Archive for May, 2008|Monthly archive page
Time to Use Our Heads to Resolve Real Problems
Time to Use Our Heads to Resolve Real Problems
China Times Editorial (Taipei, China)
A Translation
May 31, 2008
Call it breaking the ice. Call it melting the ice. The leaders of the ruling parties on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait finally met yesterday amidst an atmosphere of goodwill. They agreed to resume talks between the SEF and ARATS in mid-June. The mainland will open up four locations for direct flights from Taoyuan’s CKS Airport. In an unprecedented move, CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao personally committed to negotiate with Taipei over increasing the ROC’s international space. This must await follow-up consultations by the SEF and ARATS before it becomes official of course. But the success of the Wu Hu Meeting has already created an optimistic atmosphere for the SEF and ARATS negotiations comin up in June. The check the KMT issued, promising direct charter flights and the arrival of mainland tourists by July, may not bounce after all.
Watching the KMT and CCP party hierarchy shake hands and exchange ritual greetings was emotionally overwhelming. These two political parties have been locked in a life and death struggle for over half a century. How many historical grievances have they accumulated? How many lives have been lost? How many families have been torn apart? Today the leaders of the two parties are citing peace as their highest value. They are vowing to put the interests of the people first. Looking back at these struggles between the KMT and the CCP, one can’t help wondering how many generations have been carried away by these currents of history? To dismiss these struggles with a wave of the hand seems disrespectful. Without this tangled history, there would be no complex and intractable cross-strait problems today. But in the end what can one say, other than “It’s all in the past?”
Whatever might have happened, in the end these matters must be left to the historians. How future history will be written, is in the hands of a new generation. Will cross-strait relations move towards peace, reconciliation, dialog, cooperation, and mutual benefit? It all depends on the leaders on both sides. Since the second ruling party change in March, Siew and Hu have met at the Boao Forum, and President Ma has delivered his inaugural address. These made the current Wu Hu Meeting possible. As we can see, the authorities on the two sides used informal contacts as feelers for formal contacts. They invested considerable energy and used considerable discretion. They avoided all sensitive language. They even expressed good faith through the manner in which they presented their positions, making sure the other side could interpret their position in their own manner.
This linguistic sleight of hand is necessary because cross-strait dialogue has been interrupted by prolonged confrontation and stalemate, by a vicious cycle of zero sum provocations and mutual recriminations on the international stage. If the two sides can stop picking each other’s arguments apart in an attempt to make political hay, but instead seek the greatest common denominator, they can transform the process into a virtuous circle.
The Wu Hu Meeting is reestablishing bilateral talks as soon as possible. It is authorizing direct charter flights and mainland tourism to Taiwan. It is also confronting the issue of the ROC’s international space, particularly membership in the WHO, head on. This was always an issue Taipei would raise, but to which Beijing would give either the cold shoulder or an non-commital response. This time however, Beijing has taken the initiative. It has explicitly stated that once cross-strait consultations resume, “priority will be given to Taiwan’s participation in WHO,” and that “we should be smart enough to find a solution.” These words were spoken by Hu Jintao himself, the highest ranking leader of the CCP. They have ground-breaking significance and deserve our attention.
We need to realize that as long as we do not deliberately bring up sensitive issues, direct flights or mainland tourists are mainly technical issues. But the Republic of China’s international space and participation in international organizations is an another matter altogether. These touch upon the core issue of the dispute over sovereignty. Beijing has consistently adopted a hard-line policy in the past. Most of the obstacles to cross-strait reconciliation reside here. Now, on its own initiative, Beijing has offered to begin consultations on this matter. Therefore one can predict with near certainty that the two sides will find a way to enable the ROC to participate in the WHO. This will become the focus of the next stage of cross-strait relations. Can the two sides create a virtuous circle? This will be a key indicator.
in the past neither side was willing to give an inch. The other side always had to do this, that, and the other before one responded in kind. The result was each side would obsess over its own concerns, and no one got to talk about anything. Now the two sides have learned to shelve their differences. Call it what you like. Call it looking the other way. Call it Different Interpretations of One China. At least the two sides are now willing to seek common ground, willing to tackle what is mutually beneficial, and postpone more sensitive issues until the establishment of greater mutual trust. As long as the two sides maintain such a pragmatic attitude, and seek mutually acceptable solutions, they will encounter little difficulty. The KMT vs. CCP struggle is history. So is the cross-strait propaganda war. It is time to resolve issues of substance. It is time to use our heads.
中時電子報
中國時報 2008.05.30
兩岸應就解決實質問題拚智慧
中時社論
是破冰也好,是融冰也罷,兩岸執政黨的領導人,日前終於在善意的氛圍下會面了,雙方除了確定六月中旬讓兩岸兩會復談,大陸開放四個定點與桃園直航外,對台灣參與國際空間的問題,中共總書記胡錦濤也首度親口承諾可以商談。當然這都還得要等後續的兩會協商後才算正式拍板,但至少這場吳胡會的成功,已經為六月啟動的兩會協商營造了樂觀的氛圍,國民黨所謂七月落實包機直航與陸客來台的承諾,應該是不會跳票了。
看到國共兩黨高層握手寒喧的畫面,實在令人感慨萬千!這兩個政黨對立鬥爭了大半個世紀,種下多少歷史恩怨?曾讓多少生靈塗炭?又讓多少家庭分隔兩地?如今兩黨領導人都將「和平」標舉為最高價值,都宣稱要把人民的利益擺在最前面,回首前塵那一頁頁國共鬥爭史,曾讓多少世代的青春歲月、生命記憶,綁在這滾動的大歷史洪流裡?如今這一切俱成歷史陳跡,說它「一切盡付笑談中」好像太輕,但好像也只能說「一切俱往矣」,不是嗎?沒有這一頁複雜糾結的歷史,也就不會有今天這般複雜難解的「兩岸關係」了。
無論歷史的過往如何,終究還是只能交給史家去評斷。而怎麼書寫未來歷史的任務,還是操持在新世代的手上。該怎麼讓未來的兩岸關係邁向和平的、和解的、對話的,再進一步進展到合作的、互利的狀態,機會其實也全都操在雙方領導人的手中。僅就這一點而論,從三月間二次政黨輪替後,先是博鰲論壇的蕭胡會,然後是馬總統的就職演說,次第再推進到這次的吳胡會,可以看得出來,兩岸執政當局從迂迴試探到正面對話,都付出了相當的心力,雙方都在語言修辭上細心斟酌,所有可能引發彼此敏感聯想的字句都盡量避免;雙方也都在傳達善意的論述上悉心布局,好讓彼此都有各自的詮釋空間。
某種意義上,這種語言工程的重建是必須的。畢竟兩岸對話的中斷,乃至長期的對立僵持,除了彼此在國際社會零和對抗的挑釁外,很大部分就是肇因於雙方長期惡言相向所形成的惡性循環。當兩岸不再在對方的語言中挑毛病、作文章,而是致力尋找彼此的最大公約數與善意,自然也就轉而形成良性循環了。
這次的吳胡會,除了確立兩岸盡快復談、盡快落實包機與觀光外,也正面觸及了台灣的國際空間問題,特別是參與WHO的問題。這個議題往昔都是台灣這邊片面呼籲,北京那邊不是冷處理就是模糊以對,但這次北京卻主動表態,明示未來啟動兩岸協商後,「可優先討論台灣參加世界衛生組織的問題」,而且認為「應有智慧找到可行的方式」。由於這些話是由中共最高領導人胡錦濤親口說出,其所具有的突破性意義,當然值得重視。
要知道,直航或觀光只要不在敏感議題上挑剔,剩下就是技術問題了。但台灣國際空間的參與議題則完全不同,它勢必得觸及更核心的主權爭議,過去北京當局對此一貫都採取零和的強硬政策,兩岸和解的障礙有大半也就是卡在這裡。如今北京當局既然主動提出願意就此啟動協商,那麼幾乎就可以確定,兩岸未來怎麼「有智慧的」就台灣參與WHO,「找到可行的方式」,將會是各方觀察兩岸關係下一階段進展的焦點,甚至將會是兩岸能否進一步邁向良性循環的關鍵指標。
不諱言說,兩岸過往都對「前提」的堅持一步不讓,永遠都是「先要對方如何如何……,才能如何如何……」,結果落得雙方都在努力「鑽牛角尖」,最後當然是什麼都談不下去。如今兩岸顯然都學會了暫時擱置爭議,說是「存而不論」也好,說是「各自表述」也罷,至少都願意求同存異,也都願意讓對雙方都有利的部分議題「先行」,等到累積了一定的互信基礎,再往更敏感、更高層次的議題推進,只要維持這種「務實」的態度不變,那麼一步步找出雙方都可以接受的模式,就一點都不困難了。真的,國共鬥爭的年代已經過去了,兩岸政治喊話的年代也該過去了,如今何妨都集中在實質問題的解決上,各自發揮智慧呢!
The Wu Hu Meeting: Sun Yat-sen and the 1992 Consensus
The Wu Hu Meeting: Sun Yat-sen and the 1992 Consensus
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, China)
A Translation
May 29, 2008
On May 22, the United Daily News published an editorial on KMT Chairman Wu Po-hsiung’s upcoming visit to the mainland. We urged him to deliver a message to CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao, saying: “The two sides of the strait cannot avoid earthquakes, but the two sides of the strait can avoid war.”
Yesterday, the Wu Hu Meeting took place. Wu Po-hsiung told Hu Jintao, before live television cameras, before viewers watching in realtime on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, “No one can guarantee that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait will not experience natural disasters. But through our joint effort, we can ensure that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait will never experience war.”
Sichuan earthquake relief efforts motivated authorities on both sides of the strait to value the historic opportunity and to redouble their efforts to communicate. As expected, weekend charter flights, mainland tourists to Taiwan, and other “Four Constants” received Hu Jintao’s endorsement. This was essentially Hu Jintao’s gift to the Ma Ying-jeou administration. Its significance extended beyond specific policies. It established a foundation for stable and amicable cross-strait relations. It significantly reduced internal and external pressure on the new KMT government regarding its cross-strait policy promises.
Wu and Hu repeatedly underscored the importance of the new cross-strait situation and the importance of the new cross-strait opportunities. We hope cross-strait relations will grow following the Wu Hu Meeting, both at the macro level and at the practical level. At the macro level, the two sides need a common political ideal. We suggest a “Sun Yat-sen Framework.” At the practical level, the two sides need a better political framework, one that reflects the way they actually interact. We suggest the “1992 Consensus.”
First, the Sun Yat-sen Framework. In 2005, during the Lien Hu Meeting, Hu Jintao told Lien Chan, “The Chinese Communist Party… has long been a staunch supporter of Sun Yat-sen, a collaborator with Sun Yat-sen, and an heir to Sun Yat-sen’s tradition. During this visit, when Chen Yunlin greeted Wu Po-hsiung at the Nanjing Airport, Wu quoted Sun’s proposal for national unity. The staff of the Sun Yat-sen Tomb noted that the 392 stone steps leading up to the tomb symbolized the “Three People’s Principles, the nation’s territory, and cooperation between the two parties.” Wu Po-hsiung did not pass up an opportunity to present his own views. He mentioned Sun Yat-sen’s formulation, “Of the People, by the People, and for the People,” and with a brush penned the words, “tian xia wei gong, ren min zui da.” (the earth is our common heritage, the people above all else.”
During the 2005 Lien Hu Meeting, the United Daily News published an editorial noting that cross-strait interaction lacked an overarching framework. Communism could not provide that framework. Afer all, the Communists themselves were engaged in De-Communization. But the two sides respected Sun Yat-sen, therefore a Sun Yat-sen Framework for cross-strait interaction could ensure long term stability.
Regarding the Sun Yat-sen Framework, “The Chinese People” seems to be the buzzword in current discussions of cross-strait relations. Ma Ying-jeou and Wu Poh-hsiung have both stated that “People on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are Chinese.” During yesterday’s Wu Hu Meeting, expressions such as “love for one’s compatriates,” “blood is thicker than water,” and “one’s own flesh and blood” emerged. The problem is that in addition to “tian xia wei gong” and “the people above all else,” a reunified China needs civil rights and economic prosperity. The Taiwan region’s second change in ruling parties is considered a significant achievement by many in the mainland, Hong Kong, and Macao regions.
Regarding the “Big Tent” Theory, Beijing’s “One China” hard sell seems to have been replaced by a “One People” soft sell. Regarding the Sun Yat-sen Framework, Beijing is stressing Chinese nationalism. Taipei is stressing “national unity, civil rights, and economic prosperity” in equal measures. Wu Po-hsiung’s couplet “tian xia wei gong, ren min zui da” summed up his position.
Wu Po-hsiung’s couplet has three implications. First, it is an internal memo to the KMT. That is why he said the KMT must “clean house.” Second, it is a message to Beijing. If Beijing wishes to stabilize cross-strait relations, it needs to understand that leaders on Taiwan must honor the concept of “tian xia wei gong, ren min zui da.” Beijing must understand it is no easy matter to preserve the Republic of China. Third, Wu Poh-hsiung apparently wanted to encourage Beijing, as a friend. Upholding civil rights and achieving economic prosperity are probably goals Beijing aspires to, but feels it is unable to fulfill as yet. This does not negate the reforms and liberalizations Beijing has implemented over the past 30 years. If one day Beijing can ensure civil rights and economic prosperity on mainland China, then the Divided China problem will be solved. The two sides will most assuredly find a solution. The Sun Yat-sen Framework offers an elevated perspective, one that can provide the overarching superstructure for cross-strait interaction.
Let’s review the 1992 Consensus. Between the 2005 Lien Hu Meeting, and the current Wu Hu Meeting, the language of the 1992 Consensus has remained the same. But the substance of the 1992 Consensus remains unfulfilled. After 20 years of ups and downs, Beijing realizes that in order to stabilize cross-strait relations, it must secure the Republic of China. Without a secure Republic of China, there can be no stable cross-strait relations. When Taipei stresses the need to face reality, the reality it refers to is the reality of divided rule. When Beijing stresses that it is setting aside disputes, the disputes have merely being set aside. They have not been resolved.
When Hu Jintao took the initiative to invite Wu Poh-hsiung to visit, he did so on the understanding that Wu Po-hsiung was the Chairman of the ruling party of the Republic of China. But he did not officially refer to the Republic of China. When Wu Po-hsiung stood before the tomb of KMT Founder Sun Yat-sen, he reported that the KMT had regained political power. He referred to Nanjing as the seat of the national government. In his eulogy to Sun, he noted the date as “May 27 of the 97th Year of the Republic.” But he never uttered the words “Republic of China.” Only when he referred to Sun Yat-sen’s date of burial, “June 1 of the 18th Year of the Republic,” did he finally utter the words “Republic of China.” Wu Po-hsiung’s frustration can be imagined. The 1992 Consensus merely shelves disputes. It does not confront reality. The two sides must not limit themselves merely to shelving disputes on the basis of the 1992 Consensus. They must also confront reality. The two sides of the Taiwan Strait could use the former East and West German model, or the current South and North Korean model as their framework for interaction. We believe the results would be more salutory than those for East and West Germany, or those for South and North Korea.
A major earthquake in Sichuan has inspired the public on both sides of the strait to interact in an exemplary manner. They became the theme of yesterday’s talks in Beijing, Wu and Hu wound up acting as the peoples’ spokesmen. Such an atmosphere is beneficial to cross-strait interaction. It puts the people first. The role of leaders is to accurately reflect the thoughts and feelings of the people.
If we look at cross-strait relations purely on the basis of who is bigger or smaller, the question inevitably becomes “Who will gobble up whom?” But if we look at cross-strait relations on the basis of ideas, then it leads to competition in the pursuit of “national unity, civil rights, and economic prosperity.” If we look at the Sun Yat-sen Framework and the 1992 Consensus from this perspective, then the two sides are unlikely to squander this historic opportunity.
吳胡會:孫中山的啟示與九二共識的詮釋
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.05.29 03:00 am
五月二十二日,本報社論曾請即將往訪大陸的國民黨主席吳伯雄帶給中共總書記胡錦濤一句話:「兩岸不會沒有地震,但可以沒有戰爭!」
昨天,吳胡會登場,吳伯雄面對胡錦濤,在兩岸電視直播的致詞中帶到了這一句話。他說:「兩岸之間,誰也不能保證沒有自然災害;但可以透過共同的努力,來保證兩岸永遠沒有戰爭。」
四川震災使得兩岸當局所相互強調的「歷史機遇」更添動力。果如預料,周末包機、大陸觀光客來台等「四個繼續」皆獲胡錦濤背書。這形同是胡錦濤致送馬英九政府的就任禮物,其意義尚不僅是幾項政策個案如周末包機能如期實現,更是對兩岸關係的友善穩定下錨定樁,使國民黨新政府在兩岸的領域中大幅減低了內外壓力。
然而,在吳胡二人一再強調的兩岸「新形勢」、「新契機」中,我們更希望此次吳胡會後的兩岸關係,能夠在「宏觀願景」及「現實基礎」上皆有所長進。就宏觀願景言,是指兩岸應當發展出一個共同的政治理念追求,我們想談的是「孫中山架構」;就現實基礎言,是指兩岸應當有一更能反映現實的互動架構,我們想談的是「九二共識」。
先談「孫中山架構」。二○○五年「連胡會」,胡錦濤曾當著連戰說:「中國共產黨人……從來就是中山先生的堅定支持者、合作者、繼承者。」此次吳伯雄往訪,陳雲林在首站南京接機,亦當場引述了孫中山「民族大團結」的主張;連中山陵的接待人員也說,三九二級石階,寓有「三民主義、九州方圓、兩黨合作」之義。吳伯雄當然也未錯過借題發揮的機會,標舉「民有、民治、民享」的理念,並當場揮毫題了八個大字:「天下為公、人民最大。」
二○○五年連胡會時,本報社論即指出,兩岸互動交流中缺少一個「巨型架構」;因為,共產主義不能成為此一架構,連中共當局也在「去共產主義化」;而既然兩岸皆推崇孫中山,則倘若兩岸能以「孫中山架構」為兩岸互動的「巨型架構」,應可期諸久遠。
就「孫中山架構」言,「民族」似為當前兩岸對話中最突出的話題,馬英九及吳伯雄皆已道出「兩岸同屬中華民族」;昨日吳胡會,「同胞之愛」、「骨肉之情」、「血肉相連」,亦是聲聲入耳;但問題在於「民權」與「民生」,亦即在於「天下為公」及「人民最大」。此次台灣實現「二次政黨輪替」,被許多大陸及港澳人民視為華人世界的民主成就,亦緣於此。
從「屋頂理論」來看北京當局現今的兩岸操作,「一個中國」的「硬屋頂」似已漸漸退至第二線,「中華民族」的「軟屋頂」則站上了第一線。倘以孫中山架構來說,北京當局強調的是「民族主義」;但台北方面則希望能將「民族/民權/民生」均衡體現,吳伯雄的八個字「天下為公/人民最大」,透露了心曲。
吳伯雄的這八個大字,也許可從三方面來看。一方面是自我惕厲,因此他說國民黨必須「好自為之」;再一方面是傳話北京當局,若欲穩定兩岸關係,不能不知台灣的主政者有「天下為公/人民最大」的責任,亦不能不知「中華民國」這個架構之維持非易。最後,吳伯雄似亦有以諍友地位與北京當局互勉之意;「民權/民生」應非中共當局所不願為或所不想為,而是形格勢禁做不到,然亦不能據此否定中共在改革開放三十年來已經實現的成績;倘若中共有朝一日能將中國的民權與民生成就至一定程度,則中國問題即可解決,兩岸問題亦必會找到出路。倘能站在此一高度看「孫中山架構」,當然可以作為兩岸互動的「巨型架構」。
再談九二共識。自二○○五年「連胡會」,至此次「吳胡會」,「九二共識」的政策標誌已趨穩固;但是,「九二共識」的內涵「一中各表」,卻仍待體現。經歷過去二十年來的跌宕曲折,北京當局應知,欲穩固兩岸關係,即必須穩固「中華民國」;無穩固的「中華民國」,即無穩固的兩岸關係。然而,就此以論,台北方面強調的是「正視現實」,亦即「正視」兩岸分治的「現實」;但北京當局強調的卻是「擱置爭議」,只是「擱置」而已,「爭議」仍在。
胡錦濤主動邀請吳伯雄往訪,當然是承認了吳伯雄「中華民國執政黨主席」的身分,卻未同等表現出「正視」中華民國的「現實」。於是,吳伯雄此行在言詞之間,雖向國民黨總理孫中山報告「重新取回政權」,又稱南京曾是「國民政府所在地」,再在祭文標出「維民國九十七年五月二十七日」,卻始終說不出一個「中華民國」;一直到引據孫中山下葬日為「中華民國十八年六月一日」,才說出「中華民國」四個字。吳伯雄心中的壓抑可想而知,而「九二共識」只是「擱置爭議」卻未「正視現實」,亦是有目共睹。寄望兩岸當局,未來在「九二共識」的基礎上,不能只是「擱置爭議」,也應有更多「正視現實」的表現。海峽兩岸,其實可用類如過去東西德、如今南北韓的模式來建立互動架構,相信必有東西德、南北韓所難及的較佳表現。
一場四川大地震,以乎使得「兩岸人民」的相互感應成了昨日北京會談的主題,吳胡二人反而成了人民的代言人。這樣的氛圍,有益於兩岸的互動;將人民擺在首位,主政者的角色則是準確反映人民的思維情感。
兩岸關係若以大小論,不免變成「誰吃掉誰」的問題;但若以理念論,則在於「民族/民權/民生」的競爭與追求。倘若能以這個高度來看「孫中山架構」與「九二共識」,兩岸始不致錯失當前彌足珍貴的「歷史機遇」。
Donate the Balance of the Chung Hsing Bills Fund to Charity
Donate the Balance of the Chung Hsing Bills Fund to Charity
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, China)
A Translation
May 28, 2008
No sooner had the new administration opened its doors for business, than reports emerged that the KMT hoped to reclaim the 240 million NT balance in the controversial Chung Hsing Bills Fund. In terms of both timing and procedure, this is an unwise move. To stir up dust that had long settled, for the sake of a tainted sum of money, can only damage the KMT’s image.
Both the KMT and PFP are being naive. The KMT hopes to reclaim 240 million NT belonging to the party. James Soong hopes to emerge from the shadow of the Chung Hsing Bills scandal. One party hopes to receive monetary benefits. The other hopes to clear his name. Both see a win/win scenario. But they are forgetting the third keyholder in the case — Lee Teng-hui. They are also forgetting the public on Taiwan, which has been following this case for the past eight years. Besides, even assuming the procedural knots can be untangled, this case is not as simple as “You get your money back. I get my name cleared.” Public perception is a tricky matter.
The Chung Hsing Bills Case is not just an internal KMT scandal. It is also an old-fashioned backroom deal. During the 2000 Presidential Election, Lee Teng-hui fought tooth and nail with James Soong. James Soong lost because Lee Teng-hui used the Chung Hsing Bills scandal to block Soong’s path to the presidency. The KMT also lost power. It was a lose/lose proposition. The public on Taiwan endured eight years of Chen regime misrule and degeneracy. Nothing good can come out of revisiting the Chung Hsing Bills scandal.
Wu Po-hsiung and James Soong appear interested in bringing closure to this affair. But if the 240 million NT is treated as a reward for making peace with Lee Teng-hui, this could make matters even worse. After so much storm and strife, the air surrounding the Chung Hsing Bills Case may never clear. All we can do is allow bygones be bygones, then donate that dirty money to charity. Only this can result in a win/win/win scenario.
Each of the parties should deal with the personal and financial issues separately. Personal issues must not be linked with financial issues. Money must not be the price of reconciliation. Only then can the Chung Hsing Bills scandal finally be resolved.
The concerned parties include Lee Teng-hui, Lien Chan, and James Soong. Much has changed since then. Lee and Lien once stood on the same side with regards the Chung Hsing Bills Finance scandal. Following the debacle however, Lien and Soong ended up as running mates. Now that the political winds are blowing from Ma Ying-jeou’s direction, Lee Teng-hui has once again changed course. Obviously changes in the strategic scenario influence personal attitudes. Over the past eight years, the concerned parties have formed and broken alliance after alliance. Witness the ruling Democratic Progressive Party drunk with power. Witness Taiwan’s regression and the people’s suffering. How can one not be chagrined?
The public on Taiwan is fed up. It has endured eight years of pain. The public on Taiwan has handed the incoming administration a new mandate for Taiwan’s future. Lee Teng-hui and James Soong have receded into the shadows. That they might wish to resolve old grievances is understandable. Besides, the pain of the Chung Hsing Bills Finance case is something Lee, Lien, and Soong inflicted upon Taiwan. If those responsible for the scandal can reconcile, then they can apologize to the people. The disposal of the money however allows no room for ambiguity. According to James Soong and Wu Po-hsiung, the 240 million NT slush fund came from various secret channels. Lee Teng-hui ordered James Soong to establish the fund. The fund definitely belongs to the KMT. According to Lee Teng-hui, this is untrue. But Lee has flip-flopped on this allegation repeatedly. The two sides differ on what happened, primarily on the main reason why this fund couldn’t be withdrawn. Besides caring for the Chiang family, this “Party/Government Operation Fund” includes private campaign contributions, grants, and other sources of income. funneled through private channels. Under such circumstances, can one really regard them as KMT funds, to be reclaimed by the KMT and used for other purposes?
Controversy over KMT party assets has never subsided. If the KMT attempts to reclaim these funds, whose origins remain unclear, and brings back bad memories of improper party assets, is it really worth it? Besides, 240 million NT may be tempting, but attempting to reclaim will summon the ghosts of a bygone era — an era of palace intrigues and political infighting. The KMT barely has time to look to the future. Why let this dirty money destroy its image?
If these political elders are willing to set aside old scores, they may as well donate the money to charity. Or else simply allow the time limit to expire. The funds will automatically forfeited. They will then be returned to the state treasury, to the people. Consider the funds a contribution these political elders owe the people of Taiwan.
興票餘緒:人的恩仇難解,錢應捐作公益
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.05.28 03:06 am
新政府方才開張,國民黨即傳出希領回興票案提存的二點四億元,就時機和作法而言,均屬不智。為了一筆爛帳,重新掀起漫天歷史塵埃,對國民黨的形象有害無益。
在這裡,國親兩黨各有一個天真的想像:國民黨拿回屬於黨的二點四億元,宋楚瑜則可從「興票案」的陰影底下完全脫困;一方獲得實惠,一方還得清白,想像中是兩全其美的好事一樁。但他們忽略了握有此案「第三把鑰匙」的李登輝,還有旁觀此事八年而備覺疑惑的台灣民眾;況且,即使提存的程序糾結得以解開,從社會觀感而言,此案已絕非「你拿回錢,我洗刷名」這麼簡單。
回顧興票案始末,它不只是國民黨內部惡鬥的醜陋一頁,也讓舊式密室政治的汙穢現形。二 ○○○年的總統大選,是李登輝與宋楚瑜的惡鬥;結果宋楚瑜因李登輝主導的興票案而阻斷了總統之路,國民黨也痛失政權,可謂兩敗俱傷,而台灣人民則由此承受了扁政權八年失政敗德的苦果。就此而言,興票案已是絕無可能討回「公道」。
如今,吳伯雄和宋楚瑜似有意將這段恩怨作個了結,但如果把二點四億視為與李登輝言和的「報償」,卻可能是治絲益棼。事實上,經過這麼巨大的風暴,興票案要返歸純淨的天空已無可能;唯一可以做的事,是將人的恩怨情仇作一了斷,然後讓那筆罪惡源頭的錢回歸社會,才有三贏的可能。
亦即,當事的各方,應該把「人」和「錢」的問題分開來處理,不可彼此勾聯,更不必以錢的解套作為彼此和解的前提。如此,興票案才可能尋得最後的救贖。
從「人」的問題看,李連宋等人當年的情仇,如今已有了莫大的變化:原本於興票案站在同一陣營的「李連」,在慘敗後演變成「連宋」攜手搭檔的局面;至馬英九出線,李登輝又見風轉舵。顯然,政治情境的變化,可以催化政治情仇的變化。過去八年,相關人等歷經分分合合,目睹民進黨執政的顛狂,看到台灣的倒退和人民的痛苦,不可能對自己的作為沒有絲毫懊惱吧?
當台灣飽經艱難,熬過痛苦的八年,新的民意對台灣前途也已作出新的選擇,李宋這些已退至舞台邊緣的人物,若思化解舊日恩怨,自是可以理解。何況,興票案是李連宋共同加給台灣的歷史疼痛,現在始作俑者若能就此和解,至少可表達對人民今是昨非的歉意。但是,對於錢的處置,卻沒有含糊的餘地。根據宋楚瑜和吳伯雄的認知,這二點四億元來自不同管道的秘密撥款,是李登輝委託宋楚瑜動支,確屬國民黨所有;李登輝的說法,則與此不同,且一再反覆。雙方認知上的不同,是這筆錢無法提取的主因。事實上,撇開蔣家遺族照護經費不談,所謂的「黨政運作基金」包含了民間政治捐款及競選補助款等紛雜來源,且經過私人管道的輾轉理財運用;在這種情況下,能否視為國民黨資金而由國民黨領回並另作他用,自然大有可議。
試想,國民黨的黨產爭議多年來未曾平息,如今若要為這筆妾身未明的興票款,再度勾起社會對其不當黨產的記憶,豈屬明智?更何況,二點四億的巨款固然誘人,卻是充滿「舊時代」、「宮廷風」、「政治惡鬥」的魅影;國民黨往前看都來不及,何必為這筆錢再讓自己沾滿歷史的汙穢?
如果老巨頭們願意放下恩怨,大家不妨把這筆錢領出來,然後捐出供作公益用途;否則就讓提存時限屆滿自動充公,歸入國庫後自然而然地回到民間。如此,就算政治巨頭們積欠台灣社會的少許補償吧!
How Will Chow Mei-ching Fulfill Her New Role?
How Will Chow Mei-ching Fulfill Her New Role?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, China)
A Translation
May 27, 2008
Once the news came out that First Lady Chow Mei-ching intended to retire, charitable groups began fighting over her tooth and nail, trying desperately to recruit her to their cause.
This was hardly unexpected. If Chow Mei-ching had continued going to work, had continued being a career woman, the public would have respected her decision. They wouldn’t have bothered her too much. But now that she is retiring, the public has a whole new set of expectations of her. They want her to take part in charitable work. That the public would react this way was entirely predictable.
To Chow Mei-ching and the larger community, this is a big deal. Chow Mei-ching may be willing to meet the public’s expectations. But would she be merely sticking her big toe in the water? Or would she be diving in head first? Would she be taking on all comers, or concentrating her efforts in a single area, for maximum effect?
Thirty years ago, Song Mei-ling retired from public life. She has been followed by a secession of First Ladies, including Liu Chi-chun (Mrs. Yen Chia-kan), Chiang Fang-liang, Tseng Wen-hui, and Wu Shu-cheng. None of these are the kind of First Lady we wish to discuss at the moment. Today the public has all sorts of expectations of Chow Mei-ching, and Chow Mei-ching appears duty bound to meet these expectations. In fact, If a nation has a First Lady who can participate in charitable activities and touch the hearts and minds of the entire nation, she is not merely a sidekick who can amass approval points for the president, she is a precious asset to the entire community. Does Chow Mei-ching have such expectations of herself? Is she ready for such expectations from the public?
We believe that Chow Mei-ching is willing to fulfill her new role. If Chow Mei-ching is conscientious, she should not merely dabble. She should devote all her energies to a specific charitable activity, enabling her to make a genuine contribution. She may wish to focus on families, with an emphasis on youth. If Chow Mei-ching becomes a field worker for a charitable organization, her high media profile may become a hindrance. It may be best if she settles down inside some particular charitable organization. She can then network horizontally with other organizations that deal with families and youth. For example, If Chow Mei-ching were to settle down inside the Tzu Chi Foundation, or the Family Support Center, she could set up a “workshop” within such a reputable charity, and through such a workshop connect with other charities willing to be part of a larger network. She could even link to universities and vocational schools. Each charity would solve problems its own way, but each charity would support other charities. She could do great things. Chow Mei-ching could become “The People’s Chow Mei-ching.” Chow Mei-ching would be working for everyone.
Chow Mei-ching participating in such an effort would be a golden opportunity for all sorts of charities. Helping families lies at the heart of all charitable activity. This includes low-income households and elderly people living alone. Helping youth, in turn, lies at the center of the heart of all charitable activity. One cannot not wait until parents, driven by despair, kill themselves and their children by setting charcoal fires in their living rooms. Such efforts as delivering meals, visiting the housebound, and tutoring, require vast amounts of human resources, financial resources, and love. If the various charities can establish horizontal links, they can share resources, eliminate dead corners, and reduce blind spots, They would complement each other and increase each others’ effectiveness. Therefore instead of squabbling over her, the various charities should come up with a win/win approach that pools their resources. Only this will enable Chow Mei-ching to maximize her potential. Only this will enable her to benefit the entire community.
If by some miracle Chow Mei-ching still has energy to spare, she can participate in other charitable activies. But we think it would be best if she stuck to the same theme, such as families or youth. She should establish a solid reputation in a specific area before expanding out to others. Two years from now, in her capacity as a charity worker, Chow Mei-ching may even wish to visit children in the Sichuan region who were victimized by the earthquake.
Based on recent public reaction, charitable groups have exerted a great deal of pressure on Chow Mei-ching. But Chow Mei-ching should see these expectations as well-intentioned. The public should allow Chow Mei-ching to decide how she wishes to participate in charitable activities and to what extent. Chow Mei-ching is known for being as cool as a cucumber. But if you look closely at her forehead, you can detect a trace of tension and a touch of melancholy. The shackles imposed by the Ma family are something she can’t talk about. If she dives into charitable activities right now, her public persona may lack softness, warmth, and openness. Becoming involved in charitable activities may not be much of a challenge for her. But if Chow Mei-ching keeps an open mind, and plunges headlong into charitable activities, she has a good chance of achieving something meaningful. Once she unleashes her full potential, and reveals the full extent of her charisma, the public will see a sunnier, brighter, more charismatic Chow Mei-ching. If so, the cool as a cucumber Chow Mei-ching we know so well, may finally allow the public to see her smile.
The public considers Chow Mei-ching more charismatic than Ma Ying-jeou. In fact, just as Song Mei-ling was able to be her own woman, Chow Mei-ching does not need to be conceived exclusively in terms of his relationship to Ma Ying-jeou. Why not take this historic opportunity to allow Chow Mei-ching to make a name for herself?
周美青如何擔當她的新角色?
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.05.27 02:27 am
第一夫人周美青打算退休的消息傳出後,社福慈善團體出現搶人大戰。
這是意料中事。周美青若繼續上班,當她的職業婦女,社會大眾會尊重她的選擇,不至於太過打攪她;但如今一旦「退休」,國人不免對她另有期待,各方希望她能參與公益慈善工作,則是用膝蓋想也可知道的社會反應。
這對周美青自己及對整個社會,都是一件「大事」。對周美青而言,她也許會願意回應社會的期待,但究竟是打算蜻蜓點水式地淺嘗輒止,或是準備整個人「←落去」?究竟是來者不拒地四處放煙火,或是選擇一個主題深耕密耘?
對整個社會來說,則自宋美齡隱退後,三十餘年來,劉期純(嚴家淦夫人)、蔣方良、曾文惠、吳淑珍皆非此刻我們要討論的那類「第一夫人」;但如今社會大眾卻對周美青頗有期待,周美青似乎也是義不容辭。其實,一個國家如果有一位能夠參與社會並感動國人的「第一夫人」,她非但是可為總統加分的「賢外助」,抑且是整個社會的珍貴資產。不知這是否周美青的自我期許,亦不知她是否準備好了?
我們認為,周美青應會樂於承當起她的新角色。倘若周美青是有心人,則最好不要蜻蜓點水地四出作花瓶,而不妨集中心力在一個社福主題上,作出一些實質的貢獻。或許可以選擇以「家庭」為主題,並以「青少年」為重點;且周美青似乎不便作為某一社福機構的專屬義工,而最好能「寄靠」在一機構中,卻能將其他機構有關「家庭」及「青少年」的工作橫向聯結起來,形成整合的大網絡。例如,周美青如果「寄靠」在慈濟功德會或家扶中心,而這個有公信力的「寄靠」單位能設立一個「工作室」,再透過這個「工作室」將其他願意「加盟」的相關社福機構聯結起來,亦可連繫大專學校慈善社團,分頭發掘問題,相互支援資源,即必可有大作為。如此,周美青始可能成為「大家的周美青」,而周美青亦始可能「為大家工作」。
周美青若能參與,也是各社福團體群策群力的契機。「家庭扶助」是社福工作最核心的課題,包括了中低收入戶、獨居老人等項目;「青少年」則又是核心中的核心,不能等到父母帶孩子燒炭才來掉淚。然而,這些工作,如送餐、親訪、課輔等,皆需極大的人力、資源及愛心;若能將各社福機構橫向聯結起來,資源更充裕,死角減少,盲點也減少,自有相輔相成的效益。因此,各社福團體與其對周美青爭相「挖角」,何如想出一個「資源共享」的共贏之道;倘能如此,就不但成全了周美青,也嘉惠了整個社會。
當然,周美青若行有餘力,仍可參與其他社福工作;但我們認為,最好是在一個「主題」(如家庭、青少年)的工作上有若干基礎後,亦即以實際績效建立了自己的品牌後,再行漸進地拓展工作領域。周美青甚至不妨思考,兩年後可以慈善義工的身分,往訪四川災區兒童。
從近日社會的反應看,社福團體似乎給了周美青不小的壓力;但周美青不妨皆視為善意的期許,社會公眾最後仍應尊重周美青自己決定參與的項目及程度。其實,被稱為酷酷嫂的周美青,眉間常有一絲淡淡的憂鬱與緊張;馬家的拘謹,對她應是難以言說的束縛;以她現在的形象,若投身慈善工作,或許仍少了幾分柔軟、溫暖與開放;因此,未來她若投身社會福利,在應對上未嘗不是一大挑戰。不過,我們認為,周美青若能開放胸懷,投身社會工作,對她的自我實現也是甚佳的契機;或許,待她充分釋放了能力與魅力,國人應可看到一個更陽光、更開朗,更具感動力的周美青。倘能如此,未來走入社會的酷酷嫂周美青,也許會讓國人看到多一些笑容。
輿論曾經認為,周美青有超越馬英九的魅力。其實,正如宋美齡享有自我實現的榮譽,周美青也不必認為自己只是馬英九的分身;何妨在這個歷史機遇中,也為周美青三字寫下一段傳奇?
The Historical Significance of the KMT/CCP Meeting
The Historical Significance of the KMT/CCP Meeting
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, China)
A Translation
May 27, 2008
KMT Chairman Wu Po-hsiung will depart today on a visit to the mainland. The day after tomorrow he will meet with CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao. This is the first time the leaders of the ruling parties on both sides of the strait have met. Needless to say, this is a major event.
History unfolds like myth. Had the KMT not lost power in 2000, Party Chairman Lien Chan would never have been able to visit the mainland in 2005. Had Chen Shui-bian and the ruling DPP not been guilty of such rampant misrule, the “KMT CPC Platform” would have remained Politically Incorrect and beyond the pale. Had the KMT not made a comeback in 2008, the leaders of the two ruling parties, Wu and Hu, would not have been able to meet today. History unfolds spontaneously. It morphs mysteriously, like the clouds. It flows relentlessly, like the rivers. It conceals forces that can change our world.
Wu Po-hsiung is the Chairman of the Chung-kuo Kuomintang, the ruling party of the Republic of China. General Secretary Hu Jintao did not evade this political reality when he extended his personal invitation to Wu Po-hsiung. Admittedly, Hu Jintao extended his invitation to “KMT Chairman” Wu Po-hsiung. But by implication, the invitation was extended to the ruling party of the Republic of China. After all, without the Republic of China to rule, Wu Po-hsiung could hardly be the chairman of a ruling party.
Naturally these implications have remain unstated. They have remained implicit and unofficial. Hu Jintao is not greeting Wu Po-hsiung in Hu’s capacity as President of the People’s Republic of China. He is greeting him as the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party. This, ironically, exemplifies the separation of party and state. Nevertheless, Wu Po-hsiung is in fact the “Chairman of the ruling party of the Republic of China.” Both sides know this perfectly well. This is precisely why the Wu Hu Meeting is of unprecedented historical significance.
The history of modern China has been the history of struggle and reconciliation between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party. This includes struggles over who would rule the nation, and struggles over “Whither China?” After 1949, the two parties governed separately. The KMT was determined to “counterattack the mainland.” The CCP was determined to “liberate Taiwan.” During the late 1970s however, the CCP embarked on its own version of Perestroika and Glasnost. During the 1980s, the KMT lifted martial law. By 1990, the Cold War was over and the buzzword was “globalization.” In 2000 the KMT lost control of the Republic of China for eight years. Now however, it is back in power. Thirty long years have passed. Heaven has turned on its axis. People have come and gone. Major changes have taken place within the CCP and the KMT, both in form and content. The Wu Hu Meeting scheduled to take place the day after tomorrow sums up the vicissitudes of life over those 30 years. It is a new beginning for a future without limits.
To sum up, the Civil War between the KMT and the CCP is over. They no longer have anything to fight about. The prevailing international framework does not permit a cross-strait war. Mainstream public opinion on both sides of the strait will not countenance fellow Chinese killing each other. Numerous mainland leaders have said “There is no issue of who will do away with whom.” The new point of departure is that KMT vs. CCP conflict should evolve into competition, and competition should evolve into cooperation. This is what Ma Ying-jeou means when he speaks of “peace and mutual prosperity.”
Before 1949, the KMT and the CCP were both situated on the mainland. A life and death struggle was inevitable. This led to a loss of a perspective regarding the question, “Whither China?” In retrospect, China’s fate seems like the Wrath of Heaven. But ever since the two sides have been governed separately, they seem increasingly in competition than in conflict, and increasingly in cooperation than in competition. Whither China? Whither the Chinese people? That we leave the tender mercies of History.
When Wu and Hu meet the day after tomorrow, they should no longer be thinking in terms of who will do away with whom. They should be thinking of coexistence and mutual prosperity. Destiny is unfathomable. A life and death struggle between the KMT and the CCP on the mainland led to separate rule, then to today’s competition and to tomorrow’s cooperation. Surely Wu and Hu appreciate these ironies of history. Surely they will not fritter away this historic opportunity.
That historic opportunity is here. That historic opportunity is now. After many ups and downs, Taiwan is now a democracy and a free market economy. After 30 years of reform and opening up, the mainland is now on the right path. With the rise of China, new opportunities present themselves. The mainland authorities have more work to do, for example, in the area of democracy and human rights. We believe the mainland authorities genuinely wish to resolve these issues, and are merely waiting for the right time. That being the case, must the KMT and the CCP continue their civil war? Can’t they coexist and prosper?
Therefore we hope that these two ruling party leaders, will take the road to democracy. We hope that together they will build a better future for the people, that they will encourage and assist each other, that they will minimize conflict and maximize competition, or better yet, cooperation. They have no need continue the civil war.
兩岸執政黨黨魁首會的歷史意義
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.05.26
國民黨主席吳伯雄今日啟程訪問大陸,並將於後天會見中共總書記胡錦濤,這是兩岸執政黨黨魁的首次見面,意義重大。
歷 史的流變宛如神話。倘若不是國民黨在二○○○年失去政權,黨主席連戰不可能在二○○五年訪問大陸;又倘若不是陳水扁與民進黨政府的倒行逆施,「國共平台」 亦不可能具有社會正當性;再倘若不是國民黨又在二○○八年贏回了政權,又豈可能出現今日兩岸執政黨黨魁聚首的「吳胡會」?上述歷史流變,看似有如行雲流水 地自然與流暢,其實卻寓藏著旋乾轉坤的重大意義。
吳伯雄是中華民國執政黨中國國民黨主席,這是胡錦濤總書記親自邀請吳伯雄往訪時所未迴避的政治事實。然而,胡錦濤既接受了吳伯雄為「國民黨主席」,當然也必然隱含著同時也默認了國民黨所執政的中華民國。畢竟,若無中華民國,吳伯雄怎麼會是執政黨主席?
當 然,這些意義,目前尚是「潛台詞」,並未在台前宣諸語言文字。胡錦濤未以「國家主席」的身分接待吳伯雄,而以「黨總書記」的身分會客,可見仍在「黨國分 離」的操作階段;但即使如此,吳伯雄的身分是「中華民國執政黨主席」,這卻是賓主皆知的政治事實,而這正是「吳胡會」空前無匹的歷史意義。
國 民黨與共產黨的和解與鬥爭,曾是中國現代史上的主軸。其間當然有政權的爭奪,卻也有「中國往何處去」的義理之爭。一九四九年以後,兩黨隔海分治,又有「反 攻大陸/解放台灣」的鬥爭。然而,隨著中共在一九七○年代末期嘗試改革開放,一九八○年代末期台灣解嚴,及一九九○年代「冷戰結束」及「全球化」以來,再 加上二○○○年以後國民黨失去中華民國政權八年,以至如今又重新執政;漫長三十年來,物換星移,人事代謝,共產黨與國民黨的互動關係在形式及內涵上皆有重 大變化,後天的「吳胡會」可謂是這三十年滄桑的總結,亦是無限未來的新起點。
這個總結應當是:「國共內戰」已無延續的條件,國際主流架構 不容兩岸開戰,兩岸主流民意亦不容相互殘殺。這正是中共數位領導人曾經說過的,兩岸不存在「誰吃掉誰的問題」。所謂的新起點則是:國共兩黨之間,應當從 「鬥爭」,轉為「競爭」,再由「競爭」轉為「合作」。這正是馬英九總統所說的「和平共榮」的憧憬。
一九四九年以前,國共兩黨共處中國大陸 之內,你死我活的「鬥爭」不可避免,反而扭曲了「中國往何處去」的義理追求;回首前塵,真有如造化的天譴。然而,兩岸隔海分治以來,如今反而儼然出現了兩 黨「競爭」的態勢,與「合作」的契機,以及對「中國往何處去」或「中華民族往何處去」的更深刻思考,這卻是歷史的恩典。
吳胡後天會面之 時,內心不應再有「誰吃掉誰」的意念,而應存有「共生共榮」的思維。回顧冥冥之中歷史意志的顯示,造化竟能將曾經同處大陸、「鬥爭」得你死我活的國共兩 黨,安排到今日隔海分治,進而出現了可能互勉互惠的「競爭」與「合作」的契機;吳胡二人皆應體驗此一歷史恩典,不要辜負了此一歷史機遇。
此 時此際,確是最佳的「歷史機遇」。就台灣而言,經歷了跌宕起伏,終於實現了民主政治與自由經濟。就大陸而言,三十年的改革開放無疑已走在正確的道路上,而 有了「中國崛起」的願景與機會;即使中共當局目前尚有作不到的地方,譬如民主及人權,但我們亦深信這並非中共當局所不想作,應是尚待來日。倘係如此,國共 兩黨還有什麼理由延續所謂的「內戰」,又豈有什麼理由不能「共生共榮」?
因此,我們希望:此次兩岸執政黨黨魁的「吳胡會」,應以共赴民主道途、共創民生福祉為共同志業,相互勉勵、相互祝福;盡量減低「鬥爭」的意味,盡量提升「競爭」與「合作」的氣氛,更當然不必將此視為「內戰」的延續。
Big Tent Theory: A De Facto rather than De Jure Solution?
Big Tent Theory: A De Facto rather than De Jure Solution?
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, China)
A Translation
May 23, 2008
In his inaugural speech, President Ma Ying-jeou said “People on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are Chinese.” Together with Beijing’s “both the mainland and Taiwan are part of China,” the two statements have caught peoples’ attention.
At a meeting chaired by Vincent Siew during April’s Boao Forum, Beijing’s Minister of Commerce Chen Deming said more than once that “under the premise that we are all part of the same family, everything is negotiable.” To everyones’ surprise however, a press release issued by the Ministry of Commerce changed Chen’s wording to “under the the premise of One China, everything is negotiable.” But after bilateral discussion the press release was amended and the passage “under the premise of One China” was deleted. These developments suggest that Beijing’s official position is that “under the premise that we are all part of the same family” is interchangeable with “under the premise of One China,” and that the Ministry of Commerce press release was in error.
Hu Jintao and Vincent Siew seem to have validated this notion during their talks. Hu told Hsiao “Compatriots on both sides of the strait are all part of the same family. They are all kinfolk, all part of the same community.” What Beijing did was to replace “One China” with “One Family.” Perhaps they were using “under the premise that we are all part of the same family” or “under the premise that we are all Chinese” interchangeably with “under the premise of One China.” Chen Deming used “under the premise that we are all part of the same family” as a synonym for “under the premise of One China.” Yesterday, during Chen Yunlin’s remarks to Taiwan, he omitted any mention of “One China.” Instead he referred to “the renaissance of the Chinese people and a brighter future.” He also spoke of “safeguarding the fundamental interests of the Chinese people” and of “allowing the spirit of the Chinese people to shine.”
The two sides are distinct political entities. This is a political reality. Beijing initially maintained that “Taiwan is part of China” or that “Taiwan is a province of China.” Such formulations have encountered resistance. Beijing now maintains that “both the mainland and Taiwan are part of China.” This is a significant change from Beijing’s original formulation. If “Taiwan is part of China,” the “China” means “People’s Republic of China.” But if “both the mainland and Taiwan are part of China” then “China” refers something other than either the mainland or Taiwan.
This third definition is the underlying premise for the “Big Tent Theory.” It means that although both Taiwan and the mainland sit beneath a “Big Tent” known as “China,” this China is neither the People’s Republic of China nor the Republic of China. It means that the mainland and Taiwan, as well as the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China, fall under the aegis of a third entity, a Big Tent. This Big Tent may actually have more structure than the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations. One China, Different Interpretations amounts to each side establishing its own political edifice. The Big Tent on the other hand, puts both political entities under the same roof.
But what precisely is this Big Tent? Is it a third definition of “China?” If so, perhaps the two sides can become a confederation? If not, then how can one maintain such a Big Tent? If a third, de jure definition of China as a Big Tent is infeasible, perhaps a de facto definition of China as a Big Tent would be more acceptable? Perhaps “the Chinese people” or “we are all part of the same family” would be more acceptable? Perhaps if we move in this direction, we can find a way out.
Hu Jintao said “compatriots on both sides are all part of the same family,” Ma Ying-jeou said “people on both sides are Chinese.” Chen Yunlin spoke of the “spirit of the Chinese people” and “the Chinese peoples’ fundamental interests.” That all three used such formulations at such a critical juncture is no accident. The two sides may be attempting to find a mutually acceptable Big Tent when “reunification, independence, and war” are all unacceptable.
Eight years ago, Chen Shui-bian was elected president. He presented floral wreaths before Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek, acknowledging that he was heir to the Republic of China’s legal system. He honored his ancestors from afar. He acknowledged his roots. He acknowledged that he had inherited the traditions of the Chinese people. Political solutions are one means of linking the two sides of the strait. But shared cultural traditions are also an important means. In fact, shared cultural traditions often kick in when political solutions are inadequate. The impact of shared cultural traditions may even be stronger than political solutions. The impact of the Sichuan earthquake on the two sides of the strait is a clear example.
Besides, according to Chinese tradition, political solutions involving the imposition of laws are predicated upon “Might makes Right.” Social cohesion within a civil society, on the other hand, is predicated upon “The Way.” Must the two sides be linked by political solutions involving the imposition of laws? Why not first promote a Big Tent based on mutual trust among the Chinese people. Why rush to impose a de jure political solution based on the imposition of laws?
Perhaps the substitution of a Big Tent for de jure political solutions amounts to a Big Tent Theory?
新屋頂理論:「軟屋頂」取代「硬屋頂」?
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.05.23 02:51 am
馬英九總統在就職演說中稱,「兩岸人民同屬中華民族」,與北京當局所主張的「大陸與台灣同屬中國的一部分」,兩相形成對比的概念,頗受矚目。
可從四月的博鰲論壇談起。當時在蕭萬長主持的座談中,北京方面的商務部長陳德銘幾次談及「在一家人的前提下,沒有什麼問題不可協商」等語;不料,會後商務部所發新聞稿卻稱,「在一個中國的前提下」如何如何。後經雙方對證,在新華社的新聞稿中刪去了「在一個中國的前提下」等語。這一段曲折,似乎顯示,北京當局如今的官方口徑是:以「在一家人的前提下」代換了「在一個中國的前提下」;卻意外地在商務部的新聞稿中出了錯。
此一論斷,亦可在當時胡錦濤會蕭萬長的談話中獲得佐證。胡對蕭說:「兩岸同胞是一家人,是血脈相連的共同體。」如今可待觀察的發展是:北京當局倘不是以「一家人」取代了「一個中國」,或許是認為可將「一家人前提」或「中華民族前提」與「一個中國前提」相互替代使用。陳德銘就是用「一家人前提」替換了「一個中國前提」。昨天,陳雲林的對台談話,就未見「一個中國」,卻有「中華民族偉大復興的美好未來」、「維護中華民族根本利益」及「讓中華民族精神煥發新的光彩」等句,或許又是一個例證。
兩岸是分治的政治實體,這是政治現實。北京當局原本所持的兩岸聯結是「台灣是中國的一部分」,甚至稱「台灣是中國的一個省」,此類論述已難維持;事實上,最近幾年北京已改口稱「大陸與台灣同屬中國的一部分」,此與原本的論述已有極大改變。因為,若稱「台灣是中國的一部分」,則「中國」即指「中華人民共和國」;但稱「大陸與台灣同屬中國的一部分」,則「中國」應指超越大陸與台灣的「第三概念」。
「第三概念」是「屋頂理論」的前提。意指在台灣與大陸之上有一「屋頂」,雖稱作「中國」,卻不是中華人民共和國,也不是中華民國;而「大陸/台灣」或「中華人民共和國/中華民國」,就是靠這個「第三概念」的「屋頂」來聯結。若就程度而言,「屋頂理論」可能較「九二共識/一中各表」有規範性;因為,「一中各表」是分立門戶,而「屋頂理論」則是在同一屋頂之下。
問題是:這個「屋頂」究竟是什麼?是「第三概念」的「中國」嗎?那麼,兩岸有否可能成為「邦聯」?否則,這個「屋頂」如何維持?反過來說,既然不可能出現一個「法制化的第三概念中國」為兩岸的「硬屋頂」,則「中華民族」或「一家人」是否可能成為兩岸共同接受並維護的「軟屋頂」?若朝此一方向思考,兩岸也許可有新出路。
因而,值此關鍵時刻,胡錦濤強調「兩岸同胞是一家人」,馬英九表示「兩岸人民同屬中華民族」,陳雲林又稱「中華民族精神/中華民族根本利益」;恐怕未必只是巧合,而可能是雙方在「不(能)統/不(能)獨/不(能)武」的現狀之上,找到了可以共同接受的「軟屋頂」。
八年前,陳水扁首次當選總統,除了向孫中山、蔣介石獻花行禮,表示承繼了「中華民國」的法統外;尚且「遙祭黃陵」,意在宣示「認祖歸宗」,表示也承繼了「中華民族」的宗祧。可見,若欲聯結兩岸,政治體制固然是一工具,民族文化也是重要的憑藉;而且,民族文化的聯結,往往可在政治聯結闕如之時發生效應,且其效應更強於、大於、深於政治聯結。此次四川震災在兩岸之間產生的感應,即是鮮明的例證。
何況,就中國傳統言,政治法制的聯結是基於「霸道」,民族人心的聯結則是合於「王道」。兩岸若無使人心聯結的方法,豈可能出現以政治法制聯結的方法?準此以論,兩岸何妨先以「中華民族」的「軟屋頂」、「軟聯結」進行互勉互惠;而不應急於用「政治法制」的「硬屋頂」、「硬聯結」來強人所難。
Chairman Wu Po-hsiung: Please give Chairman Hu Jintao the Following Message
Chairman Wu Po-hsiung: Please give Chairman Hu Jintao the Following Message
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, China)
A Translation
May 22, 2008
Next week, at the invitation of Hu Jintao, Wu Po-hsiung will visit the mainland. We would like to ask Chairman Wu to convey a message to Chairman Hu. That message is: The two sides cannot avoid earthquakes, but the two sides of the Taiwan Strait can avoid war.
The Great Sichuan Earthquake created an unexpected climate of reconciliation between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. This climate of reconciliation grew from a spontaneous reaction on the part of the public on Taiwan. Wang Yung-ching started the ball rolling by donating 100 million NT. This set the tone for the public’s perception of the Sichuan earthquake and its subsequent response. The DPP government, not wanting to find itself behind the curve of mainstream public opinion, promptly announced a 2 billion NT disaster relief program. This was followed by humanitarian charter flights between the two sides, waves of volunteers, and large quantities of relief supplies rushed to disaster areas. A major earthquake brought down all kinds of barriers between the two sides, liberating everyone from psychological and physical barriers built up over the years. Liberated psychologically, people on Taiwan were free to express their heartfelt concern for mainland quake victims. Conversely, people on the mainland were free to express their gratitude and appreciation for their Taiwan compatriots’ compassion and goodwill. Liberated physically, humanitarian charter flights were able to shuttle back and forth freely, exposing the folly of previously imposed political shackles.
The earthquake stimulated cross-strait dialogue at two levels. First, the humanitarian level. In essence, the living and dead from the September 21, 1999 Taiwan Earthquake spoke with the living and dead from the May 12, 2008 Sichuan Earthquake. The deceased in Taiwan and in Sichuan bled the same blood. The survivors in Taiwan and Sichuan shed the same tears. Second, the political level. The heartfelt concern of the public on Taiwan for mainland quake victims unconsciously repaired years of trauma to cross-strait political relations. People on Taiwan blazed a trail for both governments. Fortunately both governments elected to make the most of the opportunity that presented itself. They used earthquake efforts to raise cross-strait relations to a new level.
The Wu/Hu Conference will debut under these circumstances. Wu Poh-hsiung will express sympathy for mainland quake victims on behalf of the Taiwan public. Hu Jintao will express gratitude to the Taiwan public for its generosity on behalf of mainland quake victims. This meeting will be the first between these two chairmen. As chairmen of their respective ruling parties, they must remind each other to heed the common aspirations of people on both sides of the strait. An earthquake may be an extraordinary event. But in a sense it is merely a magnified version of the hardships people every day. An event such as an earthquake reminds political leaders about the nature of their responsibilities. When Hu Jintao and Wu Po-hsiung meet and discuss the earthquake, they must remind each other to live up the expectations of the people.
The theme of the Wu/Hu Conference will of course be cross-strait relations. Both sides must treasure the friendly cross-strait atmosphere created by the earthquake. They must offer concrete policy prescriptions in response to public expectations. Official gestures of goodwill will encourage and sustain friendly people-to-people relations, creating a virtuous circle. Friendly cross-strait people-to-people relations is a precious commodity. The atmosphere of compassion and mutual concern that emerged as a result of the earthquake must be nurtured by leaders on both sides of the strait. It must become an integral part of the framework for cross-strait relations.
In terms of cross-strait relations, the lesson the earthquake offers authorities on both sides is that peaceful cross-strait relations cannot be achieved by means of war. The lives taken by the earthquake have cut people to the quick. If one day the two sides are driven by their leaders to shoot at each other, that would be an offense to god and man. The authorities and the public on Taiwan must remain confident in their ability to persuade the public on the mainland to cherish and preserve Taiwan’s democracy and way of life. They must persuade the public on the mainland to soften their leaders’ attitudes toward Taiwan. As a previous editorial in this newspaper stated, when mainland authorities “pin their hopes on the people of Taiwan,” they must consider the people of Taiwan’s hopes.
Natural disasters are unavoidable. The two sides of the strait cannot avoid earthquakes. But if people on both sides of the strait can demonstrate the kind of concern for each other they did during the Sichuan Earthquake, they are already blood brothers. Man-made disasters can be avoided. The two sides can avoid war. If an earthquake can inspire people to shed the same tears, might not an earthquake prevent people from shedding each others’ blood?
We would like to ask Chairman Wu to carry a message to Chairman Hu. That message is: The two sides cannot avoid earthquakes, but the two sides can avoid war.
請吳伯雄主席帶給胡錦濤主席一句話
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.05.22 02:59 am
吳伯雄應胡錦濤之邀,將於下周訪問大陸。我們想請吳主席給胡主席帶一句話:兩岸不會沒有地震,但兩岸可以沒有戰爭!
四川大地震給兩岸關係帶來了意料之外的和解氣氛,且這種氣氛是由台灣民間自動自發地發動。首先,王永慶在第一時間拋出一億元人民幣捐款,可謂為台灣民間的認知與態度定了調;接著,民進黨政府宣布二十億台幣賑災方案,毋寧也是感知到不能自外於台灣主流民意使然。接下來,兩岸人道包機往返,大批的台灣志工與救援物資湧向災區。一場大地震,彷彿震垮了兩岸之間近年來若有似無的種種矜持與障礙,使得雙方多年來在心理及實體上的阻絕立即獲得大幅解放。就心理層面的解放言,台灣人民慷慨地向大陸災民表達關懷,大陸人民亦深刻感受到台灣人民真摯的善意;就實體層面的解放言,人道包機的往返,正好反襯了過去五花大綁的政治束縛是多麼無謂無聊。
大地震所觸動的兩岸對話,有兩個層次:一、人道層次。可謂是「九二一」與「五一二」的對話,畢竟兩岸死者流的血是一樣的血,兩岸生者流的淚是一樣的淚。二、政治層次。台灣人民此次對大陸災民的熱心關切,在不知不覺間也是對兩岸多年來惡化的政治關係進行修補;這一次,可說是台灣民間走在兩岸政府的前面,民間打開了政府打不開的局面,且幸而兩岸政府亦能因勢利導,藉震災互動而將兩岸關係推升了幾個台階。
吳胡會在這樣的背景下登場,吳伯雄自然會代表台灣人民向大陸災民表達慰問,而胡錦濤亦會代表大陸人民向台灣人民的關懷與捐輸表達謝意。但最重要的是,這是兩岸「執政黨主席」的首次會晤;二人應就各自身為兩岸執政黨主席的責任相互勉勵,並且共同傾聽兩岸人民的心聲。震災固然是非常事件,卻將民間疾苦放大呈現在主政者的眼前;救災亦是非常任務,卻可使主政者更能領悟自己的執政天職。當吳伯雄及胡錦濤兩位執政黨主席面對面地論及慘重的震災,二人應當自我提醒及相互勉勵,皆要做一個不辜負人民喁喁殷望的執政者。
兩岸關係當然是吳胡會的主題。賓主雙方尤應珍惜震災所形成的兩岸民間友善氣氛,以具體的政策宣示來回應民間的期許;如此,兩岸官方釋放的善意政策,又能回過頭來鼓勵及滋長兩岸民間的友好氛圍,即可形成良性循環。兩岸民間的相互珍惜,是兩岸互動的重大資產;此種相惜相憐的民間氛圍因震災而密集顯現,主政者應當善加維護,並使之成為架構兩岸關係的脊柱。
就兩岸關係的角度來看,大震災給兩岸執政者的啟示應是:兩岸關係必須和平穩定,絕不能以戰爭解決。地震滅殺生命已使兩岸民間有連心之痛,倘若有一天兩岸主政者驅使兩岸人民用槍砲互相殘殺,豈是天理民心所容?準此以言,台灣的主政者與人民,應當自信有能力說服大陸人民對台灣的民主與民生知所珍惜與維護,並藉大陸的民心與民意來軟化改善大陸主政者對台灣的態度;相對而言,則如日前本報社論所言,當大陸當局「寄希望於台灣人民」之時,亦當多想一想「台灣人民的希望」是什麼?
天災難免,兩岸不會沒有地震;發生地震,兩岸民間若能如這次四川震災一般地相互關懷與扶持,其實猶如「兄弟之邦」。但是,人禍則可避,兩岸可以沒有戰爭;倘若今日震災尚且教兩岸人民一同淚眼相對,誰能想像有一天兩岸人民會倒在對方槍口下的血泊中?
請吳主席帶給胡主席一句話:兩岸不會沒有地震,但兩岸可以沒有戰爭!
Taiwan’s Renaissance Depends on the Rebirth of the Republic of China
Taiwan’s Renaissance Depends on the Rebirth of the Republic of China
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, China)
A Translation
May 21, 2008
The title of Ma Ying-jeou’s inaugural address is “Taiwan’s Renaissance.” But within the text you see only phrases such as “the Republic of China’s Renaissance on Taiwan.”
Democracy is blessing. Yesterday, The skies over Taiwan remained unchanged. Life on the island remained unchanged. Apart from a few sections of road in Taipei being closed to traffic for the duration of the inaugural ceremony, traffic remained unchanged. Inside the Presidential Palace however, Chen Shui-bian handed the Great Seal of the Republic of China, the symbol of our nation’s sovereignty, over to Ma Ying-jeou. Within minutes, they completed a peaceful transfer of political power. At that moment the entire nation changed. The head of state changed. The nation’s course changed. The nation’s prospects changed. Everything changed. Democracy is a blessing, a strange and wondrous blessing.
In his inaugural address Ma Ying-jeou said Taiwan is the only region of the world ruled by ethnic Chinese that has undergone a “second change of ruling parties.” What is particularly astonishing about this “second change of ruling parties” is that Chen Shui-bian, who asserted that the “Republic of China is dead,” will be handing over the reins of the Republic of China government to Ma Ying-jeou, whom champions of Taiwan independence consider an “alien regime.” This, in effect, is the “Renaissance of the Republic of China on Taiwan.”
One could say that yesterday’s democratic transfer of political power nullified Chen Shui-bian’s imprecation that the “Republic of China is dead.” The people of Taiwan used their ballots to rescue the Republic of China. This aspect of democracy, this “second change of ruling parties” is even more astonishing, and has left people incredulous.
The principle theme of President Ma’s inaugural address was the rehabilitation of the Republic of China. First he told his domestic audience “the Republic of China has gained a new lease on life on Taiwan” and that he intends to restore public identification with the Republic of China. Second, he told listeners on both sides of the Taiwan Strait the vital role of the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations. He proposed maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, under the framework of the Republic of China Constitution.
This is how President Ma is positioning himself relative to his two major internal and external problems. With regards Taiwan, to borrow Frank Hsieh’s phrase, he seeks “Reconciliation and Coexistence,” to establish a consensus concerning the Republic of China. With regards cross-strait relations, he seeks Beijing’s respect for the Republic of China’s status quo, and “peace and mutual prosperity.” These problems have vital internal and external implications. If Beijing allows the Republic of China greater breathing room, the public on Taiwan will identify more closely with the Republic of China. If on the other hand, pro independence sentiment on Taiwan increases, Beijing will surely reduce Taiwan’s room to maneuver.
Let’s take a closer look at his inaugural address, which he entitled “Taiwan’s Renaissance.” The only place where the word “renaissance” appears is “the Republic of China has received a new lease on life on Taiwan.” President Ma pointed out that during his term of office the Republic of China will celebrate its centennial. He underscored the fact that the Republic of China ruled the mainland region for only 38 years, but the Taiwan region for over 60 years. He underscored the fact that “the fate of the Republic of China is now inextricably intertwined with the fate of Taiwan.” In fact, the notion that “the Republic of China has received a new lease on life on Taiwan” is inextricably intertwined with the notion of a “second change of ruling parties.” After all, If President Ma cannot persuade the public on Taiwan to identify with “the Republic of China’s renaissance,” how can he talk of “One China, Different Interpretations?”
In his speech President Ma referred to his own status as a “post war immigrant.” He said Taiwan was his home, and that his loved ones were buried here. He said he was grateful to Taiwan society for accepting, cultivating, and embracing this “post war immigrant.” His words may have reflected Ma Ying-jeou’s deeply ingrained sense of Original Sin. His words may have paid obeisance to “earlier immigrants’” sense of entitlement. They did demonstrate that Ma Ying-jeou lacks confidence in his own appeals for “Reconciliation and Coexistence.” This may be a tough nut for Ma Ying-jeou to crack.
As expected, President Ma’s cross-strait relations will be built on the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations. He called for “no unification, no independence, and no war.” In his speech, President Ma specifically mentioned “Mr. Hu Jintao’s last three most recent remarks on cross-strait relations,” He endorsed Hu Jintao’s 1992 Consensus and his Four Constants, i.e., building of mutual trust, shelving of disputes, seeking of commonalities, and creation of win/win. Usually inaugural addresses mention only abstract principles. For Ma Ying-jeou to specifically address and dialogue with Hu Jintao in his inaugural address is rather extraordinary. This is because even though the 1992 Consensus has now become the new point of reference for cross-strait interaction, it still takes two to Tango. This is not a solo performance for either side. If Ma and Hu truly believe this is a rare, historic opportunity, they must work together and on the basis of the 1992 Consensus gradually improve cross-strait relations. In which case Beijing will not perceive the 1992 Consensus as a means of indefinitely postponing cross-strait talks, and will be more inclined to allow Taiwan more international space.
President Ma said that the President of the Republic of China’s most sacred duty is to defend the Constitution. This is the President of the Republic of China’s greatest challenge. On Taiwan, defending the Constitution means two things. One is maintaining public identification with the Republic of China. The other is complying with provisions of the Republic of China Constitution regarding one’s powers and responsibilities. Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian failed because they had no desire or intention to defend the Republic of China and its Constitution. That is why they promoted their “Two States Theory,” their “Rectification of Names” campaigns, and their “Authoring of a New Constitution” campaigns. They were unable to defend the ROC Constitution because Beijing knew Lee and Chen were merely using the ROC Constitution as cover while they promoted “creeping independence.” Ma Ying-jeou by contrast, is someone willing to defend the ROC Constitution. If Ma Ying-jeou is unable to defend the ROC Constitution, then nobody can defend it. Then nobody will be willing to defend it. Then nobody will dare to defend it. Beijing cannot treat the Republic of China the same way it treated Taiwan independence. Beijing cannot treat Ma Ying-jeou the same way it treated Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian.
President Ma Ying-jeou and Chairman Hu Jintao have an historic opportunity to break the current cross-strait deadlock. Both are aware that the recent presidential election rescued the Republic of China from Chen Shui-bian’s imprecation that the “Republic of China is dead.” Therefore Ma Ying-jeou must midwife the rebirth of the Republic of China. Hu Jintao must respect the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations premise. Only this will enable ROC voters on Taiwan to support and identify politically with the Republic of China and with ROC cross-strait policy. If the Republic of China can not be kept alive, it will be difficult to maintain cross-strait relations. The two sides need such an understanding. Ma Ying-jeou’s speech concluded with two rallying cries: Long live Taiwan’s democracy! Long live the Republic of China! Normal relations across the Taiwan Strait must be built on Taiwan’s democracy and the Republic of China. If the Republic of China loses the support of Taiwan’s democracy, cross-strait relations are bound to degenerate. This is Ma Ying-jeou’s problem. It is something Hu surely can appreciate.
Taiwan’s Renaissance depends on the rebirth of the Republic of China. The rebirth of cross-strait relations depends on Beijing’s understanding and implementation of the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations.
台灣的新生建立在中華民國的新生之上
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.05.21 02:12 am
馬英九總統就職演說的標題有「台灣新生」四字,但文中僅見「中華民國在台灣的新生」等語。
民主是美妙的恩典。昨天,台灣天空的太陽沒有變,整個島上的生活運作,除了台北市幾條路段因慶典而短暫交通管制外,一切也都沒有變;然而,在象徵國家主權的總統府內,陳水扁把中華民國國璽移交給馬英九,在幾分鐘內就完成了「政權和平轉移」的程序,整個國家卻立即從元首到路線、到憧憬皆全盤改變。民主真是何其美妙!民主又是何等恩典!
新總統馬英九的就職演說指出:台灣是全球華人文化土壤中,唯一完成「二次政黨輪替」的範例。尤其令人震撼的是:這場「二次政黨輪替」,是由宣布「中華民國已死」的陳水扁,將中華民國政權交給原被他指為「外來政權」的馬英九手中。這正是「中華民國在台灣的新生」。
可以這麼說,昨天這場政權交替的最核心意義是:台灣的民主政治使得陳水扁「中華民國已死」的詛咒未能應驗,最後是由台灣人民在投票箱前救回了中華民國。就這一層意義而言,更使人驚嘆民主政治的神奇,也更使人為這場「二次政黨輪替」感到震懾。
其實,馬總統的就職演說,也是以重建中華民國的角色為主軸:一、對台灣內部,他說「中華民國在台灣得到了新生」,因此,致力於修補重建國家認同;二、對海峽兩岸,他則楬櫫「九二共識/一中各表」,主張「在中華民國憲法架構下,維持台灣海峽的現狀」。
誠然,這也正是馬總統在國家定位工程上,對內與對外的兩大難題:對台灣內部,必須「和解共生」(他借用了謝長廷的佳句),以建立「中華民國」的認同與共識;對海峽兩岸,則必須爭取北京政權正視並尊重「中華民國的現狀」,以求「和平共榮」。其實,在此一議題上,對內對外存在著生剋關係;北京若給中華民國空間,台灣內部的中華民國認同即可望升高;反之,台灣內部倘若台獨高張,北京恐怕就會更加緊縮台灣的空間。
進一步解讀「對內」部分。就職演說的標題是「台灣新生」,但文中唯一出現「新生」二字之處,則是「中華民國在台灣得到了新生」。馬總統指出,他任內將慶祝中華民國一百周年國慶;又稱中華民國在大陸僅三十八年,在台灣則將逾一甲子;並稱「中華民國與台灣的命運已經緊緊結合在一起」。這些論述,其實皆在建構「中華民國在台灣的新生」,也是這場「二次政黨輪替」最重大的意義所在。畢竟,倘若馬總統不能對內在國家認同上創造「中華民國的新生」,對外亦將失去「一中各表」的憑藉。
可附一筆的是:馬總統在演講中,標示出自己的「戰後新移民」的角色。他說:台灣是我的故鄉(應是「家鄉」之誤,身處異鄉時始稱「故鄉」),是我親人埋骨之處;台灣社會對他這個「戰後新移民」的「包容之義/栽培之恩/擁抱之情」令他感念。這些話充分反映了馬英九的「原罪感」,或許滿足了「老移民」的優越感,卻顯示馬英九對「和解共生」並無足夠的信心;這也可見馬英九處境艱難之一斑。
再談「對外」部分。一如預料,馬總統將兩岸關係建立在「一中各表/九二共識」之上,並主張「不統/不獨/不武」。馬總統在演說中且特別提到「胡錦濤先生最近三次有關兩岸關係的談話」,並表示贊同胡錦濤「九二共識」、「四個繼續」、「建立互信/擱置爭議/求同存異/共創雙贏」等幾項觀點。通常,就職演說往往只在標舉抽象原則,如今像馬英九這般以就職演說指名與胡錦濤對話,應是很不尋常的作法;這是因為,即使「九二共識」已成兩岸互動的新準據,但這畢竟仍是「兩人探戈」,不是任何單方面能唱得成的獨腳戲。倘若馬胡二位兩岸領導人,果真認為此時此際正是兩岸之間難得的「歷史機遇」,即應共同努力在「九二共識的基礎上」漸次「發展」兩岸關係,那麼北京方面就不宜將「九二共識」視為使兩岸關係「停格」的工具,而應在「開放國際空間」等方面對台灣有所回應。
馬總統說:中華民國總統最神聖的職責就是守護憲法;但這正是最近幾任中華民國總統的最大難題。在台灣,守護憲法有兩層意義,一是守護中華民國的國家認同,一是遵守憲政的權責規範。李登輝與陳水扁的失敗,一方面是因不想守護及不願守護,於是搞「兩國論」、「正名制憲」或「台獨建國」;另一方面其實亦因北京的因素而使他們二人守護不住中華民國憲法。如今,馬英九相對而言應是一個願意守護中華民國憲法者,倘若北京方面仍使馬英九也「守護不住」,那麼恐怕也就無人能守,亦無人願守、無人敢守了。北京不能將「中華民國」與「台獨」一般對待,也不可將馬英九與李登輝、陳水扁一般對待!
馬英九總統及胡錦濤主席,皆用「歷史機遇」一詞來形容兩岸現今所處時空情境,二人皆應心知肚明的是:如前所述,這次總統大選不啻是台灣選民從詛咒「中華民國已死」的陳水扁手中,將中華民國搶救了回來;因而,未來馬英九必須能夠創造「中華民國的新生」,胡錦濤應當尊重「九二共識/一中各表」,才能使站在投票箱前的台灣選民願意支持中華民國的政治認同與兩岸政策。倘若「中華民國」不能維持,兩岸關係就難以維繫。兩岸當局若能有此認知,即知馬英九昨日演說結尾的兩句口號也許有相互呼應的關係,他說:台灣民主萬歲!中華民國萬歲!其實,海峽兩岸的正常關係,正是必須建立在「台灣民主」與「中華民國」的正常關係之上;當「中華民國」失去「台灣民主」的支撐,兩岸關係也必定變質。這是馬英九的難題,也是胡錦濤應有的領悟。
台灣的新生,建立在中華民國的新生之上;兩岸關係的新生,則建立在北京政府對「九二共識/一中各表」的真正理解與實踐之上。
Taiwan’s Renaissance Depends on the Rebirth of the Republic of China
Taiwan’s Renaissance Depends on the Rebirth of the Republic of China
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, China)
A Translation
May 21, 2008
The title of Ma Ying-jeou’s inaugural address is “Taiwan’s Renaissance.” But within the text you see only phrases such as “the Republic of China’s Renaissance on Taiwan.”
Democracy is blessing. Yesterday, The skies over Taiwan remained unchanged. Life on the island remained unchanged. Apart from a few sections of road in Taipei being closed to traffic for the duration of the inaugural ceremony, traffic remained unchanged. Inside the Presidential Palace however, Chen Shui-bian handed the Great Seal of the Republic of China, the symbol of our nation’s sovereignty, over to Ma Ying-jeou. Within minutes, they completed a peaceful transfer of political power. At that moment the entire nation changed. The head of state changed. The nation’s course changed. The nation’s prospects changed. Everything changed. Democracy is a blessing, a strange and wondrous blessing.
In his inaugural address Ma Ying-jeou said Taiwan is the only region of the world ruled by ethnic Chinese that has undergone a “second change of ruling parties.” What is particularly astonishing about this “second change of ruling parties” is that Chen Shui-bian, who asserted that the “Republic of China is dead,” will be handing over the reins of the Republic of China government to Ma Ying-jeou, whom champions of Taiwan independence consider an “alien regime.” This, in effect, is the “Renaissance of the Republic of China on Taiwan.”
One could say that yesterday’s democratic transfer of political power nullified Chen Shui-bian’s imprecation that the “Republic of China is dead.” The people of Taiwan used their ballots to rescue the Republic of China. This aspect of democracy, this “second change of ruling parties” is even more astonishing, and has left people incredulous.
The principle theme of President Ma’s inaugural address was the rehabilitation of the Republic of China. First he told his domestic audience “the Republic of China has gained a new lease on life on Taiwan” and that he intends to restore public identification with the Republic of China. Second, he told listeners on both sides of the Taiwan Strait the vital role of the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations. He proposed maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, under the framework of the Republic of China Constitution.
This is how President Ma is positioning himself relative to his two major internal and external problems. With regards Taiwan, to borrow Frank Hsieh’s phrase, he seeks “Reconciliation and Coexistence,” to establish a consensus concerning the Republic of China. With regards cross-strait relations, he seeks Beijing’s respect for the Republic of China’s status quo, and “peace and mutual prosperity.” These problems have vital internal and external implications. If Beijing allows the Republic of China greater breathing room, the public on Taiwan will identify more closely with the Republic of China. If on the other hand, pro independence sentiment on Taiwan increases, Beijing will surely reduce Taiwan’s room to maneuver.
Let’s take a closer look at his inaugural address, which he entitled “Taiwan’s Renaissance.” The only place where the word “renaissance” appears is “the Republic of China has received a new lease on life on Taiwan.” President Ma pointed out that during his term of office the Republic of China will celebrate its centennial. He underscored the fact that the Republic of China ruled the mainland region for only 38 years, but the Taiwan region for over 60 years. He underscored the fact that “the fate of the Republic of China is now inextricably intertwined with the fate of Taiwan.” In fact, the notion that “the Republic of China has received a new lease on life on Taiwan” is inextricably intertwined with the notion of a “second change of ruling parties.” After all, If President Ma cannot persuade the public on Taiwan to identify with “the Republic of China’s renaissance,” how can he talk of “One China, Different Interpretations?”
In his speech President Ma referred to his own status as a “post war immigrant.” He said Taiwan was his home, and that his loved ones were buried here. He said he was grateful to Taiwan society for accepting, cultivating, and embracing this “post war immigrant.” His words may have reflected Ma Ying-jeou’s deeply ingrained sense of Original Sin. His words may have paid obeisance to “earlier immigrants’” sense of entitlement. They did demonstrate that Ma Ying-jeou lacks confidence in his own appeals for “Reconciliation and Coexistence.” This may be a tough nut for Ma Ying-jeou to crack.
As expected, President Ma’s cross-strait relations will be built on the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations. He called for “no unification, no independence, and no war.” In his speech, President Ma specifically mentioned “Mr. Hu Jintao’s last three most recent remarks on cross-strait relations,” He endorsed Hu Jintao’s 1992 Consensus and his Four Constants, i.e., building of mutual trust, shelving of disputes, seeking of commonalities, and creation of win/win. Usually inaugural addresses mention only abstract principles. For Ma Ying-jeou to specifically address and dialogue with Hu Jintao in his inaugural address is rather extraordinary. This is because even though the 1992 Consensus has now become the new point of reference for cross-strait interaction, it still takes two to Tango. This is not a solo performance for either side. If Ma and Hu truly believe this is a rare, historic opportunity, they must work together and on the basis of the 1992 Consensus gradually improve cross-strait relations. In which case Beijing will not perceive the 1992 Consensus as a means of indefinitely postponing cross-strait talks, and will be more inclined to allow Taiwan more international space.
President Ma said that the President of the Republic of China’s most sacred duty is to defend the Constitution. This is the President of the Republic of China’s greatest challenge. On Taiwan, defending the Constitution means two things. One is maintaining public identification with the Republic of China. The other is complying with provisions of the Republic of China Constitution regarding one’s powers and responsibilities. Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian failed because they had no desire or intention to defend the Republic of China and its Constitution. That is why they promoted their “Two States Theory,” their “Rectification of Names” campaigns, and their “Authoring of a New Constitution” campaigns. They were unable to defend the ROC Constitution because Beijing knew Lee and Chen were merely using the ROC Constitution as cover while they promoted “creeping independence.” Ma Ying-jeou by contrast, is someone willing to defend the ROC Constitution. If Ma Ying-jeou is unable to defend the ROC Constitution, then nobody can defend it. Then nobody will be willing to defend it. Then nobody will dare to defend it. Beijing cannot treat the Republic of China the same way it treated Taiwan independence. Beijing cannot treat Ma Ying-jeou the same way it treated Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian.
President Ma Ying-jeou and Chairman Hu Jintao have an historic opportunity to break the current cross-strait deadlock. Both are aware that the recent presidential election rescued the Republic of China from Chen Shui-bian’s imprecation that the “Republic of China is dead.” Therefore Ma Ying-jeou must midwife the rebirth of the Republic of China. Hu Jintao must respect the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations premise. Only this will enable ROC voters on Taiwan to support and identify politically with the Republic of China and with ROC cross-strait policy. If the Republic of China can not be kept alive, it will be difficult to maintain cross-strait relations. The two sides need such an understanding. Ma Ying-jeou’s speech concluded with two rallying cries: Long live Taiwan’s democracy! Long live the Republic of China! Normal relations across the Taiwan Strait must be built on Taiwan’s democracy and the Republic of China. If the Republic of China loses the support of Taiwan’s democracy, cross-strait relations are bound to degenerate. This is Ma Ying-jeou’s problem. It is something Hu surely can appreciate.
Taiwan’s Renaissance depends on the rebirth of the Republic of China. The rebirth of cross-strait relations depends on Beijing’s understanding and implementation of the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations.
台灣的新生建立在中華民國的新生之上
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.05.21 02:12 am
馬英九總統就職演說的標題有「台灣新生」四字,但文中僅見「中華民國在台灣的新生」等語。
民主是美妙的恩典。昨天,台灣天空的太陽沒有變,整個島上的生活運作,除了台北市幾條路段因慶典而短暫交通管制外,一切也都沒有變;然而,在象徵國家主權的總統府內,陳水扁把中華民國國璽移交給馬英九,在幾分鐘內就完成了「政權和平轉移」的程序,整個國家卻立即從元首到路線、到憧憬皆全盤改變。民主真是何其美妙!民主又是何等恩典!
新總統馬英九的就職演說指出:台灣是全球華人文化土壤中,唯一完成「二次政黨輪替」的範例。尤其令人震撼的是:這場「二次政黨輪替」,是由宣布「中華民國已死」的陳水扁,將中華民國政權交給原被他指為「外來政權」的馬英九手中。這正是「中華民國在台灣的新生」。
可以這麼說,昨天這場政權交替的最核心意義是:台灣的民主政治使得陳水扁「中華民國已死」的詛咒未能應驗,最後是由台灣人民在投票箱前救回了中華民國。就這一層意義而言,更使人驚嘆民主政治的神奇,也更使人為這場「二次政黨輪替」感到震懾。
其實,馬總統的就職演說,也是以重建中華民國的角色為主軸:一、對台灣內部,他說「中華民國在台灣得到了新生」,因此,致力於修補重建國家認同;二、對海峽兩岸,他則楬櫫「九二共識/一中各表」,主張「在中華民國憲法架構下,維持台灣海峽的現狀」。
誠然,這也正是馬總統在國家定位工程上,對內與對外的兩大難題:對台灣內部,必須「和解共生」(他借用了謝長廷的佳句),以建立「中華民國」的認同與共識;對海峽兩岸,則必須爭取北京政權正視並尊重「中華民國的現狀」,以求「和平共榮」。其實,在此一議題上,對內對外存在著生剋關係;北京若給中華民國空間,台灣內部的中華民國認同即可望升高;反之,台灣內部倘若台獨高張,北京恐怕就會更加緊縮台灣的空間。
進一步解讀「對內」部分。就職演說的標題是「台灣新生」,但文中唯一出現「新生」二字之處,則是「中華民國在台灣得到了新生」。馬總統指出,他任內將慶祝中華民國一百周年國慶;又稱中華民國在大陸僅三十八年,在台灣則將逾一甲子;並稱「中華民國與台灣的命運已經緊緊結合在一起」。這些論述,其實皆在建構「中華民國在台灣的新生」,也是這場「二次政黨輪替」最重大的意義所在。畢竟,倘若馬總統不能對內在國家認同上創造「中華民國的新生」,對外亦將失去「一中各表」的憑藉。
可附一筆的是:馬總統在演講中,標示出自己的「戰後新移民」的角色。他說:台灣是我的故鄉(應是「家鄉」之誤,身處異鄉時始稱「故鄉」),是我親人埋骨之處;台灣社會對他這個「戰後新移民」的「包容之義/栽培之恩/擁抱之情」令他感念。這些話充分反映了馬英九的「原罪感」,或許滿足了「老移民」的優越感,卻顯示馬英九對「和解共生」並無足夠的信心;這也可見馬英九處境艱難之一斑。
再談「對外」部分。一如預料,馬總統將兩岸關係建立在「一中各表/九二共識」之上,並主張「不統/不獨/不武」。馬總統在演說中且特別提到「胡錦濤先生最近三次有關兩岸關係的談話」,並表示贊同胡錦濤「九二共識」、「四個繼續」、「建立互信/擱置爭議/求同存異/共創雙贏」等幾項觀點。通常,就職演說往往只在標舉抽象原則,如今像馬英九這般以就職演說指名與胡錦濤對話,應是很不尋常的作法;這是因為,即使「九二共識」已成兩岸互動的新準據,但這畢竟仍是「兩人探戈」,不是任何單方面能唱得成的獨腳戲。倘若馬胡二位兩岸領導人,果真認為此時此際正是兩岸之間難得的「歷史機遇」,即應共同努力在「九二共識的基礎上」漸次「發展」兩岸關係,那麼北京方面就不宜將「九二共識」視為使兩岸關係「停格」的工具,而應在「開放國際空間」等方面對台灣有所回應。
馬總統說:中華民國總統最神聖的職責就是守護憲法;但這正是最近幾任中華民國總統的最大難題。在台灣,守護憲法有兩層意義,一是守護中華民國的國家認同,一是遵守憲政的權責規範。李登輝與陳水扁的失敗,一方面是因不想守護及不願守護,於是搞「兩國論」、「正名制憲」或「台獨建國」;另一方面其實亦因北京的因素而使他們二人守護不住中華民國憲法。如今,馬英九相對而言應是一個願意守護中華民國憲法者,倘若北京方面仍使馬英九也「守護不住」,那麼恐怕也就無人能守,亦無人願守、無人敢守了。北京不能將「中華民國」與「台獨」一般對待,也不可將馬英九與李登輝、陳水扁一般對待!
馬英九總統及胡錦濤主席,皆用「歷史機遇」一詞來形容兩岸現今所處時空情境,二人皆應心知肚明的是:如前所述,這次總統大選不啻是台灣選民從詛咒「中華民國已死」的陳水扁手中,將中華民國搶救了回來;因而,未來馬英九必須能夠創造「中華民國的新生」,胡錦濤應當尊重「九二共識/一中各表」,才能使站在投票箱前的台灣選民願意支持中華民國的政治認同與兩岸政策。倘若「中華民國」不能維持,兩岸關係就難以維繫。兩岸當局若能有此認知,即知馬英九昨日演說結尾的兩句口號也許有相互呼應的關係,他說:台灣民主萬歲!中華民國萬歲!其實,海峽兩岸的正常關係,正是必須建立在「台灣民主」與「中華民國」的正常關係之上;當「中華民國」失去「台灣民主」的支撐,兩岸關係也必定變質。這是馬英九的難題,也是胡錦濤應有的領悟。
台灣的新生,建立在中華民國的新生之上;兩岸關係的新生,則建立在北京政府對「九二共識/一中各表」的真正理解與實踐之上。
Taiwan’s Renaissance Depends on the Rebirth of the Republic of China
Taiwan’s Renaissance Depends on the Rebirth of the Republic of China
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, China)
A Translation
May 21, 2008
The title of Ma Ying-jeou’s inaugural address is “Taiwan’s Renaissance.” But within the text you see only phrases such as “the Republic of China’s Renaissance on Taiwan.”
Democracy is blessing. Yesterday, The skies over Taiwan remained unchanged. Life on the island remained unchanged. Apart from a few sections of road in Taipei being closed to traffic for the duration of the inaugural ceremony, traffic remained unchanged. Inside the Presidential Palace however, Chen Shui-bian handed the Great Seal of the Republic of China, the symbol of our nation’s sovereignty, over to Ma Ying-jeou. Within minutes, they completed a peaceful transfer of political power. At that moment the entire nation changed. The head of state changed. The nation’s course changed. The nation’s prospects changed. Everything changed. Democracy is a blessing, a strange and wondrous blessing.
In his inaugural address Ma Ying-jeou said Taiwan is the only region of the world ruled by ethnic Chinese that has undergone a “second change of ruling parties.” What is particularly astonishing about this “second change of ruling parties” is that Chen Shui-bian, who asserted that the “Republic of China is dead,” will be handing over the reins of the Republic of China government to Ma Ying-jeou, whom champions of Taiwan independence consider an “alien regime.” This, in effect, is the “Renaissance of the Republic of China on Taiwan.”
One could say that yesterday’s democratic transfer of political power nullified Chen Shui-bian’s imprecation that the “Republic of China is dead.” The people of Taiwan used their ballots to rescue the Republic of China. This aspect of democracy, this “second change of ruling parties” is even more astonishing, and has left people incredulous.
The principle theme of President Ma’s inaugural address was the rehabilitation of the Republic of China. First he told his domestic audience “the Republic of China has gained a new lease on life on Taiwan” and that he intends to restore public identification with the Republic of China. Second, he told listeners on both sides of the Taiwan Strait the vital role of the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations. He proposed maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, under the framework of the Republic of China Constitution.
This is how President Ma is positioning himself relative to his two major internal and external problems. With regards Taiwan, to borrow Frank Hsieh’s phrase, he seeks “Reconciliation and Coexistence,” to establish a consensus concerning the Republic of China. With regards cross-strait relations, he seeks Beijing’s respect for the Republic of China’s status quo, and “peace and mutual prosperity.” These problems have vital internal and external implications. If Beijing allows the Republic of China greater breathing room, the public on Taiwan will identify more closely with the Republic of China. If on the other hand, pro independence sentiment on Taiwan increases, Beijing will surely reduce Taiwan’s room to maneuver.
Let’s take a closer look at his inaugural address, which he entitled “Taiwan’s Renaissance.” The only place where the word “renaissance” appears is “the Republic of China has received a new lease on life on Taiwan.” President Ma pointed out that during his term of office the Republic of China will celebrate its centennial. He underscored the fact that the Republic of China ruled the mainland region for only 38 years, but the Taiwan region for over 60 years. He underscored the fact that “the fate of the Republic of China is now inextricably intertwined with the fate of Taiwan.” In fact, the notion that “the Republic of China has received a new lease on life on Taiwan” is inextricably intertwined with the notion of a “second change of ruling parties.” After all, If President Ma cannot persuade the public on Taiwan to identify with “the Republic of China’s renaissance,” how can he talk of “One China, Different Interpretations?”
In his speech President Ma referred to his own status as a “post war immigrant.” He said Taiwan was his home, and that his loved ones were buried here. He said he was grateful to Taiwan society for accepting, cultivating, and embracing this “post war immigrant.” His words may have reflected Ma Ying-jeou’s deeply ingrained sense of Original Sin. His words may have paid obeisance to “earlier immigrants’” sense of entitlement. They did demonstrate that Ma Ying-jeou lacks confidence in his own appeals for “Reconciliation and Coexistence.” This may be a tough nut for Ma Ying-jeou to crack.
As expected, President Ma’s cross-strait relations will be built on the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations. He called for “no unification, no independence, and no war.” In his speech, President Ma specifically mentioned “Mr. Hu Jintao’s last three most recent remarks on cross-strait relations,” He endorsed Hu Jintao’s 1992 Consensus and his Four Constants, i.e., building of mutual trust, shelving of disputes, seeking of commonalities, and creation of win/win. Usually inaugural addresses mention only abstract principles. For Ma Ying-jeou to specifically address and dialogue with Hu Jintao in his inaugural address is rather extraordinary. This is because even though the 1992 Consensus has now become the new point of reference for cross-strait interaction, it still takes two to Tango. This is not a solo performance for either side. If Ma and Hu truly believe this is a rare, historic opportunity, they must work together and on the basis of the 1992 Consensus gradually improve cross-strait relations. In which case Beijing will not perceive the 1992 Consensus as a means of indefinitely postponing cross-strait talks, and will be more inclined to allow Taiwan more international space.
President Ma said that the President of the Republic of China’s most sacred duty is to defend the Constitution. This is the President of the Republic of China’s greatest challenge. On Taiwan, defending the Constitution means two things. One is maintaining public identification with the Republic of China. The other is complying with provisions of the Republic of China Constitution regarding one’s powers and responsibilities. Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian failed because they had no desire or intention to defend the Republic of China and its Constitution. That is why they promoted their “Two States Theory,” their “Rectification of Names” campaigns, and their “Authoring of a New Constitution” campaigns. They were unable to defend the ROC Constitution because Beijing knew Lee and Chen were merely using the ROC Constitution as cover while they promoted “creeping independence.” Ma Ying-jeou by contrast, is someone willing to defend the ROC Constitution. If Ma Ying-jeou is unable to defend the ROC Constitution, then nobody can defend it. Then nobody will be willing to defend it. Then nobody will dare to defend it. Beijing cannot treat the Republic of China the same way it treated Taiwan independence. Beijing cannot treat Ma Ying-jeou the same way it treated Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian.
President Ma Ying-jeou and Chairman Hu Jintao have an historic opportunity to break the current cross-strait deadlock. Both are aware that the recent presidential election rescued the Republic of China from Chen Shui-bian’s imprecation that the “Republic of China is dead.” Therefore Ma Ying-jeou must midwife the rebirth of the Republic of China. Hu Jintao must respect the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations premise. Only this will enable ROC voters on Taiwan to support and identify politically with the Republic of China and with ROC cross-strait policy. If the Republic of China can not be kept alive, it will be difficult to maintain cross-strait relations. The two sides need such an understanding. Ma Ying-jeou’s speech concluded with two rallying cries: Long live Taiwan’s democracy! Long live the Republic of China! Normal relations across the Taiwan Strait must be built on Taiwan’s democracy and the Republic of China. If the Republic of China loses the support of Taiwan’s democracy, cross-strait relations are bound to degenerate. This is Ma Ying-jeou’s problem. It is something Hu surely can appreciate.
Taiwan’s Renaissance depends on the rebirth of the Republic of China. The rebirth of cross-strait relations depends on Beijing’s understanding and implementation of the 1992 Consensus and One China, Different Interpretations.
台灣的新生建立在中華民國的新生之上
【聯合報╱社論】
2008.05.21 02:12 am
馬英九總統就職演說的標題有「台灣新生」四字,但文中僅見「中華民國在台灣的新生」等語。
民主是美妙的恩典。昨天,台灣天空的太陽沒有變,整個島上的生活運作,除了台北市幾條路段因慶典而短暫交通管制外,一切也都沒有變;然而,在象徵國家主權的總統府內,陳水扁把中華民國國璽移交給馬英九,在幾分鐘內就完成了「政權和平轉移」的程序,整個國家卻立即從元首到路線、到憧憬皆全盤改變。民主真是何其美妙!民主又是何等恩典!
新總統馬英九的就職演說指出:台灣是全球華人文化土壤中,唯一完成「二次政黨輪替」的範例。尤其令人震撼的是:這場「二次政黨輪替」,是由宣布「中華民國已死」的陳水扁,將中華民國政權交給原被他指為「外來政權」的馬英九手中。這正是「中華民國在台灣的新生」。
可以這麼說,昨天這場政權交替的最核心意義是:台灣的民主政治使得陳水扁「中華民國已死」的詛咒未能應驗,最後是由台灣人民在投票箱前救回了中華民國。就這一層意義而言,更使人驚嘆民主政治的神奇,也更使人為這場「二次政黨輪替」感到震懾。
其實,馬總統的就職演說,也是以重建中華民國的角色為主軸:一、對台灣內部,他說「中華民國在台灣得到了新生」,因此,致力於修補重建國家認同;二、對海峽兩岸,他則楬櫫「九二共識/一中各表」,主張「在中華民國憲法架構下,維持台灣海峽的現狀」。
誠然,這也正是馬總統在國家定位工程上,對內與對外的兩大難題:對台灣內部,必須「和解共生」(他借用了謝長廷的佳句),以建立「中華民國」的認同與共識;對海峽兩岸,則必須爭取北京政權正視並尊重「中華民國的現狀」,以求「和平共榮」。其實,在此一議題上,對內對外存在著生剋關係;北京若給中華民國空間,台灣內部的中華民國認同即可望升高;反之,台灣內部倘若台獨高張,北京恐怕就會更加緊縮台灣的空間。
進一步解讀「對內」部分。就職演說的標題是「台灣新生」,但文中唯一出現「新生」二字之處,則是「中華民國在台灣得到了新生」。馬總統指出,他任內將慶祝中華民國一百周年國慶;又稱中華民國在大陸僅三十八年,在台灣則將逾一甲子;並稱「中華民國與台灣的命運已經緊緊結合在一起」。這些論述,其實皆在建構「中華民國在台灣的新生」,也是這場「二次政黨輪替」最重大的意義所在。畢竟,倘若馬總統不能對內在國家認同上創造「中華民國的新生」,對外亦將失去「一中各表」的憑藉。
可附一筆的是:馬總統在演講中,標示出自己的「戰後新移民」的角色。他說:台灣是我的故鄉(應是「家鄉」之誤,身處異鄉時始稱「故鄉」),是我親人埋骨之處;台灣社會對他這個「戰後新移民」的「包容之義/栽培之恩/擁抱之情」令他感念。這些話充分反映了馬英九的「原罪感」,或許滿足了「老移民」的優越感,卻顯示馬英九對「和解共生」並無足夠的信心;這也可見馬英九處境艱難之一斑。
再談「對外」部分。一如預料,馬總統將兩岸關係建立在「一中各表/九二共識」之上,並主張「不統/不獨/不武」。馬總統在演說中且特別提到「胡錦濤先生最近三次有關兩岸關係的談話」,並表示贊同胡錦濤「九二共識」、「四個繼續」、「建立互信/擱置爭議/求同存異/共創雙贏」等幾項觀點。通常,就職演說往往只在標舉抽象原則,如今像馬英九這般以就職演說指名與胡錦濤對話,應是很不尋常的作法;這是因為,即使「九二共識」已成兩岸互動的新準據,但這畢竟仍是「兩人探戈」,不是任何單方面能唱得成的獨腳戲。倘若馬胡二位兩岸領導人,果真認為此時此際正是兩岸之間難得的「歷史機遇」,即應共同努力在「九二共識的基礎上」漸次「發展」兩岸關係,那麼北京方面就不宜將「九二共識」視為使兩岸關係「停格」的工具,而應在「開放國際空間」等方面對台灣有所回應。
馬總統說:中華民國總統最神聖的職責就是守護憲法;但這正是最近幾任中華民國總統的最大難題。在台灣,守護憲法有兩層意義,一是守護中華民國的國家認同,一是遵守憲政的權責規範。李登輝與陳水扁的失敗,一方面是因不想守護及不願守護,於是搞「兩國論」、「正名制憲」或「台獨建國」;另一方面其實亦因北京的因素而使他們二人守護不住中華民國憲法。如今,馬英九相對而言應是一個願意守護中華民國憲法者,倘若北京方面仍使馬英九也「守護不住」,那麼恐怕也就無人能守,亦無人願守、無人敢守了。北京不能將「中華民國」與「台獨」一般對待,也不可將馬英九與李登輝、陳水扁一般對待!
馬英九總統及胡錦濤主席,皆用「歷史機遇」一詞來形容兩岸現今所處時空情境,二人皆應心知肚明的是:如前所述,這次總統大選不啻是台灣選民從詛咒「中華民國已死」的陳水扁手中,將中華民國搶救了回來;因而,未來馬英九必須能夠創造「中華民國的新生」,胡錦濤應當尊重「九二共識/一中各表」,才能使站在投票箱前的台灣選民願意支持中華民國的政治認同與兩岸政策。倘若「中華民國」不能維持,兩岸關係就難以維繫。兩岸當局若能有此認知,即知馬英九昨日演說結尾的兩句口號也許有相互呼應的關係,他說:台灣民主萬歲!中華民國萬歲!其實,海峽兩岸的正常關係,正是必須建立在「台灣民主」與「中華民國」的正常關係之上;當「中華民國」失去「台灣民主」的支撐,兩岸關係也必定變質。這是馬英九的難題,也是胡錦濤應有的領悟。
台灣的新生,建立在中華民國的新生之上;兩岸關係的新生,則建立在北京政府對「九二共識/一中各表」的真正理解與實踐之上。
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