浪費資源又毫無意義，而且傷害國際形象。他認為，邦交國是廿三還是卅個，並沒有太多差別；在國際組織爭吵名稱與儀節，既癱瘓了台灣的外交，也無法替人民帶來幫助。這些觀念雖出自一位老外交官之口，和社會習慣的思路相比，卻是比較前進創新且務實的。

　問題在於一個巴掌拍不響，要休兵，得雙方都放下武器。在兩岸的外交戰中，台灣處於嚴重不利局勢，之前之所以投注大量資源心力，也是為了避免岌岌可危的主權地位與國際生存空間被完全吞噬掉。這是千鈞一髮的求生，沒有太多揮霍或犯錯的本錢。

　在沒有得到中共具體讓步之前，台灣太早即自行休兵，可能會對自己造成嚴重的傷害。因為中共外交對台部門即使睡個幾年覺，就算丟了幾個邦交國吧，也無損於其舉足輕重的國際地位；但台灣的外交版圖可是寸土寸金，每一寸都在咽喉上。廿三個邦交國如果掉到十三或三個，是否還能構成合法政權的定義，已經會成為國際法上需要爭辯的議題了。而且，中共以其實力，讓步之後很容易就能反攻，台灣的陣線如果後退了，要再搶回可就難上加難。

　因此，我們希望「外交休兵」在付諸實行前，要先把重點放在理念溝通與說服上，不能變成不划算的片面退讓。畢竟這是用另一種方式來維護國家主權與生存機會，手段與目的之間的從屬位階不能混淆。

　馬總統此行並不輕鬆，首先，他必須鞏固台灣在拉美的外交地盤，改善因多項獻金醜聞而被汙名化的台灣形象。馬總統個人既有涉外的能力，希望他能多多替台灣做有效的公關工作，爭取拉美友邦的民意支持，甚至去當地民間「long stay」搏感情也可以。現在兩岸關係大為改善，中共又力求奧運圓滿成功而投鼠忌器，正是台灣趁隙補強外交陣地的絕佳時機。

　馬總統另外一件要做的事，是加強與美國的溝通。兩岸關係固然因新政府上台而暫時解除警報，但台灣和中共愈走愈近，對美國來說，也是一個大問題。因為台灣現在到底屬於自己這一邊、還是中共那一邊，已經不如過去那麼有把握了。偏偏馬總統一直沒有提出個清楚的論述，新政府至今的施政也讓人覺得向中共一路倒，沒有自我校正或警惕的機制。

　但無論在軍事、經濟或國際空間上，美國都是台灣的最重要支持，從傳出凍結軍售之說以來，美國都在等待馬政府給個說法。如果有機會的話，這次過境美國時，馬總統倒是可以在這方面多多釋疑，順便也讓台灣民眾有更多了解。總統是要做大事的人，與其在搭包機省錢之類的小細節上斤斤計較，不如把心力花在經營國家發展的大方向。

President Ma’s State Visits and the Meaning of Diplomatic Truce

President Ma’s State Visits and the Meaning of Diplomatic Truce
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 29, 2008

In mid-August President Ma Ying-jeou will visit Paraguay and the Dominican Republic. This will be his first trip outside the country after becoming president. During this trip he can realize his concept of a “diplomatic truce.” The outcome will be an important indicator of his policy’s success or failure.

The Ma administration’s biggest difference with the Chen administration, is that the Ma administration is not irreconciliably hostile towards mainland China. Ma hopes to dissolve cross-Strait confrontation, promote cooperation, and increase Taiwan’s room for development. On the diplomatic front, Ma has renounced his predecessor’s “scorched earth diplomacy,” which only wound up burning the ROC’s fingers. Nor is Ma adopting his predecessor’s “transit diplomacy,” which abused the hospitality of our diplomatic allies. Ma’s visits are no longer subterfuges. They are merely means of facilitating his transit through the United States. They are unlike Chen’s visits, which squandered energy and resources merely to upgrade Chen’s city of transit and duration of transit.

This change is correct. The Chen Shui-bian administration turned “transit diplomacy” from a positive into a negative. Besides allowing Chen to bask in glory, it had no real diplomatic function. Chen Shui-bian’s plane was parked on the tarmac. By sheer coincidence, Air Force One, the U.S. President’s plane, parked next to it. Chen chose to play up this triviality, as if it had some sort of special political significance. This sort of “transit diplomacy” has become a self-deceptive, nauseating farce. The result has been the breakdown of mutual trust and serious damage to Taipei-Washington relations. With each transit, Chen Shui-bian’s treatment went from bad to worse. It went from being invited to baseball games and steak dinners, to being shunted off to Alaska to endure the cold arctic winds. Taipei-Washington relations are warming up again. It might be better not to put invest too much emotion into Ma’s upcoming transit through the US. Allow it to be remain a plain and simple transit, and allow people to catch their breath.

A “diplomatic truce” is not fruit one can pick off a tree. The Ma administration must have no illusions about that.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Francisco Ou’s basic direction is correct. His long struggle to maintain diplomatic relations in Latin America, has made him deeply aware that vicious cross-Strait diplomatic struggles have left both sides wounded. They have wasted resources. They make no sense. They have harmed our international image. He believes that whether we have 23 or 30 allies makes little difference. Quarrels in international organizations over nomenclature and protocol have paralyzed ROC diplomacy, and have been of little help to the people. These concepts, coming from a veteran diplomat, are more avant garde, innovative, and pragmatic than the public on Taiwan is accustomed to.

The problem is it takes two to Tango. A truce requires both sides to lay down their arms. In the cross-Strait diplomatic war, Taipei finds itself at a major disadvantage. Past investments of resources were intended to prevent the total loss of sovereignty and international living space. Our survival hung by a thread. We had no capital to squander, or latitude for mistakes.

In the absence of specific concessions by Beijing, it is too early for Taipei to declare a truce. Doing so may inflict serious harm upon ourselves. Even if Beijing were to fall asleep at the wheel and lose several allies, it wouldn’t harm their international stature. Taipei, by contrast, is hanging on for dear life. If 23 allies are reduced to 13 allies, or 3 allies, this could delegitimize us as a regime. This has already become an international law issue. Beijing has power. Once we make concessions, they may counterattack. If the ROC pulls back its line of defense, regaining ground may be even more difficult.

Therefore, we hope that before any “diplomatic truce” is implemented, we focus on communication and persuasion, and not make costly unilateral concessions. After all, this is another way to safeguard our national sovereignty and survival. We must never confuse means with ends.

President Ma’s trip is hardly a junket. First, he must consolidate Taiwan’s diplomatic standing in Latin America. He must improve the ROC’s image, which has been tainted by numerous bribery scandals. Since President Ma has an aptitude for foreign relations, he can be an effective PR man. He can win the support of Latin American allies. He can even win the support of local populations. Cross-Strait relations have been signifcantly improved. Beijing wants the Olympic Games to be a total success, and is worried about negative developments. This is an ideal opportunity for the ROC to strengthen its diplomatic hand.

President Ma must also improve communications with the United States. As a result of the new administration taking office, cross-Strait relations are no longer on red alert. But the closer Taipei and Beijing get. the bigger the problem for the United States. Washington is no longer as sure as it once was whether Taipei is on its side, or Beijing’s side. President Ma has not made his position clear. So far the new administration’s policy is giving people the impression that it is leaning all the way toward Beijing, without any reservations or safeguards.

But the United States is Taiwan’s most important supporter, militarily, economically, and diplomatically. Ever since reports of frozen arms sales, the United States has been waiting for the Ma administration to give the US an accounting. If he has a chance, during his transit through the United States, President Ma can do much in this respect. He can also help the public on Taiwan better understand. The President is someone who must take on major tasks. Instead of worrying about such details as saving money on charter flights, he should spend his energy thinking about the direction in which the nation must develop.

中時電子報
中國時報 　2008.07.29
從馬總統出訪談「外交休兵」的真義
中時社論

　馬英九總統將於八月中旬率團訪問巴拉圭和多明尼加，這是他就任總統後的首次出國，也是一次實踐「外交休兵」理念的出訪。後續發展結果如何，將具有重要的指標意義。

　馬政府和扁政府最大的不同，在於對中國不再採取全面敵對的態度，希望化解兩岸對立增進合作，進一步促成台灣更大的發展空間。在外交方面，揚棄到處放火最後把自己燒得焦頭爛額的「烽火外交」，也不再走喧賓奪主用過境待遇自吹自擂的「過境外交」老路，轉而將出訪單純化，過境美國時以便利、自然為主，不會像過去那樣用盡力氣耗費資源在禮遇、停留地點與天數、會晤層級上。

　這項改變是正確的，因為過去扁政府已經把「過境外交」的價值從正操作到負，最後除了自己往自己臉上貼金之外，在外交上已經沒有實質功能了。當扁搭乘的專機在停機坪上恰巧停在美國總統專機「空軍一號」的旁邊，都可以被渲染成別具政治意義，這種過境外交已經變成了自欺欺人的噁心鬧劇。尤其最後台美關係因互信破裂而嚴重毀損，陳水扁的過境待遇跟著每下愈況，從看棒球、吃牛排淪落到在阿拉斯加「閃」冬風，如今台美關係重起爐灶，元首過境這檔子事，不妨先卸下過多的政治負載，讓它回歸單純與理性，對大家都是一種喘息。

　然而，「外交休兵」並不是束手就擒，馬政府可千萬不要搞錯了。

　外交部長歐鴻鍊提出的理念基本方向是對的，他長年在拉美固守邦交，深感兩岸外交惡鬥讓雙方都受害，浪費資源又毫無意義，而且傷害國際形象。他認為，邦交國是廿三還是卅個，並沒有太多差別；在國際組織爭吵名稱與儀節，既癱瘓了台灣的外交，也無法替人民帶來幫助。這些觀念雖出自一位老外交官之口，和社會習慣的思路相比，卻是比較前進創新且務實的。

　問題在於一個巴掌拍不響，要休兵，得雙方都放下武器。在兩岸的外交戰中，台灣處於嚴重不利局勢，之前之所以投注大量資源心力，也是為了避免岌岌可危的主權地位與國際生存空間被完全吞噬掉。這是千鈞一髮的求生，沒有太多揮霍或犯錯的本錢。

　在沒有得到中共具體讓步之前，台灣太早即自行休兵，可能會對自己造成嚴重的傷害。因為中共外交對台部門即使睡個幾年覺，就算丟了幾個邦交國吧，也無損於其舉足輕重的國際地位；但台灣的外交版圖可是寸土寸金，每一寸都在咽喉上。廿三個邦交國如果掉到十三或三個，是否還能構成合法政權的定義，已經會成為國際法上需要爭辯的議題了。而且，中共以其實力，讓步之後很容易就能反攻，台灣的陣線如果後退了，要再搶回可就難上加難。

　因此，我們希望「外交休兵」在付諸實行前，要先把重點放在理念溝通與說服上，不能變成不划算的片面退讓。畢竟這是用另一種方式來維護國家主權與生存機會，手段與目的之間的從屬位階不能混淆。

　馬總統此行並不輕鬆，首先，他必須鞏固台灣在拉美的外交地盤，改善因多項獻金醜聞而被汙名化的台灣形象。馬總統個人既有涉外的能力，希望他能多多替台灣做有效的公關工作，爭取拉美友邦的民意支持，甚至去當地民間「long stay」搏感情也可以。現在兩岸關係大為改善，中共又力求奧運圓滿成功而投鼠忌器，正是台灣趁隙補強外交陣地的絕佳時機。

　馬總統另外一件要做的事，是加強與美國的溝通。兩岸關係固然因新政府上台而暫時解除警報，但台灣和中共愈走愈近，對美國來說，也是一個大問題。因為台灣現在到底屬於自己這一邊、還是中共那一邊，已經不如過去那麼有把握了。偏偏馬總統一直沒有提出個清楚的論述，新政府至今的施政也讓人覺得向中共一路倒，沒有自我校正或警惕的機制。

　但無論在軍事、經濟或國際空間上，美國都是台灣的最重要支持，從傳出凍結軍售之說以來，美國都在等待馬政府給個說法。如果有機會的話，這次過境美國時，馬總統倒是可以在這方面多多釋疑，順便也讓台灣民眾有更多了解。總統是要做大事的人，與其在搭包機省錢之類的小細節上斤斤計較，不如把心力花在經營國家發展的大方向。

Decriminalize Defamation, Now!

Decriminalize Defamation, Now!
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 25, 2008

President Ma has withdrawn the lawsuits he filed during the run-up to the presidential election, when the two camps filed a series of suits and countersuits against each other. Chen Shui-bian on the other hand, has decided to file a new lawsuit of his own. Chen had been summoned by the court to testify in the Lafayette Arms Procurement defamation lawsuit. He was physically assaulted as he approached the courthouse. Who knows the amount of legal resources squandered because politicians cannot refrain from endless recriminations? This is one of the biggest blind spots in the system. The justice system has never understood that defamation is a civil offense, and should not be considered a criminal offence. We have not been able to decriminalize defamation, the way other countries have, and restore it to the status of civil law. As a result Taiwan has paid a huge social cost. The issue requires serious soul-searching.

Several years ago some knowledgeable parties proposed decriminalizing defamation. They claimed that defining defamation as a criminal offense was unconstitutional, and petitioned the Grand Justices for a constitutional interpretation. The Grand Justices ruled that the law was not unconstitutional, and that the petitioners’ reasoning was specious. The Grand Justices ruled that criminal penalties could help make up for inadequacies in civil compensation. Their ruling reflects an outdated mindset that regards criminal penalties as a form of vengeance. The Grand Justices ignored the fundamental difference between civil law and criminal law. Civil law is about compensation. Criminal law is about punishment. The forgot that criminal penalties contain a hidden danger. They allow state power to intrude into civil disputes, but do not allow the aggrieved parties to obtain genuine relief.

The Grand Justices do not consider laws defining defamation as a criminal offense unconstitutional. But that does not mean defamation cannot or should not be decriminalized. The reason is simple. Defamation harms an individual’s reputation and legal interests. Civil law is perfectly capable of providing adequate relief. State intervention and criminal proceedings are unnecessary. They merely make conflict resolution even more difficult. Politicians resort to defamation lawsuits every day. One case gets filed on the heels of another. They yearn to see their opponents in prison. Meanwhile society must dance to their tune, unable to find a minute’s peace. This is something everyone clearly sees.

Those who least ought to resort to criminal prosecution in defamation cases are precisely those most prone to use them — public figures and politicians. Politicians, whether administrative officials, Members of Parliament, or political party leaders, wield immense power. On the one hand, their words and deeds should be subject to closer scrutiny than those of the general public. They also have an obligation to be more tolerant of criticism. On the other hand, they are more media savvy. They are far more adept than the general public at using media spin-control to defend themselves. Their ability to protect themselves by such means is often greater than any compensation they might derive after a long, drawn out court decision. If they resort to civil suits merely to demand monetary compensation, that is a legitimate exercise of their rights. But if they use criminal penalties to throw others in prison, that is a horse of a different color.

Take Chen Shui-bian for example. A number of years ago he was sued for defamation. He got a taste of what “political persecution” was like. But when he came to power, his administration did not champion the decriminalization of defamation. Those in power continued to charge member of the political opposition with the crime of defamation. Now that Chen is again in the opposition, he once again faces the threat of criminal penalties for defamation. If convicted, he will probably accuse the court of political persecution. The problem is not the fairness of the court’s judgments. The problem is the legal system has provided politicians with a weapon they can use to exact revenge against their opponents, by threatening them with prison terms. It has also provided politicians who lose such lawsuits the opportunity to accuse the ruling authorities of exerting undue influence on the administration of justice, and to challenge the independence of the judiciary. If such lawsuits involved only civil litigation, there would be no allegations of political persecution. The problem would be far simpler. Society would be quieter and more peaceful.

Do not assume that civil compensation is incapable of redressing grievances, or that civil compensation cannot compensate for injury. After all, the courts can require those convicted to publish the judgement or an apology in the media. That is one way resolve the problem, via reconciliation. If the celing for compensation has been set too low, the laws may be amended, raising the limit. The courts can also stipulate punitive damages. Punitive damages and criminal penalties are different. Punitive damages are paid to the victim. Criminal penalties are paid into the state treasury. The victim is an individual. What right does the government have to pocket the fines?

There has already been more than one change in ruling parties. Society has made considerable progress. But politicians continue to file defamation lawsuits against each other. The government has limited legal resources. The damage done to the justice system and the government’s credibility is incalculable. The political stage is a game of musical chairs. When people are in office they may be plaintiffs. But when people are out of office they may well end up as defendants. Round and round, back and forth. Politicians have turned the nation’s system of criminal law into a weapon against their enemies. Hasn’t society suffered enough?

It is high time defamation was decriminalized and redefined as a tort law issue. President Ma has withdrawn his lawsuit. Will he follow through and urge the Ministry of Justice and the Legislative Yuan to promote the decriminalization of defamation?

中時電子報
中國時報 　2008.07.25
推動誹謗除罪化，此其時矣
中時社論

　馬總統撤回了選舉期間因為兩陣營相互攻詰而提告的案件；陳水扁則於卸任後受法院傳喚出庭而遭人襲擊，決定再興訴訟。他是因公開指述拉法葉案弊端而吃上了誹謗官司。為了政治人物無止無休的唇槍舌劍，法院不知賠上多少司法資源，這其中最大的制度盲點，在於現行法制始終不能認清誹謗行為的本質是民事侵權行為，不該被認為是刑事犯罪。結果至今不能如其它國家一樣除罪化、回歸民事審理，讓台灣付出了鉅大的社會成本，這是在此要認真檢討的課題。

　誹謗罪除罪化，數年前曾有識者鼓吹其事。一度挑戰誹謗罪刑事立法為違憲而聲請大法官解釋，大法官則不以之為違憲，所持的理由則是似是而非。大法官認為刑事制裁可以彌補民事賠償之所窮。這可謂是將刑事制裁視做報復的思維依舊揮之不去，大法官不但忽略了民事是賠償、刑事是懲罰的根本差異，而且忘記了刑事懲罰藏著國家公權力介入民事糾紛的隱患，卻並不能讓受害的當事人獲得真正的實質救濟。

　即使大法官不以誹謗罪是違憲立法，也不代表誹謗不能或不該除罪。道理很簡單，誹謗是傷害個人名譽法益的行為，可由民事訴訟提供足夠的救濟，不需要國家公權力用刑事訴訟的方式介入，徒增更多的怨懟難以化解。政治人物以誹謗罪名興訟，無日無之，一波未平，一波又起，必欲對手身陷囹圄，社會受其牽引舞弄，難有寧時，已經不需要更多的證明。

　最最不該動用刑事制裁追訴誹謗刑責的，恰恰就是最愛動用誹謗刑事訴訟的公眾領袖與政治人物。政治人物不管是行政首長、國會議員或是政黨領袖，其實都是權傾一時的實力人物。一方面他們的所言所行，都該比一般平民受到更多的公評，也就應該更有容忍的責任，另一方面他們動見觀瞻，遠比一般平民更容易藉由媒體舞台發聲自辯自衛，所能得到的防護效果有時更甚於曠日費時的法院判決。如果只是訴諸民事法院，要求金錢賠償，猶屬正當權利之行使；一旦動用刑事訴訟欲陷他人於牢獄之災，那就是另一種評價了。

　以陳水扁為例，他當年因為誹謗罪吃了刑事官司，嘗到了「政治迫害」的滋味。可是當他上台執政，政府並未大力推動誹謗除罪化，在野者繼續被當政者用誹謗罪訴追；今天他又下野了，再度面臨誹謗罪的威脅，一旦成罪，恐怕又要指責法院政治迫害。問題可能不在法院依法判決公不公正，而是在於法律制度為政治人物的恩怨情仇，提供了藉用手中權力，加施敵手牢獄威脅的機會；也提供了敗訴的政治人物指責當權者影響司法、挑戰司法獨立的溫床。如果只用民事訴訟解決，就不會有政治監獄迫害的指控，問題單純得多，社會也會安靜平和許多。

　不要以為民事救濟的賠償有時難以濟事。賠償請求不足以平復傷害。還可以用媒體刊登判決書甚或是以和解道歉的方式解決問題。賠償法定金額過低，可以修法明訂提升其額度，明白規定容許請求懲罰性賠償也無不可。懲罰性賠償仍與刑事制裁不同。懲罰性賠償是由受害人取得，刑事罰金則是由國庫受付。試問，受害者為個人，國家拿走罰金，有什麼道理可言？

　政黨輪替，不只一回了。社會進步了許多，可是政治人物利用誹謗刑事官司冤冤相報的場景與業障，始終揮之不去，國家訴訟資源事小，司法乃至政府公信力的損害事大。上台下台如走馬燈的政治人物，上台時告人或看人被告，下台時成為被告，上上下下，告來告去，將國家刑事執法公器演成了互相傷害的工具，社會受害還不夠深嗎？

　誹謗，到了還其本質為民事侵權行為，刑事上除罪化的時候了！撤回告訴的馬總統，要不要功德做到底，建議法務部與立法院，推動誹謗除罪化的善舉？

A Government In a State of Perpetual Emergency is a Government That Cannot Stand

A Government In a State of Perpetual Emergency is a Government That Cannot Stand
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 24, 2008

As part of its short-term effort to boost the economy, the Liu cabinet has been pursuing additional budget cuts since taking office. It has proposed an increase in the budget to stimulate domestic demand. It never expected to come under severe criticism. All its plans have undergone additions, deletions, and amendments. After exhaustive efforts, they passed a third reading in the Legislative Yuan. The July 18 floods inundated central and southern Taiwan. The Liu cabinet immediately changed its mind. It prepared to divert funds to stimulate domestic demand to flood control, unexpectedly poking a hornet’s nest. Not only did the Green camp not support it, even the Blue camp blasted it, going so far as to call it “arguably in violation of the law.”

Is the reallocation of funds for stimulating domestic demand to disaster relief and flood control illegal? According to the Executive Yuan it is in compliance with the Disaster Prevention and Relief Law. It is exempt from the requirments of the Budget Act. The Executive Yuan’s interpretation is correct, but only on condition it is exempt from the Budget Act. First, the disaster has to be of a large enough magnitude. A disaster relief committee must then be formed. It must submit disaster relief plans. The plans must be reported to the Executive Yuan. The plans must be submitted to the Legislative Yuan. Second, in the event disaster relief funds allocated by all levels of government are insufficient to cover they needs arising from a disaster, the annual revenues and expenses may be adjusted, but only in response to special circumstances. Only then will it be exempt from the provisions of the Budget Act.

Based on the above, do the July 18 floods meet the requirements for an emergency response above and beyond those provided by the Disaster Prevention and Relief Law? The July 18 flood was the result of Typhoon Kalmaegi. Taiwan has typhoons every year, and never only one. Every year between July and September is typhoon season. Typhoon related disasters are to be expected. The only difference is the severity of the disasters. Therefore governments at all levels, from central to local, budget the necessary funds every year. These include subsidies for crop damage and revenue loss. The difference between the Liu cabinet and past cabinets is that it has relaxed the requirements for agricultural subsidies. Even if one fails to meet the requirements, one can still apply for the subsidies. President Ma wants the Executive Yuan to consider whether private floodgates can be included in the subsidies. No matter what, when it comes to disaster relief and disaster recovery governments at all levels must fulfill their respective duties and responsibilities. Whether they have “adequate funds” must be determined through Executive Yuan calculations. They must not divert funds from other budgets before first making calculations, or before the original budget has been exhausted.

Of course, flood control and disaster recovery are not equivalent and should not be spoken of in the same breath. Flood control is a major undertaking. Years ago James Soong was Governor of Taiwan. His first act in office was to provide an eight year, 50 billion dollar budget for Kaoping Creek flood control. The budget was billed as a dedicated, pioneering flood control effort, and caused quite a stir. By comparison the DPP government’s special budget for Keelung River flood control, which cost 40 billion, isn’t even worth mentioning. No matter what, one can imagine the scale of flood control projects. Tens of billions of dollars merely to tame a river or a creek. How many rivers and creeks in central and southern Taiwan does the Executive Yuan expect to tame with its 40 billion allocation? Premier Liu said that merely to purchase the land will cost 500 billion. Forty billion is not enough even for a single county.

Flood control projects are major undertakings. They are long-term projects. Building dikes, dredging, and when necessary, even making large-scale relocations. For example, the Yunlin coast is subject to long-term settlement. It is also a traditional low-lying waterway. During moderate rains it floods. During heavy rains it invariably leads to disaster. In the event of a record 100 year rainfall, no matter how high one makes the dikes, one cannot prevent a potential deluge. Years ago, James Soong allocated 4 billion to occupational retraining for farmers and fishermen. He dredged fish farm ponds to control floods and to prevent the intrusion of sea water. His plan was soon scrapped. It cost four billion back then. Today it would cost many times more. Do we want to do it? Would it be part of a long-term flood control plan? Clearly this is not merely a matter of diverting 40 billion dollars from the budget.

The Executive Yuan must face a number of challenges and problems. The typhoon season has begun. Typhoon Kalmaegi has gone, but who knows when the next typhoon will arrive? If heavy rains again lead to disaster, how much of the budget will remain? How much can be allocated? Before the onset of the next typhoon, what contingency plans will minimize potential disasters?

Amidst widespread skepticism, the Executive Yuan changed its spin. It stressed that only part of the budget will be devoted to stimulating domestic demand. However local governments faced with inadequate funds for disaster relief may apply. If that is the case, what will happen to the original half-year plan to stimulate domestic demand? Doesn’t this validate the criticisms leveled by members of both the ruling and opposition camps, who said that this item in the budget was not needed? Also, according to the Disaster Prevention and Relief Law, when funding is inadequate to cover “adjusted annual income and expenditures,” and the annual budget process is still in progress, any attempt to balance the budget should divert funds from the annual budget. The previous administration’s eight year, 100 billion budget is still in effect. Many local governments haven’t even had a chance to issue contracts. These were long ago included in the budget. Why can’t we start with these? Why must we divert funds earmarked for the stimulation of domestic demand?

The Ma administration has been in office for two months. It must clean up the ungodly mess left by its predecessor. Its six-month emergency plan involves the stimulation of domestic demand. But six months have yet to pass, and it has already launched an emergency flood control plan and budget. How long does the Ma administration intend to remain in a state of emergency? Flood control is a long-term major infrastructure project. Flood control cannot respond to emergencies and cannot solve emergencies. A government in a perpetual state of emergency, is a government that cannot stand.

中時電子報
中國時報 　2008.07.24
只知短期應急 無法站穩馬步
中時社論

　為了短期應急，提振景氣，劉內閣才上任就追加減預算，並提出擴大內需預算案，沒想到程序上遭到嚴厲質疑，所有的計畫幾番增刪修改，費盡力氣好不容易在立法院完成三讀。七一八水災灌爆中南台，劉內閣立刻動念，準備挪用擴大內需預算治水，沒想到捅了個馬蜂窩，不但綠營不支持，連藍營都強烈批評，甚至直言「確實有違法爭議。」

　挪用擴大內需於救災治水，到底違了什麼法？行政院的說法是根據災害防救法，可以排除預算法的規定。行政院的說法沒錯，但排除預算法是有前提的，第一，那是災害得要重大到一定程度，必須成立救災委員會，提列救災計畫，計畫必須報院，還得送立法院；第二，各級政府編列的災害防救經費，如有不敷支應災害發生時之所需，視情形調整當年度收支移緩濟急，才得不受預算法的限制。

　從上述前提來看，七一八水災到不到這個排除預算法以應急的標準？七一八水災是因為卡玫基颱風而致，台灣年年有颱風，颱風還總不只一個，每年七到九月，就是颱風季節，遇颱成災幾成慣例，差別僅在災害輕重。所以，各級政府從中央到地方，每年無不編列相關預算，從農損到稅務補貼，劉內閣與往例不同的是，他把農損補貼放寬了，未達農損標準者，還是可以申請；馬總統則要行政院考量，民眾的排水閥是否也可列入補貼，但不論如何，就救災復原部分，各級政府各司其職，各負權責之後，到底是否「不敷支應」？還得行政院算盤撥完之後再說，總不能算盤還沒撥，原編列預算尚未用盡，即刻挪用其他預算吧。

　當然，治水不能和損害復原部分相提並論。治水，是一樁大工程，當年宋楚瑜擔任省長，上任第一件事就是編列了八年五百億預算，為的是整治高屏溪，這筆預算堪稱是專責治水預算之先河，當年造成大轟動；民進黨政府的基隆河整治特別預算案四百多億，都是後話了。但不論如何，可以想見治水工程之龐大，數百億元不過整治一條河、一條溪。如今行政院要挪用四百多億，想整治中南部多少溪河呢？劉揆自己都說，光是徵收用地就得五千億，四百多億一個縣市都不頂用。

　治水不但是樁大工程，還得是長期工程，建堤防、搞疏浚，甚至必要時還得考量是否進行大規模的遷移。舉例來說，雲林沿海長期地層下陷，又是地勢低窪的傳統水路，大雨都能淹水，豪雨焉能不成災？遑論遇到破百年的瞬時雨量，堤防建得再高，都擋不了龐然水勢。當年，宋楚瑜曾經以四十億經費規畫輔導農漁民轉業，直接將漁塭挖深，做為防止海水倒灌的「治洪區」，這個計畫隨著廢省而報廢，當年的四十億，即使今日再要做，所需經費勢必不只數倍之多，但要不要做呢？在不在長期治水防洪的規畫之內呢？這些顯然都不是挪用區區四百多億預算能為之事。

　行政院面對的挑戰和麻煩是：颱風季才開始，卡玫基走了，下一個颱風不知何時會來，萬一又是豪雨成災，還能挪用什麼預算？多少預算？在下一個颱風來臨前，有什麼應急的辦法，讓可能的災害降到最低？

　在各界一片質疑聲中，行政院稍為調整說法，強調不是所有的擴大內需預算都可挪用，而是供地方政府在災害防救經費不敷使用時才可申請，那原來用在擴大內需的半年計畫是不是就免談了？那這不坐實擴大內需預算推動時朝野的批評：沒編這個預算的必要！此外，照災害防救法規定，經費不敷支應時是「調整當年度收支」，年度預算仍在進行中，要勻支不也該從年度預算中挪移嗎？遑論前政府的八年一千多億預算，照正常也還在進行中，許多工程甚至地方政府都還未能發包，這些早列入計畫和預算的工程項目，不能先做嗎？非得挪用擴大內需預算才能做嗎？

　馬政府上任兩個月，面對一個百廢待舉的局面，擴大內需是應急的半年期計畫，半年猶未到，卻又要推出應急的治水計畫和預算，馬政府到底要應急到何時？治水，是長期的大工程，絕對應不了急更治不了急，一個只知應急的政府，是不可能站穩馬步的。

A Taiwan Businessman’s Newspaper Ad and the Rule of Law

A Taiwan Businessman’s Newspaper Ad and the Rule of Law
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 23, 2008

Yesterday Taiwan businessman Wu Chen-shun bought a full-page ad on page A14 of the United Daily News. He related bizarre and painful experience of doing business in Qingdao, on the mainland. He openly called for authorities on both sides of the Strait to ensure justice on his behalf.

Reading the full-page ad Wu Chen-shun took out is shocking enough. We lack first-hand information about the incident. But the ad included a letter to SEF Chairman Chiang Pin-kung and to ARATS Chairman Chen Yunlin, saying: “Please contact concerned departments as soon as possible to ascertain the facts, and deal with the matter in accordance with the law.” This suggests that Wu Chen-shun’s petition has considerable basis in fact.

Since cross-Strait exchanges began, many inspiring stories have emerged, such as that of Master Kong, the instant noodles maker. But at times reports have also emerged of disputes and even tragedies involving mainland officials. We are convinced that these negative incidents are not something the Beijing authorities want to see happening. Some cases of official corruption the Beijing authorities have found particularly intolerable. If the Beijing authorities can uncover the truth in such incidents, and ensure justice, not only will the rights and interests of Taiwan businessmen will be protected, it would amount to a feather in the Beijing authorities’ cap. It would benefit cross-Strait relations. It would also help the Beijing authorities to establish clean government and to improve their public image.

Wu Chen-shun’s tale leaves one shocked and incredulous. In 1993 he was invited to Qingdao City in Shandong Province by leaders at various levels. He registered three companies In Qingdao, one after the other. Over time he invested 100 million USD. He calculated that if he enhanced the prosperity of the Laoshan region, land prices would soar.

His nightmare began in May 2004. First he was accused of “owning a private army, firearms, and rocket launchers that could reach Beijing in 10 minutes.” After the charges were proven to be baseless, new charges were brought, and he was remanded to a detention center in Jinan. “I do not know why I am being held. I do not know when I will be released.” Due to mistreatment in the detention center, he climbed the prison wall and escaped. He said: “Who would have imagined that a person in charge of a company worth billions would wind up fleeing in the middle of the night like a common criminal? During my escape, I fell into a three-story-high valley and was almost killed. They sent out nearly 1,000 police and police dogs, recaptured me, and threw me back in the detention center.”

Eventually, Wu Chen-shun was released. He had been detained for seven months. He was released on grounds that “following a prolonged investigation, he was found innocent of criminal activity.” When he emerged from his dungeon, Wu Chen-shun discovered his businesses had been looted. His six major assets had been transferred to or auctioned off to certain parties by all means available. For example, within four days, his Qingdao International Beer City, in which he had invested 500 million yuan, accumulated 509 million in debt and went bankrupt. Five hundred acres of land were resold. His Edinburgh Garden, with 162 acres of land, was transferred to someone else on the morning just before he was released.

Wu Chen-shun’s experience is reminiscent of what many Taiwan businessmen have encountered in the past. The legal process is ugly. Wu Chen-shun said he didn’t know why he had been detained, or why he was later released. He was unable to report the case to any of the various departments, such as the Public Security Bureau, Public Prosecutors, or the Courts. Still less was he able to file a complaint. Other cases like this often involve local party and government officials. The party machinery and government machinery automatically favor the victimizer, and become an accomplice in the crime. The victim ends up like a bug splattered on a windshield. Often the bigger the interests at stake, the worse political persecution the victim encounters. In the case of Wu Chen-shun, it led to the incredible scenario of a businessman in charge of billions being forced to flee in the middle of the night.

Cross-Strait exchanges are increasing rapidly. Both Taiwan investments on the mainland and mainland investments on Taiwan involve individual cases of commercial exchange. They promote a win/win cross-Strait scenario. They enhance cross-Strait peace and friendship. Authorities on both sides of the Strait hope that people-to-people cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges will enhance cross-Strait relations. Their most basic responsibility is to ensure that decent, honest people are protected by the rule of law.

In fact, the “rule of law” that Hu Jintao champions is basic. The result must be the legal protection of Taiwan businessmens’ rights and interests. If the rule of law can be implemented, Taiwan businessmen’s rights will naturally be protected. The Beijing authorities’ concept of the “rule of law” must not be destroyed by evil individuals. This is true for both Taiwan businessmen and for people on the mainland. We must speak up, not merely on behalf of Wu Chen-shun and other Taiwan businessmen. We must look forward to the promulgation of the rule of law on the Chinese mainland.

從一則台商陳情廣告談起
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.07.23 03:12 am

台商吳振順昨日在本報Ａ14版刊登全版廣告，痛陳他在大陸青島投資經商的離奇經歷，並公開呼籲兩岸政府為他主持公道。

讀罷吳振順的全版陳情書，令人震驚至難以置信的地步。我們雖對整個事件無第一手資料，但廣告附帶刊出了海基會董事長江丙坤致海協會會長陳雲林的函文，「敬請惠洽相關部門儘速查明事實真相，依法妥慎處理」，可徵吳振順的陳情應有相當憑據。

兩岸開放交流以來，雖有許多令人欣慰的傳奇故事，如康師傅；但也時常傳出糾紛，甚至悲劇，其中亦往往涉及大陸官方人士。我們相信，那些負面事件皆非北京當局所願見，且在有些事件中傳出的官方貪腐情事尤非北京當局所能容忍；北京當局若能對此類事件查明真相內情，主張公道正義，非但台商權益可獲保護，且亦是北京政府整飭吏治的正大作為。這不但有益兩岸關係，更必有助於北京當局端正政風，改善形象。

吳振順的故事，讀來令人驚愕不置。他在一九九三年受山東省及青島市各級領導「盛情邀請」，在青島前後註冊了三家公司，陸續投資了一億美元；他認為，帶動了嶗山一帶的繁榮，地價飛漲。

噩夢發生在二○○四年五月。起先，他被檢舉「擁有私人軍隊、槍械，火箭炮十分鐘內可以打到北京」。查無此事後，又以其他罪名，押入濟南看守所；「不知何以被關，不知何時才能獲釋」。後因難熬看守所中待遇，某日他竟翻牆越獄。他說：「誰能想到一個坐擁上百億公司的負責人，竟會在深夜狼狽地逃亡？在過程中我還掉進三層樓高的山谷，差點活活摔死……他們出動了近千名公安及警犬……又把我抓回了看守所裡。」

最後，吳振順被釋放時，距他被押已七個月。釋放的理由是「經長期調查，沒有犯罪」。出了黑牢，吳振順才發現他的事業已經完全解構，「六大資產」被「這些人」「用盡各種手段」過戶、拍賣、轉移。例如，在四天之內，將他投資五億元的「青島國際啤酒城」，以九百萬元債務，宣告破產，將五百畝土地轉售；又如，他擁有的「愛丁堡花園」，一六二畝土地，則在他被釋放前的當日早上被人過戶。

吳振順的事例，與過去聽聞的台商遭遇有頗多類似之處。例如，法律程序皆十分粗陋，如吳振順稱不知何以被羈押，亦不知何故被釋放；甚至在「公／檢／法」各部門，無法報案，更無法立案。又如，類此案件常有地方黨政人員涉入，以致黨政機器一面倒向加害者，成了共犯結構，被害人自是螳臂不能擋車；且往往牽涉利益愈大者，被害人遭遇的政治迫害愈大。以吳振順之例而言，居然造成了「一個坐擁上百億公司的負責人，竟然深夜（越獄）狼狽逃亡」的場景，真是匪夷所思。

兩岸交流正在快速提升，無論是台商赴大陸投資，或陸商來台灣經商，其中每一個商貿交流的個案，皆是促進兩岸互惠雙贏的元素，亦是增進兩岸和平友好的題材；兩岸當局在寄望雙方人民經貿交流能為兩岸互動累積成效時，最基本的責任是應當使雙方善良人民受到法治的保護。

其實，胡錦濤所主張的「以法治國」是根本，台商權益的法律保障則是結果。若能實現「以法治國」，台商的法律保障即是水到渠成。北京當局的「以法治國」理念，不容地方不肖人士破壞；不論是對台商，或對大陸人民。準此以論，我們其實不只是要為吳振順等台商個案說話，而更是對中國大陸的法治發展寄以期待。

A Taiwan Businessman’s Newspaper Ad and the Rule of Law

A Taiwan Businessman’s Newspaper Ad and the Rule of Law
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 23, 2008

Yesterday Taiwan businessman Wu Chen-shun bought a full-page ad on page A14 of the United Daily News. He related bizarre and painful experience of doing business in Qingdao, on the mainland. He openly called for authorities on both sides of the Strait to ensure justice on his behalf.

Reading the full-page ad Wu Chen-shun took out is shocking enough. We lack first-hand information about the incident. But the ad included a letter to SEF Chairman Chiang Pin-kung and to ARATS Chairman Chen Yunlin, saying: “Please contact concerned departments as soon as possible to ascertain the facts, and deal with the matter in accordance with the law.” This suggests that Wu Chen-shun’s petition has considerable basis in fact.

Since cross-Strait exchanges began, many inspiring stories have emerged, such as that of Master Kong, the instant noodles maker. But at times reports have also emerged of disputes and even tragedies involving mainland officials. We are convinced that these negative incidents are not something the Beijing authorities want to see happening. Some cases of official corruption the Beijing authorities have found particularly intolerable. If the Beijing authorities can uncover the truth in such incidents, and ensure justice, not only will the rights and interests of Taiwan businessmen will be protected, it would amount to a feather in the Beijing authorities’ cap. It would benefit cross-Strait relations. It would also help the Beijing authorities to establish clean government and to improve their public image.

Wu Chen-shun’s tale leaves one shocked and incredulous. In 1993 he was invited to Qingdao City in Shandong Province by leaders at various levels. He registered three companies In Qingdao, one after the other. Over time he invested 100 million USD. He calculated that if he enhanced the prosperity of the Laoshan region, land prices would soar.

His nightmare began in May 2004. First he was accused of “owning a private army, firearms, and rocket launchers that could reach Beijing in 10 minutes.” After the charges were proven to be baseless, new charges were brought, and he was remanded to a detention center in Jinan. “I do not know why I am being held. I do not know when I will be released.” Due to mistreatment in the detention center, he climbed the prison wall and escaped. He said: “Who would have imagined that a person in charge of a company worth billions would wind up fleeing in the middle of the night like a common criminal? During my escape, I fell into a three-story-high valley and was almost killed. They sent out nearly 1,000 police and police dogs, recaptured me, and threw me back in the detention center.”

Eventually, Wu Chen-shun was released. He had been detained for seven months. He was released on grounds that “following a prolonged investigation, he was found innocent of criminal activity.” When he emerged from his dungeon, Wu Chen-shun discovered his businesses had been looted. His six major assets had been transferred to or auctioned off to certain parties by all means available. For example, within four days, his Qingdao International Beer City, in which he had invested 500 million yuan, accumulated 509 million in debt and went bankrupt. Five hundred acres of land were resold. His Edinburgh Garden, with 162 acres of land, was transferred to someone else on the morning just before he was released.

Wu Chen-shun’s experience is reminiscent of what many Taiwan businessmen have encountered in the past. The legal process is ugly. Wu Chen-shun said he didn’t know why he had been detained, or why he was later released. He was unable to report the case to any of the various departments, such as the Public Security Bureau, Public Prosecutors, or the Courts. Still less was he able to file a complaint. Other cases like this often involve local party and government officials. The party machinery and government machinery automatically favor the victimizer, and become an accomplice in the crime. The victim ends up like a bug splattered on a windshield. Often the bigger the interests at stake, the worse political persecution the victim encounters. In the case of Wu Chen-shun, it led to the incredible scenario of a businessman in charge of billions being forced to flee in the middle of the night.

Cross-Strait exchanges are increasing rapidly. Both Taiwan investments on the mainland and mainland investments on Taiwan involve individual cases of commercial exchange. They promote a win/win cross-Strait scenario. They enhance cross-Strait peace and friendship. Authorities on both sides of the Strait hope that people-to-people cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges will enhance cross-Strait relations. Their most basic responsibility is to ensure that decent, honest people are protected by the rule of law.

In fact, the “rule of law” that Hu Jintao champions is basic. The result must be the legal protection of Taiwan businessmens’ rights and interests. If the rule of law can be implemented, Taiwan businessmen’s rights will naturally be protected. The Beijing authorities’ concept of the “rule of law” must not be destroyed by evil individuals. This is true for both Taiwan businessmen and for people on the mainland. We must speak up, not merely on behalf of Wu Chen-shun and other Taiwan businessmen. We must look forward to the promulgation of the rule of law on the Chinese mainland.

從一則台商陳情廣告談起
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.07.23 03:12 am

台商吳振順昨日在本報Ａ14版刊登全版廣告，痛陳他在大陸青島投資經商的離奇經歷，並公開呼籲兩岸政府為他主持公道。

讀罷吳振順的全版陳情書，令人震驚至難以置信的地步。我們雖對整個事件無第一手資料，但廣告附帶刊出了海基會董事長江丙坤致海協會會長陳雲林的函文，「敬請惠洽相關部門儘速查明事實真相，依法妥慎處理」，可徵吳振順的陳情應有相當憑據。

兩岸開放交流以來，雖有許多令人欣慰的傳奇故事，如康師傅；但也時常傳出糾紛，甚至悲劇，其中亦往往涉及大陸官方人士。我們相信，那些負面事件皆非北京當局所願見，且在有些事件中傳出的官方貪腐情事尤非北京當局所能容忍；北京當局若能對此類事件查明真相內情，主張公道正義，非但台商權益可獲保護，且亦是北京政府整飭吏治的正大作為。這不但有益兩岸關係，更必有助於北京當局端正政風，改善形象。

吳振順的故事，讀來令人驚愕不置。他在一九九三年受山東省及青島市各級領導「盛情邀請」，在青島前後註冊了三家公司，陸續投資了一億美元；他認為，帶動了嶗山一帶的繁榮，地價飛漲。

噩夢發生在二○○四年五月。起先，他被檢舉「擁有私人軍隊、槍械，火箭炮十分鐘內可以打到北京」。查無此事後，又以其他罪名，押入濟南看守所；「不知何以被關，不知何時才能獲釋」。後因難熬看守所中待遇，某日他竟翻牆越獄。他說：「誰能想到一個坐擁上百億公司的負責人，竟會在深夜狼狽地逃亡？在過程中我還掉進三層樓高的山谷，差點活活摔死……他們出動了近千名公安及警犬……又把我抓回了看守所裡。」

最後，吳振順被釋放時，距他被押已七個月。釋放的理由是「經長期調查，沒有犯罪」。出了黑牢，吳振順才發現他的事業已經完全解構，「六大資產」被「這些人」「用盡各種手段」過戶、拍賣、轉移。例如，在四天之內，將他投資五億元的「青島國際啤酒城」，以九百萬元債務，宣告破產，將五百畝土地轉售；又如，他擁有的「愛丁堡花園」，一六二畝土地，則在他被釋放前的當日早上被人過戶。

吳振順的事例，與過去聽聞的台商遭遇有頗多類似之處。例如，法律程序皆十分粗陋，如吳振順稱不知何以被羈押，亦不知何故被釋放；甚至在「公／檢／法」各部門，無法報案，更無法立案。又如，類此案件常有地方黨政人員涉入，以致黨政機器一面倒向加害者，成了共犯結構，被害人自是螳臂不能擋車；且往往牽涉利益愈大者，被害人遭遇的政治迫害愈大。以吳振順之例而言，居然造成了「一個坐擁上百億公司的負責人，竟然深夜（越獄）狼狽逃亡」的場景，真是匪夷所思。

兩岸交流正在快速提升，無論是台商赴大陸投資，或陸商來台灣經商，其中每一個商貿交流的個案，皆是促進兩岸互惠雙贏的元素，亦是增進兩岸和平友好的題材；兩岸當局在寄望雙方人民經貿交流能為兩岸互動累積成效時，最基本的責任是應當使雙方善良人民受到法治的保護。

其實，胡錦濤所主張的「以法治國」是根本，台商權益的法律保障則是結果。若能實現「以法治國」，台商的法律保障即是水到渠成。北京當局的「以法治國」理念，不容地方不肖人士破壞；不論是對台商，或對大陸人民。準此以論，我們其實不只是要為吳振順等台商個案說話，而更是對中國大陸的法治發展寄以期待。

Administrative Matters May Take a Back Seat, but National Affairs Must Take a Front Seat

Administrative Matters May Take a Back Seat, but National Affairs Must Take a Front Seat
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 22, 2008

According to a survey conducted by the China Times Public Opinion Survey Center, since Ma Ying-jeou became president two months ago, his approval rating has dropped to 36 percent, possibly the lowest in his political career. The survey also found that KMT legislators, Premier Liu Chao-hsuan, and the Executive Yuan’s approval ratings are even lower. Nevertheless, over 55% of the people still have confidence in the Ma administration’s future governance. Over half the people feel satisfied with the Ma administration’s handling of cross-Strait relations. Nearly half the people do not think that President Ma should continue his “long stay” in the countryside, seven percent more than those who think he should. Most intriguing of all, only 30% were in favor of President Ma retreating to the second-line on issues other than national defence and foreign affairs. Nearly 40% were not in favor of him turning those responsibilities over to the Executive Yuan. This tells us that the public on Taiwan does not fully understand the nature of democracy.

After President Ma took office, he said that according to the Constitution, national defence and foreign affairs are the president’s responsibility. On other issues, the President ought to retreat to the second-line, and the Premier ought to be in charge. This is the President’s understanding of his duties under the Constitution. Currently more people disapprove of his decision than approve. Normally the public tends to agree with the president’s understanding of the Constitution. This is not a matter of asking to public to amend the Constitution. The public considers the president correct in his understanding of the Constitution. At the same time it disapproves of his decision to retreat to the second line out of respect for the Constitution. What exactly does that mean?

Not long ago the China Times said that Ma’s so-called retreat to the second-line is a concept that requires clarification. When the President retreats to the second-line, he is defending the Constitution and acknowledging his proper role. It does not mean the President should be indifferent to the Executive Yuan’s duties. A President who retreats to the second-line must still empathize with the people’s suffering. When the nation finds itself in difficulty, he must stand up and bolster public morale. During times of peace he must remain vigilant. He must stabilize the nation. As Head of State, the President must set the major objectives and determine the larger direction for the nation’s development. He must become a stabilizing force for the political situation. In reality, a President who has retreated to the second line must at times stand on the front line, uniting the people.

President Chen and President Ma must understand of constitutional separation of powers between the President and the Executive Yuan. They may not ignore the provisions of the Constitution merely because they are democratically elected. They may not usurp powers not delegated to them, merely because they received a majority of the votes. This is something that President Ma, who studied law, wishes to uphold. It is also something that voters may be neglecting. To put it bluntly, voters who support the President must not encourage the President to violate the rule of law, violate the Constitution, exceed his rightfully delegated powers, and make decisions he is not authorized to make. The Constitution tells people how to elect a President. It also tells the President what he may and may not do. The President must act in accordance with the Constitution. Democracy must not be a system in which a president, once elected, is able to set the Constitution to one side.

In a democracy the people choose their leaders. When these leaders’ peform their duties, two problems may arise. One, they may accomplish something of value. The other, they may exceed their authority. To accomplish something of value, requires leadership, determination, and administrative ability. To avoid exceeding one’s authority, requires self-control, a refusal to abuse power, and a refusal to be corrupted by money. The best elected leaders possess both virtues. The worst elected leaders lack both virtues. Such leaders are both incompetent and corruptible. In the event we cannot have both, is it better to have a leader who is competent, or a leader who incorruptible? A feudal society that does not insist on democracy may prefer a leader who is competent. But Taiwan is a democracy unwilling to turn back the clock. The President must be both competent and incorruptible. Failing that, an incompetent president is preferable to a corrupt president. The worst of all worlds is a President who is both incompetent and corrupt. Taiwan has had more than a little experience with just such a President.

Besides an elected President, The Constitution also provides for a Premier. The Premier is the head of the Executive Yuan. He is responsible for leading the cabinet in accordance with the law. People who elect their own leaders will sooner or later elect a popular but mediocre leader. If a Zhu Geliang is elected, that is good. But a Zhu Geliang might not run for office. If a Liu Bei is elected, then in accordance with the Constitution, he can still appoint a Zhu Geliang as a professional administrator. Liu Bei knew enough to respect Zhu Geliang. That fact is extremely important. In today’s democracy, a popular President who respects diversity, who can win the trust of the people, who abides by the Constitution, who knows how to use talent, who respects expertise, is far more worthy of recognition than someone is is arbitrary and who has contempt for the rule of law. Taiwan’s democracy requires further consolidation. What kind of president it needs requires further thought.

No matter what kind of President the people of Taiwan want, we already have a President who has three years and 10 months left in his term. He has formed a professional team of administrators. The public on Taiwan wants a President who can solve people’s problems. The public hopes the President will exercise self-restraint. The President must not “rule by doing nothing.” But he must not violate the Constitution in order to accomplish something of value. A President who exceeds his Constitutional authority, no matter how promising he might be as an administrator, would not be a blessing for Taiwan. When President Ma sees his poll results, he will feel pressured to do something. But he must also know when not to do anything.

中時電子報
中國時報 　2008.07.22
政務退二線 國家大政仍應上一線
中時社論

　 本報民意中心調查顯示，馬英九總統就任兩個月，施政滿意度跌到卅六％，可能是他從政以來的歷史新低。此一調查也發現，國民黨立委、劉兆玄院長以及行政團隊 的表現，民意評價更低，但是民眾對於馬政府未來施政，仍有超過五成五的人具有信心，也有半數以上的民眾對於馬政府經營兩岸關係的做法感到滿意，還有接近半 數的民眾不以為馬總統現在應該繼續下鄉進行long stay，超過贊成者七個百分點。最耐人尋味的是，只有三成的人贊成馬總統在國防外交以外的問題上站在二線；對交由行政院負責不表贊成的民眾，則接近四 成。此問題充分反映了台灣在民主政治進程上，可能還有需要反思的觀念。

　馬總統就任後表示，依據憲法國防外交是總統職權；其他問題，總統 站在二線，而由行政院院長負責；這是總統對於憲法上總統職權功能的理解。現在表示不贊成的人多過贊成的人，依正常判斷，當然不會是因一般民眾並不同意總統 的憲法認知。這個題目，不是在問民眾該不該修改憲法，如果民眾既不以為總統的憲法認識錯誤，又不贊成總統尊重憲法守在二線，其中究竟代表了什麼涵意？

　 不久之前，我們也曾表達看法，所謂退居二線，是個應該釐清的概念。總統退居二線是要謹守憲法上的權力分寸，但也不是說總統就對應由行政院團隊負責之事，漠 不關心；退居二線的總統還是應該疾民之苦，在國家處境陷入困局的時候站出來振作民心士氣，在順遂平穩的時候知道要居安思危。不論是什麼時候，總統都該站在 穩定大局的高度，以國家元首的身分指出整體發展的總目標與大方向，成為政治局面穩定的力量。在實質政務上退居二線的總統，仍該是在各種公開場合站上一線凝 聚民氣的國家元首。

　我們也必須指陳，馬總統正確地理解到憲法上總統與行政院的權限有其分工之處，不能只因為他是全民選出的總統，就將憲 法的規定拋諸腦後，靠著選票的加持，侵奪並不屬於他的權力。這是習法出身的馬總統的法治堅持，卻反而可能是總統選民忽略的地方。說得直白一些，總統的選民 經過思考之後，不該會去支持總統不守法治，不守憲法，去接不該由他掌握的權力，去做不該由他做的決定。憲法，不但告訴人們總統怎麼選，也告訴總統能做什 麼，不能做什麼。總統，應該按照憲法行事；民主政治不該是選出總統，就把憲法擺在一邊。

　民主政治由人民選擇領袖，有兩項可能相互衝突的 指標，一是他是否有為，一是他是否有守。有為，是有領導魄力與執行能力；有守，則是自我把持，不濫用權力，不貪汙歛財。上選的國家元首，當然是既有為，又 有守。下下之選，則是不但無能，而且不守分際。有為有守若是不能得兼，是寧取有為呢？還是寧取有守？不堅持民主的封建社會，可能寧取有為；可是台灣已是不 許回頭的民主政治，總統要就是有為有守，不然也該是無能而有守。最怕是碰到無能而又無守的總統，這點台灣不是沒有經驗。

　在民選總統之 外，憲法上確還有位負責領導內閣依法行政的行政院長。從長遠看，人民選舉領袖，總有選出人氣充足，但才具平庸者的時候。諸葛亮當選，固然很好；但諸葛亮未 必參選。當選的若是劉備，依照憲法，也還有任命諸葛亮作為專業經理人的機會。劉備懂得尊重諸葛亮，其實極為重要。現在民主政治，面向多元，贏得人民信賴的 人氣總統，謹守憲法分寸，識人善任，尊重專才，要遠比乾綱獨斷，視法治如無物者，值得肯定許多。台灣的民主仍須鞏固，究竟需要那一種總統，應該深思。

　 不管台灣人想要那一種總統，我們已經有了一位任期還有三年十個月的總統，也已組成了一支專業行政團隊。台灣人無非想要總統解民倒懸，我們也希望總統有為有 守，總統既不該無為而治，更不可為了展現有為，就不守憲法分際。不守憲法分際的總統，再怎麼有為，也非台灣之福，馬總統看到民調結果，必須有所做為，也還 是要有所不為。