Archive for October, 2007|Monthly archive page
Returning to the UN vs. Joining the UN: The Fire Burns, The Heat Remains
Leave a CommentReturning to the UN vs. Joining the UN: The Fire Burns, The Heat Remains
United Daily New editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 31, 2007
The Democratic Progressive Party’s “Join the UN” Torch Relay and the Kuomintang’s “Rejoin the UN” Bicycle Tour are each making their way around the island of Taiwan.
As everyone knows this is not really a disagreement over whether to “Rejoin the UN” or to “Join the UN.” One: Most people approve of attempts to obtain representation in the UN. Two: Both the “Rejoin the UN” campaign and the “Join the UN” campaign are futile. Three: The result of any “Plebiscite to Join the UN” will be “Nothing will happen.” In terms of results, there is no difference between the two campaigns. Therefore the “Join the UN” campaign and the “Rejoin the UN” campaign should not be a matter of controversy.
The “Join the UN” campaign and the “Rejoin the UN” campaign differ over four points. One: Whether to eventually eliminate the Republic of China and establish a Nation of Taiwan. Two: Whether to maintain the status quo, the international modus vivendi, and Taipei/Washington trust. Three: Whether the government may resort to unconstitutional and illegal means to hold a plebiscite/referendum. Four: Whether package-dealing the “Plebiscite to the Join the UN” with the Presidential Election will distort the election results.
Eventually a choice must be made between the Republic of China and a Nation of Taiwan. Chen Shui-bian says the Republic of China is neither here nor there. The Republic of China is already dead. The Republic of China altar will soon be torn down.
The Democratic Progressive Party’s Taiwan independence strategy could be described as a “smoke and fire” strategy. Its “Taiwan independence consciousness” is the fire. Its “Taiwanese consciousness” is the smoke. The “Plebiscite to Join the UN” campaign is classic smoke and fire strategy. The DPP uses its “Nation of Taiwan” rhetoric to demand the “rectification of names, the authoring of a new constitution, and the founding of an independent Nation of Taiwan.” It asserts that the “Republic of China is already dead.” It demands that the “altar of the Republic of China” be demolished. This rhetoric helps ignite the fires of Deep Green “Taiwan independence consciousness.” Once these fires are burning, they will turn up the heat on issues such as “Taiwan is our Mother,” “native political authority,” “Taiwanese consciousness,” “Taiwanese pathos,” and “Taiwanese dignity.” When the fires of “Taiwan independence consciousness” have reached the right temperature, people will no longer be able to see past the smoke of “Taiwanese consciousness.” The frog in the pot will already be cooked. The fires of “Taiwan independence consciousness” will burn brighter and brighter. The smoke of “Taiwanese consciousness” will spread farther and farther, penetrating every nook and cranny.
It was necessary for the Kuomintang to counter the “Join the UN” campaign with its own “Rejoin the UN” campaign. Otherwise voters would have a choice of only one “Join the UN” initiative during the presidential election. The potential repercussions of that are unthinkable. But the Kuomintang is engaging the DPP in battle only at the level of “Taiwanese consciousness.” It lacks the ability and courage to deal with the “Republic of China/Nation of Taiwan” issue at the level of “Taiwan independence consciousness.” This is the principle reason it finds itself in its current dilemma. The Kuomintang has endorsed the “Taiwanese consciousness” embedded within the UN issue. It lacks the ability to warn people that the “Plebiscite to Join the UN” is merely a “Taiwan independence Plebiscite” veneer, applied to a “Taiwan independence consciousness” core. The Kuomintang wants to take refuge within the smoke generated by the Democratic Progressive Party’s flames of “Taiwanese consciousness.” It is even helping the Democratic Progressive Party fan the flames, accelerating their spread. The Kuomintang wants to jump on the Democratic Progressive Party’s bandwagon, in order to avoid criticism. It lacks the ability and courage to extinguish the flames that are generating the smoke.
If one fails to extinguish the flames, how can one disperse the smoke? Conversely, if the flames cannot burn, how can there be smoke?
The “Plebiscite to Join/Rejoin the UN” campaign has four major problems. The “Nation of Taiwan/Republic of China” option lies at the heart of the dispute between the Blue and Green camps. The Democratic Progressive Party must prove that a Nation of Taiwan is preferable to the Republic of China. The Kuomintang must prove that the Republic of China is preferable to a Nation of Taiwan. The Democratic Progressive Party must prove that a “Nation of Taiwan” is beneficial to its “Taiwanese consciousness.” The Kuomintang must prove that the “Republic of China” is beneficial to “Taiwanese consciousness.” As matters stand, the Democratic Progressive Party’s “Nation of Taiwan” fire is burning brightly and generating a great deal of heat. The Kuomintang meanwhile, seems incapable of generating the same heat for the Republic of China. It seems to think that as long as it fans the Democratic Progressive Party’s flames of “Taiwanese consciousness,” then any heat generated somehow becomes the Kuomintang’s heat. It doesn’t realize that since these were flames started by the Democratic Progressive Party, it is merely helping the Democratic Progressive Party’s flame burn brighter. The Democratic Progressive Party need only declare that “There is a Blue/Green consensus on the issue of Joining the UN” to coopt the the Kuomintang and make it look as if it has endorsed the Democratic Progressive Party’s initiative. If the Kuomintang cannot light its own fire, how can it generate its own heat?
The entire scenario is being stage-managed by the Democratic Progressive Party, using its “smoke and fire strategy.” Look at the way government-owned and privately-owned banks and credit unions lined up to contribute to the “Plebiscite to Join the UN.” That’s how far the Democratic Progressive Party’s artificially concocted “Taiwanese consciousness” has infiltrated society. That’s how it has hijacked voters and promoted its “Taiwan independence Effect.” The Kuomintang has fanned the smoke, but it has refused to put out the fire. This has led to a situation in which the fire burns, and the heat remains.
If the Kuomintang can’t tell us why the Republic of China is preferable to a Nation of Taiwan, then what platform is it running on? Why should we vote for it on election day? If you can’t light your own fire, how can you generate your own heat?
返聯vs.入聯：火不滅，煙不會散！
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.10.31 03:24 am
民進黨的「入聯」聖火接力，與國民黨的「返聯」青春鐵馬，正在分頭繞行台灣。
眾所周知，這其實不是「返聯」與「入聯」的爭議。一、因為，若將「入聯」或「返聯」視為政治意念，國人皆贊同，沒有異議；二、「返聯」不會實現，「入聯」最後也「什麼事都不會發生」，若論效果，二者亦無不同。所以，「入聯」與「返聯」不應當成為爭議。
「入聯」與「返聯」的爭議是在：一、這是終究要不要消滅中華民國的問題，也就是另建台灣國能否救台灣的問題；二、這也是應否衝撞「維持現狀」的國際均衡架構的問題，包括應否維持台美戰略信任的問題；三、這也是政府可否以違憲違法的種種手段來推動公投的問題；四、這又是可否「公投綁大選」而導致扭曲大選結果的問題。
以上四大問題的核心皆在：這是終究須在中華民國與台灣國之間作一選擇的問題。陳水扁說：中華民國是什麼碗糕，中華民國已經亡了，中華民國的供桌很快就將拆掉。
民進黨的台獨戰略，可以稱作「煙與火」戰略。「台獨意識」是火，「台灣意識」是煙。此次「入聯公投」的操作即屬「煙火戰略」的典型架構。以不斷加重口味的「台灣國」論述燒起「火」來，諸如「要正名、要制憲、要台獨」、「中華民國已亡」，「拆掉中華民國供桌」等，這是點燃深綠「台獨意識」薪炭的「火」；「火」燒起來後，就開始搧「台灣是我們的母親」、「本土政權」、「台灣意識」、「台灣悲情」或「台灣尊嚴」的「煙」。等到「台灣意識」的「煙」愈來愈大，人們已看不到「台獨意識」的「火」。「台灣意識」的「煙」將選民薰醉，冷水煮青蛙，「台獨意識」的「火」也就愈燒愈旺；相對地，「台灣意識」的「煙」也漸漫漸遠，無孔不入。
國民黨以「返聯」制衡「入聯」是必要手段，否則到大選時若只領「入聯」一張公投票，情勢殊難想像。但是，國民黨只在「台灣意識」層次作戰，卻無能又無膽處理「中華民國／台灣國」的「台獨意識」層次，則是如今陷入困境的主因。國民黨贊同「聯合國議題」的「台灣意識」；卻無能耐以其論述讓國人警覺「入聯公投」其實是「台獨公投」的「台獨意識」。如此一來，國民黨形同躲入民進黨「台灣意識」的「煙」裡，甚至還幫著民進黨去搧「煙」，加速加大其擴散。國民黨似乎只想躲在「煙」裡，拿香跟拜，只求民進黨打不到他；卻無能亦無膽設法用水潑熄藏在煙裡的那一盆「台獨之火」。
火不滅，煙怎會散？反過來說，火燒不起來，怎會有煙？
前述「入（返）聯公投」的「四大問題」中，「台灣國／中華民國」是藍綠兩邊的核心火種。民進黨須證明台灣國有勝過中華民國的優越性，國民黨則須證明中華民國有勝過台灣國的優越性；民進黨須證明「台灣國」有益於「台灣意識」，國民黨則須證明「中華民國」始對「台灣意識」有利。然而，現在的情勢是：民進黨把「台灣國」的「火」燒得很旺，煙也很大；國民黨卻似無能把中華民國的火種燒出應有的熱度，以為只要跟著民進黨搧「台灣意識」的煙即可。其實，國民黨搧的煙，原是民進黨燒起來的煙，甚至是幫著民進黨在搧煙。民進黨只憑一句「入聯是藍綠共識」，就可將國民黨吞沒在民進黨的「煙霧」中。國民黨自己的火燒不起來，怎會有自己的煙？
整個情勢已被民進黨的「煙火戰略」主導。只要看公民營行庫一列排開捐助「入聯公投」，即可知「台灣意識」在民進黨操作下已經無孔不入地偽裝了、夾帶了並傳導了「台獨效應」。國民黨這種「搧煙不滅火」的手法，已經導致「火不滅，煙不散」的後果，不可收拾。
如果國民黨說不出「中華民國優於台灣國」的道理，憑什麼選，更憑何勝選？沒有自己的火，怎會有自己的煙？
Chang’e-1: Seven Tenths Politics, Three Tenths Military Development
Leave a CommentChang’e-1: Seven Tenths Politics, Three Tenths Military Development
United Daily New editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 30, 2007
On the morning of October 24, the Green camp launched its “Join the UN Torch Relay.” The Blue camp launched its “Return to the UN Bicycle Tour.” On the evening of the same day, the Red Camp, i.e., the Chinese Communist Party, launched its Chang’e-1 satellite, which successfully orbited the moon. While political parties on Taiwan were mired in endless national identity struggles, the Chinese mainland’s strategic might took a quantum leap.
The Chinese Communist Party succeeded in launching its Chang’e-1 satellite. However it did not characterize it as a “Great Leap Forward” for the military, the way it did for nuclear bombs, incontinental ballistic missiles, and man-made satellites a number of years ago. Now it faces international concerns about the militarization of outer space. Therefore it constantly emphasizes its peaceful uses. To claim that Chang’e-1 has no military function would be a lie. The Chang’e-1’s exploration of the moon is a prelude to the construction of a space station. It will be followed by an outer space control center and outer space weapons deployment.
What’s noteworthy is not the Chang’e-1’s military implications, but the Chinese Communist Party’s change in international and cross-Straits strategy. The Chinese Communist Party no longer bluffs and blusters. It now emphasizes the soft power exemplified by its exploration of the moon. This does not mean the Chinese Communist Party no longer values military development. Its military expenditures have increased in double digits for the past 20 years. Obviously it is continuing to develop its military capability, It is merely doing so at a lower key. For example, early this year the Chinese Communist Party successfully test-fired its first antisatellite missile, becoming the third nation besides America and Russia with this capability. Over the course of last year it introduced the J-10 multirole fighter plane, the nuclear powered Type 094 ballistic missile submarine and Type 093 attack submarine, the East Wind 20 medium range ballistic missile and other new weapons. These reveal that the Chinese Communist Party is also increasing its hard power.
By contrast, during this year’s National Day celebration, the Democratic Progressive Party government held a troop review that was not a troop review. It showed off the new generation Hsiung Feng HF-3 anti-ship missile and Tien Kung TK-3 surface-to-air missile. It also planned to debut the Hsiung Feng HF-2 cruise missile, but the US expressed concerns and exercised its veto. A few days later word spread of Taipei’s intent to develop nuclear weapons. The international media considered these moves toward Taiwan independence by the Democratic Progressive Party as acts of defiance against the Chinese Communist Party. But to everyones’ surprise, Hu Jintao not only did not reply in kind, he offered Taipei an olive branch, in the form of a peace agreement. This immediately created the impression that the CCP was pursuing peace, while Taiwan was rattling its sabers. Chen Shui-bian seemed to be making a public declaration that he had decided to rely on military force to promote Taiwan independence.
This sudden contrast left the impression that the Chinese Communist Party was promoting peace and discouraging militarism, that Taiwan was the party escalating the conflict, promoting militarism, and discouraging peace. The Democratic Progressive Party’s “troop review that was not a troop review” and the Chinese Communist Party’s “Chang’e’s Flight to the Moon” make us wonder. Should Taiwan adopt a strategic posture of “Taiwan independence/balance of military terror?” Or should it adopt a strategic posture of “Non Taiwan independence/military assistance?”
If one wants Taiwan independence, one must increase one’s military might. About this one need have no doubt. If, on the other hand, one eschews Taiwan independence, then military force can be relegated to a secondary role. About this one also need have no doubt. If one wants to adopt a strategic posture of “Taiwan independence political strategy/balance of military terror,” one has two choices: The first is the US’s Cold War strategy. Escalate the cost of the Balance of Terror. Bankrupt the Soviet Union by means of arms race. The second is North Korea’s current strategy of “nuclear blackmail.” Trade peace gestures for international aid and US recognition. But the ROC’s wealth is diminishing day by day. It can’t even pay for educational reform. Where is it going to find the means to engage in an arms race with the Chinese Communist Party? If it chooses to adopt North Korea’s strategy of nuclear brinksmanship, when the US won’t even allow the open display of two ballistic missiles, how can it possibly allow Taiwan to develop nuclear weapons?
Besides, due to conflicting views of national identity, troops on Taiwan “don’t know whom they’re fighting for, or what they’re fighting for.” Politicians have been shortening soldiers’ terms of enlistment in response the public’s anti-war psychology. Under such conditions, Taiwan lacks the wherewithal for a military solution. Political infighting in recent years has deeply wounded public morale. This has dealt national defense a grievous blow from which it will not soon recover.
The government on Taiwan cannot possibly carry on an arms race against the Chinese Communist Party. A policy of nuclear confronation would be an unwise move. Taiwan should return to its “seven tenths politics, three tenths military development” cross-Straits policy framework. It should rely primarily upon enlightened policies, and only secondarily on military might. Put plainly, if the government pursues Taiwan independence, it must begin an arms race. Merely playing at Taiwan independence, merely screaming Taiwan independence while not actually implementing Taiwan independence, is highly disadvantageous. By contrast, if one eschews Taiwan independence, one might need to increase one’s armaments, but one can at least avoid a suicidal arms race.
Seven tenths politics, and three tenths military development is still the ROC’s best strategy for dealing with cross-Straits relations.
解讀嫦娥：台灣仍應七分政治三分軍事
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.10.30 03:54 am
十月二十四日晨，藍綠陣營在博愛特區分別發起入聯聖火及返聯鐵馬活動；是日傍晚，中共發射「嫦娥一號」繞月衛星成功。當台灣仍陷於連國家認同都無共識的困境，中共的國際勢位又見升高了一個台階。
中共成功發射「嫦娥一號」繞月球衛星，但不似當年將「兩彈一星」喻為軍事躍進的具體指標，如今面對國際質疑其太空軍事化意圖，卻反而不斷強調和平用途。若謂「嫦娥一號」沒有軍事目的，那是欺世的外交語言。「嫦娥一號」對月探測，實係中共未來建立太空站的前奏，續曲則是太空指揮中心及太空武器的部署。
值得關注的不是「嫦娥」的軍事意圖，而是中共國際戰略與兩岸戰略的變化。中共不再「耀武揚威」，改而強調探勘月球能源的「軟實力」；但這不表示中共不重視軍事發展，近二十年兩位數增加的軍事預算，顯見其持續發展軍力，只不過轉向檯面下低調進行。例如，今年初中共成功試射反衛星導彈，成為美、俄之外，第三個具備此一能力的國家，並在去年底以來陸續公布殲十戰機、○九四及○九三型核動力潛艦、東風廿一型中程導彈等新型武器，凸顯中共也在大幅擴張「硬實力」。
相對而言，民進黨政府也在今年國慶，辦了一場沒有大閱官的閱兵，並秀出雄風三型和天弓三型等新一代武器，原先要露臉的雄二Ｅ巡弋飛彈，則因美國關切臨時喊卡；不數日更傳出準備發展核武的消息。這一連串動作被不少國際媒體解讀為民進黨為推動台獨，向中共展示姿態；但是，未料胡錦濤非但未作針對性的回應，反而丟出兩岸簽署「和平協議」的橄欖枝，頓時在國際上形成中共追求和平，台灣卻炫示武力的對比。陳水扁似在向國際宣示，他已有憑藉武力推動台獨的決心。
此一對照，相當突兀。似乎呈現出中共「揚和抑武」的姿態；但台灣卻有升高衝突、「揚武抑和」的意味。如今，在台灣「國防表演」及中共「嫦娥奔月」後，似應冷靜思考：台灣究竟應採「台獨政略／軍力恐怖均衡」的戰略架構，或採「非台獨政略／軍力輔佐」的戰略架構？
欲台獨，必須加強軍力，此點不必置疑；倘採「非台獨」的政略，軍事即可居輔佐角色，這也是情理中事。若欲採「台獨政略／軍力恐怖均衡」的架構，或有兩種模式可採：一是冷戰時期美國以升高「恐怖平衡」成本，拖垮蘇聯的「軍備競賽」模式；另一則是北韓以「核訛詐」換取國際援助與美國承認的模式。但台灣綜合國力相對日下，連教改經費都吃緊，哪來與中共軍備競賽的足夠國力？若採北韓戰爭邊緣的「核訛詐」模式，則美國連雄二飛彈都不准露臉，豈會同意台灣發展核武？
何況，由於國家認同分裂，台灣軍隊充滿不知「為何而戰，為誰而戰」的低迷氛圍；且政客又不斷縮短役期，亦反映民間反戰、避戰心理。在這樣的社會因素下，台灣實在已無挑起軍事解決的條件；而近年政客內鬥對士氣民心造成的莫大傷害，更儼然已成國防上的不治之症，恐已復原無日。
台灣沒有可能與中共進行「軍備競賽」，台灣若走持有核武的偏鋒亦顯非明智之舉。台灣的兩岸政策，仍應回歸「七分政治、三分軍事」的比例與架構。以正確的「政略」為主，以必要軍備的「軍略」為輔。明白地說，倘採台獨政略，即必須走向軍備競賽之途，否則即是「鬧台獨／不敢台獨」的假台獨，對台灣極為不利；相對而言，若採「非台獨」的「政略」，固然仍須加強必要軍備，卻可避免走上軍備競賽的自殺之途。
七分政治，三分軍事，仍是台灣在處理兩岸關係時的最佳戰略。
Chang’e-1: Seven Tenths Politics, Three Tenths Military Development
Leave a CommentChang’e-1: Seven Tenths Politics, Three Tenths Military Development
United Daily New editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 30, 2007
On the morning of October 24, the Green camp launched its “Join the UN Torch Relay.” The Blue camp launched its “Return to the UN Bicycle Tour.” On the evening of the same day, the Red Camp, i.e., the Chinese Communist Party, launched its Chang’e-1 satellite, which successfully orbited the moon. While political parties on Taiwan were mired in endless national identity struggles, the Chinese mainland’s strategic might took a quantum leap.
The Chinese Communist Party succeeded in launching its Chang’e-1 satellite. However it did not characterize it as a “Great Leap Forward” for the military, the way it did for nuclear bombs, incontinental ballistic missiles, and man-made satellites a number of years ago. Now it faces international concerns about the militarization of outer space. Therefore it constantly emphasizes its peaceful uses. To claim that Chang’e-1 has no military function would be a lie. The Chang’e-1’s exploration of the moon is a prelude to the construction of a space station. It will be followed by an outer space control center and outer space weapons deployment.
What’s noteworthy is not the Chang’e-1’s military implications, but the Chinese Communist Party’s change in international and cross-Straits strategy. The Chinese Communist Party no longer bluffs and blusters. It now emphasizes the soft power exemplified by its exploration of the moon. This does not mean the Chinese Communist Party no longer values military development. Its military expenditures have increased in double digits for the past 20 years. Obviously it is continuing to develop its military capability, It is merely doing so at a lower key. For example, early this year the Chinese Communist Party successfully test-fired its first antisatellite missile, becoming the third nation besides America and Russia with this capability. Over the course of last year it introduced the J-10 multirole fighter plane, the nuclear powered Type 094 ballistic missile submarine and Type 093 attack submarine, the East Wind 20 medium range ballistic missile and other new weapons. These reveal that the Chinese Communist Party is also increasing its hard power.
By contrast, during this year’s National Day celebration, the Democratic Progressive Party government held a troop review that was not a troop review. It showed off the new generation Hsiung Feng HF-3 anti-ship missile and Tien Kung TK-3 surface-to-air missile. It also planned to debut the Hsiung Feng HF-2 cruise missile, but the US expressed concerns and exercised its veto. A few days later word spread of Taipei’s intent to develop nuclear weapons. The international media considered these moves toward Taiwan independence by the Democratic Progressive Party as acts of defiance against the Chinese Communist Party. But to everyones’ surprise, Hu Jintao not only did not reply in kind, he offered Taipei an olive branch, in the form of a peace agreement. This immediately created the impression that the CCP was pursuing peace, while Taiwan was rattling its sabers. Chen Shui-bian seemed to be making a public declaration that he had decided to rely on military force to promote Taiwan independence.
This sudden contrast left the impression that the Chinese Communist Party was promoting peace and discouraging militarism, that Taiwan was the party escalating the conflict, promoting militarism, and discouraging peace. The Democratic Progressive Party’s “troop review that was not a troop review” and the Chinese Communist Party’s “Chang’e’s Flight to the Moon” make us wonder. Should Taiwan adopt a strategic posture of “Taiwan independence/balance of military terror?” Or should it adopt a strategic posture of “Non Taiwan independence/military assistance?”
If one wants Taiwan independence, one must increase one’s military might. About this one need have no doubt. If, on the other hand, one eschews Taiwan independence, then military force can be relegated to a secondary role. About this one also need have no doubt. If one wants to adopt a strategic posture of “Taiwan independence political strategy/balance of military terror,” one has two choices: The first is the US’s Cold War strategy. Escalate the cost of the Balance of Terror. Bankrupt the Soviet Union by means of arms race. The second is North Korea’s current strategy of “nuclear blackmail.” Trade peace gestures for international aid and US recognition. But the ROC’s wealth is diminishing day by day. It can’t even pay for educational reform. Where is it going to find the means to engage in an arms race with the Chinese Communist Party? If it chooses to adopt North Korea’s strategy of nuclear brinksmanship, when the US won’t even allow the open display of two ballistic missiles, how can it possibly allow Taiwan to develop nuclear weapons?
Besides, due to conflicting views of national identity, troops on Taiwan “don’t know whom they’re fighting for, or what they’re fighting for.” Politicians have been shortening soldiers’ terms of enlistment in response the public’s anti-war psychology. Under such conditions, Taiwan lacks the wherewithal for a military solution. Political infighting in recent years has deeply wounded public morale. This has dealt national defense a grievous blow from which it will not soon recover.
The government on Taiwan cannot possibly carry on an arms race against the Chinese Communist Party. A policy of nuclear confronation would be an unwise move. Taiwan should return to its “seven tenths politics, three tenths military development” cross-Straits policy framework. It should rely primarily upon enlightened policies, and only secondarily on military might. Put plainly, if the government pursues Taiwan independence, it must begin an arms race. Merely playing at Taiwan independence, merely screaming Taiwan independence while not actually implementing Taiwan independence, is highly disadvantageous. By contrast, if one eschews Taiwan independence, one might need to increase one’s armaments, but one can at least avoid a suicidal arms race.
Seven tenths politics, and three tenths military development is still the ROC’s best strategy for dealing with cross-Straits relations.
解讀嫦娥：台灣仍應七分政治三分軍事
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.10.30 03:54 am
十月二十四日晨，藍綠陣營在博愛特區分別發起入聯聖火及返聯鐵馬活動；是日傍晚，中共發射「嫦娥一號」繞月衛星成功。當台灣仍陷於連國家認同都無共識的困境，中共的國際勢位又見升高了一個台階。
中共成功發射「嫦娥一號」繞月球衛星，但不似當年將「兩彈一星」喻為軍事躍進的具體指標，如今面對國際質疑其太空軍事化意圖，卻反而不斷強調和平用途。若謂「嫦娥一號」沒有軍事目的，那是欺世的外交語言。「嫦娥一號」對月探測，實係中共未來建立太空站的前奏，續曲則是太空指揮中心及太空武器的部署。
值得關注的不是「嫦娥」的軍事意圖，而是中共國際戰略與兩岸戰略的變化。中共不再「耀武揚威」，改而強調探勘月球能源的「軟實力」；但這不表示中共不重視軍事發展，近二十年兩位數增加的軍事預算，顯見其持續發展軍力，只不過轉向檯面下低調進行。例如，今年初中共成功試射反衛星導彈，成為美、俄之外，第三個具備此一能力的國家，並在去年底以來陸續公布殲十戰機、○九四及○九三型核動力潛艦、東風廿一型中程導彈等新型武器，凸顯中共也在大幅擴張「硬實力」。
相對而言，民進黨政府也在今年國慶，辦了一場沒有大閱官的閱兵，並秀出雄風三型和天弓三型等新一代武器，原先要露臉的雄二Ｅ巡弋飛彈，則因美國關切臨時喊卡；不數日更傳出準備發展核武的消息。這一連串動作被不少國際媒體解讀為民進黨為推動台獨，向中共展示姿態；但是，未料胡錦濤非但未作針對性的回應，反而丟出兩岸簽署「和平協議」的橄欖枝，頓時在國際上形成中共追求和平，台灣卻炫示武力的對比。陳水扁似在向國際宣示，他已有憑藉武力推動台獨的決心。
此一對照，相當突兀。似乎呈現出中共「揚和抑武」的姿態；但台灣卻有升高衝突、「揚武抑和」的意味。如今，在台灣「國防表演」及中共「嫦娥奔月」後，似應冷靜思考：台灣究竟應採「台獨政略／軍力恐怖均衡」的戰略架構，或採「非台獨政略／軍力輔佐」的戰略架構？
欲台獨，必須加強軍力，此點不必置疑；倘採「非台獨」的政略，軍事即可居輔佐角色，這也是情理中事。若欲採「台獨政略／軍力恐怖均衡」的架構，或有兩種模式可採：一是冷戰時期美國以升高「恐怖平衡」成本，拖垮蘇聯的「軍備競賽」模式；另一則是北韓以「核訛詐」換取國際援助與美國承認的模式。但台灣綜合國力相對日下，連教改經費都吃緊，哪來與中共軍備競賽的足夠國力？若採北韓戰爭邊緣的「核訛詐」模式，則美國連雄二飛彈都不准露臉，豈會同意台灣發展核武？
何況，由於國家認同分裂，台灣軍隊充滿不知「為何而戰，為誰而戰」的低迷氛圍；且政客又不斷縮短役期，亦反映民間反戰、避戰心理。在這樣的社會因素下，台灣實在已無挑起軍事解決的條件；而近年政客內鬥對士氣民心造成的莫大傷害，更儼然已成國防上的不治之症，恐已復原無日。
台灣沒有可能與中共進行「軍備競賽」，台灣若走持有核武的偏鋒亦顯非明智之舉。台灣的兩岸政策，仍應回歸「七分政治、三分軍事」的比例與架構。以正確的「政略」為主，以必要軍備的「軍略」為輔。明白地說，倘採台獨政略，即必須走向軍備競賽之途，否則即是「鬧台獨／不敢台獨」的假台獨，對台灣極為不利；相對而言，若採「非台獨」的「政略」，固然仍須加強必要軍備，卻可避免走上軍備競賽的自殺之途。
七分政治，三分軍事，仍是台灣在處理兩岸關係時的最佳戰略。
Chang’e-1: Seven Tenths Politics, Three Tenths Military Development
Chang’e-1: Seven Tenths Politics, Three Tenths Military Development
United Daily New editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 30, 2007
On the morning of October 24, the Green camp launched its “Join the UN Torch Relay.” The Blue camp launched its “Return to the UN Bicycle Tour.” On the evening of the same day, the Red Camp, i.e., the Chinese Communist Party, launched its Chang’e-1 satellite, which successfully orbited the moon. While political parties on Taiwan were mired in endless national identity struggles, the Chinese mainland’s strategic might took a quantum leap.
The Chinese Communist Party succeeded in launching its Chang’e-1 satellite. However it did not characterize it as a “Great Leap Forward” for the military, the way it did for nuclear bombs, incontinental ballistic missiles, and man-made satellites a number of years ago. Now it faces international concerns about the militarization of outer space. Therefore it constantly emphasizes its peaceful uses. To claim that Chang’e-1 has no military function would be a lie. The Chang’e-1’s exploration of the moon is a prelude to the construction of a space station. It will be followed by an outer space control center and outer space weapons deployment.
What’s noteworthy is not the Chang’e-1’s military implications, but the Chinese Communist Party’s change in international and cross-Straits strategy. The Chinese Communist Party no longer bluffs and blusters. It now emphasizes the soft power exemplified by its exploration of the moon. This does not mean the Chinese Communist Party no longer values military development. Its military expenditures have increased in double digits for the past 20 years. Obviously it is continuing to develop its military capability, It is merely doing so at a lower key. For example, early this year the Chinese Communist Party successfully test-fired its first antisatellite missile, becoming the third nation besides America and Russia with this capability. Over the course of last year it introduced the J-10 multirole fighter plane, the nuclear powered Type 094 ballistic missile submarine and Type 093 attack submarine, the East Wind 20 medium range ballistic missile and other new weapons. These reveal that the Chinese Communist Party is also increasing its hard power.
By contrast, during this year’s National Day celebration, the Democratic Progressive Party government held a troop review that was not a troop review. It showed off the new generation Hsiung Feng HF-3 anti-ship missile and Tien Kung TK-3 surface-to-air missile. It also planned to debut the Hsiung Feng HF-2 cruise missile, but the US expressed concerns and exercised its veto. A few days later word spread of Taipei’s intent to develop nuclear weapons. The international media considered these moves toward Taiwan independence by the Democratic Progressive Party as acts of defiance against the Chinese Communist Party. But to everyones’ surprise, Hu Jintao not only did not reply in kind, he offered Taipei an olive branch, in the form of a peace agreement. This immediately created the impression that the CCP was pursuing peace, while Taiwan was rattling its sabers. Chen Shui-bian seemed to be making a public declaration that he had decided to rely on military force to promote Taiwan independence.
This sudden contrast left the impression that the Chinese Communist Party was promoting peace and discouraging militarism, that Taiwan was the party escalating the conflict, promoting militarism, and discouraging peace. The Democratic Progressive Party’s “troop review that was not a troop review” and the Chinese Communist Party’s “Chang’e’s Flight to the Moon” make us wonder. Should Taiwan adopt a strategic posture of “Taiwan independence/balance of military terror?” Or should it adopt a strategic posture of “Non Taiwan independence/military assistance?”
If one wants Taiwan independence, one must increase one’s military might. About this one need have no doubt. If, on the other hand, one eschews Taiwan independence, then military force can be relegated to a secondary role. About this one also need have no doubt. If one wants to adopt a strategic posture of “Taiwan independence political strategy/balance of military terror,” one has two choices: The first is the US’s Cold War strategy. Escalate the cost of the Balance of Terror. Bankrupt the Soviet Union by means of arms race. The second is North Korea’s current strategy of “nuclear blackmail.” Trade peace gestures for international aid and US recognition. But the ROC’s wealth is diminishing day by day. It can’t even pay for educational reform. Where is it going to find the means to engage in an arms race with the Chinese Communist Party? If it chooses to adopt North Korea’s strategy of nuclear brinksmanship, when the US won’t even allow the open display of two ballistic missiles, how can it possibly allow Taiwan to develop nuclear weapons?
Besides, due to conflicting views of national identity, troops on Taiwan “don’t know whom they’re fighting for, or what they’re fighting for.” Politicians have been shortening soldiers’ terms of enlistment in response the public’s anti-war psychology. Under such conditions, Taiwan lacks the wherewithal for a military solution. Political infighting in recent years has deeply wounded public morale. This has dealt national defense a grievous blow from which it will not soon recover.
The government on Taiwan cannot possibly carry on an arms race against the Chinese Communist Party. A policy of nuclear confronation would be an unwise move. Taiwan should return to its “seven tenths politics, three tenths military development” cross-Straits policy framework. It should rely primarily upon enlightened policies, and only secondarily on military might. Put plainly, if the government pursues Taiwan independence, it must begin an arms race. Merely playing at Taiwan independence, merely screaming Taiwan independence while not actually implementing Taiwan independence, is highly disadvantageous. By contrast, if one eschews Taiwan independence, one might need to increase one’s armaments, but one can at least avoid a suicidal arms race.
Seven tenths politics, and three tenths military development is still the ROC’s best strategy for dealing with cross-Straits relations.
解讀嫦娥：台灣仍應七分政治三分軍事
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.10.30 03:54 am
十月二十四日晨，藍綠陣營在博愛特區分別發起入聯聖火及返聯鐵馬活動；是日傍晚，中共發射「嫦娥一號」繞月衛星成功。當台灣仍陷於連國家認同都無共識的困境，中共的國際勢位又見升高了一個台階。
中共成功發射「嫦娥一號」繞月球衛星，但不似當年將「兩彈一星」喻為軍事躍進的具體指標，如今面對國際質疑其太空軍事化意圖，卻反而不斷強調和平用途。若謂「嫦娥一號」沒有軍事目的，那是欺世的外交語言。「嫦娥一號」對月探測，實係中共未來建立太空站的前奏，續曲則是太空指揮中心及太空武器的部署。
值得關注的不是「嫦娥」的軍事意圖，而是中共國際戰略與兩岸戰略的變化。中共不再「耀武揚威」，改而強調探勘月球能源的「軟實力」；但這不表示中共不重視軍事發展，近二十年兩位數增加的軍事預算，顯見其持續發展軍力，只不過轉向檯面下低調進行。例如，今年初中共成功試射反衛星導彈，成為美、俄之外，第三個具備此一能力的國家，並在去年底以來陸續公布殲十戰機、○九四及○九三型核動力潛艦、東風廿一型中程導彈等新型武器，凸顯中共也在大幅擴張「硬實力」。
相對而言，民進黨政府也在今年國慶，辦了一場沒有大閱官的閱兵，並秀出雄風三型和天弓三型等新一代武器，原先要露臉的雄二Ｅ巡弋飛彈，則因美國關切臨時喊卡；不數日更傳出準備發展核武的消息。這一連串動作被不少國際媒體解讀為民進黨為推動台獨，向中共展示姿態；但是，未料胡錦濤非但未作針對性的回應，反而丟出兩岸簽署「和平協議」的橄欖枝，頓時在國際上形成中共追求和平，台灣卻炫示武力的對比。陳水扁似在向國際宣示，他已有憑藉武力推動台獨的決心。
此一對照，相當突兀。似乎呈現出中共「揚和抑武」的姿態；但台灣卻有升高衝突、「揚武抑和」的意味。如今，在台灣「國防表演」及中共「嫦娥奔月」後，似應冷靜思考：台灣究竟應採「台獨政略／軍力恐怖均衡」的戰略架構，或採「非台獨政略／軍力輔佐」的戰略架構？
欲台獨，必須加強軍力，此點不必置疑；倘採「非台獨」的政略，軍事即可居輔佐角色，這也是情理中事。若欲採「台獨政略／軍力恐怖均衡」的架構，或有兩種模式可採：一是冷戰時期美國以升高「恐怖平衡」成本，拖垮蘇聯的「軍備競賽」模式；另一則是北韓以「核訛詐」換取國際援助與美國承認的模式。但台灣綜合國力相對日下，連教改經費都吃緊，哪來與中共軍備競賽的足夠國力？若採北韓戰爭邊緣的「核訛詐」模式，則美國連雄二飛彈都不准露臉，豈會同意台灣發展核武？
何況，由於國家認同分裂，台灣軍隊充滿不知「為何而戰，為誰而戰」的低迷氛圍；且政客又不斷縮短役期，亦反映民間反戰、避戰心理。在這樣的社會因素下，台灣實在已無挑起軍事解決的條件；而近年政客內鬥對士氣民心造成的莫大傷害，更儼然已成國防上的不治之症，恐已復原無日。
台灣沒有可能與中共進行「軍備競賽」，台灣若走持有核武的偏鋒亦顯非明智之舉。台灣的兩岸政策，仍應回歸「七分政治、三分軍事」的比例與架構。以正確的「政略」為主，以必要軍備的「軍略」為輔。明白地說，倘採台獨政略，即必須走向軍備競賽之途，否則即是「鬧台獨／不敢台獨」的假台獨，對台灣極為不利；相對而言，若採「非台獨」的「政略」，固然仍須加強必要軍備，卻可避免走上軍備競賽的自殺之途。
七分政治，三分軍事，仍是台灣在處理兩岸關係時的最佳戰略。
Chang’e-1: Seven Tenths Politics, Three Tenths Military Development
Chang’e-1: Seven Tenths Politics, Three Tenths Military Development
United Daily New editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 30, 2007
On the morning of October 24, the Green camp launched its “Join the UN Torch Relay.” The Blue camp launched its “Return to the UN Bicycle Tour.” On the evening of the same day, the Red Camp, i.e., the Chinese Communist Party, launched its Chang’e-1 satellite, which successfully orbited the moon. While political parties on Taiwan were mired in endless national identity struggles, the Chinese mainland’s strategic might took a quantum leap.
The Chinese Communist Party succeeded in launching its Chang’e-1 satellite. However it did not characterize it as a “Great Leap Forward” for the military, the way it did for nuclear bombs, incontinental ballistic missiles, and man-made satellites a number of years ago. Now it faces international concerns about the militarization of outer space. Therefore it constantly emphasizes its peaceful uses. To claim that Chang’e-1 has no military function would be a lie. The Chang’e-1’s exploration of the moon is a prelude to the construction of a space station. It will be followed by an outer space control center and outer space weapons deployment.
What’s noteworthy is not the Chang’e-1’s military implications, but the Chinese Communist Party’s change in international and cross-Straits strategy. The Chinese Communist Party no longer bluffs and blusters. It now emphasizes the soft power exemplified by its exploration of the moon. This does not mean the Chinese Communist Party no longer values military development. Its military expenditures have increased in double digits for the past 20 years. Obviously it is continuing to develop its military capability, It is merely doing so at a lower key. For example, early this year the Chinese Communist Party successfully test-fired its first antisatellite missile, becoming the third nation besides America and Russia with this capability. Over the course of last year it introduced the J-10 multirole fighter plane, the nuclear powered Type 094 ballistic missile submarine and Type 093 attack submarine, the East Wind 20 medium range ballistic missile and other new weapons. These reveal that the Chinese Communist Party is also increasing its hard power.
By contrast, during this year’s National Day celebration, the Democratic Progressive Party government held a troop review that was not a troop review. It showed off the new generation Hsiung Feng HF-3 anti-ship missile and Tien Kung TK-3 surface-to-air missile. It also planned to debut the Hsiung Feng HF-2 cruise missile, but the US expressed concerns and exercised its veto. A few days later word spread of Taipei’s intent to develop nuclear weapons. The international media considered these moves toward Taiwan independence by the Democratic Progressive Party as acts of defiance against the Chinese Communist Party. But to everyones’ surprise, Hu Jintao not only did not reply in kind, he offered Taipei an olive branch, in the form of a peace agreement. This immediately created the impression that the CCP was pursuing peace, while Taiwan was rattling its sabers. Chen Shui-bian seemed to be making a public declaration that he had decided to rely on military force to promote Taiwan independence.
This sudden contrast left the impression that the Chinese Communist Party was promoting peace and discouraging militarism, that Taiwan was the party escalating the conflict, promoting militarism, and discouraging peace. The Democratic Progressive Party’s “troop review that was not a troop review” and the Chinese Communist Party’s “Chang’e’s Flight to the Moon” make us wonder. Should Taiwan adopt a strategic posture of “Taiwan independence/balance of military terror?” Or should it adopt a strategic posture of “Non Taiwan independence/military assistance?”
If one wants Taiwan independence, one must increase one’s military might. About this one need have no doubt. If, on the other hand, one eschews Taiwan independence, then military force can be relegated to a secondary role. About this one also need have no doubt. If one wants to adopt a strategic posture of “Taiwan independence political strategy/balance of military terror,” one has two choices: The first is the US’s Cold War strategy. Escalate the cost of the Balance of Terror. Bankrupt the Soviet Union by means of arms race. The second is North Korea’s current strategy of “nuclear blackmail.” Trade peace gestures for international aid and US recognition. But the ROC’s wealth is diminishing day by day. It can’t even pay for educational reform. Where is it going to find the means to engage in an arms race with the Chinese Communist Party? If it chooses to adopt North Korea’s strategy of nuclear brinksmanship, when the US won’t even allow the open display of two ballistic missiles, how can it possibly allow Taiwan to develop nuclear weapons?
Besides, due to conflicting views of national identity, troops on Taiwan “don’t know whom they’re fighting for, or what they’re fighting for.” Politicians have been shortening soldiers’ terms of enlistment in response the public’s anti-war psychology. Under such conditions, Taiwan lacks the wherewithal for a military solution. Political infighting in recent years has deeply wounded public morale. This has dealt national defense a grievous blow from which it will not soon recover.
The government on Taiwan cannot possibly carry on an arms race against the Chinese Communist Party. A policy of nuclear confronation would be an unwise move. Taiwan should return to its “seven tenths politics, three tenths military development” cross-Straits policy framework. It should rely primarily upon enlightened policies, and only secondarily on military might. Put plainly, if the government pursues Taiwan independence, it must begin an arms race. Merely playing at Taiwan independence, merely screaming Taiwan independence while not actually implementing Taiwan independence, is highly disadvantageous. By contrast, if one eschews Taiwan independence, one might need to increase one’s armaments, but one can at least avoid a suicidal arms race.
Seven tenths politics, and three tenths military development is still the ROC’s best strategy for dealing with cross-Straits relations.
解讀嫦娥：台灣仍應七分政治三分軍事
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.10.30 03:54 am
十月二十四日晨，藍綠陣營在博愛特區分別發起入聯聖火及返聯鐵馬活動；是日傍晚，中共發射「嫦娥一號」繞月衛星成功。當台灣仍陷於連國家認同都無共識的困境，中共的國際勢位又見升高了一個台階。
中共成功發射「嫦娥一號」繞月球衛星，但不似當年將「兩彈一星」喻為軍事躍進的具體指標，如今面對國際質疑其太空軍事化意圖，卻反而不斷強調和平用途。若謂「嫦娥一號」沒有軍事目的，那是欺世的外交語言。「嫦娥一號」對月探測，實係中共未來建立太空站的前奏，續曲則是太空指揮中心及太空武器的部署。
值得關注的不是「嫦娥」的軍事意圖，而是中共國際戰略與兩岸戰略的變化。中共不再「耀武揚威」，改而強調探勘月球能源的「軟實力」；但這不表示中共不重視軍事發展，近二十年兩位數增加的軍事預算，顯見其持續發展軍力，只不過轉向檯面下低調進行。例如，今年初中共成功試射反衛星導彈，成為美、俄之外，第三個具備此一能力的國家，並在去年底以來陸續公布殲十戰機、○九四及○九三型核動力潛艦、東風廿一型中程導彈等新型武器，凸顯中共也在大幅擴張「硬實力」。
相對而言，民進黨政府也在今年國慶，辦了一場沒有大閱官的閱兵，並秀出雄風三型和天弓三型等新一代武器，原先要露臉的雄二Ｅ巡弋飛彈，則因美國關切臨時喊卡；不數日更傳出準備發展核武的消息。這一連串動作被不少國際媒體解讀為民進黨為推動台獨，向中共展示姿態；但是，未料胡錦濤非但未作針對性的回應，反而丟出兩岸簽署「和平協議」的橄欖枝，頓時在國際上形成中共追求和平，台灣卻炫示武力的對比。陳水扁似在向國際宣示，他已有憑藉武力推動台獨的決心。
此一對照，相當突兀。似乎呈現出中共「揚和抑武」的姿態；但台灣卻有升高衝突、「揚武抑和」的意味。如今，在台灣「國防表演」及中共「嫦娥奔月」後，似應冷靜思考：台灣究竟應採「台獨政略／軍力恐怖均衡」的戰略架構，或採「非台獨政略／軍力輔佐」的戰略架構？
欲台獨，必須加強軍力，此點不必置疑；倘採「非台獨」的政略，軍事即可居輔佐角色，這也是情理中事。若欲採「台獨政略／軍力恐怖均衡」的架構，或有兩種模式可採：一是冷戰時期美國以升高「恐怖平衡」成本，拖垮蘇聯的「軍備競賽」模式；另一則是北韓以「核訛詐」換取國際援助與美國承認的模式。但台灣綜合國力相對日下，連教改經費都吃緊，哪來與中共軍備競賽的足夠國力？若採北韓戰爭邊緣的「核訛詐」模式，則美國連雄二飛彈都不准露臉，豈會同意台灣發展核武？
何況，由於國家認同分裂，台灣軍隊充滿不知「為何而戰，為誰而戰」的低迷氛圍；且政客又不斷縮短役期，亦反映民間反戰、避戰心理。在這樣的社會因素下，台灣實在已無挑起軍事解決的條件；而近年政客內鬥對士氣民心造成的莫大傷害，更儼然已成國防上的不治之症，恐已復原無日。
台灣沒有可能與中共進行「軍備競賽」，台灣若走持有核武的偏鋒亦顯非明智之舉。台灣的兩岸政策，仍應回歸「七分政治、三分軍事」的比例與架構。以正確的「政略」為主，以必要軍備的「軍略」為輔。明白地說，倘採台獨政略，即必須走向軍備競賽之途，否則即是「鬧台獨／不敢台獨」的假台獨，對台灣極為不利；相對而言，若採「非台獨」的「政略」，固然仍須加強必要軍備，卻可避免走上軍備競賽的自殺之途。
七分政治，三分軍事，仍是台灣在處理兩岸關係時的最佳戰略。
Chang’e-1: Seven Tenths Politics, Three Tenths Military Development
Chang’e-1: Seven Tenths Politics, Three Tenths Military Development
United Daily New editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 30, 2007
On the morning of October 24, the Green camp launched its “Join the UN Torch Relay.” The Blue camp launched its “Return to the UN Bicycle Tour.” On the evening of the same day, the Red Camp, i.e., the Chinese Communist Party, launched its Chang’e-1 satellite, which successfully orbited the moon. While political parties on Taiwan were mired in endless national identity struggles, the Chinese mainland’s strategic might took a quantum leap.
The Chinese Communist Party succeeded in launching its Chang’e-1 satellite. However it did not characterize it as a “Great Leap Forward” for the military, the way it did for nuclear bombs, incontinental ballistic missiles, and man-made satellites a number of years ago. Now it faces international concerns about the militarization of outer space. Therefore it constantly emphasizes its peaceful uses. To claim that Chang’e-1 has no military function would be a lie. The Chang’e-1’s exploration of the moon is a prelude to the construction of a space station. It will be followed by an outer space control center and outer space weapons deployment.
What’s noteworthy is not the Chang’e-1’s military implications, but the Chinese Communist Party’s change in international and cross-Straits strategy. The Chinese Communist Party no longer bluffs and blusters. It now emphasizes the soft power exemplified by its exploration of the moon. This does not mean the Chinese Communist Party no longer values military development. Its military expenditures have increased in double digits for the past 20 years. Obviously it is continuing to develop its military capability, It is merely doing so at a lower key. For example, early this year the Chinese Communist Party successfully test-fired its first antisatellite missile, becoming the third nation besides America and Russia with this capability. Over the course of last year it introduced the J-10 multirole fighter plane, the nuclear powered Type 094 ballistic missile submarine and Type 093 attack submarine, the East Wind 20 medium range ballistic missile and other new weapons. These reveal that the Chinese Communist Party is also increasing its hard power.
By contrast, during this year’s National Day celebration, the Democratic Progressive Party government held a troop review that was not a troop review. It showed off the new generation Hsiung Feng HF-3 anti-ship missile and Tien Kung TK-3 surface-to-air missile. It also planned to debut the Hsiung Feng HF-2 cruise missile, but the US expressed concerns and exercised its veto. A few days later word spread of Taipei’s intent to develop nuclear weapons. The international media considered these moves toward Taiwan independence by the Democratic Progressive Party as acts of defiance against the Chinese Communist Party. But to everyones’ surprise, Hu Jintao not only did not reply in kind, he offered Taipei an olive branch, in the form of a peace agreement. This immediately created the impression that the CCP was pursuing peace, while Taiwan was rattling its sabers. Chen Shui-bian seemed to be making a public declaration that he had decided to rely on military force to promote Taiwan independence.
This sudden contrast left the impression that the Chinese Communist Party was promoting peace and discouraging militarism, that Taiwan was the party escalating the conflict, promoting militarism, and discouraging peace. The Democratic Progressive Party’s “troop review that was not a troop review” and the Chinese Communist Party’s “Chang’e’s Flight to the Moon” make us wonder. Should Taiwan adopt a strategic posture of “Taiwan independence/balance of military terror?” Or should it adopt a strategic posture of “Non Taiwan independence/military assistance?”
If one wants Taiwan independence, one must increase one’s military might. About this one need have no doubt. If, on the other hand, one eschews Taiwan independence, then military force can be relegated to a secondary role. About this one also need have no doubt. If one wants to adopt a strategic posture of “Taiwan independence political strategy/balance of military terror,” one has two choices: The first is the US’s Cold War strategy. Escalate the cost of the Balance of Terror. Bankrupt the Soviet Union by means of arms race. The second is North Korea’s current strategy of “nuclear blackmail.” Trade peace gestures for international aid and US recognition. But the ROC’s wealth is diminishing day by day. It can’t even pay for educational reform. Where is it going to find the means to engage in an arms race with the Chinese Communist Party? If it chooses to adopt North Korea’s strategy of nuclear brinksmanship, when the US won’t even allow the open display of two ballistic missiles, how can it possibly allow Taiwan to develop nuclear weapons?
Besides, due to conflicting views of national identity, troops on Taiwan “don’t know whom they’re fighting for, or what they’re fighting for.” Politicians have been shortening soldiers’ terms of enlistment in response the public’s anti-war psychology. Under such conditions, Taiwan lacks the wherewithal for a military solution. Political infighting in recent years has deeply wounded public morale. This has dealt national defense a grievous blow from which it will not soon recover.
The government on Taiwan cannot possibly carry on an arms race against the Chinese Communist Party. A policy of nuclear confronation would be an unwise move. Taiwan should return to its “seven tenths politics, three tenths military development” cross-Straits policy framework. It should rely primarily upon enlightened policies, and only secondarily on military might. Put plainly, if the government pursues Taiwan independence, it must begin an arms race. Merely playing at Taiwan independence, merely screaming Taiwan independence while not actually implementing Taiwan independence, is highly disadvantageous. By contrast, if one eschews Taiwan independence, one might need to increase one’s armaments, but one can at least avoid a suicidal arms race.
Seven tenths politics, and three tenths military development is still the ROC’s best strategy for dealing with cross-Straits relations.
解讀嫦娥：台灣仍應七分政治三分軍事
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.10.30 03:54 am
十月二十四日晨，藍綠陣營在博愛特區分別發起入聯聖火及返聯鐵馬活動；是日傍晚，中共發射「嫦娥一號」繞月衛星成功。當台灣仍陷於連國家認同都無共識的困境，中共的國際勢位又見升高了一個台階。
中共成功發射「嫦娥一號」繞月球衛星，但不似當年將「兩彈一星」喻為軍事躍進的具體指標，如今面對國際質疑其太空軍事化意圖，卻反而不斷強調和平用途。若謂「嫦娥一號」沒有軍事目的，那是欺世的外交語言。「嫦娥一號」對月探測，實係中共未來建立太空站的前奏，續曲則是太空指揮中心及太空武器的部署。
值得關注的不是「嫦娥」的軍事意圖，而是中共國際戰略與兩岸戰略的變化。中共不再「耀武揚威」，改而強調探勘月球能源的「軟實力」；但這不表示中共不重視軍事發展，近二十年兩位數增加的軍事預算，顯見其持續發展軍力，只不過轉向檯面下低調進行。例如，今年初中共成功試射反衛星導彈，成為美、俄之外，第三個具備此一能力的國家，並在去年底以來陸續公布殲十戰機、○九四及○九三型核動力潛艦、東風廿一型中程導彈等新型武器，凸顯中共也在大幅擴張「硬實力」。
相對而言，民進黨政府也在今年國慶，辦了一場沒有大閱官的閱兵，並秀出雄風三型和天弓三型等新一代武器，原先要露臉的雄二Ｅ巡弋飛彈，則因美國關切臨時喊卡；不數日更傳出準備發展核武的消息。這一連串動作被不少國際媒體解讀為民進黨為推動台獨，向中共展示姿態；但是，未料胡錦濤非但未作針對性的回應，反而丟出兩岸簽署「和平協議」的橄欖枝，頓時在國際上形成中共追求和平，台灣卻炫示武力的對比。陳水扁似在向國際宣示，他已有憑藉武力推動台獨的決心。
此一對照，相當突兀。似乎呈現出中共「揚和抑武」的姿態；但台灣卻有升高衝突、「揚武抑和」的意味。如今，在台灣「國防表演」及中共「嫦娥奔月」後，似應冷靜思考：台灣究竟應採「台獨政略／軍力恐怖均衡」的戰略架構，或採「非台獨政略／軍力輔佐」的戰略架構？
欲台獨，必須加強軍力，此點不必置疑；倘採「非台獨」的政略，軍事即可居輔佐角色，這也是情理中事。若欲採「台獨政略／軍力恐怖均衡」的架構，或有兩種模式可採：一是冷戰時期美國以升高「恐怖平衡」成本，拖垮蘇聯的「軍備競賽」模式；另一則是北韓以「核訛詐」換取國際援助與美國承認的模式。但台灣綜合國力相對日下，連教改經費都吃緊，哪來與中共軍備競賽的足夠國力？若採北韓戰爭邊緣的「核訛詐」模式，則美國連雄二飛彈都不准露臉，豈會同意台灣發展核武？
何況，由於國家認同分裂，台灣軍隊充滿不知「為何而戰，為誰而戰」的低迷氛圍；且政客又不斷縮短役期，亦反映民間反戰、避戰心理。在這樣的社會因素下，台灣實在已無挑起軍事解決的條件；而近年政客內鬥對士氣民心造成的莫大傷害，更儼然已成國防上的不治之症，恐已復原無日。
台灣沒有可能與中共進行「軍備競賽」，台灣若走持有核武的偏鋒亦顯非明智之舉。台灣的兩岸政策，仍應回歸「七分政治、三分軍事」的比例與架構。以正確的「政略」為主，以必要軍備的「軍略」為輔。明白地說，倘採台獨政略，即必須走向軍備競賽之途，否則即是「鬧台獨／不敢台獨」的假台獨，對台灣極為不利；相對而言，若採「非台獨」的「政略」，固然仍須加強必要軍備，卻可避免走上軍備競賽的自殺之途。
七分政治，三分軍事，仍是台灣在處理兩岸關係時的最佳戰略。
The Role of Hsieh Chih Wei in the Democratic Progressive Party
The Role of Hsieh Chih Wei in the Democratic Progressive Party
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 29, 2007
Whether the event is the Democratic Progressive Party’s “Join the UN Torch Relay” or an election rally, the person guaranteed to make the biggest splash is Hsieh Chih-wei. His popularity exceeds even that of Chen Shui-bian, Frank Hsieh, and Su Tseng-chang.
Hsieh Chih-wei would be well-suited for the role of variety show host. He would do a terrific job of livening things up. He might sing Karaoke, or take the lead on the dance floor. Every guest would be sure to have a roaring good time. But Hsieh Chih-wei is not a variety show host. He is the Chief of the Government Information Office. He is the government’s top spokesman.
As the government’s number one mouthpiece, Hsieh Chih-wei fills a vital role within the Chen regime. When Chen Shui-bian attends a summit with an ally, and puts his foot in his mouth by asking Palau’s president “Whom did you embrace in bed last night?”, Hsieh Chih-wei’s job is to break into an impromptu dance or rap song, drawing attention away from Chen’s faux pas. But as Government Information Officer, Hsieh Chih-wei has another job. To provoke opposition party lawmakers to such fits of anger that they shout “Sit down! You sit down!” His job is to demonstrate how the executive branch “checks and balances” the legislative branch. He has done such a great job his colleague Shih Mao-ling gave Hsieh a big thumbs up.
And no wonder. In reference to Hsieh Chih-wei, former Central Election Committee Chairman Huang Shih-cheng said: “A person like this is no different from a monkey at the zoo pretending to be a government official.”
When Hsieh Chih-wei crossed swords with NCC Chairman Su Yung-chin, he did not address legitimate issues such as the constitutionality of the NCC within the legal framework of the ROC. Instead he bullied Su over irrelevancies regarding transitional justice in a reunified Germany. When Hsieh Chih-wei responded to questions about the post office’s illegal stamping of “Join the UN” slogans on personal correpsondence, he did not address the legitimacy of the policy or encroachments on the people’s right to privacy. He trivialized the affair by inviting an American English teacher on Taiwan to discuss the matter of English usage over tea. What would Huang Shih-chen say watching such a thug in a position of power? Would he refer to Hsieh as a “mu hou er guan” (“a monkey in a suit”) incapable of maintaining the illusion of humanity?
Is this really the image the Democratic Progressive Party wants to broadcast to the world? Older generation Democratic Progressive Party officials such as current premier Chang Chun-hsiung, confronted with a verbal confrontation between Hsieh Chih-wei and an opposition lawmaker, quietly urged Hsieh, “Don’t argue any more. Go and sit down.” Chang hoped to maintain an image of rationality for the ruling administration. Yet Frank Hsieh had nothing but praise for the controversial Hsieh Chih-wei at a public rally, referring to him as “an outstanding GIO Chief,” and expressed concern that the Blue camp wanted to force Hsieh Chih-wei out of office. Does Frank Hsieh really not know that many voters hope Hsieh Chih-wei’s simian antics will take Frank Hsieh down with him?
Ever since DPP legislator Lin Chung-mo gained fame by insulting Sisy Chen with sexist vulgarisms, the “Three Stooges” (Lin Chung-mo, Tsai Chi-fang, and Hou Shui-sheng) have become immensely popular within the Democratic Progressive Party, and simultaneously the focus of outside criticism. The role of the Three Stooges was originally to generate controversy concerning certain topics, to underscore the Democratic Progressive Party’s “grass roots” nature. Their uncouth language and manners are nothing parents would want to inculcate in their own children. But the Three Stooges have come to fill a certain role in the party. When Chen Tang-shan referred to Singapore as “a nation the size of a piece of snot” and accused it of “fondling China’s balls,” he violated all norms of diplomatic etiquette. When Tsai Chi-fang accused Luo Wen-chia and his wife as “putting on a show” and “singing a duet,” he ripped away the hypocritical mask of intraparty comradeship and ethics. Former GIO Chief Yao Wen-chi flaunted a supercilious “Trust me, I know what I’m doing” manner. This “evolved” into current GIO Chief Hsieh Chih-wei’s simian antics. This process swiftly undermined any standards of ethics or decorum established over many long years.
The Democratic Progressive Party has undergone a transformation. It now belongs to the “Three Stooges,” to “Hsieh Chih-wei,” and their ilk. The character of the party has changed from “to know shame is courage,” to “to know no shame is courage.”
When the anti-corruption movement was in full swing, many citizens took to the streets, not for the Blue camp or the Green camp, not for reunification or for independence, but for the traditional Chinese virtues of “Propriety, Honor, Integrity, and Conscience.” Alas, the Three Stooges and Hsieh Chih-wei have set a new tone for society. They hold such virtues in contempt. Taiwan has forsaken civilized rules of conduct, and the public has become accustomed to the political antics of Lin Chung-mo and Tsai Chi-fang. The term “LP” (“balls”) has become an in word. Hsieh Chih-wei’s impromptu performances of rap music are all the rage. Under the circumstances, “watching monkeys perform in a zoo” perfectly describes Taiwan’s politics.
Society has degenerated to the point where all that matters is Wu Shu-chen’s diamond ring from Tiffany, Chen Shui-bian’s off-key rendition of “Ode to the Republic of China,” or where to find a gourmet dish of abalone. What room is there for serious topics such as truth and justice, right and wrong, constitutionalism and the rule of law? Don’t be deceived by the hoopla over the “Join the UN” campaign. The Democratic Progressive Party hopes that public’s attitude toward the democratic process will be: “Is it really so serious?” Enter Hsieh Chih-wei. The function of officials like Hsieh Chih-wei is to transform serious issues of state into the antics of monkeys at a zoo.
民進黨的「謝志偉化」
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.10.29 04:47 am
無論在民進黨的入聯慢跑路上或造勢晚會中，鋒頭最健就屬謝志偉，人氣猶勝扁謝蘇。
如果有人找謝志偉去當同樂會的主持人，他一定很稱職，會把場子弄得很熱鬧。又或者和他一起去唱ＫＴＶ，由他帶頭又唱又跳，肯定會讓每個來賓都很high。但謝志偉畢竟不是同樂會主持人。他是中華民國的新聞局長，政府發言人。
謝志偉作為政府發言人，他的功能是這樣的：當陳水扁參加友邦高峰會議，忘情追問帛琉總統「昨夜床上擠的是誰」而令全場尷尬無言時，謝志偉立刻扭腰擺臀，當場來段饒舌歌舞，即時移轉了氣氛。而謝志偉作為內閣一員的新聞局長，他的功能又是這樣的：把在野黨立委氣得大喊「下去，你下去」，充分展現了行政權「制衡」立法權的勝利，讓同僚施茂林佩服得當場豎起大拇指。
也難怪，前中選會主委黃石城談起謝志偉，是這麼說的：「這種人當官，跟請動物園的猴子來表演當官有什麼不一樣？」
謝志偉和ＮＣＣ主委蘇永欽過招，不是辯論體制定位和憲政法理的正經事，而是用同為「留德青山在」等輕薄言行欺之君子以方。謝志偉回答郵戳蓋入聯的質疑，不是討論政策正當性或人民關切隱私權受侵犯的議題，而是「歡迎打電話找我討論英文」。以如此江湖風格身居廟堂，黃石城想說的莫非「沐猴而冠」？
但這真正是民進黨所希望傳達出的理念象徵和人物標竿嗎？民進黨內老一輩如當今閣揆張俊雄，面對謝志偉和立委纏鬥的場合，屢次輕聲勸阻要他「不要說了，你先回去」，似乎希望保持住一點執政團隊的理性形象。但是，對於高度爭議性的謝志偉，謝長廷卻在造勢大會中公開讚揚為「表現極傑出的新聞局長」，並擔心藍軍想把謝志偉搞下台。難道謝長廷不知，多少選民巴不得謝志偉的猴戲就這樣演下去，直到拖垮謝長廷為止。
民進黨自林重謨當年以鄙言辱罵陳文茜一炮而紅之後，迅速崛起的「三寶化」現象，一度成為輿論批評焦點。三寶的作用本來也只是製造特定議題，放大民進黨草根性的那一面特徵；其言行舉止，不會是任何為人父母者希望子女培養文明素質的示範對象。但「三寶化」現象逐漸發揮了一些作用：像陳唐山指新加坡「鼻屎大的國家」、「捧中國卵葩」那樣的語言，打破任何外交禮儀的界限；像蔡啟芳指羅文嘉夫妻「嘜擱裝啦」、「演雙簧」的那般攻擊，扯破黨內倫理和同志情誼的假面具；像新聞局長從姚文智那樣「一皮天下無難事」的作風，「進化」到謝志偉一般又唱又跳、「猴戲化」政府發言人的角色；這一段過程，快速淡化了一個社會多少年才累積出的政治規範界限和行為羞恥底線。
從「三寶化」而「謝志偉化」，民進黨把士節風骨從「知恥近乎勇」，顛覆成「無恥才是勇」。
反貪腐運動風起雲湧之時，多少民眾走上街頭，不為藍也不為綠，無關統也無關獨，所想的不過是喚回「禮義廉恥」一點基本的做人規矩而已。但「三寶化」和「謝志偉化」蔚為風氣，擺明了就是要瞧不起那些規矩。台灣喪失此文明規矩之後，民眾漸漸也就習慣了林重謨和蔡啟芳的問政表演，講起ＬＰ二字變成一種時尚語詞，看見謝志偉的饒舌歌舞覺得很爽，用「看動物園猴子表演」的那種娛樂感觀來評量台灣的政治。
公民社會的民主意識一旦淪落到這種地步時，市井談笑之間論吳淑珍的蒂芙妮鑽戒、陳水扁唱「中華民國頌」是否五音不全、「三井宴」的鮑魚餐找機會也去吃看看等等，也就再沒有什麼公理正義、是非曲直、憲政體制等議題可嚴肅看待的餘地了。不要看入聯議題搞得轟轟烈烈，民進黨對所希望於老百姓認知民主的程度其實正是「有那麼嚴重嗎」；而這種將政治猴戲化的本事，正是謝志偉諸人的作用吧！
State-owned Banks "Facilitate" the Join the UN Campaign
State-owned Banks “Facilitate” the Join the UN Campaign, but the Financial Supervisory Commission merely looks on
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 25, 2007
A row of well-dressed men in expensive business suits, stands on the floor of the Legislative Yuan. These men are CEOs and general managers of state-owned banks and credit unions. They have been summoned here by Members of the Legislature. These officials are guilty of turning funds entrusted to their care over to the Executive Yuan, allowing the ruling DPP to misuse these funds paying for its “Join the UN” campaign. They now stand obediently before the legislature.
State-owned banks and credit unions are well recognized “golden rice bowls.” Which of these officials, each of whom has clawed his way to the rank of CEO or general manager, isn’t a player? Yet here they stand, hemming and hawing, with nothing to say. They must endure this humiliation because they know they have behaved dishonorably. Grilling by legislators reveals that most of these officials, using “advertising expenditures” as a pretext, turned funds under their management over to the Government Information Office, for the purpose of promoting the ruling DPP regime’s “Join the UN” campaign. The Taiwan Cooperative Bank and the Taiwan Business Bank, for example, invited major borrowers to participate in a series of Democratic Progressive Party fundraising dinners. Even the First Commercial Bank, which has already been privatized, donated 10 million NT to the National Cultural Association, in the name of “Pubic Relations to Promote the Image of the Nation.”
These highly partisan expenditures were clearly intended to help the Democratic Progressive Party’s election efforts. They were illegitimate on the face of it, and could only be made under false pretenses. They violate the revenue and expenditure provisions of the Budget Law for state-owned banks and credit unions. They exceed the limits of authority for professional managers of such institutions. Most of these banks and credit unions are publicly held companies. Not only must they must answer to their depositors, they must also answer to small shareholders. What responsible financier is willing to ignore profits and scatter money to the winds? And we haven’t even mentioned the issue of legal liability. Legislators fulminated, demanding that these funds to be deducted directly from these CEOs’ and general managers’ year end bonuses. In fact, these bank managers are already under suspicion for diverting funds and violating the public trust.
These managers of state-owned bank and credit union managers, under pressure from “higher authorities,” did not dare speaking freely. Minister of Finance He Chih-chin looked as if he were under duress. He mumbled some vague generalities about “Administrative Guidance by a Comprehensive Executive Yuan Plan.” This is not the first time Minister He has been outside the loop. Public announcements of important government plans such as tax reform were made by Conference for Economic Reconstruction Chairman He Mei-yue. When questioned, Minister He said he knew nothing about the matter. He Chih-chin’s role is to provide a scholarly image for the Ministry of Finance. The fact that he has no real power has been public knowledge for a long time. The Financial Supervisory Commission is the domestic financial organization responsible for oversight and control of the nation’s domestic financial institutions. It stands on the front lines. It is the entity that most ought to step forward and take responsibility for the scandal. But what are Chairman Hu Sheng-cheng and current Bank Bureau Vice Chairman Chang Hsiu-lien doing at this very moment?
In recent years, the Financial Supervisory Commission has often been criticized for doing too much. Many of its committee chairmen, committee members, and bureau chiefs are mired in legal scandals. The Rebar Group controversy led judges to suspect that Financial Supervisory Commission managers had been making illegal loans. The public still has a vivid memory of the presiding judge blasting the Financial Supervisory Commission for dereliction of duty and patronage. Faced with such accusations, the Financial Supervisory Commission has vigorously and resolutely sworn to establish strict controls. During the past half year it has helped prosecute quite a few domestic bank managers. Bank managers now jump at the slightest sound. For public financial institutions to turn over funds to designated political organizations or political parties, under the guise of business expenses, and to expect not to be investigated, fined, and prosecuted, is inconceivable.
And yet now, before the public eye, in broad daylight, we see banks collectively donating money to the “Join the UN” campaign, inviting major borrowers to wine and dine Democratic Progressive Party candidates. We see bank chairmen of the board and general managers being called onto the floor of the Legislative Yuan and being forced to stand at attention, receive tongue-lashings, while struggling to explain themselves. Can Hu Sheng-cheng and Chang Hsiu-lien really turn a blind eye and a deaf ear to these outrages? These public banks and credit unions, which take their orders from major stockholders of public shares, have harmed the interests of many smaller and younger shareholders. Isn’t the Securities and Futures Investors Protection Center supposed to be watching over such abuses? Officials of the judiciary reproached the Financial Supervisory Commission for official patronage, for allowing favored banks to violate the law. Yet now we see with our own eyes “guanxi” between the Executive Yuan, the Financial Supervisory Commission, and state owned banks and credit unions. How are we supposed to feel?
A number of years ago, when the Legislative Yuan interpellated Minister of Economic Affairs Chung Tsai-yi, she was forced to admit she had no idea what was happening all around her, and to hurriedly resigned after only 40 days in office. The public regarded the incident as a joke. But at least the government had the decency to admit its inadequacies, and conduct itself correspondingly. The apparent cluelessness of our current Minister of Finance is far more shocking. Standing alongside a row of CEOs and general managers in the Legislative Yuan, officials of our current Financial Supervisory Commission apparently need to have their mistakes pointed out to them in court by a judge. In fact they are perfectly aware of the illicit activities of state-owned banks and credit unions. But they are unwilling or unable to do anything about it. Political appointees and professional managers alike have suffered humiliation and abuse from the ruling DPP. Do they really intend to cling to their jobs without giving a thought to their dignity? No wonder some people are nostalgic for Chung Tsai-yi.
銀行「援交」入聯：金管會豈可坐視？
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.10.25 03:39 am
立法院裡一字排開，個個西裝筆挺大有來頭，不是董事長就是總經理。這是公營行庫高層被立法委員召喚「出列」的景象，凡「上繳」經費給行政院辦入聯宣傳的都被點名，結果就出現了這些董事長、總經理乖乖排隊站好的畫面。
公營行庫都是老字號金飯碗，能升上老總、老董的，誰沒有兩把刷子？如今在立法院裡遭此羞辱，卻多半訥訥說不出話來，因為他們做的事確實不光彩。立委質詢指出，多家公股行庫以「業務廣告費」之名，將銀行預算上繳新聞局辦入聯；合庫、台企銀等銀行則是接連邀約貸款大戶參加民進黨候選人出席的餐宴，有拉票和選舉募款之嫌；又有如已經民營化的第一銀行，最近也捐款一千萬元給文化總會，用以「辦理提升國家形象宣傳活動經費」。
這些政治性極高、擺明了替民進黨助選的經費開銷，師出無名，必須挪用預算。以公營行庫的收支原則來說，是違反了預算法規定；以公司治理的規範來說，是違背了專業經理人的職務權限；甚至以這些行庫多已上市的事實來評斷，不但要向存戶負責，還應向小市民股東們負責。算盤精明的金融家，誰肯如此不計利潤、向外撒錢？更何況其中還有法律責任。立委開罵，指這些款項應直接從董事長和總經理的年終獎金中扣除；其實，這些銀行主管恐已涉及挪用預算和背信的嫌疑。
公營行庫主管受「上級」壓力而有口難言，財政部長何志欽好像也身不由己，模糊回答了「行政院整體施政方案宣導」等籠統話語。何部長對重要政策處於狀況外，不是第一次；就連政府擬進行稅賦改革等大事，也是由經建會主委何美玥對外宣布，何部長在記者詢問時猶不知所云。何志欽被放在檯面上扮演著學者形象、卻無指揮實權的財政部長，受議論已久；這是另一層面的問題了。而最應出來管事的金管會，在第一線上負責監理國內金融機構的主管機關，主委胡勝正和身兼銀行局長的副主委張秀蓮，此時此刻所做何事？
金管會近年來的行事，總在過猶不及之間遭到批評。除了多位主委、委員、局長等人身陷違法醜聞之外，力霸集團風暴引起法官質疑金檢主管長年縱容違法放貸，審判長當庭痛罵金管會官員失職和圖利的那一幕，社會記憶猶新。金管會受此指責，一度雷厲風行，想要建立嚴厲控管的形象，近半年來將國內銀行主管移送檢調的案例委實不少，也造成風聲鶴唳的效果。可以想像，如果任何一家上市的金融機構，膽敢把業務費用「援交」給特定團體或政黨，不被金管會嚴查、開罰、送辦才怪。
如今在眾目睽睽之下，卻見這麼多家銀行集體發生「捐錢搞入聯」的圖利事實，出面邀約大戶和民進黨候選人餐敘的用心亦昭然若揭；以至於銀行的董事長和總經理們被叫到立法院「罰站」、聽訓，亦無能自辯。則胡勝正和張秀蓮真能對此視若無睹、不加聞問嗎？不僅如此，這些上市行庫聽命於大股東公股的指揮，因而損害了諸多市民小股東的利益，則證券投資人保護中心不應出面管事嗎？當初在法庭上訓斥金管會官員圖利、放縱特定銀行違法的司法人員，如今眼見「行政院—金管會—公營行庫」之間發展出扭曲的「關係人」互動，又該是何種感想？
想當年，宗才怡在立法院裡被質詢得不知所云，經濟部長幹了四十幾天就倉皇下台，被輿論視為笑話，卻也可見其時官場尚有「知難而退」的行為界限。如今的財政部長在其位而不知所云的程度更加驚人，「率領」了一隊董事長和總經理在立法院裡排排站；金管會官員在法庭裡受到法官「指正」，如今對公營行庫的不當行徑絕對心知肚明，卻不能管也不敢管。從政務官到專業經理人，受盡難堪，受盡政治蹧蹋，卻難道繼續在位而不顧尊嚴嗎？也難怪有人說，真懷念宗才怡。
The Pig Snout Plebiscite: The Plebiscite to Join the UN Self-destructs
The Pig Snout Plebiscite: The Plebiscite to Join the UN Self-destructs
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 24, 2007
Annette Lu noted that the logo for the Plebiscite to Join the UN campaign looks remarkably like a pig’s snout. As a result some people began referring to the “Plebiscite to Join the UN” as the “Pig Snout Plebiscite.”
Superficially, it would seem that Chen Shui-bian has successfully demagogued the “Plebiscite to Join the UN” issue. But because the campaign has been conducted in an uncivilized, unconstitutional, illegal, and anti-democratic manner that violates human rights, he has undercut its legitimacy and hastened its demise. The political image of the Plebiscite to Join the UN has been badly tarnished.
Chen Shui-bian should beware of overkill, i.e., a promotional effort that produces diminishing returns because it repels rather than attracts. He should not provoke political moderates into snorting contemptuously: “Pig Snout Plebiscite!”
The Plebiscite to Join the UN began with a positive image. It gave vent to accumulated public frustration. It championed the rights and interests of citizens of the ROC on Taiwan. These were among the plebiscite’s selling points. But the Chen regime has resorted to means that cannot be justified. It has ordered the post office to stamp “Join the UN” slogans on private correspondence. It has coerced civil servants to participate in petition drives. It has embezzled public funds to underwrite “Join the UN” campaign activities. It has printed “Join the UN” slogans on sales slips. It intends to “package deal” the “Plebiscite to Join the UN” with the 2008 Presidential Election It intends to force voters to accept plebisite ballots along with presidential election ballots, whether they want them or not. It is violating the Rule of Law and the principle of administrative neutrality. Even the “Join the UN Torch Relay” has been reduced to a “Come and get me if you have the guts!” show of bravado. These political excesses clearly violate Article 13 of the Referendum Act, which states: “Unless prescribed by this Act, no administrative entity may in any form, carry out a referendum or commission any other organization to carry out a referendum on any topic, and may not draw upon any funds or use government employess at any level to do so.” The ruling DPP has turned the system upside down and demonstrated its utter contempt for constitutionalism and the Rule of Law.
Chen Shui-bian needs to realize that if the “Join the UN” campaign peaks too soon, by the time the presidential election rolls around five months from now, any initial thrill from the “Plebiscite to Join the UN” will have died down. The public may then begin to realize the extent of the DPP’s violations of the constitution, of the law, of democratic norms, and of human rights. The public may begin to see through its lawlessness and its perversions of the truth. On election day, moderate voters may dismiss the highly touted “Plebiscite to Join the UN” as nothing more than a “Pig Snout Plebiscite.”
Chen Shui-bian said that “Nothing bad will happen merely because we hold his ‘Plebiscite to Join the UN’.” In other words, no matter what the result of the “Plebiscite to Join the UN” might be, Taiwan won’t gain membership in the UN, nor will a “Nation of Taiwan” be born. Actually, even though we have yet to hold a “Plebiscite to Join the UN,” can we really say that “Nothing bad has happened?” Actually a great deal has happened. A lawless government has violated the Rule of Law and the principle of administrative neutrality. Something very bad indeed has happened.
For Chen Shui-bian to exploit the “Plebiscite to Join the UN” as shamelessly as he has, may cost him more than it is worth. The “Plebiscite to Join the UN” campaign is merely a means of linking certain issues with the presidential election. But the Democratic Progressive Party has violated the constitution and broken the law. Will rational voters dare cast their ballots for a political party with no respect for consitutionalism and the Rule of Law? The “Plebiscite to Join the UN” may well have awakened moderate centrist voters. It may motivate them to cast a cold and rational eye on the perils of continued DPP rule.
Chen Shui-bian wants to “package deal” the “Plebiscite to Join the UN” to “Taiwanese Pathos” and “Taiwanese Consciousness.” It wants to bolster support for the Democratic Progressive Party during the presidential election. But political moderates may be turned off by the manipulative methods being used. They may see through the Democratic Progressive Party’s hypocrisy and lawlessness. They may decide they have no reason to vote for a Democratic Progressive Party presidential candidate again. Chen Shui-bian, beware, lest the “Plebiscite to Join the UN” either evaporates or changes into something ugly before our eyes.
The “Plebiscite to Join the UN” is a farce. The sequence of events should have been: The Democratic Progressive Party proposes a “Plebiscite to Join the UN” -> The voters give their approval -> The government formulates a policy -> The government proposes a “Plebiscite to Join the UN” before the United Nations General Assembly. This procedure has been turned on its head: “The government proposed a “Plebiscite to Join the UN under the Name Taiwan” before the United Nations General Assembly -> The United Nations General Assembly rejected it -> The government violated the constitution and the law promoting a “Plebiscite to Join the UN under the Name Taiwan” -> On March 22 of next year the government will hold a “Plebiscite to Join the UN under the Name Taiwan.” The inversion of the proper procedure, from beginning to end, shows that Chen Shui-bian never had any intention in of “Joining the UN.” He merely wanted to use the feelings of victimization engendered by the inability to join the UN to destroy the constitution, the law, and the nation. The cost be damned.
Chen Shui-bian and Democratic Progressive Party need to pay attention. The moral legitimacy of the “Plebiscite to Join the UN” has been undermined. The political image of the “Plebiscite to Join the UN” has been tarnished. If political moderates see the Democratic Progressive Party behaving lawlessly while promoting the “Plebiscite to Join the UN,” destroying the law and destroying the country, will they dare to vote for the Democratic Progressive Party during the presidential election?
The Democratic Progressive Party demands the holding of a “Plebiscite to Join the UN under the Name Taiwan,” even though it knows that such a plebiscite will never result in UN membership. What are moderate voters to conclude, except that the Democratic Progressive Party has no respect for law and order? What are they to conclude? Other than that the DPP, which purports to “love Taiwan,” is determined to destroy Taiwan?
豬鼻公投：入聯公投正當性的自我解構
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.10.24 03:47 am
呂秀蓮說：入聯公投的logo像個豬鼻子，於是有人調侃「入聯公投」是「豬鼻公投」。
從表象上看，陳水扁將入聯公投炒得愈來愈熱，但是由於炒作手法不斷出現違憲、違法、反民主、反人權、反文明的爭議，已使入聯公投的正當性漸趨自我解構，入聯公投的政治形象亦日漸自我醜化。
陳水扁應知「過猶不及，莫為已甚」，勿將入聯公投搞成遭中間選民「嗤之以鼻」的「豬鼻公投」。
入聯公投原有正面形象，發抒民間積鬱，主張台灣權益等，這些皆是入聯公投的賣點。但是，搞到如今這種不擇手段的地步，強令郵局在私人信件上加蓋入聯戳記、動員公務員強拉連署、盜用大筆公帑挹注入聯活動、發票上加印入聯標語、妄將「公投綁大選」採「一階段領投票」、違反「依法行政」、違反「行政中立」，甚至今日起跑的「入聯聖火」接力路跑也一度出現「好膽來抓」的爭議；這些走火入魔的動作，非但明白違反公投法第十三條「行政機關不得以任何形式動用任何經費或調用各級人員辦理公投事項」，就憲政法治而言，更簡直已經到了倒行逆施、無法無天的境地。
陳水扁應有警覺，一鼓作氣，再而衰，三而竭；如今距總統大選還有五個月，等到入聯公投在表象上的絢麗煙霧逐漸散去，民眾或許漸將察覺其中違憲、違法、反民主、反人權的實體，洞燭其無法無天、倒行逆施的真相；屆時，冠冕堂皇的「入聯公投」，恐怕就會變成被中間選民「嗤之以鼻」的「豬鼻公投」。
陳水扁說，「入聯公投以後什麼也不會發生」。此話無誤，不論公投結果如何，皆不可能「入聯」，「台灣國」亦不可能誕生。但是，如今雖然尚未公投，難道真的什麼事都不曾「發生」嗎？其實已經「發生」了一個無法無天的政府，違反「依法行政」、違反「行政中立」，難道這還是「什麼事都不會發生」？
陳水扁將入聯公投玩到這種無法無天的地步，恐怕會有本末倒置、因小失大的風險。因為，公投畢竟是「綁」大選的手段，但如今將公投玩到這種違憲違法、無法無天的地步，難道能叫理智的中間選民還敢再把票投給民進黨這種違憲違法、無法無天的政府嗎？公投火熱，可能反而喚醒了中間選民的冷靜與理智。
陳水扁想用「入聯公投」，綁住選民的「台灣悲情」與「台灣意識」，在總統大選中支持民進黨；但是，中間選民卻可能從「入聯公投」的醜惡操作中，更加看清民進黨的虛偽奸巧與無法無天，則總統大選即無再選民進黨的理由。陳水扁應仔細拿捏：勿使「入聯公投」的正當性如冰銷雪融般地自我解構，亦勿使「入聯公投」急轉直下地自我醜化。
其實，這場入聯公投根本是一場鬧劇。其原本應有的運動流程是：「民進黨提入聯公投→全民公投通過→政府據以形成政策→政府向聯大提出『以台灣名義入聯』」；但是，如今這個運動流程已本末顛倒：「政府已向聯大聲請『以台灣名義入聯』→聯大已否決→政府違法違憲推動『台灣入聯公投』→明年三月二十二日『公投以台灣名義入聯』」。從這個始末顛倒的程序即可看出，陳水扁根本意不在「入聯」，而只是要玩弄「入不了聯合國」的悲情與挫折感。毀憲、毀法、毀國，在所不惜。
陳水扁及民進黨必須注意：「入聯公投」的正當性正逐漸自我解構，「入聯公投」的政治形象亦日漸自我醜化；只要中間選民看出民進黨操作「入聯公投」的無法無天，毀法毀國，難道還敢在總統大選中選民進黨嗎？
中間選民此時的思考是：這究竟是一個主張「入聯什麼事都不會發生」的民進黨，還是一個無法無天的民進黨？這究竟是一個「愛台灣」的民進黨，還是一個毀法毀國的民進黨？
Triumph of the Will: Chen Shui-bian’s "Rule by Confrontation"
Triumph of the Will: Chen Shui-bian’s “Rule by Confrontation”
United Daily New editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 23, 2007
Apparently the strong suit of the eight-year old Chen Shui-bian regime is its ability to say: “You want to make something of it?”
Chen Shui-bian, ignoring the fact that he failed to file an application for a road use permit, insisted on running the first stage of the “Join the UN Torch Relay.” By doing so, he trampled over the rule of law and further undermined the questionable legitimacy of the “Join the UN” campaign. The tempest over the road use permit is being referred to as an “incident.” It would be more accurate to characterize it as a confrontation. The Chen regime habitually resorts to confrontation to get what it wants. This reveals that Chen Shui-bian’s goal is not to “Join the UN,” but to exploit the political impact of the confrontation itself. Universal chaos means political opportunities.
The road use permit was purely a procedural issue. It has now been turned into a test of strength between central authorities and local authorities, into a contest of wills between a president and a mayor. The problem is not with the Taipei Municipal Government, but with an arrogant event sponsor. The event sponsor intentionally created a situation in which the president would take the lead in breaking the law. The “Join the UN Torch Relay” is a public activity in which a head of state and scores of political appointees intend to participate. Yet the Sports Affairs Council never had any intention of applying for a road use permit. It considered the general public’s right to use the roads a non-issue. Chen Shui-bian dared Hao Lung-pin to “Come and get me, if you have the guts!” In his eyes there was no rule of law. It did not exist. His only concern was creating chaos and escalating confrontation.
Whether a government is able to operate smoothly is determined a three levels: At the lowest level is the civil service, its administrative neutrality and its adherence to the rule of law. At the intermediate level are political appointees, their policy-making ability and their administrative style. At the highest level is the ruling administration and its vision for the nation. Since regime change seven and a half years ago, the government’s ability to make policy has steadily deteriorated, starting from the top down. The leadership’s irresolution, corruption, and incompetence have become Taiwan greatest liability. Mid-level decision-makers have lost the capacity to arrive at independent judgments. Today, even low-level agencies’s adherence to the rule of law has been obliterated by the chief executive. How can such a government carry out even its most basic functions?
The sponsors of the “Join the UN Torch Relay” missed the one month filing deadline for a “sporting event.” Why not make up for it by changing the application to read “political event?” It would be more honest. The sponsors could coordinate with the Taipei Municipal Government, requesing an emergency dispensation. That would be the normal procedure for a normal government. But the Chen regime taunted local authorities for two straight days, daring them to “Come and get me, if you have the guts!” Chen Shui-bian puts himself above the law and abuses the powers of his office when he engages in such provocations. This is why the ROC is no longer a “normal nation.”
The Chen regime’s love of confrontation has its roots. When the Democratic Progressive Party was out of office, it provoked endless street corner confrontations to undermine Kuomintang authority. Once it seized power, it used demostrations and provocations against the Chinese Communist Party to gain an edge at the polls. The strategic value of such confrontations is understandable. But Chen Shui-bian is provoking confrontations not merely between people, but also between north and south, and the government itself. It is provoking confrontations between different agencies within the executive, making it impossible for law enforcement and administrative personnel to fulfill their duties. To rule a nation in this manner is selfish, myopic, and callous beyond belief.
Nor is Chen Shui-bian alone. More and more officials have adopted confrontation as a means of dealing with government affairs. For example, Government Information Office Chief Hsieh Chi-wei’s recent theatrics in the Legislative Yuan. For example, Minister of Education Tu Cheng-sheng’s glowering responses to outside criticisms. Not forgetting of course Ye Kuo-hsing, who “shot” and executed members of the media with his thumb and forefinger, or Yao Wen-chi, who provoked one controversy after another. These reflect a government and civil service out of control and oblivious about its mission. Rule by Whim has replaced Rule by Law. What kind of face should we associate with such a government? How about the face of a petty tyrant barking out commands? How about a bunch of harlequins leaping about in an effort to steal the spotlight, while conscientious officials look on in silence?
The Democratic Progressive Party is aware of the need for order. But it has chosen to engage in an orgy of mayhem, then to feast on the blood gushing from the nation’s wounds. For over seven years, it has shouted slogans promising “reconciliation, harmony, happiness, and joy,” not one of which has materialized. It relentlessly leads the people down the road toward confrontation, animosity, and misery.
What kind of language is “Come and get me, if you have the guts!” but the language of a Mafia capo? Yet it emerges from the mouth of our head of state, a man who was once a prominent lawyer and legislator. This man, the “Son of Taiwan” responsible for regime change, is now the same man who has destroyed the island’s budding democracy and fragile rule of law. Chen Shui-bian’s contorted visage reflects both the ruling party’s rapid decay and Taiwan’s collective unwillingness to look itself in the mirror.
Chen Shui-bian’s eight year long “rule by confrontation” has drained Taiwan of its lifeblood and vitality. Now Chen would have everyone believe that an illegal, unsanctioned “Join the UN Torch Relay” will somehow overthrow the Republic of China and establish a “Nation of Taiwan?”
依「膽」行政：陳水扁的「衝突治國術」
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.10.23 03:56 am
陳水扁八年治國的看家本領就是：嘸你嘜安吶？
罔顧未合法取得路權，陳水扁執意持第一棒率「入聯路跑」開跑，這不僅踐踏了國家法治，更玷汙整個入聯活動。路權風波與其稱為一個「事件」，倒不如說是扁政府慣用的「衝突模式」，企圖藉著製造衝突和爭端來營造效果。這也顯示，陳水扁追求的不是入聯，而是它的政爭效應。天下大亂，形勢大好。
路權原是一個單純的「程序」問題，現在竟能升級為中央對地方、總統對市長的角力，關鍵不在北市府強硬，而在主辦單位傲慢自恃，從而故意造成「總統帶頭違法」的態勢。一個國家元首及眾多政務官參與的公開活動，體委會自始即無意申請路權，那是根本不把民眾的用路權放在眼裡；而當陳水扁向郝龍斌嗆聲「有膽來抓」時，他的眼裡根本沒有法治，只想製造這種「無政府狀態」來升高衝突。
政府的運作順暢與否，取決於三個層次：在最基礎的部分，是文官體系的「行政中立」及「依法行政」；在中間一層，是政務官員的決策智慧及從政風格；在最上一層，則是主政者的治國瞻矚。政黨輪替七年半來，政府的決策力由上而下逐漸腐蝕，領導階層的善變反覆及貪瀆無能，成為台灣最大的危機；在中間的政務決策層次，則陷入失去人格風骨及自主判斷的茫然；如今，竟連基層機構「依法行政」的準則都遭元首踐踏，這個政府還能維持基本的功能嗎？
試想，入聯活動錯過以「體育活動」名義在一個月前申請的期限，何妨改以「政治活動」補辦，也更名副其實；甚至，也可透過行政協調，要求北市府緊急協助，這才是正常政府的運作方式。但扁政府的作法，卻接連兩天由總統放話威嚇「有膽來抓」，這種挑釁的手法，不僅把自己放在一個超越法律的地位，甚至是刻意利用元首身分製造衝突，把「依法行政」的基本信仰全盤瓦解。台灣之所以不是一個「正常國家」，真正的根源其實在此。
扁政府對於「衝突模式」之愛好，其來有自。民進黨在野時期，透過不斷的街頭衝撞，有效瓦解國民黨的統治權威；執政後，又利用對中共的示威挑釁，賺取選舉的邊緣利益。上述衝突操作不乏戰略需要，倒可理解；但演至今天，陳水扁不僅在人民之間製造衝突，在南北製造衝突，甚至在政府內部製造衝突，讓不同的行政機構互相對立，讓執法及行政人員無所適從。這樣的治國方式，何止自私短視，簡直是冷血不仁。
不僅陳水扁如此，政府部門也越來越多官員採取「衝突模式」來處理政務。諸如新聞局長謝志偉在立法院的越位演出，教育部長杜正勝對外界批評的橫眉怒目應答，更別忘了先前「掃射」媒體的葉國興，屢滋爭議的姚文智，都反映了整個政府體系的傾斜與文官自我認知的失控。且看，當「依法行政」的邏輯被「依膽行政」取代後，政府的面貌變成了什麼模樣？一個獨夫隻手號令天下，幾個跳梁小丑搶盡舞台風光，絕大多數官員噤若寒蟬，現在不就是這般景象嗎？
民進黨並非不知道「秩序」為何物，它卻讓自己耽溺在以「破壞秩序」與「破壞和諧」為職志的癖好中，以舔吮社會的創傷和國家的血痕為樂。七年多了，喊過最多的「和解」、「和諧」、「幸福」、「快樂」的口號，無一能夠實現，卻不斷把人民帶入對峙、仇恨和哀傷。
「有膽來抓」，其實是黑幫大哥向司法嗆聲的語言，卻出自我們國家元首之口，他還曾是狀元律師、第一名的立法委員、首位締造政黨輪替的「台灣之子」，他卻也一手葬送了台灣的民主和法治。陳水扁的扭曲變形，反射的不僅是執政黨的快速墮落，也是台灣不敢攬鏡自照的沉淪。
陳水扁的「衝突治國術」內耗空轉了台灣八年的元氣，如今他卻要大家相信，跑一場未經合法手續的入聯接力，「中華民國的供桌」即可拆掉，台灣就可以得救了！
