Cross-Strait Relations in the Wake of Lai Hsing-yuan’s Appointment to Mainland Affairs Council Chairman

Cross-Strait Relations in the Wake of Lai Hsing-yuan’s Appointment to Mainland Affairs Council Chairman
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, China)
A Translation
April 30, 2008

Lai Hsing-yuan will definitely head up the Mainland Affairs Council. Leave aside what political considerations were behind Ma Ying-jeou’s move. Leave aside the controversy and backlash this appointment has elicited within the Blue camp. To focus exclusively on Lai Hsing-yuan herself is pointless. After all, MAC and SEF personnel have already been officially appointed. Future cross-strait policy will be handled by this group. The question now ought to be how to make this rag tag group into a well-organized team.

In other words, the next cause for concern, is not relations between Lai Hsing-yuan and Chiang Pin-kung, or relations between Lai Hsing-yuan and the rest of the Ma administration. The next cause for concern is relations between the MAC and the SEF, the future of cross-strait policy, the division of labor, and the modus operanda. More broadly speaking, this includes the modus operanda for the presidential palace, the National Security Council, the Executive Yuan, the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Transportation, and other relevant ministries. How will they coordinate their efforts to promote cross-strait policy? From this point of view, to focus exclusively on Lai Hsing-yuan or to deliberately overestimate her role is unnecessary.

Frankly, the MAC and the SEF’s two-track system design was a product of the special “cross-strait” situation. One set policy, the other carried it out. In cross-strait interactions they played the roles of “good cop” and “bad cop.” This inevitably led to conflicts between the two. But in the end, they did enable cross-strait dialogue to take place, including the Koo-Wang during the early 90s. It was only the controversy over the Two States Theory and the subsequent ruling party change that mothballed this cross-straits mechanism for nearly 10 years. Ten years is a long time. People have passed away. Expertise has been lost and cross-strait mutual trust has been undermined. When we say we now want to “restart” cross-strait exchanges, we are not exaggerating.

But today’s cross-strait situation is completely different from the way it was 10 years ago. MAC and SEF personnel have all been replaced. It would be impossible to replicate the decision-making process in place a decade ago. It makes no difference if we are comparing Chiang Pin-kung today to Koo Chen-fu yesterday, or even Lai Hsing-yuan today to Huang Kun-hui yesterday. Everything is different. Since it is so different, what should the cross-strait policy-making and implementation process be? That is the question Lai Hsing-yuan and Chiang Pin-kung will have to answer.

Some people are worried that having Lai Hsing-yuan at the head of the Mainland Affairs Council may affect the timetable for direct flights and mainland tourism, or even destroy the ongoing process of cross-strait reconciliation. The Taiwan stock exchange (TAIEX) plummeted for an entire day. Many political observers worry that Lai Hsing-yuan’s EQ is too low. They worry that her pro-green stance will drag the entire Ma administration down. But is Lai Hsing-yuan that powerful? Based on interviews with the media, Lai Hsing-yuan is already on the same page as the Ma Hsiao team. She said she now agrees with Ma’s “One China, Different Interpretations” premise. She said she approved of opening Taiwan to mainland tourism, to weekend charter flights, and to allowing the free exchange of NTD with RMB. These provisions are ready for implementation. They are already in full swing. She is confident they can be achieved.

As for raising the ceiling on mainland investments beyond the current 40 percent, recognizing mainland diplomas, she said she had reservations about them unless comprehensive plans were first drawn up. As we look at these policy statements, we can’t see any big differences between Lai and Ma Ying-jeou’s campaign platform.

The KMT’s real cross-strait policy challenge is not that Lai Hsing-yuan will hijack the Ma Hsiao team’s policy, but that the Blue camp can pull together and avoid having a carriage with too many horses pulling in too many directions. For example, the outgoing administration has yet to hand over power to the incoming administration. The new cross-strait exchange mechanism has yet to be established. Chiang Pin-kung, who has yet to be inaugurated as chairman of the SEF, went to the mainland to thank Taiwan businesspeople for their support. Former Party Chairman Lien Chan also led a delegation to Beijing to attend a Lien-Hu Summit. Current Party Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung lead a delegation that took part in a KMT-CCP Forum, If cross-strait relations can allow these Blue camp elders to fight over the spotlight, while the decision makers who must assume political responsibility are caught in a dilemma, then hasn’t all hell broken loose? Frankly Lai Hsing-yuan is not the only person who must face the music. So must soon to be inaugurated President Ma.

How Beijing views Lai Hsing-yuan’s appointment will also be worth noting. We await the consequences of Ma Ying-jeou’s decision to appoint Green camp fighter Lai Hsing-yuan as cross-strait decision-maker. It is clear that Ma Ying-jeou is interested in uniting the Blue and Green camps behind his cross-strait policy. He represents the will of over 7 million Blue camp voters. But he does not want to ignore the concerns of 5 million voters. If Beijing cannot see this, if it cools cross-strait relations, then it is not seeing the bigger picture.

中時電子報
中國時報 　2008.04.30
如何看待賴幸媛掌陸委會後的兩岸關係
中時社論

　賴幸媛確定出掌陸委會之後，姑不論馬英九這步棋背後的政治考量是什麼，也不論這項人事任命引發藍軍內部多少議論與反彈，持續將焦點鎖定在賴幸媛一個人身上，其實意義已經不大。畢竟陸委會與海基會的人事既然已經正式底定，未來處理兩岸政策的核心，就是這組搭配了。現在的問題焦點應該是：如何讓這個混雜編組的隊伍，變身成一支行動一致的團隊，才是未來真正需要面對的挑戰。

　換言之，接下來最值得關注的，絕對不是賴幸媛與江丙坤之間，或是賴幸媛跟整個馬團隊之間將怎麼磨合，而是陸委會與海基會未來在兩岸政策上的角色分工、乃至運作機制會是什麼？或者更大範圍的說，這個運作機制在未來將與總統府國安會、行政院所屬的外交部、經濟部、內政部與交通部等相關部會間，怎麼步伐一致的推動兩岸政策？從這個角度看，刻意放大或高估賴幸媛一個人的角色，其實是不必要的。

　不諱言說，當初陸委會與海基會這種雙軌的制度設計，本來就是為因應「兩岸」特殊情境的產物。它們一掌政策、一掌執行，在兩岸互動上各自扮演黑白臉，固然免不了鬧出過多次的「海陸大戰」，但畢竟還是在一九九○年代完成包括辜汪會談在內的多次兩岸對話。只不過歷經「兩國論」風波以及後來的政黨輪替，使得這套運作機制有近十年的歲月幾近完全停擺，十年可不是短暫的歲月，人事全非不說，經驗傳承乃至兩岸互信的建立也全部中斷。如今重新啟動相關機制，說是「重新出發」亦不為過。

　只不過，如今的兩岸情勢，與十年前對比已經完全不一樣，重新人事布局的陸委會與海基會，也不可能再複製十年前的決策與運作模式，不論是江丙坤相較於當年辜振甫，亦或是賴幸媛相較於當年的黃昆輝，所面對課題其實是完全都不同了。既然不一樣，那麼新兩岸決策與執行模式又該是什麼？這個問題正就是賴幸媛與江丙坤在接下來所要回答的問題。

　沒錯，有人擔憂賴幸媛出掌陸委會之後，可能會影響直航與陸客來台觀光的時程，甚至還會把已經融冰的兩岸關係再度摧毀掉，連台北股市都還為此慘跌了一天，也有不少政界人士擔心賴幸媛的ＥＱ太差，怕她親綠的立場會拖累整個馬團隊，問題是賴幸媛真有那麼大的能耐嗎？至少從賴幸媛接受記者訪談內容看來，她其實已經是站在馬蕭執政團隊的立場在思考了！她說她現在已經可以認同馬的「一中各表」概念，她也說開放觀光客來台、周末包機與開放人民幣兌換等政策，都是已經準備差不多的開放措施，也進入緊鑼密鼓階段，她有信心可以達成。至於調整對大陸投資四十％上限、開放大陸學歷等，則除非有完整配套，否則她依舊持保留態度。檢視這些立場表述，與馬英九在競選期間的主張，看得出有太大的差異嗎？

　目前國民黨在兩岸政策上的真正挑戰，絕不是賴幸媛會不會以個人立場凌駕整個馬蕭團隊的政策，而是藍軍內部未來要怎麼齊一步伐，避免走上多頭馬車，一人一把號的困境。譬如說，僅僅只是目前，新舊政府都還未交接，新的兩岸互動機制也還未確定，尚未就職海基會董事長的江丙坤就已風塵樸樸的登陸謝票，已經卸下黨主席的連戰也率團赴北京進行「連胡會」，接下來還有現任黨主席吳伯雄要率團參與國共論壇，兩岸關係若是一再任由這些絡繹於兩岸的藍營大老在前面搶業績，讓真正必須負政治責任的決策者反而左支右絀、進退兩難，豈不是全都亂了套？坦言之，必須面對這個課題不只是賴幸媛，還有即將就職的馬總統。

　至於北京當局方面，未來將會用怎樣的高度看待賴幸媛的這項人事任命，也非常值得觀察。馬英九爭取賴幸媛這位昔日綠營戰將主掌兩岸決策，會有怎樣的效應與後果，大家都在拭目以待。但顯然馬英九確有意將兩岸政策的操作，試著與藍綠民意板塊的和解串聯在一起，他當然代表著七百多萬選民的意志，但他也不想完全置另外五百多萬選民的憂慮於不顧，北京若是看不透這一點，就急著將兩岸關係降溫，也就喪失應有高度了。

Cross-Strait Relations in the Wake of Lai Hsing-yuan’s Appointment to Mainland Affairs Council Chairman

Cross-Strait Relations in the Wake of Lai Hsing-yuan’s Appointment to Mainland Affairs Council Chairman
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, China)
A Translation
April 30, 2008

Lai Hsing-yuan will definitely head up the Mainland Affairs Council. Leave aside what political considerations were behind Ma Ying-jeou’s move. Leave aside the controversy and backlash this appointment has elicited within the Blue camp. To focus exclusively on Lai Hsing-yuan herself is pointless. After all, MAC and SEF personnel have already been officially appointed. Future cross-strait policy will be handled by this group. The question now ought to be how to make this rag tag group into a well-organized team.

In other words, the next cause for concern, is not relations between Lai Hsing-yuan and Chiang Pin-kung, or relations between Lai Hsing-yuan and the rest of the Ma administration. The next cause for concern is relations between the MAC and the SEF, the future of cross-strait policy, the division of labor, and the modus operanda. More broadly speaking, this includes the modus operanda for the presidential palace, the National Security Council, the Executive Yuan, the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Transportation, and other relevant ministries. How will they coordinate their efforts to promote cross-strait policy? From this point of view, to focus exclusively on Lai Hsing-yuan or to deliberately overestimate her role is unnecessary.

Frankly, the MAC and the SEF’s two-track system design was a product of the special “cross-strait” situation. One set policy, the other carried it out. In cross-strait interactions they played the roles of “good cop” and “bad cop.” This inevitably led to conflicts between the two. But in the end, they did enable cross-strait dialogue to take place, including the Koo-Wang during the early 90s. It was only the controversy over the Two States Theory and the subsequent ruling party change that mothballed this cross-straits mechanism for nearly 10 years. Ten years is a long time. People have passed away. Expertise has been lost and cross-strait mutual trust has been undermined. When we say we now want to “restart” cross-strait exchanges, we are not exaggerating.

But today’s cross-strait situation is completely different from the way it was 10 years ago. MAC and SEF personnel have all been replaced. It would be impossible to replicate the decision-making process in place a decade ago. It makes no difference if we are comparing Chiang Pin-kung today to Koo Chen-fu yesterday, or even Lai Hsing-yuan today to Huang Kun-hui yesterday. Everything is different. Since it is so different, what should the cross-strait policy-making and implementation process be? That is the question Lai Hsing-yuan and Chiang Pin-kung will have to answer.

Some people are worried that having Lai Hsing-yuan at the head of the Mainland Affairs Council may affect the timetable for direct flights and mainland tourism, or even destroy the ongoing process of cross-strait reconciliation. The Taiwan stock exchange (TAIEX) plummeted for an entire day. Many political observers worry that Lai Hsing-yuan’s EQ is too low. They worry that her pro-green stance will drag the entire Ma administration down. But is Lai Hsing-yuan that powerful? Based on interviews with the media, Lai Hsing-yuan is already on the same page as the Ma Hsiao team. She said she now agrees with Ma’s “One China, Different Interpretations” premise. She said she approved of opening Taiwan to mainland tourism, to weekend charter flights, and to allowing the free exchange of NTD with RMB. These provisions are ready for implementation. They are already in full swing. She is confident they can be achieved.

As for raising the ceiling on mainland investments beyond the current 40 percent, recognizing mainland diplomas, she said she had reservations about them unless comprehensive plans were first drawn up. As we look at these policy statements, we can’t see any big differences between Lai and Ma Ying-jeou’s campaign platform.

The KMT’s real cross-strait policy challenge is not that Lai Hsing-yuan will hijack the Ma Hsiao team’s policy, but that the Blue camp can pull together and avoid having a carriage with too many horses pulling in too many directions. For example, the outgoing administration has yet to hand over power to the incoming administration. The new cross-strait exchange mechanism has yet to be established. Chiang Pin-kung, who has yet to be inaugurated as chairman of the SEF, went to the mainland to thank Taiwan businesspeople for their support. Former Party Chairman Lien Chan also led a delegation to Beijing to attend a Lien-Hu Summit. Current Party Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung lead a delegation that took part in a KMT-CCP Forum, If cross-strait relations can allow these Blue camp elders to fight over the spotlight, while the decision makers who must assume political responsibility are caught in a dilemma, then hasn’t all hell broken loose? Frankly Lai Hsing-yuan is not the only person who must face the music. So must soon to be inaugurated President Ma.

How Beijing views Lai Hsing-yuan’s appointment will also be worth noting. We await the consequences of Ma Ying-jeou’s decision to appoint Green camp fighter Lai Hsing-yuan as cross-strait decision-maker. It is clear that Ma Ying-jeou is interested in uniting the Blue and Green camps behind his cross-strait policy. He represents the will of over 7 million Blue camp voters. But he does not want to ignore the concerns of 5 million voters. If Beijing cannot see this, if it cools cross-strait relations, then it is not seeing the bigger picture.

中時電子報
中國時報 　2008.04.30
如何看待賴幸媛掌陸委會後的兩岸關係
中時社論

　賴幸媛確定出掌陸委會之後，姑不論馬英九這步棋背後的政治考量是什麼，也不論這項人事任命引發藍軍內部多少議論與反彈，持續將焦點鎖定在賴幸媛一個人身上，其實意義已經不大。畢竟陸委會與海基會的人事既然已經正式底定，未來處理兩岸政策的核心，就是這組搭配了。現在的問題焦點應該是：如何讓這個混雜編組的隊伍，變身成一支行動一致的團隊，才是未來真正需要面對的挑戰。

　換言之，接下來最值得關注的，絕對不是賴幸媛與江丙坤之間，或是賴幸媛跟整個馬團隊之間將怎麼磨合，而是陸委會與海基會未來在兩岸政策上的角色分工、乃至運作機制會是什麼？或者更大範圍的說，這個運作機制在未來將與總統府國安會、行政院所屬的外交部、經濟部、內政部與交通部等相關部會間，怎麼步伐一致的推動兩岸政策？從這個角度看，刻意放大或高估賴幸媛一個人的角色，其實是不必要的。

　不諱言說，當初陸委會與海基會這種雙軌的制度設計，本來就是為因應「兩岸」特殊情境的產物。它們一掌政策、一掌執行，在兩岸互動上各自扮演黑白臉，固然免不了鬧出過多次的「海陸大戰」，但畢竟還是在一九九○年代完成包括辜汪會談在內的多次兩岸對話。只不過歷經「兩國論」風波以及後來的政黨輪替，使得這套運作機制有近十年的歲月幾近完全停擺，十年可不是短暫的歲月，人事全非不說，經驗傳承乃至兩岸互信的建立也全部中斷。如今重新啟動相關機制，說是「重新出發」亦不為過。

　只不過，如今的兩岸情勢，與十年前對比已經完全不一樣，重新人事布局的陸委會與海基會，也不可能再複製十年前的決策與運作模式，不論是江丙坤相較於當年辜振甫，亦或是賴幸媛相較於當年的黃昆輝，所面對課題其實是完全都不同了。既然不一樣，那麼新兩岸決策與執行模式又該是什麼？這個問題正就是賴幸媛與江丙坤在接下來所要回答的問題。

　沒錯，有人擔憂賴幸媛出掌陸委會之後，可能會影響直航與陸客來台觀光的時程，甚至還會把已經融冰的兩岸關係再度摧毀掉，連台北股市都還為此慘跌了一天，也有不少政界人士擔心賴幸媛的ＥＱ太差，怕她親綠的立場會拖累整個馬團隊，問題是賴幸媛真有那麼大的能耐嗎？至少從賴幸媛接受記者訪談內容看來，她其實已經是站在馬蕭執政團隊的立場在思考了！她說她現在已經可以認同馬的「一中各表」概念，她也說開放觀光客來台、周末包機與開放人民幣兌換等政策，都是已經準備差不多的開放措施，也進入緊鑼密鼓階段，她有信心可以達成。至於調整對大陸投資四十％上限、開放大陸學歷等，則除非有完整配套，否則她依舊持保留態度。檢視這些立場表述，與馬英九在競選期間的主張，看得出有太大的差異嗎？

　目前國民黨在兩岸政策上的真正挑戰，絕不是賴幸媛會不會以個人立場凌駕整個馬蕭團隊的政策，而是藍軍內部未來要怎麼齊一步伐，避免走上多頭馬車，一人一把號的困境。譬如說，僅僅只是目前，新舊政府都還未交接，新的兩岸互動機制也還未確定，尚未就職海基會董事長的江丙坤就已風塵樸樸的登陸謝票，已經卸下黨主席的連戰也率團赴北京進行「連胡會」，接下來還有現任黨主席吳伯雄要率團參與國共論壇，兩岸關係若是一再任由這些絡繹於兩岸的藍營大老在前面搶業績，讓真正必須負政治責任的決策者反而左支右絀、進退兩難，豈不是全都亂了套？坦言之，必須面對這個課題不只是賴幸媛，還有即將就職的馬總統。

　至於北京當局方面，未來將會用怎樣的高度看待賴幸媛的這項人事任命，也非常值得觀察。馬英九爭取賴幸媛這位昔日綠營戰將主掌兩岸決策，會有怎樣的效應與後果，大家都在拭目以待。但顯然馬英九確有意將兩岸政策的操作，試著與藍綠民意板塊的和解串聯在一起，他當然代表著七百多萬選民的意志，但他也不想完全置另外五百多萬選民的憂慮於不顧，北京若是看不透這一點，就急著將兩岸關係降溫，也就喪失應有高度了。

Cross-Strait Relations in the Wake of Lai Hsing-yuan’s Appointment to Mainland Affairs Council Chairman

Cross-Strait Relations in the Wake of Lai Hsing-yuan’s Appointment to Mainland Affairs Council Chairman
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, China)
A Translation
April 30, 2008

Lai Hsing-yuan will definitely head up the Mainland Affairs Council. Leave aside what political considerations were behind Ma Ying-jeou’s move. Leave aside the controversy and backlash this appointment has elicited within the Blue camp. To focus exclusively on Lai Hsing-yuan herself is pointless. After all, MAC and SEF personnel have already been officially appointed. Future cross-strait policy will be handled by this group. The question now ought to be how to make this rag tag group into a well-organized team.

In other words, the next cause for concern, is not relations between Lai Hsing-yuan and Chiang Pin-kung, or relations between Lai Hsing-yuan and the rest of the Ma administration. The next cause for concern is relations between the MAC and the SEF, the future of cross-strait policy, the division of labor, and the modus operanda. More broadly speaking, this includes the modus operanda for the presidential palace, the National Security Council, the Executive Yuan, the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Transportation, and other relevant ministries. How will they coordinate their efforts to promote cross-strait policy? From this point of view, to focus exclusively on Lai Hsing-yuan or to deliberately overestimate her role is unnecessary.

Frankly, the MAC and the SEF’s two-track system design was a product of the special “cross-strait” situation. One set policy, the other carried it out. In cross-strait interactions they played the roles of “good cop” and “bad cop.” This inevitably led to conflicts between the two. But in the end, they did enable cross-strait dialogue to take place, including the Koo-Wang during the early 90s. It was only the controversy over the Two States Theory and the subsequent ruling party change that mothballed this cross-straits mechanism for nearly 10 years. Ten years is a long time. People have passed away. Expertise has been lost and cross-strait mutual trust has been undermined. When we say we now want to “restart” cross-strait exchanges, we are not exaggerating.

But today’s cross-strait situation is completely different from the way it was 10 years ago. MAC and SEF personnel have all been replaced. It would be impossible to replicate the decision-making process in place a decade ago. It makes no difference if we are comparing Chiang Pin-kung today to Koo Chen-fu yesterday, or even Lai Hsing-yuan today to Huang Kun-hui yesterday. Everything is different. Since it is so different, what should the cross-strait policy-making and implementation process be? That is the question Lai Hsing-yuan and Chiang Pin-kung will have to answer.

Some people are worried that having Lai Hsing-yuan at the head of the Mainland Affairs Council may affect the timetable for direct flights and mainland tourism, or even destroy the ongoing process of cross-strait reconciliation. The Taiwan stock exchange (TAIEX) plummeted for an entire day. Many political observers worry that Lai Hsing-yuan’s EQ is too low. They worry that her pro-green stance will drag the entire Ma administration down. But is Lai Hsing-yuan that powerful? Based on interviews with the media, Lai Hsing-yuan is already on the same page as the Ma Hsiao team. She said she now agrees with Ma’s “One China, Different Interpretations” premise. She said she approved of opening Taiwan to mainland tourism, to weekend charter flights, and to allowing the free exchange of NTD with RMB. These provisions are ready for implementation. They are already in full swing. She is confident they can be achieved.

As for raising the ceiling on mainland investments beyond the current 40 percent, recognizing mainland diplomas, she said she had reservations about them unless comprehensive plans were first drawn up. As we look at these policy statements, we can’t see any big differences between Lai and Ma Ying-jeou’s campaign platform.

The KMT’s real cross-strait policy challenge is not that Lai Hsing-yuan will hijack the Ma Hsiao team’s policy, but that the Blue camp can pull together and avoid having a carriage with too many horses pulling in too many directions. For example, the outgoing administration has yet to hand over power to the incoming administration. The new cross-strait exchange mechanism has yet to be established. Chiang Pin-kung, who has yet to be inaugurated as chairman of the SEF, went to the mainland to thank Taiwan businesspeople for their support. Former Party Chairman Lien Chan also led a delegation to Beijing to attend a Lien-Hu Summit. Current Party Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung lead a delegation that took part in a KMT-CCP Forum, If cross-strait relations can allow these Blue camp elders to fight over the spotlight, while the decision makers who must assume political responsibility are caught in a dilemma, then hasn’t all hell broken loose? Frankly Lai Hsing-yuan is not the only person who must face the music. So must soon to be inaugurated President Ma.

How Beijing views Lai Hsing-yuan’s appointment will also be worth noting. We await the consequences of Ma Ying-jeou’s decision to appoint Green camp fighter Lai Hsing-yuan as cross-strait decision-maker. It is clear that Ma Ying-jeou is interested in uniting the Blue and Green camps behind his cross-strait policy. He represents the will of over 7 million Blue camp voters. But he does not want to ignore the concerns of 5 million voters. If Beijing cannot see this, if it cools cross-strait relations, then it is not seeing the bigger picture.

中時電子報
中國時報 　2008.04.30
如何看待賴幸媛掌陸委會後的兩岸關係
中時社論

　賴幸媛確定出掌陸委會之後，姑不論馬英九這步棋背後的政治考量是什麼，也不論這項人事任命引發藍軍內部多少議論與反彈，持續將焦點鎖定在賴幸媛一個人身上，其實意義已經不大。畢竟陸委會與海基會的人事既然已經正式底定，未來處理兩岸政策的核心，就是這組搭配了。現在的問題焦點應該是：如何讓這個混雜編組的隊伍，變身成一支行動一致的團隊，才是未來真正需要面對的挑戰。

　換言之，接下來最值得關注的，絕對不是賴幸媛與江丙坤之間，或是賴幸媛跟整個馬團隊之間將怎麼磨合，而是陸委會與海基會未來在兩岸政策上的角色分工、乃至運作機制會是什麼？或者更大範圍的說，這個運作機制在未來將與總統府國安會、行政院所屬的外交部、經濟部、內政部與交通部等相關部會間，怎麼步伐一致的推動兩岸政策？從這個角度看，刻意放大或高估賴幸媛一個人的角色，其實是不必要的。

　不諱言說，當初陸委會與海基會這種雙軌的制度設計，本來就是為因應「兩岸」特殊情境的產物。它們一掌政策、一掌執行，在兩岸互動上各自扮演黑白臉，固然免不了鬧出過多次的「海陸大戰」，但畢竟還是在一九九○年代完成包括辜汪會談在內的多次兩岸對話。只不過歷經「兩國論」風波以及後來的政黨輪替，使得這套運作機制有近十年的歲月幾近完全停擺，十年可不是短暫的歲月，人事全非不說，經驗傳承乃至兩岸互信的建立也全部中斷。如今重新啟動相關機制，說是「重新出發」亦不為過。

　只不過，如今的兩岸情勢，與十年前對比已經完全不一樣，重新人事布局的陸委會與海基會，也不可能再複製十年前的決策與運作模式，不論是江丙坤相較於當年辜振甫，亦或是賴幸媛相較於當年的黃昆輝，所面對課題其實是完全都不同了。既然不一樣，那麼新兩岸決策與執行模式又該是什麼？這個問題正就是賴幸媛與江丙坤在接下來所要回答的問題。

　沒錯，有人擔憂賴幸媛出掌陸委會之後，可能會影響直航與陸客來台觀光的時程，甚至還會把已經融冰的兩岸關係再度摧毀掉，連台北股市都還為此慘跌了一天，也有不少政界人士擔心賴幸媛的ＥＱ太差，怕她親綠的立場會拖累整個馬團隊，問題是賴幸媛真有那麼大的能耐嗎？至少從賴幸媛接受記者訪談內容看來，她其實已經是站在馬蕭執政團隊的立場在思考了！她說她現在已經可以認同馬的「一中各表」概念，她也說開放觀光客來台、周末包機與開放人民幣兌換等政策，都是已經準備差不多的開放措施，也進入緊鑼密鼓階段，她有信心可以達成。至於調整對大陸投資四十％上限、開放大陸學歷等，則除非有完整配套，否則她依舊持保留態度。檢視這些立場表述，與馬英九在競選期間的主張，看得出有太大的差異嗎？

　目前國民黨在兩岸政策上的真正挑戰，絕不是賴幸媛會不會以個人立場凌駕整個馬蕭團隊的政策，而是藍軍內部未來要怎麼齊一步伐，避免走上多頭馬車，一人一把號的困境。譬如說，僅僅只是目前，新舊政府都還未交接，新的兩岸互動機制也還未確定，尚未就職海基會董事長的江丙坤就已風塵樸樸的登陸謝票，已經卸下黨主席的連戰也率團赴北京進行「連胡會」，接下來還有現任黨主席吳伯雄要率團參與國共論壇，兩岸關係若是一再任由這些絡繹於兩岸的藍營大老在前面搶業績，讓真正必須負政治責任的決策者反而左支右絀、進退兩難，豈不是全都亂了套？坦言之，必須面對這個課題不只是賴幸媛，還有即將就職的馬總統。

　至於北京當局方面，未來將會用怎樣的高度看待賴幸媛的這項人事任命，也非常值得觀察。馬英九爭取賴幸媛這位昔日綠營戰將主掌兩岸決策，會有怎樣的效應與後果，大家都在拭目以待。但顯然馬英九確有意將兩岸政策的操作，試著與藍綠民意板塊的和解串聯在一起，他當然代表著七百多萬選民的意志，但他也不想完全置另外五百多萬選民的憂慮於不顧，北京若是看不透這一點，就急著將兩岸關係降溫，也就喪失應有高度了。

On Ma Ying-jeou’s Second Wave of Cabinet Appointments

On Ma Ying-jeou’s Second Wave of Cabinet Appointments
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, China)
A Translation
April 29, 2008

The Ma administration has arrived. The Liu cabinet has announced its second wave of cabinet appointments. As we examine the roster for the new cabinet, we notice several characteristics: Plenty of PhDs. Plenty of school principals. Plenty of women. A record high number of women. Ma has unquestionably come through on his pledge to form a cabinet consisting of one-fourth women. His financial and economics consultants are old hands who can ensure a running start. Legislators, county magistrates, and mayors have not been appointed, in keeping with his promise to the voters. But these are all surface matters. More importantly, Ma Ying-jeou has revealed his political character. For certain positions, including several plagued by controversy over the past eight years, he made several risky appointments. How they will turn out remains to be seen.

Many people see Ma Ying-jeou as a moderate. But based on his cabinet appointments, it is obvious this “model student” has a rebellious side. During his first term as Taipei mayor, he appointed people who had constantly engaged in street protests. He appointed a labour movement leader head of the Bureau of Labour, an incendiary social critic head of the Bureau of Cultural Affairs, and a young student movement leader head of the Bureau of Civil Affairs. This time around Ma Ying-jeou has appointed public service lawyers who fought the government on behalf of the underprivileged. He appointed Wang Ching-feng, who went fought public prosecutors and police investigators over the 3/19 Shooting Incident, as Minister of Justice. By appointing all these social activists he is effectively colliding with the system, head on. Wang Ju-hsuan, who has no love for the KMT, has been appointed Chairman of the Council of Labor Affairs. Even Wang herself is probably wondering whether Ma wasn’t crazy to give her the nod.

He has also appointed little-known leaders of parents groups and educational reform groups to his cabinet. The former president of National Chengchi University Cheng Jiu-Chen has been appointed Minister of Education. Chen Jiu-cheng is low-keyed by nature. He was labeled pro-Green because he wanted to eliminate partisan school songs. In fact he was merely a liberal academic. During the authoritarian era he traveled in “party outsider” political circles only because National Chengchi University disseminated his liberal concepts. During the DPP era he did not travel in official circles, nor did he participate in the Ministry of Education’s noisy campaigns. He confined his commentary to civic fora in the capacity of a scholar. Cheng Jui-chen must familiarize himself with primary and secondary educational practices, and find practical solutions to controversial educational reform problems that have arisen over the past few years.

His second wave of cabinet appointments was even more radical. Ma Ying-jeou unexpectedly appointed Taiwan Solidarity Union legislator Lai Hsing-yuan Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council, taking future premier Liu Chao-hsuan totally by surprise. Lai Hsing-yuan is a disciple of former President Lee Teng-hui. She was his aide when the KMT was still in office. For the past eight years the Taiwan Solidarity Union’s cross-strait policy has been at loggerheads with the KMT’s. Ma Ying-jeou was elected because a clear majority support and anticipate the opening of cross-straits exchanges. Lai Hsing-yuan says she shares Ma Ying-jeou’s views. She says she agrees with “One China, Different Interpretations.” She says she supports “No Reunification, No Independence, and No War.” But her differences with Ma are far from trivial. After all, even Chen Shui-bian is nominally in agreement with Ma and Lai. Chen Shui-bian opposed the 1992 Consensus but did not oppose One China, Different Interpretations. Chen Shui-bian dug in his heels, ostensibly because Beijing wasn’t allowing Taipei to have its own interpretation. The result was eight years of standoff and stagnation,

If Lai Hsing-yuan takes office, she will be required to resume cross-strait talks in June, and begin weekend direct charter flights in July. Is she really on the same page as Ma Ying-jeou? She blasted the KMT for helping fruit farmers sell their produce to the mainland. How does she feel about the Council of Agriculture completely changing its tune and subsidizing the sale of fruits from eight counties and cities to the mainland? Will she stay the course? Will she expand its scope? Even more importantly, the heart of the Ma administration’s effort to boost Taiwan’s economy is cross-strait policy. The Mainland Affairs Council is responsible for the liberalization of cross-strait policy, which impacts upon the Central Bank, the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Council of Agriculture, even the Sports Commission. If Lai Hsing-yuan disagrees with administration policy, how will the Ma administration respond? If Lai Hsing-yuan agrees, how will she deal with the negative response from her former colleagues in the Legislative Yuan?

Ma Ying-jeou recruited Lai from the Taiwan Solidarity Union to create a greater consensus, to accommodate the feelings of the 5 million voters who didn’t vote for him. This is laudable. But he must not forget the over 7 million voters who expect his administration to implement sound policies enabling Taiwan to return to normal as soon as possible. The new cabinet has many positions suitable for Lai Hsing-yuan. Why must she head the Mainland Affairs Council? Ma Ying-jeou made a risky appointment. We can only hope that he understands those risks. He must not force society to pay the price for unsuitable cabinet appointments. The new cabinet already has many positions whose sole purpose is to provide jobs for party cadres. Hopefully the new Premier will be an Premier for all the people, and not just a Premier for the ruling party,

The Government is supposed to serve the people. Its work is never done. The Chen Shui-bian regime filled government posts based on political considerations, and forced the entire nation to suffer the consequences. Once Ma’s new cabinet appointments are complete, we are willing to give it our blessing. But we hope that the newly-appointed Premier will understand our concerns and consider the welfare of all the people, and that it will set aside politics and focus on policy.

中時電子報
中國時報 　2008.04.29
對新閣第二波人事的幾點看法
中時社論

　 馬政府到位！劉內閣二波人事公布，綜觀新閣名單，有幾個特色：博士多、校長多、女性更是創下歷史新高的多，完全達到馬英九選前、選後希望女性佔內閣四分之 一的宣示；財經小內閣則由老臣壓陣，確保立刻上手；立委與縣市長都未入閣，兌現重視選民的承諾。不過，這些特點都還是浮面的，更深沉的是，馬英九嶄露了他 的政治性格，在特定部會、尤其是過去八年爭議性大的部會，祭出險招，其成與敗格外值得觀察。

　很多人認為馬英九素性溫和，但從他的用人， 不難看出這位政壇「模範生」骨子裡，藏都藏不了的叛逆性。就像他首任台北市長任內，找了專在街頭搞抗爭的工運人士出任勞工局長、寫文章火辣辣批判社會政治 現象的作家出任文化局長、還找一個年輕的學運分子出任民政局長。這一回，馬英九起用律師出身、為弱勢發聲槓上政府、為調查三一九案槓上檢警調的王清峰出任 法務部長，直接撞擊這個封閉系統；同樣是律師，活躍於社會團體，卻對國民黨沒太多好感的王如玄出任勞委會主委，連王如玄都懷疑自己會點頭是不是「瘋了」？

　 此外，還有家長團體、教改團體其實都不大認識的前政大校長鄭瑞城出任教育部長，鄭瑞城生性低調，因為他要改掉「黨校」的校歌，被校內部分人士標籤化為「親 綠」。但實際上，他只是一個單純的自由派學者，威權時代沒見他奔走於政治圈為黨外發言，只在政大傳遞他的自由派理念；民進黨時代他也沒汲汲於官場，或大聲 疾呼和爭議百出的教育部吵架，他還是以學者身分在民間論壇提出諍言。鄭瑞城的挑戰，除了他必須盡快熟悉中小學教育的實務外，就是怎麼在制度面上讓過去幾年 的教改爭議獲得合理解決。

　更大膽的不止於此，第二波人事公布，馬英九出人意表地找上前台聯不分區立委賴幸媛出任陸委會主委，第一時間讓 準閣揆劉兆玄都感錯愕。賴幸媛系出前總統李登輝門下，國民黨執政時期就是李幕僚，但無可諱言，過去八年來，台聯的兩岸政策確實與國民黨格格不入，馬英九當 選很大部分原因在於支持者對兩岸開放有期待，賴幸媛固然聲稱和馬英九的理念相同，也同意「一中各表」，都主張不統不獨不武以台灣利益為上，但在這個大原則 大方向下，可討論的就多了。馬、賴的共識又何嘗不是扁的主張呢？扁所反對的是「九二共識」，可沒反對「一中各表」，陳水扁堅持的是因為對岸不讓我們自己表 述，就這麼吵八年，兩岸關係停滯不前。

　賴幸媛上任後，立即要面對六月兩會復談、七月周末包機直航，她是否全盤接受？她曾經嚴詞痛批國民 黨協助農民水果登陸，面對農委會已經改弦更張要公款補助八縣市水果登陸，是否繼續或擴大辦理？更重要的，馬政府提振台灣經濟的核心，就是兩岸政策，陸委會 是各項開放措施主管機關包括：中央銀行、交通部、財政部、經濟部、農委會、金管會、甚至體委會能否開放的關鍵，如果賴幸媛有不同見解，馬政府該如何自處？ 如果賴幸媛沒有不同見解，她個人赴立法院備詢，面對舊日同僚的朝野立委們冷嘲熱諷，又該如何自處？

　馬英九向台聯借將，為凝聚更大的社會 共識，照顧其他五百多萬票民眾的感情，確實值得肯定，但不要忘了，七百多萬選票期待馬政府的是「政策考量」，讓台灣在最短時間內重新上路，新閣有多少職務 都適合賴幸媛，何以非要她出掌陸委會？馬英九既出險招，只能期望馬政府做好風險管控，不要讓社會再為一個不適合的人事安排而付出代價。就像新內閣中仍有擺 明為了疏散黨工幹部的職務，但盼新任首長到位後，調整心態，扮演好稱職的全民首長，而非一黨之首長。

　政府為人民服務，國政千緯萬端，過去扁政舖排人事，充斥政治考量，讓全民受盡煎熬，在新政府內閣人事布局底定後，我們仍願給予最大的祝福：希望所有新任首長體會我們的擔心，以全民福祉為念，拋開政治，專注於政策！

On Ma Ying-jeou’s Second Wave of Cabinet Appointments

On Ma Ying-jeou’s Second Wave of Cabinet Appointments
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, China)
A Translation
April 29, 2008

The Ma administration has arrived. The Liu cabinet has announced its second wave of cabinet appointments. As we examine the roster for the new cabinet, we notice several characteristics: Plenty of PhDs. Plenty of school principals. Plenty of women. A record high number of women. Ma has unquestionably come through on his pledge to form a cabinet consisting of one-fourth women. His financial and economics consultants are old hands who can ensure a running start. Legislators, county magistrates, and mayors have not been appointed, in keeping with his promise to the voters. But these are all surface matters. More importantly, Ma Ying-jeou has revealed his political character. For certain positions, including several plagued by controversy over the past eight years, he made several risky appointments. How they will turn out remains to be seen.

Many people see Ma Ying-jeou as a moderate. But based on his cabinet appointments, it is obvious this “model student” has a rebellious side. During his first term as Taipei mayor, he appointed people who had constantly engaged in street protests. He appointed a labour movement leader head of the Bureau of Labour, an incendiary social critic head of the Bureau of Cultural Affairs, and a young student movement leader head of the Bureau of Civil Affairs. This time around Ma Ying-jeou has appointed public service lawyers who fought the government on behalf of the underprivileged. He appointed Wang Ching-feng, who went fought public prosecutors and police investigators over the 3/19 Shooting Incident, as Minister of Justice. By appointing all these social activists he is effectively colliding with the system, head on. Wang Ju-hsuan, who has no love for the KMT, has been appointed Chairman of the Council of Labor Affairs. Even Wang herself is probably wondering whether Ma wasn’t crazy to give her the nod.

He has also appointed little-known leaders of parents groups and educational reform groups to his cabinet. The former president of National Chengchi University Cheng Jiu-Chen has been appointed Minister of Education. Chen Jiu-cheng is low-keyed by nature. He was labeled pro-Green because he wanted to eliminate partisan school songs. In fact he was merely a liberal academic. During the authoritarian era he traveled in “party outsider” political circles only because National Chengchi University disseminated his liberal concepts. During the DPP era he did not travel in official circles, nor did he participate in the Ministry of Education’s noisy campaigns. He confined his commentary to civic fora in the capacity of a scholar. Cheng Jui-chen must familiarize himself with primary and secondary educational practices, and find practical solutions to controversial educational reform problems that have arisen over the past few years.

His second wave of cabinet appointments was even more radical. Ma Ying-jeou unexpectedly appointed Taiwan Solidarity Union legislator Lai Hsing-yuan Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council, taking future premier Liu Chao-hsuan totally by surprise. Lai Hsing-yuan is a disciple of former President Lee Teng-hui. She was his aide when the KMT was still in office. For the past eight years the Taiwan Solidarity Union’s cross-strait policy has been at loggerheads with the KMT’s. Ma Ying-jeou was elected because a clear majority support and anticipate the opening of cross-straits exchanges. Lai Hsing-yuan says she shares Ma Ying-jeou’s views. She says she agrees with “One China, Different Interpretations.” She says she supports “No Reunification, No Independence, and No War.” But her differences with Ma are far from trivial. After all, even Chen Shui-bian is nominally in agreement with Ma and Lai. Chen Shui-bian opposed the 1992 Consensus but did not oppose One China, Different Interpretations. Chen Shui-bian dug in his heels, ostensibly because Beijing wasn’t allowing Taipei to have its own interpretation. The result was eight years of standoff and stagnation,

If Lai Hsing-yuan takes office, she will be required to resume cross-strait talks in June, and begin weekend direct charter flights in July. Is she really on the same page as Ma Ying-jeou? She blasted the KMT for helping fruit farmers sell their produce to the mainland. How does she feel about the Council of Agriculture completely changing its tune and subsidizing the sale of fruits from eight counties and cities to the mainland? Will she stay the course? Will she expand its scope? Even more importantly, the heart of the Ma administration’s effort to boost Taiwan’s economy is cross-strait policy. The Mainland Affairs Council is responsible for the liberalization of cross-strait policy, which impacts upon the Central Bank, the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Council of Agriculture, even the Sports Commission. If Lai Hsing-yuan disagrees with administration policy, how will the Ma administration respond? If Lai Hsing-yuan agrees, how will she deal with the negative response from her former colleagues in the Legislative Yuan?

Ma Ying-jeou recruited Lai from the Taiwan Solidarity Union to create a greater consensus, to accommodate the feelings of the 5 million voters who didn’t vote for him. This is laudable. But he must not forget the over 7 million voters who expect his administration to implement sound policies enabling Taiwan to return to normal as soon as possible. The new cabinet has many positions suitable for Lai Hsing-yuan. Why must she head the Mainland Affairs Council? Ma Ying-jeou made a risky appointment. We can only hope that he understands those risks. He must not force society to pay the price for unsuitable cabinet appointments. The new cabinet already has many positions whose sole purpose is to provide jobs for party cadres. Hopefully the new Premier will be an Premier for all the people, and not just a Premier for the ruling party,

The Government is supposed to serve the people. Its work is never done. The Chen Shui-bian regime filled government posts based on political considerations, and forced the entire nation to suffer the consequences. Once Ma’s new cabinet appointments are complete, we are willing to give it our blessing. But we hope that the newly-appointed Premier will understand our concerns and consider the welfare of all the people, and that it will set aside politics and focus on policy.

中時電子報
中國時報 　2008.04.29
對新閣第二波人事的幾點看法
中時社論

　 馬政府到位！劉內閣二波人事公布，綜觀新閣名單，有幾個特色：博士多、校長多、女性更是創下歷史新高的多，完全達到馬英九選前、選後希望女性佔內閣四分之 一的宣示；財經小內閣則由老臣壓陣，確保立刻上手；立委與縣市長都未入閣，兌現重視選民的承諾。不過，這些特點都還是浮面的，更深沉的是，馬英九嶄露了他 的政治性格，在特定部會、尤其是過去八年爭議性大的部會，祭出險招，其成與敗格外值得觀察。

　很多人認為馬英九素性溫和，但從他的用人， 不難看出這位政壇「模範生」骨子裡，藏都藏不了的叛逆性。就像他首任台北市長任內，找了專在街頭搞抗爭的工運人士出任勞工局長、寫文章火辣辣批判社會政治 現象的作家出任文化局長、還找一個年輕的學運分子出任民政局長。這一回，馬英九起用律師出身、為弱勢發聲槓上政府、為調查三一九案槓上檢警調的王清峰出任 法務部長，直接撞擊這個封閉系統；同樣是律師，活躍於社會團體，卻對國民黨沒太多好感的王如玄出任勞委會主委，連王如玄都懷疑自己會點頭是不是「瘋了」？

　 此外，還有家長團體、教改團體其實都不大認識的前政大校長鄭瑞城出任教育部長，鄭瑞城生性低調，因為他要改掉「黨校」的校歌，被校內部分人士標籤化為「親 綠」。但實際上，他只是一個單純的自由派學者，威權時代沒見他奔走於政治圈為黨外發言，只在政大傳遞他的自由派理念；民進黨時代他也沒汲汲於官場，或大聲 疾呼和爭議百出的教育部吵架，他還是以學者身分在民間論壇提出諍言。鄭瑞城的挑戰，除了他必須盡快熟悉中小學教育的實務外，就是怎麼在制度面上讓過去幾年 的教改爭議獲得合理解決。

　更大膽的不止於此，第二波人事公布，馬英九出人意表地找上前台聯不分區立委賴幸媛出任陸委會主委，第一時間讓 準閣揆劉兆玄都感錯愕。賴幸媛系出前總統李登輝門下，國民黨執政時期就是李幕僚，但無可諱言，過去八年來，台聯的兩岸政策確實與國民黨格格不入，馬英九當 選很大部分原因在於支持者對兩岸開放有期待，賴幸媛固然聲稱和馬英九的理念相同，也同意「一中各表」，都主張不統不獨不武以台灣利益為上，但在這個大原則 大方向下，可討論的就多了。馬、賴的共識又何嘗不是扁的主張呢？扁所反對的是「九二共識」，可沒反對「一中各表」，陳水扁堅持的是因為對岸不讓我們自己表 述，就這麼吵八年，兩岸關係停滯不前。

　賴幸媛上任後，立即要面對六月兩會復談、七月周末包機直航，她是否全盤接受？她曾經嚴詞痛批國民 黨協助農民水果登陸，面對農委會已經改弦更張要公款補助八縣市水果登陸，是否繼續或擴大辦理？更重要的，馬政府提振台灣經濟的核心，就是兩岸政策，陸委會 是各項開放措施主管機關包括：中央銀行、交通部、財政部、經濟部、農委會、金管會、甚至體委會能否開放的關鍵，如果賴幸媛有不同見解，馬政府該如何自處？ 如果賴幸媛沒有不同見解，她個人赴立法院備詢，面對舊日同僚的朝野立委們冷嘲熱諷，又該如何自處？

　馬英九向台聯借將，為凝聚更大的社會 共識，照顧其他五百多萬票民眾的感情，確實值得肯定，但不要忘了，七百多萬選票期待馬政府的是「政策考量」，讓台灣在最短時間內重新上路，新閣有多少職務 都適合賴幸媛，何以非要她出掌陸委會？馬英九既出險招，只能期望馬政府做好風險管控，不要讓社會再為一個不適合的人事安排而付出代價。就像新內閣中仍有擺 明為了疏散黨工幹部的職務，但盼新任首長到位後，調整心態，扮演好稱職的全民首長，而非一黨之首長。

　政府為人民服務，國政千緯萬端，過去扁政舖排人事，充斥政治考量，讓全民受盡煎熬，在新政府內閣人事布局底定後，我們仍願給予最大的祝福：希望所有新任首長體會我們的擔心，以全民福祉為念，拋開政治，專注於政策！

On Ma Ying-jeou’s Second Wave of Cabinet Appointments

On Ma Ying-jeou’s Second Wave of Cabinet Appointments
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, China)
A Translation
April 29, 2008

The Ma administration has arrived. The Liu cabinet has announced its second wave of cabinet appointments. As we examine the roster for the new cabinet, we notice several characteristics: Plenty of PhDs. Plenty of school principals. Plenty of women. A record high number of women. Ma has unquestionably come through on his pledge to form a cabinet consisting of one-fourth women. His financial and economics consultants are old hands who can ensure a running start. Legislators, county magistrates, and mayors have not been appointed, in keeping with his promise to the voters. But these are all surface matters. More importantly, Ma Ying-jeou has revealed his political character. For certain positions, including several plagued by controversy over the past eight years, he made several risky appointments. How they will turn out remains to be seen.

Many people see Ma Ying-jeou as a moderate. But based on his cabinet appointments, it is obvious this “model student” has a rebellious side. During his first term as Taipei mayor, he appointed people who had constantly engaged in street protests. He appointed a labour movement leader head of the Bureau of Labour, an incendiary social critic head of the Bureau of Cultural Affairs, and a young student movement leader head of the Bureau of Civil Affairs. This time around Ma Ying-jeou has appointed public service lawyers who fought the government on behalf of the underprivileged. He appointed Wang Ching-feng, who went fought public prosecutors and police investigators over the 3/19 Shooting Incident, as Minister of Justice. By appointing all these social activists he is effectively colliding with the system, head on. Wang Ju-hsuan, who has no love for the KMT, has been appointed Chairman of the Council of Labor Affairs. Even Wang herself is probably wondering whether Ma wasn’t crazy to give her the nod.

He has also appointed little-known leaders of parents groups and educational reform groups to his cabinet. The former president of National Chengchi University Cheng Jiu-Chen has been appointed Minister of Education. Chen Jiu-cheng is low-keyed by nature. He was labeled pro-Green because he wanted to eliminate partisan school songs. In fact he was merely a liberal academic. During the authoritarian era he traveled in “party outsider” political circles only because National Chengchi University disseminated his liberal concepts. During the DPP era he did not travel in official circles, nor did he participate in the Ministry of Education’s noisy campaigns. He confined his commentary to civic fora in the capacity of a scholar. Cheng Jui-chen must familiarize himself with primary and secondary educational practices, and find practical solutions to controversial educational reform problems that have arisen over the past few years.

His second wave of cabinet appointments was even more radical. Ma Ying-jeou unexpectedly appointed Taiwan Solidarity Union legislator Lai Hsing-yuan Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council, taking future premier Liu Chao-hsuan totally by surprise. Lai Hsing-yuan is a disciple of former President Lee Teng-hui. She was his aide when the KMT was still in office. For the past eight years the Taiwan Solidarity Union’s cross-strait policy has been at loggerheads with the KMT’s. Ma Ying-jeou was elected because a clear majority support and anticipate the opening of cross-straits exchanges. Lai Hsing-yuan says she shares Ma Ying-jeou’s views. She says she agrees with “One China, Different Interpretations.” She says she supports “No Reunification, No Independence, and No War.” But her differences with Ma are far from trivial. After all, even Chen Shui-bian is nominally in agreement with Ma and Lai. Chen Shui-bian opposed the 1992 Consensus but did not oppose One China, Different Interpretations. Chen Shui-bian dug in his heels, ostensibly because Beijing wasn’t allowing Taipei to have its own interpretation. The result was eight years of standoff and stagnation,

If Lai Hsing-yuan takes office, she will be required to resume cross-strait talks in June, and begin weekend direct charter flights in July. Is she really on the same page as Ma Ying-jeou? She blasted the KMT for helping fruit farmers sell their produce to the mainland. How does she feel about the Council of Agriculture completely changing its tune and subsidizing the sale of fruits from eight counties and cities to the mainland? Will she stay the course? Will she expand its scope? Even more importantly, the heart of the Ma administration’s effort to boost Taiwan’s economy is cross-strait policy. The Mainland Affairs Council is responsible for the liberalization of cross-strait policy, which impacts upon the Central Bank, the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Council of Agriculture, even the Sports Commission. If Lai Hsing-yuan disagrees with administration policy, how will the Ma administration respond? If Lai Hsing-yuan agrees, how will she deal with the negative response from her former colleagues in the Legislative Yuan?

Ma Ying-jeou recruited Lai from the Taiwan Solidarity Union to create a greater consensus, to accommodate the feelings of the 5 million voters who didn’t vote for him. This is laudable. But he must not forget the over 7 million voters who expect his administration to implement sound policies enabling Taiwan to return to normal as soon as possible. The new cabinet has many positions suitable for Lai Hsing-yuan. Why must she head the Mainland Affairs Council? Ma Ying-jeou made a risky appointment. We can only hope that he understands those risks. He must not force society to pay the price for unsuitable cabinet appointments. The new cabinet already has many positions whose sole purpose is to provide jobs for party cadres. Hopefully the new Premier will be an Premier for all the people, and not just a Premier for the ruling party,

The Government is supposed to serve the people. Its work is never done. The Chen Shui-bian regime filled government posts based on political considerations, and forced the entire nation to suffer the consequences. Once Ma’s new cabinet appointments are complete, we are willing to give it our blessing. But we hope that the newly-appointed Premier will understand our concerns and consider the welfare of all the people, and that it will set aside politics and focus on policy.

中時電子報
中國時報 　2008.04.29
對新閣第二波人事的幾點看法
中時社論

　 馬政府到位！劉內閣二波人事公布，綜觀新閣名單，有幾個特色：博士多、校長多、女性更是創下歷史新高的多，完全達到馬英九選前、選後希望女性佔內閣四分之 一的宣示；財經小內閣則由老臣壓陣，確保立刻上手；立委與縣市長都未入閣，兌現重視選民的承諾。不過，這些特點都還是浮面的，更深沉的是，馬英九嶄露了他 的政治性格，在特定部會、尤其是過去八年爭議性大的部會，祭出險招，其成與敗格外值得觀察。

　很多人認為馬英九素性溫和，但從他的用人， 不難看出這位政壇「模範生」骨子裡，藏都藏不了的叛逆性。就像他首任台北市長任內，找了專在街頭搞抗爭的工運人士出任勞工局長、寫文章火辣辣批判社會政治 現象的作家出任文化局長、還找一個年輕的學運分子出任民政局長。這一回，馬英九起用律師出身、為弱勢發聲槓上政府、為調查三一九案槓上檢警調的王清峰出任 法務部長，直接撞擊這個封閉系統；同樣是律師，活躍於社會團體，卻對國民黨沒太多好感的王如玄出任勞委會主委，連王如玄都懷疑自己會點頭是不是「瘋了」？

　 此外，還有家長團體、教改團體其實都不大認識的前政大校長鄭瑞城出任教育部長，鄭瑞城生性低調，因為他要改掉「黨校」的校歌，被校內部分人士標籤化為「親 綠」。但實際上，他只是一個單純的自由派學者，威權時代沒見他奔走於政治圈為黨外發言，只在政大傳遞他的自由派理念；民進黨時代他也沒汲汲於官場，或大聲 疾呼和爭議百出的教育部吵架，他還是以學者身分在民間論壇提出諍言。鄭瑞城的挑戰，除了他必須盡快熟悉中小學教育的實務外，就是怎麼在制度面上讓過去幾年 的教改爭議獲得合理解決。

　更大膽的不止於此，第二波人事公布，馬英九出人意表地找上前台聯不分區立委賴幸媛出任陸委會主委，第一時間讓 準閣揆劉兆玄都感錯愕。賴幸媛系出前總統李登輝門下，國民黨執政時期就是李幕僚，但無可諱言，過去八年來，台聯的兩岸政策確實與國民黨格格不入，馬英九當 選很大部分原因在於支持者對兩岸開放有期待，賴幸媛固然聲稱和馬英九的理念相同，也同意「一中各表」，都主張不統不獨不武以台灣利益為上，但在這個大原則 大方向下，可討論的就多了。馬、賴的共識又何嘗不是扁的主張呢？扁所反對的是「九二共識」，可沒反對「一中各表」，陳水扁堅持的是因為對岸不讓我們自己表 述，就這麼吵八年，兩岸關係停滯不前。

　賴幸媛上任後，立即要面對六月兩會復談、七月周末包機直航，她是否全盤接受？她曾經嚴詞痛批國民 黨協助農民水果登陸，面對農委會已經改弦更張要公款補助八縣市水果登陸，是否繼續或擴大辦理？更重要的，馬政府提振台灣經濟的核心，就是兩岸政策，陸委會 是各項開放措施主管機關包括：中央銀行、交通部、財政部、經濟部、農委會、金管會、甚至體委會能否開放的關鍵，如果賴幸媛有不同見解，馬政府該如何自處？ 如果賴幸媛沒有不同見解，她個人赴立法院備詢，面對舊日同僚的朝野立委們冷嘲熱諷，又該如何自處？

　馬英九向台聯借將，為凝聚更大的社會 共識，照顧其他五百多萬票民眾的感情，確實值得肯定，但不要忘了，七百多萬選票期待馬政府的是「政策考量」，讓台灣在最短時間內重新上路，新閣有多少職務 都適合賴幸媛，何以非要她出掌陸委會？馬英九既出險招，只能期望馬政府做好風險管控，不要讓社會再為一個不適合的人事安排而付出代價。就像新內閣中仍有擺 明為了疏散黨工幹部的職務，但盼新任首長到位後，調整心態，扮演好稱職的全民首長，而非一黨之首長。

　政府為人民服務，國政千緯萬端，過去扁政舖排人事，充斥政治考量，讓全民受盡煎熬，在新政府內閣人事布局底定後，我們仍願給予最大的祝福：希望所有新任首長體會我們的擔心，以全民福祉為念，拋開政治，專注於政策！

The DPP’s Dilemma: Whether to Return to the Centrist Path?

The DPP’s Dilemma: Whether to Return to the Centrist Path?
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, China)
A Translation
April 28, 2008

Chen Shih-meng openly declared his support for Koo Kuan-min as DPP Chairman. This finally generated a few sparks in a relentlessly dull DPP Party Chairman Election. Chen Shih-meng openly challenged elements within the DPP who advocated the adoption of a more centrist path. Chen maintained that this would never redeem the DPP, and might even lead to everyone abandoning the DPP. Suddenly the struggle over the chairmanship of the DPP, had become a struggle between a “new centrist path” and opposition to a new centrist path. Leave aside for the moment whether this was actually the case. At least the DPP’s options were finally on the table.

The current Party Chairman Election is atypical for the DPP. It is the first Party Chairman Election after the DPP’s three major electoral defeats. It is one in which the Four Princes of the DPP are conspicuous by their absence. Factional rivalry is also at an all-time low. Not one of the candidates for chairman — Koo and the two Tsais, belongs to the party’s central power structure. Perhaps this is why the confrontation between the three, and the process by which the victor will emerge, are assuming forms unprecedented for the DPP.

The media has been comparing Koo and the two Tsais. Trong Tsai is viewed as a machine politician who depends upon the top down mobilization of party members and manipulation of party factions. Koo Kuan-min is viewed as the voice of Deep Green fundamentalism. Tsai Ying-wen is viewed as a centrist reformer. Each of the candidates represents one aspect of what the DPP stands for. Machine voters and factional voters have long been a problem for DPP party members and grass roots supporters. The ideological differences between Deep Green and Pale Green factions have long been part of the DPP’s ideological spectrum. The DPP’s post election reform, just so happens to touch upon these differences. And by sheer coincidence, each faction just happens to have a spokesman.

As a party that has suffered repeated defeats, DPP leaders are wracked with anxiety. In this, they are no different from other defeated parties in democratic nations. The DPP’s anxiety takes two forms. One ascribes the party’s defeat to problems with the current path. It calls for thoroughgoing path change. The other is just the opposite. It claims the party has been losing elections because it failed to adhere to its current path, therefore must increase its commitment to its current path. Many advocates of reform within the Democratic Progressive Party will be pinning their hopes on Tsai Ing-wen. They represent the first group. Chen Shih-meng has nominated Koo Kuan-min, and is openly blasting the “centrist path.” They represent the second group. The different forms their anxieties take reflect the differences in their political paths.

The DPP’s current plight can, to some extent, be compared to the former plight of the British Labor Party. Under the impact of Conservative Party Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s “Thatcher Revolution,” the Labor Party experienced repeated setbacks. It also underwent internal struggles over the party’s political path. The Labor Party’s nomination process at the time used a form of “intra-party democracy.” This meant party hardliners who were adept at mobilization gained the upper hand, from beginning to end. But the candidates fielded by these Labour Party fundamentalists were consistently defeated in national elections by the Conservative Party. The result was a decade in the political wilderness. Only when Tony Blair adopted a “Third Way” did the Labour Party return to political office. The story of the British Labor Party provides an object lesson for the still wavering DPP.

Perhaps it was because the three candidates for party chairman just happened to represent different faces of the DPP. Therefore whoever prevails will reflect DPP members’ expectations about what kind of political party they wish to become. Whether they wish to remain mired in the swamp of machine politics and party factions, unable to extricate themselves. Whether the DPP should become a Deep Green political party. Whether the DPP should proceed down a new, broader, “centrist path.” Put simply, the results of the party chairman election will decide whether the DPP will be a party that represents only party members, or a party that represents all people on Taiwan.

Because of this, we are happy to see Chen Shih-meng put the Centrist Path controversy on the bargaining table. At least this will allow the DPP to focus on the reasons for its defeat. After all, to argue about the extent of Chen Shui-bian’s responsibility is a waste of valuable time and energy. So is arguing about the merits of the Blues Excluded clause. Should the DPP change its current party platform? What course of action meets with the expectations of the 5 million voters who cast their ballots for Hsieh? Perhaps those are the most serious issues facing the DPP.

中時電子報
中國時報 　2008.04.28
民進黨的難題：要不要重回中間路線？
中時社論

　在陳師孟公開表態力挺辜寬敏之後，終於為一路沉悶的民進黨黨主席選舉，擦出了些許火花。陳師孟直接質疑民進黨內有關「朝中間路線調整」的論述，不僅認為如此將「找不回民進黨」，甚至會造成「大家要考慮放棄民進黨」！一時之間，民進黨黨主席之爭，彷彿變成「中間路線」與「反中間路線」在對決，實況是否如此暫且不論，至少這讓民進黨在怎麼決定它自己的未來上，有了更多想像空間。

　某種程度上說，這屆黨主席的選舉，在民進黨黨史上顯得非常另類。它是民進黨連輸三場重要大選後的一次改選，也是檯面上所有天王都缺席的一次改選，更是派系較勁最淡薄的一次改選。而角逐黨主席的兩蔡一辜，一直以來都不屬於黨的權力核心，或許就是因為這樣，他們三個人的對決乃至最後由誰出線，都可以顯見出民進黨未來將呈現怎樣的風貌。

　媒體在比較兩蔡一辜的條件時，習慣性會將蔡同榮歸類為依賴人頭黨員動員、操縱派系換票的政治人物，而辜寬敏則是反映深綠基本教義路線的代言人，至於蔡英文則代表著朝中間改革路線調整的代言人。耐人尋味的是，這三位候選人所象徵的，都算得上是民進黨面貌的一部分。民進黨現有的底層黨員結構，人頭黨員與山頭派系本來就是割捨不掉的一部分，而意識形態上深綠與淺綠的分殊，也一直都是民進黨理念光譜分布的現狀。大選過後民進黨的改革，也恰恰好都觸及了這幾個部分，只是沒有想到這麼湊巧，每一部分都剛巧有一個代言人出馬競選。

　做為一個連續挫敗的政黨，民進黨內部所反映的焦慮，與民主國家所有敗退政黨所反映的焦慮其實都是一樣的。而這種焦慮恰好反映在兩種心理上，一種心理是認為黨的敗選是出在「現行路線有問題」，所以主張應全面調整路線。另一種心理則恰恰好相反，認為黨的敗選正是因為「對現有路線的堅持不夠」，因而必須更強化對既有路線的信仰。民進黨內許多主張改革的精英會寄希望於蔡英文，反映著正是前一種焦慮，而陳師孟會站出來挺辜寬敏，並公開痛批中間路線，所反映的也正是後一種焦慮心理。而這種焦慮的分歧也一定會反映在政黨的路線鬥爭上。

　一九八 ○年代的英國工黨，部分程度上正可以拿來與民進黨目前的處境相對照。那時節在保守黨柴契爾首相旋風的衝擊下，工黨面臨連番的敗選，內部自然也出現了路線上的鬥爭。當時工黨的提名採取「黨內民主」的形式，這使得黨內動員性強的強硬派一路占上風，但這批代表工黨基本教義路線的候選人，在全國大選中卻被保守黨一路壓著打，結果硬是屈居十幾年的在野黨，直到布萊爾採取向中間調整的「第三條路」，才再度掌握執政權。英國工黨的故事，對目前還擺盪在要不要調整路線的民進黨，有沒有任何啟示呢？

　或許正是因為三位黨主席的候選人，都恰好代表了民進黨的部分面貌，因而最後會是由誰出線，其實也反應了民進黨員對他們這個黨的期待與想像，他們想要未來的民進黨變成什麼樣的政黨？他們要不要民進黨繼續陷在人頭黨員與派系換票操作中不能自拔？要不要民進黨更進一步向深綠路線靠攏？還是要讓民進黨朝更寬廣的中間路線調整？講得更簡單一點，黨主席的選舉結果，將決定民進黨未來要做一個只是代表黨員的黨，還是爭取代表全台灣人的黨。

　也因為這樣，我們倒是樂見陳師孟將「中間路線」議題搬到檯面上的做法，至少這可以讓民進黨針對敗選檢討的焦距更集中，畢竟都到了這個時候，再花一堆寶貴時間去爭辯陳水扁該負多少責任，根本是在浪費口水。同樣耗費一堆精神在爭論排藍民調究竟對不對的上面，也是在浪費智慧。而民進黨究竟該不該調整現有路線？該怎麼做才算是對五百多萬的選民有所交代？或許才真的是此刻的民進黨，最該嚴肅面對的課題。

The DPP’s Dilemma: Whether to Return to the Centrist Path?

The DPP’s Dilemma: Whether to Return to the Centrist Path?
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, China)
A Translation
April 28, 2008

Chen Shih-meng openly declared his support for Koo Kuan-min as DPP Chairman. This finally generated a few sparks in a relentlessly dull DPP Party Chairman Election. Chen Shih-meng openly challenged elements within the DPP who advocated the adoption of a more centrist path. Chen maintained that this would never redeem the DPP, and might even lead to everyone abandoning the DPP. Suddenly the struggle over the chairmanship of the DPP, had become a struggle between a “new centrist path” and opposition to a new centrist path. Leave aside for the moment whether this was actually the case. At least the DPP’s options were finally on the table.

The current Party Chairman Election is atypical for the DPP. It is the first Party Chairman Election after the DPP’s three major electoral defeats. It is one in which the Four Princes of the DPP are conspicuous by their absence. Factional rivalry is also at an all-time low. Not one of the candidates for chairman — Koo and the two Tsais, belongs to the party’s central power structure. Perhaps this is why the confrontation between the three, and the process by which the victor will emerge, are assuming forms unprecedented for the DPP.

The media has been comparing Koo and the two Tsais. Trong Tsai is viewed as a machine politician who depends upon the top down mobilization of party members and manipulation of party factions. Koo Kuan-min is viewed as the voice of Deep Green fundamentalism. Tsai Ying-wen is viewed as a centrist reformer. Each of the candidates represents one aspect of what the DPP stands for. Machine voters and factional voters have long been a problem for DPP party members and grass roots supporters. The ideological differences between Deep Green and Pale Green factions have long been part of the DPP’s ideological spectrum. The DPP’s post election reform, just so happens to touch upon these differences. And by sheer coincidence, each faction just happens to have a spokesman.

As a party that has suffered repeated defeats, DPP leaders are wracked with anxiety. In this, they are no different from other defeated parties in democratic nations. The DPP’s anxiety takes two forms. One ascribes the party’s defeat to problems with the current path. It calls for thoroughgoing path change. The other is just the opposite. It claims the party has been losing elections because it failed to adhere to its current path, therefore must increase its commitment to its current path. Many advocates of reform within the Democratic Progressive Party will be pinning their hopes on Tsai Ing-wen. They represent the first group. Chen Shih-meng has nominated Koo Kuan-min, and is openly blasting the “centrist path.” They represent the second group. The different forms their anxieties take reflect the differences in their political paths.

The DPP’s current plight can, to some extent, be compared to the former plight of the British Labor Party. Under the impact of Conservative Party Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s “Thatcher Revolution,” the Labor Party experienced repeated setbacks. It also underwent internal struggles over the party’s political path. The Labor Party’s nomination process at the time used a form of “intra-party democracy.” This meant party hardliners who were adept at mobilization gained the upper hand, from beginning to end. But the candidates fielded by these Labour Party fundamentalists were consistently defeated in national elections by the Conservative Party. The result was a decade in the political wilderness. Only when Tony Blair adopted a “Third Way” did the Labour Party return to political office. The story of the British Labor Party provides an object lesson for the still wavering DPP.

Perhaps it was because the three candidates for party chairman just happened to represent different faces of the DPP. Therefore whoever prevails will reflect DPP members’ expectations about what kind of political party they wish to become. Whether they wish to remain mired in the swamp of machine politics and party factions, unable to extricate themselves. Whether the DPP should become a Deep Green political party. Whether the DPP should proceed down a new, broader, “centrist path.” Put simply, the results of the party chairman election will decide whether the DPP will be a party that represents only party members, or a party that represents all people on Taiwan.

Because of this, we are happy to see Chen Shih-meng put the Centrist Path controversy on the bargaining table. At least this will allow the DPP to focus on the reasons for its defeat. After all, to argue about the extent of Chen Shui-bian’s responsibility is a waste of valuable time and energy. So is arguing about the merits of the Blues Excluded clause. Should the DPP change its current party platform? What course of action meets with the expectations of the 5 million voters who cast their ballots for Hsieh? Perhaps those are the most serious issues facing the DPP.

中時電子報
中國時報 　2008.04.28
民進黨的難題：要不要重回中間路線？
中時社論

　在陳師孟公開表態力挺辜寬敏之後，終於為一路沉悶的民進黨黨主席選舉，擦出了些許火花。陳師孟直接質疑民進黨內有關「朝中間路線調整」的論述，不僅認為如此將「找不回民進黨」，甚至會造成「大家要考慮放棄民進黨」！一時之間，民進黨黨主席之爭，彷彿變成「中間路線」與「反中間路線」在對決，實況是否如此暫且不論，至少這讓民進黨在怎麼決定它自己的未來上，有了更多想像空間。

　某種程度上說，這屆黨主席的選舉，在民進黨黨史上顯得非常另類。它是民進黨連輸三場重要大選後的一次改選，也是檯面上所有天王都缺席的一次改選，更是派系較勁最淡薄的一次改選。而角逐黨主席的兩蔡一辜，一直以來都不屬於黨的權力核心，或許就是因為這樣，他們三個人的對決乃至最後由誰出線，都可以顯見出民進黨未來將呈現怎樣的風貌。

　媒體在比較兩蔡一辜的條件時，習慣性會將蔡同榮歸類為依賴人頭黨員動員、操縱派系換票的政治人物，而辜寬敏則是反映深綠基本教義路線的代言人，至於蔡英文則代表著朝中間改革路線調整的代言人。耐人尋味的是，這三位候選人所象徵的，都算得上是民進黨面貌的一部分。民進黨現有的底層黨員結構，人頭黨員與山頭派系本來就是割捨不掉的一部分，而意識形態上深綠與淺綠的分殊，也一直都是民進黨理念光譜分布的現狀。大選過後民進黨的改革，也恰恰好都觸及了這幾個部分，只是沒有想到這麼湊巧，每一部分都剛巧有一個代言人出馬競選。

　做為一個連續挫敗的政黨，民進黨內部所反映的焦慮，與民主國家所有敗退政黨所反映的焦慮其實都是一樣的。而這種焦慮恰好反映在兩種心理上，一種心理是認為黨的敗選是出在「現行路線有問題」，所以主張應全面調整路線。另一種心理則恰恰好相反，認為黨的敗選正是因為「對現有路線的堅持不夠」，因而必須更強化對既有路線的信仰。民進黨內許多主張改革的精英會寄希望於蔡英文，反映著正是前一種焦慮，而陳師孟會站出來挺辜寬敏，並公開痛批中間路線，所反映的也正是後一種焦慮心理。而這種焦慮的分歧也一定會反映在政黨的路線鬥爭上。

　一九八 ○年代的英國工黨，部分程度上正可以拿來與民進黨目前的處境相對照。那時節在保守黨柴契爾首相旋風的衝擊下，工黨面臨連番的敗選，內部自然也出現了路線上的鬥爭。當時工黨的提名採取「黨內民主」的形式，這使得黨內動員性強的強硬派一路占上風，但這批代表工黨基本教義路線的候選人，在全國大選中卻被保守黨一路壓著打，結果硬是屈居十幾年的在野黨，直到布萊爾採取向中間調整的「第三條路」，才再度掌握執政權。英國工黨的故事，對目前還擺盪在要不要調整路線的民進黨，有沒有任何啟示呢？

　或許正是因為三位黨主席的候選人，都恰好代表了民進黨的部分面貌，因而最後會是由誰出線，其實也反應了民進黨員對他們這個黨的期待與想像，他們想要未來的民進黨變成什麼樣的政黨？他們要不要民進黨繼續陷在人頭黨員與派系換票操作中不能自拔？要不要民進黨更進一步向深綠路線靠攏？還是要讓民進黨朝更寬廣的中間路線調整？講得更簡單一點，黨主席的選舉結果，將決定民進黨未來要做一個只是代表黨員的黨，還是爭取代表全台灣人的黨。

　也因為這樣，我們倒是樂見陳師孟將「中間路線」議題搬到檯面上的做法，至少這可以讓民進黨針對敗選檢討的焦距更集中，畢竟都到了這個時候，再花一堆寶貴時間去爭辯陳水扁該負多少責任，根本是在浪費口水。同樣耗費一堆精神在爭論排藍民調究竟對不對的上面，也是在浪費智慧。而民進黨究竟該不該調整現有路線？該怎麼做才算是對五百多萬的選民有所交代？或許才真的是此刻的民進黨，最該嚴肅面對的課題。

The DPP’s Dilemma: Whether to Return to the Centrist Path?

The DPP’s Dilemma: Whether to Return to the Centrist Path?
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, China)
A Translation
April 28, 2008

Chen Shih-meng openly declared his support for Koo Kuan-min as DPP Chairman. This finally generated a few sparks in a relentlessly dull DPP Party Chairman Election. Chen Shih-meng openly challenged elements within the DPP who advocated the adoption of a more centrist path. Chen maintained that this would never redeem the DPP, and might even lead to everyone abandoning the DPP. Suddenly the struggle over the chairmanship of the DPP, had become a struggle between a “new centrist path” and opposition to a new centrist path. Leave aside for the moment whether this was actually the case. At least the DPP’s options were finally on the table.

The current Party Chairman Election is atypical for the DPP. It is the first Party Chairman Election after the DPP’s three major electoral defeats. It is one in which the Four Princes of the DPP are conspicuous by their absence. Factional rivalry is also at an all-time low. Not one of the candidates for chairman — Koo and the two Tsais, belongs to the party’s central power structure. Perhaps this is why the confrontation between the three, and the process by which the victor will emerge, are assuming forms unprecedented for the DPP.

The media has been comparing Koo and the two Tsais. Trong Tsai is viewed as a machine politician who depends upon the top down mobilization of party members and manipulation of party factions. Koo Kuan-min is viewed as the voice of Deep Green fundamentalism. Tsai Ying-wen is viewed as a centrist reformer. Each of the candidates represents one aspect of what the DPP stands for. Machine voters and factional voters have long been a problem for DPP party members and grass roots supporters. The ideological differences between Deep Green and Pale Green factions have long been part of the DPP’s ideological spectrum. The DPP’s post election reform, just so happens to touch upon these differences. And by sheer coincidence, each faction just happens to have a spokesman.

As a party that has suffered repeated defeats, DPP leaders are wracked with anxiety. In this, they are no different from other defeated parties in democratic nations. The DPP’s anxiety takes two forms. One ascribes the party’s defeat to problems with the current path. It calls for thoroughgoing path change. The other is just the opposite. It claims the party has been losing elections because it failed to adhere to its current path, therefore must increase its commitment to its current path. Many advocates of reform within the Democratic Progressive Party will be pinning their hopes on Tsai Ing-wen. They represent the first group. Chen Shih-meng has nominated Koo Kuan-min, and is openly blasting the “centrist path.” They represent the second group. The different forms their anxieties take reflect the differences in their political paths.

The DPP’s current plight can, to some extent, be compared to the former plight of the British Labor Party. Under the impact of Conservative Party Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s “Thatcher Revolution,” the Labor Party experienced repeated setbacks. It also underwent internal struggles over the party’s political path. The Labor Party’s nomination process at the time used a form of “intra-party democracy.” This meant party hardliners who were adept at mobilization gained the upper hand, from beginning to end. But the candidates fielded by these Labour Party fundamentalists were consistently defeated in national elections by the Conservative Party. The result was a decade in the political wilderness. Only when Tony Blair adopted a “Third Way” did the Labour Party return to political office. The story of the British Labor Party provides an object lesson for the still wavering DPP.

Perhaps it was because the three candidates for party chairman just happened to represent different faces of the DPP. Therefore whoever prevails will reflect DPP members’ expectations about what kind of political party they wish to become. Whether they wish to remain mired in the swamp of machine politics and party factions, unable to extricate themselves. Whether the DPP should become a Deep Green political party. Whether the DPP should proceed down a new, broader, “centrist path.” Put simply, the results of the party chairman election will decide whether the DPP will be a party that represents only party members, or a party that represents all people on Taiwan.

Because of this, we are happy to see Chen Shih-meng put the Centrist Path controversy on the bargaining table. At least this will allow the DPP to focus on the reasons for its defeat. After all, to argue about the extent of Chen Shui-bian’s responsibility is a waste of valuable time and energy. So is arguing about the merits of the Blues Excluded clause. Should the DPP change its current party platform? What course of action meets with the expectations of the 5 million voters who cast their ballots for Hsieh? Perhaps those are the most serious issues facing the DPP.

中時電子報
中國時報 　2008.04.28
民進黨的難題：要不要重回中間路線？
中時社論

　在陳師孟公開表態力挺辜寬敏之後，終於為一路沉悶的民進黨黨主席選舉，擦出了些許火花。陳師孟直接質疑民進黨內有關「朝中間路線調整」的論述，不僅認為如此將「找不回民進黨」，甚至會造成「大家要考慮放棄民進黨」！一時之間，民進黨黨主席之爭，彷彿變成「中間路線」與「反中間路線」在對決，實況是否如此暫且不論，至少這讓民進黨在怎麼決定它自己的未來上，有了更多想像空間。

　某種程度上說，這屆黨主席的選舉，在民進黨黨史上顯得非常另類。它是民進黨連輸三場重要大選後的一次改選，也是檯面上所有天王都缺席的一次改選，更是派系較勁最淡薄的一次改選。而角逐黨主席的兩蔡一辜，一直以來都不屬於黨的權力核心，或許就是因為這樣，他們三個人的對決乃至最後由誰出線，都可以顯見出民進黨未來將呈現怎樣的風貌。

　媒體在比較兩蔡一辜的條件時，習慣性會將蔡同榮歸類為依賴人頭黨員動員、操縱派系換票的政治人物，而辜寬敏則是反映深綠基本教義路線的代言人，至於蔡英文則代表著朝中間改革路線調整的代言人。耐人尋味的是，這三位候選人所象徵的，都算得上是民進黨面貌的一部分。民進黨現有的底層黨員結構，人頭黨員與山頭派系本來就是割捨不掉的一部分，而意識形態上深綠與淺綠的分殊，也一直都是民進黨理念光譜分布的現狀。大選過後民進黨的改革，也恰恰好都觸及了這幾個部分，只是沒有想到這麼湊巧，每一部分都剛巧有一個代言人出馬競選。

　做為一個連續挫敗的政黨，民進黨內部所反映的焦慮，與民主國家所有敗退政黨所反映的焦慮其實都是一樣的。而這種焦慮恰好反映在兩種心理上，一種心理是認為黨的敗選是出在「現行路線有問題」，所以主張應全面調整路線。另一種心理則恰恰好相反，認為黨的敗選正是因為「對現有路線的堅持不夠」，因而必須更強化對既有路線的信仰。民進黨內許多主張改革的精英會寄希望於蔡英文，反映著正是前一種焦慮，而陳師孟會站出來挺辜寬敏，並公開痛批中間路線，所反映的也正是後一種焦慮心理。而這種焦慮的分歧也一定會反映在政黨的路線鬥爭上。

　一九八 ○年代的英國工黨，部分程度上正可以拿來與民進黨目前的處境相對照。那時節在保守黨柴契爾首相旋風的衝擊下，工黨面臨連番的敗選，內部自然也出現了路線上的鬥爭。當時工黨的提名採取「黨內民主」的形式，這使得黨內動員性強的強硬派一路占上風，但這批代表工黨基本教義路線的候選人，在全國大選中卻被保守黨一路壓著打，結果硬是屈居十幾年的在野黨，直到布萊爾採取向中間調整的「第三條路」，才再度掌握執政權。英國工黨的故事，對目前還擺盪在要不要調整路線的民進黨，有沒有任何啟示呢？

　或許正是因為三位黨主席的候選人，都恰好代表了民進黨的部分面貌，因而最後會是由誰出線，其實也反應了民進黨員對他們這個黨的期待與想像，他們想要未來的民進黨變成什麼樣的政黨？他們要不要民進黨繼續陷在人頭黨員與派系換票操作中不能自拔？要不要民進黨更進一步向深綠路線靠攏？還是要讓民進黨朝更寬廣的中間路線調整？講得更簡單一點，黨主席的選舉結果，將決定民進黨未來要做一個只是代表黨員的黨，還是爭取代表全台灣人的黨。

　也因為這樣，我們倒是樂見陳師孟將「中間路線」議題搬到檯面上的做法，至少這可以讓民進黨針對敗選檢討的焦距更集中，畢竟都到了這個時候，再花一堆寶貴時間去爭辯陳水扁該負多少責任，根本是在浪費口水。同樣耗費一堆精神在爭論排藍民調究竟對不對的上面，也是在浪費智慧。而民進黨究竟該不該調整現有路線？該怎麼做才算是對五百多萬的選民有所交代？或許才真的是此刻的民進黨，最該嚴肅面對的課題。

The New Administration’s Diplomatic Challenges

The New Administration’s Diplomatic Challenges
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 25, 2008

Although Washington is not allowing Ma Ying-jeou to visit the United States, it is sending a higher-ranking envoy than usual to his inauguration. On the one hand this defers to international realpolitik. One the other hand it expresses goodwill towards the new administration. The international community also welcomes the imminent return to rational and pragmatic diplomacy. The new administration’s first challenge will be to revamp the ROC’s diplomatic strategy. It must defend the nation’s sovereignty, uphold its dignity, ensure its survival, and provide for its future development.

When the outcome of the presidential election was announced, the international community breathed a collective sigh of relief, and focused its attention on cross-strait reconciliation. Long ago planned but long delayed exchanges may soon take place. A new dawn is breaking on once troubled cross-strait relations. The atmosphere of growing optimism has even led to hopes for a diplomatic truce.

Such expectations are unrealistic and must not form the basis for diplomatic strategy. Beijing may display unprecedentes flexibility by allowing Vice President-elect Vincent Siew participate in the Boao Forum and an historic Hu Siew Summit. But such flexibility will probably not extend to the diplomatic arena. The CCP has long maintained distinct internal and external policies. It may treat compatriots on Taiwan more gently, but it is unrealisic to expect the CCP to accept the Republic of China’s sovereignty in the international arena. The mainland China Ministry of Foreign Affairs has long maintained a hardline position regarding Taiwan. The mainland is currently experiencing a surge of nationalist sentiment reminiscent of the Boxer Rebellion. Under such circumstances the mainland authorities will be under pressure not to give way.

Moreover, given the mainland’s economic rise, international developments have benefited the mainland authorities. They believe time is on their side. They want to avoid driving the public on Taiwan toward independence. Nevertheless they must provide incentives for the comparatively moderate Kuomintang government. Only then can the KMT influence the public on Taiwan. But how far Beijing is prepared to relax its attitude toward Taiwan, in what areas, and in what manner, remains unclear. Whatever it gives, it can take away. Therefore it is not something one can depend upon. We must not harbor any illusions. Otherwise we may harm the ROC’s interests.

The ROC’s diplomatic plight is the result of the disparity between its strength and the mainland’s, and the CCP’s insistence on playing a zero-sum game. Being weaker, we must make increase our strength and accumulate bargaining chips. Only then can we defend our sovereignty and ensure a modicum of breathing space in the international arena. Unfortunately the outgoing DPP’s diplomatic efforts have been a complete waste. They have provided Chen Shui-bian with photo-ops and opportunities for electioneering, but little else. The ruling DPP has frittered away precious diplomatic capital accumulated through long years of hard work. Its Taiwan independence provocations have depleted the reserves of sympathy the international community once felt for the ROC, and undermined Taipei’s once close relationship with Washington. Ma Ying-jeou is inheriting a foreign policy debacle. He must rebuild foreign relations from scratch. Although Taipei/Washington relations can be quickly rebuilt, relations with other nations will need considerably more effort. The unprecedented appointment of Latin American expert Francisco Ou as Minister of Foreign Affairs will return professionalism to diplomacy. It will also help manage crises that have arisen in our relations with allies in Latin America, our diplomatic stronghold.

The mainland’s foreign policies are not under our control. Therefore one cannot expect major breakthroughs merely because our ruling administration and foreign policies have changed. But at least our diplomacy can get back on track. At least we can do what we ought to do, and not do what we ought not to do. At least we can begin giving priority to our long-term interests, adopting the most advantageous strategies for safeguarding the ROC’s sovereignty, ensuring our survival, and providing for future development. At least the new administration will restore the dignity of professional diplomats, and allow our foreign policy to reflect the aspirations of 23 million Chinese on Taiwan.

In fact, the Republic of China’s greatest asset is its values. We have relations with fewer countries than the mainland. We have even fewer votes in the United Nations. But the ROC has undergone a second change in ruling parties. It has demonstrated to the world that the Chinese people are capable of establishing a free, democratic, open, and mature society. To the world’s advanced democracies, the continued existence of these values is something precious and worth defending.

The ROC understands the harsh reality of international realpolitik. But we have ignored the intangible values of civilized human society. We have failed to properly market the ROC’s virtues. More can be written about this in the future. Because the ROC needs to survive internationally. we need the support of the major powers. Domestic opinion has an influence on decision-making within these major powers. If the ROC’s civilized values meet with the approval of international public opinion, their government’s foreign policy will reflect that opinion. Many political leaders’ decision not to participate in the Beijing Olympics torch relay or the opening ceremonies were based on public opinion and domestic pressure. The ROC government is far more powerful than the Tibetan protestors. If Tibet can gain international sympathy, so can the ROC.

Faced with the rise of mainland China, the ROC finds itself in a position of political weakness. We have also lost our economic advantage. But we must not lose our self-confidence and fighting spirit. The ROC is valuable not merely for its tangible economic achievements, but also for its intangible civilized values. We must reaffirm the value of our continued existence. We must find new ways to market this beautiful island of Taiwan to the international community.

中時電子報
中國時報 　2008.04.25
新政府面對的外交挑戰
中時社論

　美國華府最終雖沒讓馬英九訪美，但畢竟也提升了出席就職典禮的特使層次；一方面維持國際現實的框架，一方面對新政府表達出善意與期待。同樣的，國際社會也期待台灣外交回歸理性務實。如何重建外交策略，保護台灣的生存發展與主權尊嚴，將是新政府的重大課題。

　從總統大選揭曉以來，鬆了一口氣的國際社會，紛紛把關注焦點擺在兩岸將走向和解上。就近來的發展看來確是如此，多項延宕許久的交流措施解禁有望，兩岸之間從山雨欲來一夕變成春暖花開，緩和的大氣氛在想像中一再加碼，乃至衍生出「外交休兵」的期待。

　但是，這樣的期待其實是不切實際的，也不能作為外交策略的前提。雖然中共願意讓副總統當選人蕭萬長參加博鰲會議，並舉行歷史性的胡蕭會，立場上更展現出前所罕見的彈性，可這樣的彈性未必能見諸外交領域。因為中共一向內外有別，對台灣同胞講話可以軟一些，寬容度可以大一些，但在國際舞台上要接受台灣的主權國家地位，對中共當局來說還是非常困難的。不要說外交部門一向對台立場最為強硬，現在大陸近於義和團式的激烈民族情緒，也會對中共當局造成不能退讓的壓力。

　何況，中國經濟崛起後，國際局勢一直朝對中共有利的局面發展，因此中共相信時間站在自己那一邊。儘管為了不刺激台灣鋌而走險尋求獨立，北京必須對路線比較和緩的國民黨政府提供一些鼓勵，才能讓這樣的路線在台灣內部有說服力，但到底願意放鬆到什麼程度、在哪些領域、以什麼方式，目前都還不清楚，也因為收放由人，隨時可以收回，所以不足以依賴，更不能有過多樂觀幻想，否則將對台灣的利益造成危害。

　台灣的外交困境源自兩岸力量懸殊及中共堅持零和戰，居於弱勢的我們，必須盡一切努力壯大實力累積籌碼，才能在國際社會有起碼的生存空間與主權地位。遺憾的是這些年外交大搞虛功，為了供元首作秀或替政黨助選，把長年耕耘的外交資源無謂浪擲，還以挑釁的台獨操作耗損國際間對台灣的同情，破壞台美原本緊密的關係。如今馬英九接收的，是片滿目瘡痍的外交荒地，得從頭整地灌溉。雖然台美關係可以很快重建，但與其他國家的關係，卻需要投下更多心力。這次破天荒由拉美專家歐鴻鍊出任外交部長，除了回歸外交專業外，應該也是著眼於我國外交重鎮拉美已經烽火四起，必須緊急救火了。

　國際環境與中共政策都非操之在我，因此很難期待外交處境因為政權輪替而出現重大突破，但至少應該要回歸外交正軌，做該做的事，不做不該做的事，以國家整體長遠利益為優先考量，選擇最有利的策略，來維護台灣的生存發展及主權地位。也期盼新政府能重建外交的專業尊嚴，讓外交政策能真正反映台灣二千三百萬人的心聲。

　其實，台灣最大的資產在於「價值」。比邦交國，我們當然比不過中共；算票數，離聯合國也還差得遠。但再度政黨輪替的台灣，卻示範了華人社會也可以有如此自由、民主、開放、成熟的文明狀態，這些價值的繼續存在，對世界民主先進國家來說，是非常珍貴而且必須保護的。

　台灣通常接觸到的是國際現實的苦澀面，忽略了無形的文明對人類社會的價值，也不懂得如何以此作為行銷台灣的賣點，未來在這方面其實可以多加著墨。因為台灣要維護國際生存，必定需要重要大國的支持，而這些大國的內部民意對決策頗具影響力，當台灣的文明價值得到民意認同時，政府的外交政策也必須作出回應。不少政治領袖決定不參與聖火傳遞或北京奧運開幕式，就是基於民意及輿論壓力，而西藏與中國力量之差距比台灣更大。西藏都可以得到國際同情，台灣當然不能妄自菲薄。

　面對崛起的中國，台灣本來政治地位就居弱勢，如今經濟優勢也迅速流失，但不必因此失去自信和鬥志，因為台灣的價值不只在有形的經濟成就，更在無形的文明發展。我們在確認自己存在價值的同時，也應該以嶄新的策略，重新向國際社會行銷台灣這個美麗島。