The Funnel and the Trumpet

The Funnel and the Trumpet:
Ten Years after the Return of Hong Kong, 20 years after Martial Law, 30 years after the Cultural Revolution
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
June 27, 2007


Deng Xiaoping

Lee Teng-hui

Chen Shui-bian

This is the 10th anniversary of Hong Kong’s retrocession, the 20th anniversary of the lifting of martial law on Taiwan, and the 30th anniversary, more or less, of the end of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Taiwan’s political path following the lifting of martial law resembles a funnel. The broad horizons opened up by the lifting of martial law represent the large end of the funnel, Taiwan’s every narrowing horizons represent the small end of the funnel. By contrast, the political path followed by the mainland and Hong Kong regions, 30 years after the end of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and 10 years after Hong Kong’s retrocession, resembles a trumpet. From the small end with mouthpiece, their horizons have steadily broadened as they advanced confidently toward the ever wider bell.

Of course, the mainland and Taiwan regions of China have many areas in which they cannot be compared. The biggest difference is that the Taiwan region has established a procedural framework for democracy. It has surpassed Hong Kong in directly electing its president. It has surpassed the mainland in ways too numerous to be cited individually, such as multiparty politics, direct elections at all levels, and a free media.

But Taiwan qua Taiwan, 20 years after the lifting of martial law, truly has been marching into the small end of a funnel. Martial Law and the Period of Mobilization for the Suppression of Communist Rebellion were rescinded 20 years ago. Politically and economically, the Taiwan region found itself at a watershed moment, reborn into a new world of limitless possibilities. Who knew it would soon fall victim to Lee Teng-hui’s relentless attempts to undermine the constitution and practice “black gold” (cronyist) politics? Furthermore the direct election of the president required only a plurality, enabling the Democratic Progressive Party and Chen Shui-bian to seize power, and by means of “two bullets” obtain an illegal second term, during which time divisions arose over national identity, chaos undermined constitutional rule, the judiciary became a rubber stamp, the economy fell into depression, corruption became the norm, and the quality of life declined. Instead of progressing, Taiwan began regressing in every way, sliding toward the bottom of the funnel. Democracy and constitutionalism have become nothing more than tools with which Chen Shui-bian can hijack the nation and safeguard his kleptocracy.

Twenty years after the lifting of martial law, the core value of Taiwan’s ruling regime has become: How to safeguard Chen Shui-bian’s corruption, and how to work with Chen Shui-bian to continue deceiving oneself and others about Taiwan independence. Is this why we lifted 20 years of martial law? Is this to be its crowning achievement?

Do not compare the mainland with Taiwan, you say? Well then let’s discuss the mainland qua mainland. Let’s look at the changes 30 years after the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, at
Deng Xiaoping’s “Black Cat, White Cat” thesis, at his declaration that “Only economic development is a hard truth,” and at his call to “Let some people get rich first.” His logic is incontrovertible, and the benefits are incalculable. Thirty years ago, if a farmer’s wife sold two eggs on the street, she risked vilification as a “capitalist-roader.” Thirty years later, the mainland has become the industrial workshop of the world. A conformist ant hill in which everyone wore blue Lenin jackets, has become a prosperous consumer society. Yes, problems still plague the mainland. The democratization of its political system lags behind others’. But China qua China, 30 years after the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, truly does suggest the ever widening bell of a trumpet.

Looking at Hong Kong qua Hong Kong, the ten year trend is also remarkably trumpet like. Ten years ago, Hong Kong was panic-stricken. The bottom had dropped out of the real estate and stock markets. Today it is booming. Its global economic and trade roles are on the rise. Its virtues prior to retrocession, clean and transparent government, have been preserved. Hong Kongers continue to push for the direct election of governors and an upgrade of the region’s status. Hong Kong’s retrocession to China was a thorny problem. But Deng Xiaoping’s formula “one country, two systems” has allowed the mainland and Hong Kong to advance step by step toward the broad end of the trumpet over the past ten years. A single phrase has shrugged off ideology. A simple formula has allowed a nation to extricate itself from a dead end. (At this point we must add that we do not advocate “one country, two systems” for Taiwan.)

Lee Teng-hui was the first president following the lifting of martial law. Chen Shui-bian was the first president following regime change. Both stood at historic watersheds, full of possibilty. But they both stooped to racist demagoguery and political intrigue, and took Taiwan down the path to constitutional ruin, political corruption, and economic decline. By contrast, Deng Xiaoping was the first leader following Mao Zedong. He rescued a mainland on the verge of disintegration, and set it back on the path toward national greatness. It is not easy to draw comparisons between Lee, Chen, and Deng. But if we simply compare their starting points and end points, we can see that Deng Xiaoping went from narrow to wide. He was dealt a losing hand, but parlayed it into a fortune. Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian meanwhile, went from wide to narrow. They were dealt winning hands, yet frittered away the family fortune.

What is the reason behind the rise of the mainland and the decline of Taiwan over the past 20 years? Put simply, it is because they had Deng Xiaoping, while we had Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian.

Original Chinese below:

解嚴20年／文革後30年／香港回歸10年
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.06.27 04:10 am

今年是香港「回歸」十年，解嚴二十年，亦是文革後約莫三十年。

從大歷史來看，台灣解嚴後二十年的歷史走向是「漏斗型」；二十年來，從解嚴當時最寬闊的地帶（猶如漏斗的上端開口處），一步一步，愈走愈窄（走向漏斗窄狹的底部）。相對而言，文革後的三十年，及香港回歸十年的歷史走向，則宛如「喇叭型」；自頂端窄小的吹嘴，愈走愈寬，走向前方寬闊的喇叭口。

當然，中國與台灣頗多不能相比之處。最大的差異在於台灣已經大抵建立了民主運作的完整程序架構；例如，超越香港者是總統直選等，超越中國者更不可以道里計，如政黨政治、里長以上的各級直選與自由媒體等等，不勝枚舉。

但是，以台灣論台灣，解嚴後的二十年，確實是愈走愈窄的「漏斗型」。二十年前解嚴時，因戒嚴令的取消與動員戡亂時期的終止，台灣在政治經濟各方面確實曾有大開大闔、脫胎換骨的契機。當時的台灣，宛如站在歷史的大出口，何其開闊！詎料，解嚴後不久竟即陷入李登輝毀憲亂憲的風潮及黑金政治的夢魘。接著，因總統選舉採相對多數制，使民進黨及陳水扁奪得政權，又以兩顆子彈而僥倖連任；其間國家認同分裂、憲政濁亂、司法受到操弄、經濟低迷、貪腐成風、民生凋敝……。整個台灣，亦即台灣的各方面，不進反退，皆一步一步滑向漏斗的底端；情勢演變至今，整個民主憲政，竟然沉淪墮落到了只成為被陳水扁挾持以捍衛貪腐的私器而已！

解嚴二十年，如今台灣主政當局的核心政策議題竟然是：如何捍衛貪腐的陳水扁？以及如何陪陳水扁繼續操弄「自欺欺人」的台獨騙術！這難道就是當年解嚴所追求的目標？這難道就是台灣解嚴二十年的終極成就？

不要用中國和台灣來比，然而，不妨以中國論中國，看看文革後三十年的變化。鄧小平的「黑貓白貓論」、「發展才是硬道理」及「讓一部分人先富起來」，道理淺白，效益宏大。三十年前，連農村大媽捧兩顆雞蛋到街上求售，皆可能被打成「走資派」；三十年後的中國，已成了世界工廠與世界市場。穿著列寧裝制服的藍螞蟻社會，如今儼然已經成了繽紛滿目的花花世界。是的，中國仍有極多問題，政治的民主化尤其落伍太多；但是就中國論中國，文革後三十年的政經趨勢，確實是走向愈來愈寬的喇叭口。

再以香港論香港，十年的走向亦大體上是「喇叭型」。經濟方面，從十年前的人心惶惶，房價股市狂跌，到如今非但景氣回溫，且其世界經貿角色亦仍見上升空間。在社會及政治方面，回歸前的優勢如政府廉能及公信力仍然維持，且政治議題亦朝向「特首直選」等升級領域進行試探。試想，香港回歸中國曾是多麼棘手的問題，但鄧小平一句「一國兩制」，卻使十年來的中港關係一步步走向寬闊的喇叭口；一句話甩掉了意識形態的包袱，一句話使國家從死胡同裡鑽出來。（在此須附一語，我們不贊成台灣施行「一國兩制」。）

李登輝是站在解嚴時代的第一人，陳水扁是站在政黨輪替時代的第一人。他們皆曾站在歷史的最開闊處，但他們皆沉溺於政爭權謀，將國家在大歷史上帶往憲政沉淪、政治腐敗及經濟下坡的漏斗下端。相對而言，鄧小平則是站在後毛澤東時代的第一人，他卻在大歷史上將中國從瀕臨解構帶向「大國崛起」的氣勢。即使不宜以李扁鄧三人相互比較，就以他們自己的政治起點與政治終點比較，鄧小平的歷史表現應是由窄而寬的「喇叭型」，把一手爛牌打旺了；李登輝與陳水扁則無疑是由寬而窄的「漏斗型」，把一手好牌打臭掉。

兩岸二十年來的消長，因何所致？一個比較簡化但中肯的答案可能是：因為他們有鄧小平，我們有李登輝與陳水扁。

The Funnel and the Trumpet

The Funnel and the Trumpet:
Ten Years after the Return of Hong Kong, 20 years after Martial Law, 30 years after the Cultural Revolution
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
June 27, 2007


Deng Xiaoping

Lee Teng-hui

Chen Shui-bian

This is the 10th anniversary of Hong Kong’s retrocession, the 20th anniversary of the lifting of martial law on Taiwan, and the 30th anniversary, more or less, of the end of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Taiwan’s political path following the lifting of martial law resembles a funnel. The broad horizons opened up by the lifting of martial law represent the large end of the funnel, Taiwan’s every narrowing horizons represent the small end of the funnel. By contrast, the political path followed by the mainland and Hong Kong regions, 30 years after the end of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and 10 years after Hong Kong’s retrocession, resembles a trumpet. From the small end with mouthpiece, their horizons have steadily broadened as they advanced confidently toward the ever wider bell.

Of course, the mainland and Taiwan regions of China have many areas in which they cannot be compared. The biggest difference is that the Taiwan region has established a procedural framework for democracy. It has surpassed Hong Kong in directly electing its president. It has surpassed the mainland in ways too numerous to be cited individually, such as multiparty politics, direct elections at all levels, and a free media.

But Taiwan qua Taiwan, 20 years after the lifting of martial law, truly has been marching into the small end of a funnel. Martial Law and the Period of Mobilization for the Suppression of Communist Rebellion were rescinded 20 years ago. Politically and economically, the Taiwan region found itself at a watershed moment, reborn into a new world of limitless possibilities. Who knew it would soon fall victim to Lee Teng-hui’s relentless attempts to undermine the constitution and practice “black gold” (cronyist) politics? Furthermore the direct election of the president required only a plurality, enabling the Democratic Progressive Party and Chen Shui-bian to seize power, and by means of “two bullets” obtain an illegal second term, during which time divisions arose over national identity, chaos undermined constitutional rule, the judiciary became a rubber stamp, the economy fell into depression, corruption became the norm, and the quality of life declined. Instead of progressing, Taiwan began regressing in every way, sliding toward the bottom of the funnel. Democracy and constitutionalism have become nothing more than tools with which Chen Shui-bian can hijack the nation and safeguard his kleptocracy.

Twenty years after the lifting of martial law, the core value of Taiwan’s ruling regime has become: How to safeguard Chen Shui-bian’s corruption, and how to work with Chen Shui-bian to continue deceiving oneself and others about Taiwan independence. Is this why we lifted 20 years of martial law? Is this to be its crowning achievement?

Do not compare the mainland with Taiwan, you say? Well then let’s discuss the mainland qua mainland. Let’s look at the changes 30 years after the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, at
Deng Xiaoping’s “Black Cat, White Cat” thesis, at his declaration that “Only economic development is a hard truth,” and at his call to “Let some people get rich first.” His logic is incontrovertible, and the benefits are incalculable. Thirty years ago, if a farmer’s wife sold two eggs on the street, she risked vilification as a “capitalist-roader.” Thirty years later, the mainland has become the industrial workshop of the world. A conformist ant hill in which everyone wore blue Lenin jackets, has become a prosperous consumer society. Yes, problems still plague the mainland. The democratization of its political system lags behind others’. But China qua China, 30 years after the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, truly does suggest the ever widening bell of a trumpet.

Looking at Hong Kong qua Hong Kong, the ten year trend is also remarkably trumpet like. Ten years ago, Hong Kong was panic-stricken. The bottom had dropped out of the real estate and stock markets. Today it is booming. Its global economic and trade roles are on the rise. Its virtues prior to retrocession, clean and transparent government, have been preserved. Hong Kongers continue to push for the direct election of governors and an upgrade of the region’s status. Hong Kong’s retrocession to China was a thorny problem. But Deng Xiaoping’s formula “one country, two systems” has allowed the mainland and Hong Kong to advance step by step toward the broad end of the trumpet over the past ten years. A single phrase has shrugged off ideology. A simple formula has allowed a nation to extricate itself from a dead end. (At this point we must add that we do not advocate “one country, two systems” for Taiwan.)

Lee Teng-hui was the first president following the lifting of martial law. Chen Shui-bian was the first president following regime change. Both stood at historic watersheds, full of possibilty. But they both stooped to racist demagoguery and political intrigue, and took Taiwan down the path to constitutional ruin, political corruption, and economic decline. By contrast, Deng Xiaoping was the first leader following Mao Zedong. He rescued a mainland on the verge of disintegration, and set it back on the path toward national greatness. It is not easy to draw comparisons between Lee, Chen, and Deng. But if we simply compare their starting points and end points, we can see that Deng Xiaoping went from narrow to wide. He was dealt a losing hand, but parlayed it into a fortune. Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian meanwhile, went from wide to narrow. They were dealt winning hands, yet frittered away the family fortune.

What is the reason behind the rise of the mainland and the decline of Taiwan over the past 20 years? Put simply, it is because they had Deng Xiaoping, while we had Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian.

Original Chinese below:

解嚴20年／文革後30年／香港回歸10年
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.06.27 04:10 am

今年是香港「回歸」十年，解嚴二十年，亦是文革後約莫三十年。

從大歷史來看，台灣解嚴後二十年的歷史走向是「漏斗型」；二十年來，從解嚴當時最寬闊的地帶（猶如漏斗的上端開口處），一步一步，愈走愈窄（走向漏斗窄狹的底部）。相對而言，文革後的三十年，及香港回歸十年的歷史走向，則宛如「喇叭型」；自頂端窄小的吹嘴，愈走愈寬，走向前方寬闊的喇叭口。

當然，中國與台灣頗多不能相比之處。最大的差異在於台灣已經大抵建立了民主運作的完整程序架構；例如，超越香港者是總統直選等，超越中國者更不可以道里計，如政黨政治、里長以上的各級直選與自由媒體等等，不勝枚舉。

但是，以台灣論台灣，解嚴後的二十年，確實是愈走愈窄的「漏斗型」。二十年前解嚴時，因戒嚴令的取消與動員戡亂時期的終止，台灣在政治經濟各方面確實曾有大開大闔、脫胎換骨的契機。當時的台灣，宛如站在歷史的大出口，何其開闊！詎料，解嚴後不久竟即陷入李登輝毀憲亂憲的風潮及黑金政治的夢魘。接著，因總統選舉採相對多數制，使民進黨及陳水扁奪得政權，又以兩顆子彈而僥倖連任；其間國家認同分裂、憲政濁亂、司法受到操弄、經濟低迷、貪腐成風、民生凋敝……。整個台灣，亦即台灣的各方面，不進反退，皆一步一步滑向漏斗的底端；情勢演變至今，整個民主憲政，竟然沉淪墮落到了只成為被陳水扁挾持以捍衛貪腐的私器而已！

解嚴二十年，如今台灣主政當局的核心政策議題竟然是：如何捍衛貪腐的陳水扁？以及如何陪陳水扁繼續操弄「自欺欺人」的台獨騙術！這難道就是當年解嚴所追求的目標？這難道就是台灣解嚴二十年的終極成就？

不要用中國和台灣來比，然而，不妨以中國論中國，看看文革後三十年的變化。鄧小平的「黑貓白貓論」、「發展才是硬道理」及「讓一部分人先富起來」，道理淺白，效益宏大。三十年前，連農村大媽捧兩顆雞蛋到街上求售，皆可能被打成「走資派」；三十年後的中國，已成了世界工廠與世界市場。穿著列寧裝制服的藍螞蟻社會，如今儼然已經成了繽紛滿目的花花世界。是的，中國仍有極多問題，政治的民主化尤其落伍太多；但是就中國論中國，文革後三十年的政經趨勢，確實是走向愈來愈寬的喇叭口。

再以香港論香港，十年的走向亦大體上是「喇叭型」。經濟方面，從十年前的人心惶惶，房價股市狂跌，到如今非但景氣回溫，且其世界經貿角色亦仍見上升空間。在社會及政治方面，回歸前的優勢如政府廉能及公信力仍然維持，且政治議題亦朝向「特首直選」等升級領域進行試探。試想，香港回歸中國曾是多麼棘手的問題，但鄧小平一句「一國兩制」，卻使十年來的中港關係一步步走向寬闊的喇叭口；一句話甩掉了意識形態的包袱，一句話使國家從死胡同裡鑽出來。（在此須附一語，我們不贊成台灣施行「一國兩制」。）

李登輝是站在解嚴時代的第一人，陳水扁是站在政黨輪替時代的第一人。他們皆曾站在歷史的最開闊處，但他們皆沉溺於政爭權謀，將國家在大歷史上帶往憲政沉淪、政治腐敗及經濟下坡的漏斗下端。相對而言，鄧小平則是站在後毛澤東時代的第一人，他卻在大歷史上將中國從瀕臨解構帶向「大國崛起」的氣勢。即使不宜以李扁鄧三人相互比較，就以他們自己的政治起點與政治終點比較，鄧小平的歷史表現應是由窄而寬的「喇叭型」，把一手爛牌打旺了；李登輝與陳水扁則無疑是由寬而窄的「漏斗型」，把一手好牌打臭掉。

兩岸二十年來的消長，因何所致？一個比較簡化但中肯的答案可能是：因為他們有鄧小平，我們有李登輝與陳水扁。

The Funnel and the Trumpet

The Funnel and the Trumpet:
Ten Years after the Return of Hong Kong, 20 years after Martial Law, 30 years after the Cultural Revolution
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
June 27, 2007


Deng Xiaoping

Lee Teng-hui

Chen Shui-bian

This is the 10th anniversary of Hong Kong’s retrocession, the 20th anniversary of the lifting of martial law on Taiwan, and the 30th anniversary, more or less, of the end of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Taiwan’s political path following the lifting of martial law resembles a funnel. The broad horizons opened up by the lifting of martial law represent the large end of the funnel, Taiwan’s every narrowing horizons represent the small end of the funnel. By contrast, the political path followed by the mainland and Hong Kong regions, 30 years after the end of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and 10 years after Hong Kong’s retrocession, resembles a trumpet. From the small end with mouthpiece, their horizons have steadily broadened as they advanced confidently toward the ever wider bell.

Of course, the mainland and Taiwan regions of China have many areas in which they cannot be compared. The biggest difference is that the Taiwan region has established a procedural framework for democracy. It has surpassed Hong Kong in directly electing its president. It has surpassed the mainland in ways too numerous to be cited individually, such as multiparty politics, direct elections at all levels, and a free media.

But Taiwan qua Taiwan, 20 years after the lifting of martial law, truly has been marching into the small end of a funnel. Martial Law and the Period of Mobilization for the Suppression of Communist Rebellion were rescinded 20 years ago. Politically and economically, the Taiwan region found itself at a watershed moment, reborn into a new world of limitless possibilities. Who knew it would soon fall victim to Lee Teng-hui’s relentless attempts to undermine the constitution and practice “black gold” (cronyist) politics? Furthermore the direct election of the president required only a plurality, enabling the Democratic Progressive Party and Chen Shui-bian to seize power, and by means of “two bullets” obtain an illegal second term, during which time divisions arose over national identity, chaos undermined constitutional rule, the judiciary became a rubber stamp, the economy fell into depression, corruption became the norm, and the quality of life declined. Instead of progressing, Taiwan began regressing in every way, sliding toward the bottom of the funnel. Democracy and constitutionalism have become nothing more than tools with which Chen Shui-bian can hijack the nation and safeguard his kleptocracy.

Twenty years after the lifting of martial law, the core value of Taiwan’s ruling regime has become: How to safeguard Chen Shui-bian’s corruption, and how to work with Chen Shui-bian to continue deceiving oneself and others about Taiwan independence. Is this why we lifted 20 years of martial law? Is this to be its crowning achievement?

Do not compare the mainland with Taiwan, you say? Well then let’s discuss the mainland qua mainland. Let’s look at the changes 30 years after the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, at
Deng Xiaoping’s “Black Cat, White Cat” thesis, at his declaration that “Only economic development is a hard truth,” and at his call to “Let some people get rich first.” His logic is incontrovertible, and the benefits are incalculable. Thirty years ago, if a farmer’s wife sold two eggs on the street, she risked vilification as a “capitalist-roader.” Thirty years later, the mainland has become the industrial workshop of the world. A conformist ant hill in which everyone wore blue Lenin jackets, has become a prosperous consumer society. Yes, problems still plague the mainland. The democratization of its political system lags behind others’. But China qua China, 30 years after the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, truly does suggest the ever widening bell of a trumpet.

Looking at Hong Kong qua Hong Kong, the ten year trend is also remarkably trumpet like. Ten years ago, Hong Kong was panic-stricken. The bottom had dropped out of the real estate and stock markets. Today it is booming. Its global economic and trade roles are on the rise. Its virtues prior to retrocession, clean and transparent government, have been preserved. Hong Kongers continue to push for the direct election of governors and an upgrade of the region’s status. Hong Kong’s retrocession to China was a thorny problem. But Deng Xiaoping’s formula “one country, two systems” has allowed the mainland and Hong Kong to advance step by step toward the broad end of the trumpet over the past ten years. A single phrase has shrugged off ideology. A simple formula has allowed a nation to extricate itself from a dead end. (At this point we must add that we do not advocate “one country, two systems” for Taiwan.)

Lee Teng-hui was the first president following the lifting of martial law. Chen Shui-bian was the first president following regime change. Both stood at historic watersheds, full of possibilty. But they both stooped to racist demagoguery and political intrigue, and took Taiwan down the path to constitutional ruin, political corruption, and economic decline. By contrast, Deng Xiaoping was the first leader following Mao Zedong. He rescued a mainland on the verge of disintegration, and set it back on the path toward national greatness. It is not easy to draw comparisons between Lee, Chen, and Deng. But if we simply compare their starting points and end points, we can see that Deng Xiaoping went from narrow to wide. He was dealt a losing hand, but parlayed it into a fortune. Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian meanwhile, went from wide to narrow. They were dealt winning hands, yet frittered away the family fortune.

What is the reason behind the rise of the mainland and the decline of Taiwan over the past 20 years? Put simply, it is because they had Deng Xiaoping, while we had Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian.

Original Chinese below:

解嚴20年／文革後30年／香港回歸10年
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.06.27 04:10 am

今年是香港「回歸」十年，解嚴二十年，亦是文革後約莫三十年。

從大歷史來看，台灣解嚴後二十年的歷史走向是「漏斗型」；二十年來，從解嚴當時最寬闊的地帶（猶如漏斗的上端開口處），一步一步，愈走愈窄（走向漏斗窄狹的底部）。相對而言，文革後的三十年，及香港回歸十年的歷史走向，則宛如「喇叭型」；自頂端窄小的吹嘴，愈走愈寬，走向前方寬闊的喇叭口。

當然，中國與台灣頗多不能相比之處。最大的差異在於台灣已經大抵建立了民主運作的完整程序架構；例如，超越香港者是總統直選等，超越中國者更不可以道里計，如政黨政治、里長以上的各級直選與自由媒體等等，不勝枚舉。

但是，以台灣論台灣，解嚴後的二十年，確實是愈走愈窄的「漏斗型」。二十年前解嚴時，因戒嚴令的取消與動員戡亂時期的終止，台灣在政治經濟各方面確實曾有大開大闔、脫胎換骨的契機。當時的台灣，宛如站在歷史的大出口，何其開闊！詎料，解嚴後不久竟即陷入李登輝毀憲亂憲的風潮及黑金政治的夢魘。接著，因總統選舉採相對多數制，使民進黨及陳水扁奪得政權，又以兩顆子彈而僥倖連任；其間國家認同分裂、憲政濁亂、司法受到操弄、經濟低迷、貪腐成風、民生凋敝……。整個台灣，亦即台灣的各方面，不進反退，皆一步一步滑向漏斗的底端；情勢演變至今，整個民主憲政，竟然沉淪墮落到了只成為被陳水扁挾持以捍衛貪腐的私器而已！

解嚴二十年，如今台灣主政當局的核心政策議題竟然是：如何捍衛貪腐的陳水扁？以及如何陪陳水扁繼續操弄「自欺欺人」的台獨騙術！這難道就是當年解嚴所追求的目標？這難道就是台灣解嚴二十年的終極成就？

不要用中國和台灣來比，然而，不妨以中國論中國，看看文革後三十年的變化。鄧小平的「黑貓白貓論」、「發展才是硬道理」及「讓一部分人先富起來」，道理淺白，效益宏大。三十年前，連農村大媽捧兩顆雞蛋到街上求售，皆可能被打成「走資派」；三十年後的中國，已成了世界工廠與世界市場。穿著列寧裝制服的藍螞蟻社會，如今儼然已經成了繽紛滿目的花花世界。是的，中國仍有極多問題，政治的民主化尤其落伍太多；但是就中國論中國，文革後三十年的政經趨勢，確實是走向愈來愈寬的喇叭口。

再以香港論香港，十年的走向亦大體上是「喇叭型」。經濟方面，從十年前的人心惶惶，房價股市狂跌，到如今非但景氣回溫，且其世界經貿角色亦仍見上升空間。在社會及政治方面，回歸前的優勢如政府廉能及公信力仍然維持，且政治議題亦朝向「特首直選」等升級領域進行試探。試想，香港回歸中國曾是多麼棘手的問題，但鄧小平一句「一國兩制」，卻使十年來的中港關係一步步走向寬闊的喇叭口；一句話甩掉了意識形態的包袱，一句話使國家從死胡同裡鑽出來。（在此須附一語，我們不贊成台灣施行「一國兩制」。）

李登輝是站在解嚴時代的第一人，陳水扁是站在政黨輪替時代的第一人。他們皆曾站在歷史的最開闊處，但他們皆沉溺於政爭權謀，將國家在大歷史上帶往憲政沉淪、政治腐敗及經濟下坡的漏斗下端。相對而言，鄧小平則是站在後毛澤東時代的第一人，他卻在大歷史上將中國從瀕臨解構帶向「大國崛起」的氣勢。即使不宜以李扁鄧三人相互比較，就以他們自己的政治起點與政治終點比較，鄧小平的歷史表現應是由窄而寬的「喇叭型」，把一手爛牌打旺了；李登輝與陳水扁則無疑是由寬而窄的「漏斗型」，把一手好牌打臭掉。

兩岸二十年來的消長，因何所致？一個比較簡化但中肯的答案可能是：因為他們有鄧小平，我們有李登輝與陳水扁。

The Funnel and the Trumpet

The Funnel and the Trumpet:
Ten Years after the Return of Hong Kong, 20 years after Martial Law, 30 years after the Cultural Revolution
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
June 27, 2007


Deng Xiaoping

Lee Teng-hui

Chen Shui-bian

This is the 10th anniversary of Hong Kong’s retrocession, the 20th anniversary of the lifting of martial law on Taiwan, and the 30th anniversary, more or less, of the end of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Taiwan’s political path following the lifting of martial law resembles a funnel. The broad horizons opened up by the lifting of martial law represent the large end of the funnel, Taiwan’s every narrowing horizons represent the small end of the funnel. By contrast, the political path followed by the mainland and Hong Kong regions, 30 years after the end of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and 10 years after Hong Kong’s retrocession, resembles a trumpet. From the small end with mouthpiece, their horizons have steadily broadened as they advanced confidently toward the ever wider bell.

Of course, the mainland and Taiwan regions of China have many areas in which they cannot be compared. The biggest difference is that the Taiwan region has established a procedural framework for democracy. It has surpassed Hong Kong in directly electing its president. It has surpassed the mainland in ways too numerous to be cited individually, such as multiparty politics, direct elections at all levels, and a free media.

But Taiwan qua Taiwan, 20 years after the lifting of martial law, truly has been marching into the small end of a funnel. Martial Law and the Period of Mobilization for the Suppression of Communist Rebellion were rescinded 20 years ago. Politically and economically, the Taiwan region found itself at a watershed moment, reborn into a new world of limitless possibilities. Who knew it would soon fall victim to Lee Teng-hui’s relentless attempts to undermine the constitution and practice “black gold” (cronyist) politics? Furthermore the direct election of the president required only a plurality, enabling the Democratic Progressive Party and Chen Shui-bian to seize power, and by means of “two bullets” obtain an illegal second term, during which time divisions arose over national identity, chaos undermined constitutional rule, the judiciary became a rubber stamp, the economy fell into depression, corruption became the norm, and the quality of life declined. Instead of progressing, Taiwan began regressing in every way, sliding toward the bottom of the funnel. Democracy and constitutionalism have become nothing more than tools with which Chen Shui-bian can hijack the nation and safeguard his kleptocracy.

Twenty years after the lifting of martial law, the core value of Taiwan’s ruling regime has become: How to safeguard Chen Shui-bian’s corruption, and how to work with Chen Shui-bian to continue deceiving oneself and others about Taiwan independence. Is this why we lifted 20 years of martial law? Is this to be its crowning achievement?

Do not compare the mainland with Taiwan, you say? Well then let’s discuss the mainland qua mainland. Let’s look at the changes 30 years after the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, at
Deng Xiaoping’s “Black Cat, White Cat” thesis, at his declaration that “Only economic development is a hard truth,” and at his call to “Let some people get rich first.” His logic is incontrovertible, and the benefits are incalculable. Thirty years ago, if a farmer’s wife sold two eggs on the street, she risked vilification as a “capitalist-roader.” Thirty years later, the mainland has become the industrial workshop of the world. A conformist ant hill in which everyone wore blue Lenin jackets, has become a prosperous consumer society. Yes, problems still plague the mainland. The democratization of its political system lags behind others’. But China qua China, 30 years after the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, truly does suggest the ever widening bell of a trumpet.

Looking at Hong Kong qua Hong Kong, the ten year trend is also remarkably trumpet like. Ten years ago, Hong Kong was panic-stricken. The bottom had dropped out of the real estate and stock markets. Today it is booming. Its global economic and trade roles are on the rise. Its virtues prior to retrocession, clean and transparent government, have been preserved. Hong Kongers continue to push for the direct election of governors and an upgrade of the region’s status. Hong Kong’s retrocession to China was a thorny problem. But Deng Xiaoping’s formula “one country, two systems” has allowed the mainland and Hong Kong to advance step by step toward the broad end of the trumpet over the past ten years. A single phrase has shrugged off ideology. A simple formula has allowed a nation to extricate itself from a dead end. (At this point we must add that we do not advocate “one country, two systems” for Taiwan.)

Lee Teng-hui was the first president following the lifting of martial law. Chen Shui-bian was the first president following regime change. Both stood at historic watersheds, full of possibilty. But they both stooped to racist demagoguery and political intrigue, and took Taiwan down the path to constitutional ruin, political corruption, and economic decline. By contrast, Deng Xiaoping was the first leader following Mao Zedong. He rescued a mainland on the verge of disintegration, and set it back on the path toward national greatness. It is not easy to draw comparisons between Lee, Chen, and Deng. But if we simply compare their starting points and end points, we can see that Deng Xiaoping went from narrow to wide. He was dealt a losing hand, but parlayed it into a fortune. Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian meanwhile, went from wide to narrow. They were dealt winning hands, yet frittered away the family fortune.

What is the reason behind the rise of the mainland and the decline of Taiwan over the past 20 years? Put simply, it is because they had Deng Xiaoping, while we had Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian.

Original Chinese below:

解嚴20年／文革後30年／香港回歸10年
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.06.27 04:10 am

今年是香港「回歸」十年，解嚴二十年，亦是文革後約莫三十年。

從大歷史來看，台灣解嚴後二十年的歷史走向是「漏斗型」；二十年來，從解嚴當時最寬闊的地帶（猶如漏斗的上端開口處），一步一步，愈走愈窄（走向漏斗窄狹的底部）。相對而言，文革後的三十年，及香港回歸十年的歷史走向，則宛如「喇叭型」；自頂端窄小的吹嘴，愈走愈寬，走向前方寬闊的喇叭口。

當然，中國與台灣頗多不能相比之處。最大的差異在於台灣已經大抵建立了民主運作的完整程序架構；例如，超越香港者是總統直選等，超越中國者更不可以道里計，如政黨政治、里長以上的各級直選與自由媒體等等，不勝枚舉。

但是，以台灣論台灣，解嚴後的二十年，確實是愈走愈窄的「漏斗型」。二十年前解嚴時，因戒嚴令的取消與動員戡亂時期的終止，台灣在政治經濟各方面確實曾有大開大闔、脫胎換骨的契機。當時的台灣，宛如站在歷史的大出口，何其開闊！詎料，解嚴後不久竟即陷入李登輝毀憲亂憲的風潮及黑金政治的夢魘。接著，因總統選舉採相對多數制，使民進黨及陳水扁奪得政權，又以兩顆子彈而僥倖連任；其間國家認同分裂、憲政濁亂、司法受到操弄、經濟低迷、貪腐成風、民生凋敝……。整個台灣，亦即台灣的各方面，不進反退，皆一步一步滑向漏斗的底端；情勢演變至今，整個民主憲政，竟然沉淪墮落到了只成為被陳水扁挾持以捍衛貪腐的私器而已！

解嚴二十年，如今台灣主政當局的核心政策議題竟然是：如何捍衛貪腐的陳水扁？以及如何陪陳水扁繼續操弄「自欺欺人」的台獨騙術！這難道就是當年解嚴所追求的目標？這難道就是台灣解嚴二十年的終極成就？

不要用中國和台灣來比，然而，不妨以中國論中國，看看文革後三十年的變化。鄧小平的「黑貓白貓論」、「發展才是硬道理」及「讓一部分人先富起來」，道理淺白，效益宏大。三十年前，連農村大媽捧兩顆雞蛋到街上求售，皆可能被打成「走資派」；三十年後的中國，已成了世界工廠與世界市場。穿著列寧裝制服的藍螞蟻社會，如今儼然已經成了繽紛滿目的花花世界。是的，中國仍有極多問題，政治的民主化尤其落伍太多；但是就中國論中國，文革後三十年的政經趨勢，確實是走向愈來愈寬的喇叭口。

再以香港論香港，十年的走向亦大體上是「喇叭型」。經濟方面，從十年前的人心惶惶，房價股市狂跌，到如今非但景氣回溫，且其世界經貿角色亦仍見上升空間。在社會及政治方面，回歸前的優勢如政府廉能及公信力仍然維持，且政治議題亦朝向「特首直選」等升級領域進行試探。試想，香港回歸中國曾是多麼棘手的問題，但鄧小平一句「一國兩制」，卻使十年來的中港關係一步步走向寬闊的喇叭口；一句話甩掉了意識形態的包袱，一句話使國家從死胡同裡鑽出來。（在此須附一語，我們不贊成台灣施行「一國兩制」。）

李登輝是站在解嚴時代的第一人，陳水扁是站在政黨輪替時代的第一人。他們皆曾站在歷史的最開闊處，但他們皆沉溺於政爭權謀，將國家在大歷史上帶往憲政沉淪、政治腐敗及經濟下坡的漏斗下端。相對而言，鄧小平則是站在後毛澤東時代的第一人，他卻在大歷史上將中國從瀕臨解構帶向「大國崛起」的氣勢。即使不宜以李扁鄧三人相互比較，就以他們自己的政治起點與政治終點比較，鄧小平的歷史表現應是由窄而寬的「喇叭型」，把一手爛牌打旺了；李登輝與陳水扁則無疑是由寬而窄的「漏斗型」，把一手好牌打臭掉。

兩岸二十年來的消長，因何所致？一個比較簡化但中肯的答案可能是：因為他們有鄧小平，我們有李登輝與陳水扁。

Cutthroat Island

Cutthroat Island
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
June 26, 2007

Cutthroat Island (1995, directed by Renny Harlin, written by Michael Frost Beckner and James Gorman)

The Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) “Cutthroat Election Campaign” has begun. The DPP’s cutthroat strategy divides the party’s election platform into different planks. When it comes time to cut the throats of political rivals, each is cut using a different technique.

Campaigns for major elections such as legislative elections and presidential elections require political platforms that can rally the people, that reflect their aspirations and goals. The DPP has been unable to offer such a political platform. Therefore it has transformed elections into cutthroat wars. Elections are no longer mechanisms for comparing political perspectives and reaching consensus. They are national catastrophes that tear the nation apart.

The DPP uses the “rectification of names and the authoring of a new constitution” to cut the throats of Deep Green political rivals. The DPP uses “development of rural communities” to go cut the throats of political rivals dependent upon farmers. But even assuming the DPP wins these elections, does that really mean Taiwan independence has scored a victory? By the same token, is the “development of rural communities,” a policy intended to phase out agriculture altogether, truly advantageous to Taiwan independence?

One need only examine two recent campaigns launched by the DPP to realize that Lee Teng-hui was right. The DPP’s brand of Taiwan independence is a fraud. Let’s examine the DPP’s platform for the “reduction of military service to one year” and its platform for the “development of rural communities.” If one truly intends to promote Taiwan independence, one must make preparations for war. If one nullifies one’s ability to wage war while engaging in wild talk about Taiwan independence, that is phony Taiwan independence. If one reduces military service to one year, so that even corporals are a thing of the past, how can one possibly fight a war? To phase out agriculture in order to develop rural communities, is to open a Pandora’s Box. It is nothing less than a declaration of surrender, nothing less than giving up on Taiwan independence.

This is the real consequence of the DPP’s cutthroat campaigns. The DPP’s “rectification of names and authoring of a new constitution” plank has cut the throats of Deep Green political rivals. The “reduction of military service to one year” plank has cut the throats of political rivals dependent upon military servicemen. The “development of rural communities” plank has cut the throats of political rivals dependent upon farmers. Three throats cut using three different techniques, all are critical to the election results, but none have a common denominator, and some even conflict. The Taiwan independence movement has been rendered toothless, its ability to fight a war for independence neutralized. An agricultural policy that endured for 60 years has been repudiated. Even assuming the DPP wins the election, the nation will pay a heavy price, and everyone will be the loser.

For eight years, the DPP has been squatting in the halls of power, abusing its authority to satisfy its power lust, indulging in corruption to line its pockets. Now, relying on its authority as the ruling regime, it has launched its insane “Three Middles Policy,” targeting the central and middle regions of Taiwan, small and middle enterprises, and middle and lower income voters. Previous cutthroat wars promoting the DPP’s “welfare subsidies for the elderly” plank and “welfare subsidies for elderly farmers” plank were small potatoes. At most they consumed some public funds. Today’s “reduction of military service to one year” plank and “development of rural communities” plank will weaken the island’s military capabilities and destroy the island’s agricultural base. How can such pork barrel politics not shake the foundations of the nation?

The DPP’s Taiwan independence agenda boasts constantly evolving cutthroat techniques. One minute it announces its “Five Noes.” The next minute it announces its “Four Imperatives and One Non-Issue.” The current “rectification of names and authoring a new constitution” plank, having cut the throats of the Deep Greens and consolidated Chen Shui-bian’s hold on power, is complete. As we approach election season, the Taiwan independence plank has faded out. Now it is time to cut the throats of swing voters. Oddly enough when the DPP engages in deception to cut the throats of the Deep Greens, they passively acquiesce. Conversely, when the DPP cuts the throats of swing voters, they voluntarily extend their necks as well.

Deceptive Taiwan independence appeals to Deep Greens, in addition to “Three Middles Policy” political patronage, cannot establish a coherent political and economic agenda for the nation, or indicate the direction it ought to go. If the DPP wins the election, would that amount to a victory for Taiwan independence? Or would it amount to a victory for political patronage? Furthermore, once they win the election, do they intend to use “Three Middles Policy” political patronage to promote Taiwan independence and the “rectification of names and the authoring of a new constitution?”

But at least the DPP has a strategy. At the strategic level, it has its Taiwan independence election rhetoric. At the tactical level, it has its pork barrel election techniques. Its cutting techniques may be different, but the throats cut are the same. By contrast, Ma Ying-jeou’s Kuomintang (KMT) has neither fresh concepts, nor effective countermeasures. All it can do is watch passively as the DPP’s “Three Middles Policy” cuts one KMT throat after another. When we look at the two camps side by by side, the winners and losers are obvious.

As each segment of society’s throat is cut, so Taiwan’s throat is cut.

Cutthroat Island

Original Chinese below:

割喉戰：利刃劃向役男及農夫的咽喉！
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.06.26 02:56 am

民進黨的「大選割喉戰」已經全面發動。所謂「割喉戰」，就是將原本被視為「整體」的選舉，分割成一塊一塊的「區塊」來看待，亦即區分為一個一個不同的「喉嚨」來處理。割喉時，對於每一個「喉嚨」，皆有不一樣的「割」法，刀工亦自不同。

照理說，在國會改選或總統大選這類最高層次的選舉中，應當有一套足以號召全民的綱領性訴求，以反映全民的總體利益與期待，為國家指出全民共同的追求與歸趨。但是，民進黨由於未能建立一個足以號召全民的綱領性訴求，竟將選舉變成了「割喉戰」；用不同的「刀工」，來切斷不同的「喉嚨」。選舉非但不再是政見評比與整合的機制，反而成了撕裂國家的災禍。

例如：一方面用「正名制憲」來「割」深綠的「喉嚨」，這是一種「刀工」；另一方面又用「開發田園社區」去「割」農民的喉嚨，這又是另一種「刀工」。然而，如果民進黨未來贏了選舉，這能證明是台獨贏得了勝利嗎？相對而言，「開發田園社區」這類「廢農政策」，又難道有利於台獨嗎？

其實，只要細究民進黨最近發動的兩種「割喉戰」，即知民進黨的「台獨」根本如李登輝所說是一個「假議題」。一、兵役減為一年；二、開發田園社區。若要台獨，即須有戰爭的準備；但若自廢作戰的準備卻妄言台獨，就是假台獨。然而，兵役減為一年，連「上等兵」亦因役期縮短而可能成為歷史名詞，豈能作戰？開發田園社區，打開了「廢農政策」的潘朵拉魔盒，更不啻是宣示放棄戰爭，亦即放棄了台獨。

這就是「割喉戰」的真實效應：民進黨用「正名制憲」割了深綠的喉嚨，再用「兵役減為一年」割了役男的喉嚨，另用「開發田園社區」割了農民的喉嚨。三個喉嚨分別以三種不同的刀工割斷，而三個被割斷的喉嚨皆變成關鍵的選票；但是，三個斷喉之間並無一致的政策邏輯，且可能相互矛盾；台獨破滅了，國防虛弱了，維護了六十年的國家農業部門也解構了。民進黨即使贏了選舉，國家卻將付出全盤皆輸的代價！

八年來，民進黨盤踞政府之內，濫權縱欲，貪腐自肥；如今又憑藉其執政權力，瘋狂發動以「三中政策」（中南部、中小企業、中下階層）為目標的「割喉戰」。如今回顧，過去老年津貼及老農津貼的「割喉戰」，其實只是小兒科，頂多消耗一些公帑；現今搞到兵役減為一年、開發田園社區的地步，竟是要以弱化國防及停廢農業為代價了！這樣的「政策賄選」，豈不是要「動搖國本」？

尤有甚者，民進黨之台獨訴求也有變化不定的「割喉刀工」。一下子說「四不一沒有」，這是一種「割」法；一下子又說「四要一沒有」，則是另一種「割」法。如今看來，這一波「正名制憲」的亂刀狂割，似已完成了「階段性任務」，割斷了深綠的喉嚨，亦即穩住了陳水扁的權位；現在隨著漸漸進入大選的情勢，台獨論述已不無淡出的可能性，這是為了割「中間選民」的喉嚨。奇怪的是，民進黨以「自欺欺人」的手法割深綠的喉嚨時，深綠甘心被割；回過頭來割「中間選民」的喉嚨時，「中間選民」也一樣伸長脖子被它割！

對深綠「自欺欺人」的台獨號召，加上對「三中階層」的政策賄選，這樣的選舉不能塑造國家政經總路線，亦不能指出國家未來的方向與目標。民進黨若贏得選舉，究竟是「台獨」的勝利？或是政策賄選「割喉」刀工的勝利？再者，一旦勝選以後，難道要以賄選所獲的「三中階層」的支持，來繼續推動正名制憲的台獨路線？

不過，無論如何，民進黨總算有一套大選戰略。就高層次言，以台獨論述為基調；就低層次言，以政策賄選為手段。刀工不同，割喉則一。相對而言，國民黨馬英九方面，在高層次上始終未能建立鮮明的主體論述，就低層次言，亦只能坐視「三中階層」等等一個一個喉嚨被人割斷。兩相對照，消長立見。

當一個一個「區塊」的咽喉被一一割斷，台灣的咽喉也被割斷了！

Cutthroat Island

Cutthroat Island
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
June 26, 2007

Cutthroat Island (1995, directed by Renny Harlin, written by Michael Frost Beckner and James Gorman)

The Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) “Cutthroat Election Campaign” has begun. The DPP’s cutthroat strategy divides the party’s election platform into different planks. When it comes time to cut the throats of political rivals, each is cut using a different technique.

Campaigns for major elections such as legislative elections and presidential elections require political platforms that can rally the people, that reflect their aspirations and goals. The DPP has been unable to offer such a political platform. Therefore it has transformed elections into cutthroat wars. Elections are no longer mechanisms for comparing political perspectives and reaching consensus. They are national catastrophes that tear the nation apart.

The DPP uses the “rectification of names and the authoring of a new constitution” to cut the throats of Deep Green political rivals. The DPP uses “development of rural communities” to go cut the throats of political rivals dependent upon farmers. But even assuming the DPP wins these elections, does that really mean Taiwan independence has scored a victory? By the same token, is the “development of rural communities,” a policy intended to phase out agriculture altogether, truly advantageous to Taiwan independence?

One need only examine two recent campaigns launched by the DPP to realize that Lee Teng-hui was right. The DPP’s brand of Taiwan independence is a fraud. Let’s examine the DPP’s platform for the “reduction of military service to one year” and its platform for the “development of rural communities.” If one truly intends to promote Taiwan independence, one must make preparations for war. If one nullifies one’s ability to wage war while engaging in wild talk about Taiwan independence, that is phony Taiwan independence. If one reduces military service to one year, so that even corporals are a thing of the past, how can one possibly fight a war? To phase out agriculture in order to develop rural communities, is to open a Pandora’s Box. It is nothing less than a declaration of surrender, nothing less than giving up on Taiwan independence.

This is the real consequence of the DPP’s cutthroat campaigns. The DPP’s “rectification of names and authoring of a new constitution” plank has cut the throats of Deep Green political rivals. The “reduction of military service to one year” plank has cut the throats of political rivals dependent upon military servicemen. The “development of rural communities” plank has cut the throats of political rivals dependent upon farmers. Three throats cut using three different techniques, all are critical to the election results, but none have a common denominator, and some even conflict. The Taiwan independence movement has been rendered toothless, its ability to fight a war for independence neutralized. An agricultural policy that endured for 60 years has been repudiated. Even assuming the DPP wins the election, the nation will pay a heavy price, and everyone will be the loser.

For eight years, the DPP has been squatting in the halls of power, abusing its authority to satisfy its power lust, indulging in corruption to line its pockets. Now, relying on its authority as the ruling regime, it has launched its insane “Three Middles Policy,” targeting the central and middle regions of Taiwan, small and middle enterprises, and middle and lower income voters. Previous cutthroat wars promoting the DPP’s “welfare subsidies for the elderly” plank and “welfare subsidies for elderly farmers” plank were small potatoes. At most they consumed some public funds. Today’s “reduction of military service to one year” plank and “development of rural communities” plank will weaken the island’s military capabilities and destroy the island’s agricultural base. How can such pork barrel politics not shake the foundations of the nation?

The DPP’s Taiwan independence agenda boasts constantly evolving cutthroat techniques. One minute it announces its “Five Noes.” The next minute it announces its “Four Imperatives and One Non-Issue.” The current “rectification of names and authoring a new constitution” plank, having cut the throats of the Deep Greens and consolidated Chen Shui-bian’s hold on power, is complete. As we approach election season, the Taiwan independence plank has faded out. Now it is time to cut the throats of swing voters. Oddly enough when the DPP engages in deception to cut the throats of the Deep Greens, they passively acquiesce. Conversely, when the DPP cuts the throats of swing voters, they voluntarily extend their necks as well.

Deceptive Taiwan independence appeals to Deep Greens, in addition to “Three Middles Policy” political patronage, cannot establish a coherent political and economic agenda for the nation, or indicate the direction it ought to go. If the DPP wins the election, would that amount to a victory for Taiwan independence? Or would it amount to a victory for political patronage? Furthermore, once they win the election, do they intend to use “Three Middles Policy” political patronage to promote Taiwan independence and the “rectification of names and the authoring of a new constitution?”

But at least the DPP has a strategy. At the strategic level, it has its Taiwan independence election rhetoric. At the tactical level, it has its pork barrel election techniques. Its cutting techniques may be different, but the throats cut are the same. By contrast, Ma Ying-jeou’s Kuomintang (KMT) has neither fresh concepts, nor effective countermeasures. All it can do is watch passively as the DPP’s “Three Middles Policy” cuts one KMT throat after another. When we look at the two camps side by by side, the winners and losers are obvious.

As each segment of society’s throat is cut, so Taiwan’s throat is cut.

Cutthroat Island

Original Chinese below:

割喉戰：利刃劃向役男及農夫的咽喉！
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.06.26 02:56 am

民進黨的「大選割喉戰」已經全面發動。所謂「割喉戰」，就是將原本被視為「整體」的選舉，分割成一塊一塊的「區塊」來看待，亦即區分為一個一個不同的「喉嚨」來處理。割喉時，對於每一個「喉嚨」，皆有不一樣的「割」法，刀工亦自不同。

照理說，在國會改選或總統大選這類最高層次的選舉中，應當有一套足以號召全民的綱領性訴求，以反映全民的總體利益與期待，為國家指出全民共同的追求與歸趨。但是，民進黨由於未能建立一個足以號召全民的綱領性訴求，竟將選舉變成了「割喉戰」；用不同的「刀工」，來切斷不同的「喉嚨」。選舉非但不再是政見評比與整合的機制，反而成了撕裂國家的災禍。

例如：一方面用「正名制憲」來「割」深綠的「喉嚨」，這是一種「刀工」；另一方面又用「開發田園社區」去「割」農民的喉嚨，這又是另一種「刀工」。然而，如果民進黨未來贏了選舉，這能證明是台獨贏得了勝利嗎？相對而言，「開發田園社區」這類「廢農政策」，又難道有利於台獨嗎？

其實，只要細究民進黨最近發動的兩種「割喉戰」，即知民進黨的「台獨」根本如李登輝所說是一個「假議題」。一、兵役減為一年；二、開發田園社區。若要台獨，即須有戰爭的準備；但若自廢作戰的準備卻妄言台獨，就是假台獨。然而，兵役減為一年，連「上等兵」亦因役期縮短而可能成為歷史名詞，豈能作戰？開發田園社區，打開了「廢農政策」的潘朵拉魔盒，更不啻是宣示放棄戰爭，亦即放棄了台獨。

這就是「割喉戰」的真實效應：民進黨用「正名制憲」割了深綠的喉嚨，再用「兵役減為一年」割了役男的喉嚨，另用「開發田園社區」割了農民的喉嚨。三個喉嚨分別以三種不同的刀工割斷，而三個被割斷的喉嚨皆變成關鍵的選票；但是，三個斷喉之間並無一致的政策邏輯，且可能相互矛盾；台獨破滅了，國防虛弱了，維護了六十年的國家農業部門也解構了。民進黨即使贏了選舉，國家卻將付出全盤皆輸的代價！

八年來，民進黨盤踞政府之內，濫權縱欲，貪腐自肥；如今又憑藉其執政權力，瘋狂發動以「三中政策」（中南部、中小企業、中下階層）為目標的「割喉戰」。如今回顧，過去老年津貼及老農津貼的「割喉戰」，其實只是小兒科，頂多消耗一些公帑；現今搞到兵役減為一年、開發田園社區的地步，竟是要以弱化國防及停廢農業為代價了！這樣的「政策賄選」，豈不是要「動搖國本」？

尤有甚者，民進黨之台獨訴求也有變化不定的「割喉刀工」。一下子說「四不一沒有」，這是一種「割」法；一下子又說「四要一沒有」，則是另一種「割」法。如今看來，這一波「正名制憲」的亂刀狂割，似已完成了「階段性任務」，割斷了深綠的喉嚨，亦即穩住了陳水扁的權位；現在隨著漸漸進入大選的情勢，台獨論述已不無淡出的可能性，這是為了割「中間選民」的喉嚨。奇怪的是，民進黨以「自欺欺人」的手法割深綠的喉嚨時，深綠甘心被割；回過頭來割「中間選民」的喉嚨時，「中間選民」也一樣伸長脖子被它割！

對深綠「自欺欺人」的台獨號召，加上對「三中階層」的政策賄選，這樣的選舉不能塑造國家政經總路線，亦不能指出國家未來的方向與目標。民進黨若贏得選舉，究竟是「台獨」的勝利？或是政策賄選「割喉」刀工的勝利？再者，一旦勝選以後，難道要以賄選所獲的「三中階層」的支持，來繼續推動正名制憲的台獨路線？

不過，無論如何，民進黨總算有一套大選戰略。就高層次言，以台獨論述為基調；就低層次言，以政策賄選為手段。刀工不同，割喉則一。相對而言，國民黨馬英九方面，在高層次上始終未能建立鮮明的主體論述，就低層次言，亦只能坐視「三中階層」等等一個一個喉嚨被人割斷。兩相對照，消長立見。

當一個一個「區塊」的咽喉被一一割斷，台灣的咽喉也被割斷了！

Cutthroat Island

Cutthroat Island
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
June 26, 2007

Cutthroat Island (1995, directed by Renny Harlin, written by Michael Frost Beckner and James Gorman)

The Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) “Cutthroat Election Campaign” has begun. The DPP’s cutthroat strategy divides the party’s election platform into different planks. When it comes time to cut the throats of political rivals, each is cut using a different technique.

Campaigns for major elections such as legislative elections and presidential elections require political platforms that can rally the people, that reflect their aspirations and goals. The DPP has been unable to offer such a political platform. Therefore it has transformed elections into cutthroat wars. Elections are no longer mechanisms for comparing political perspectives and reaching consensus. They are national catastrophes that tear the nation apart.

The DPP uses the “rectification of names and the authoring of a new constitution” to cut the throats of Deep Green political rivals. The DPP uses “development of rural communities” to go cut the throats of political rivals dependent upon farmers. But even assuming the DPP wins these elections, does that really mean Taiwan independence has scored a victory? By the same token, is the “development of rural communities,” a policy intended to phase out agriculture altogether, truly advantageous to Taiwan independence?

One need only examine two recent campaigns launched by the DPP to realize that Lee Teng-hui was right. The DPP’s brand of Taiwan independence is a fraud. Let’s examine the DPP’s platform for the “reduction of military service to one year” and its platform for the “development of rural communities.” If one truly intends to promote Taiwan independence, one must make preparations for war. If one nullifies one’s ability to wage war while engaging in wild talk about Taiwan independence, that is phony Taiwan independence. If one reduces military service to one year, so that even corporals are a thing of the past, how can one possibly fight a war? To phase out agriculture in order to develop rural communities, is to open a Pandora’s Box. It is nothing less than a declaration of surrender, nothing less than giving up on Taiwan independence.

This is the real consequence of the DPP’s cutthroat campaigns. The DPP’s “rectification of names and authoring of a new constitution” plank has cut the throats of Deep Green political rivals. The “reduction of military service to one year” plank has cut the throats of political rivals dependent upon military servicemen. The “development of rural communities” plank has cut the throats of political rivals dependent upon farmers. Three throats cut using three different techniques, all are critical to the election results, but none have a common denominator, and some even conflict. The Taiwan independence movement has been rendered toothless, its ability to fight a war for independence neutralized. An agricultural policy that endured for 60 years has been repudiated. Even assuming the DPP wins the election, the nation will pay a heavy price, and everyone will be the loser.

For eight years, the DPP has been squatting in the halls of power, abusing its authority to satisfy its power lust, indulging in corruption to line its pockets. Now, relying on its authority as the ruling regime, it has launched its insane “Three Middles Policy,” targeting the central and middle regions of Taiwan, small and middle enterprises, and middle and lower income voters. Previous cutthroat wars promoting the DPP’s “welfare subsidies for the elderly” plank and “welfare subsidies for elderly farmers” plank were small potatoes. At most they consumed some public funds. Today’s “reduction of military service to one year” plank and “development of rural communities” plank will weaken the island’s military capabilities and destroy the island’s agricultural base. How can such pork barrel politics not shake the foundations of the nation?

The DPP’s Taiwan independence agenda boasts constantly evolving cutthroat techniques. One minute it announces its “Five Noes.” The next minute it announces its “Four Imperatives and One Non-Issue.” The current “rectification of names and authoring a new constitution” plank, having cut the throats of the Deep Greens and consolidated Chen Shui-bian’s hold on power, is complete. As we approach election season, the Taiwan independence plank has faded out. Now it is time to cut the throats of swing voters. Oddly enough when the DPP engages in deception to cut the throats of the Deep Greens, they passively acquiesce. Conversely, when the DPP cuts the throats of swing voters, they voluntarily extend their necks as well.

Deceptive Taiwan independence appeals to Deep Greens, in addition to “Three Middles Policy” political patronage, cannot establish a coherent political and economic agenda for the nation, or indicate the direction it ought to go. If the DPP wins the election, would that amount to a victory for Taiwan independence? Or would it amount to a victory for political patronage? Furthermore, once they win the election, do they intend to use “Three Middles Policy” political patronage to promote Taiwan independence and the “rectification of names and the authoring of a new constitution?”

But at least the DPP has a strategy. At the strategic level, it has its Taiwan independence election rhetoric. At the tactical level, it has its pork barrel election techniques. Its cutting techniques may be different, but the throats cut are the same. By contrast, Ma Ying-jeou’s Kuomintang (KMT) has neither fresh concepts, nor effective countermeasures. All it can do is watch passively as the DPP’s “Three Middles Policy” cuts one KMT throat after another. When we look at the two camps side by by side, the winners and losers are obvious.

As each segment of society’s throat is cut, so Taiwan’s throat is cut.

Cutthroat Island

Original Chinese below:

割喉戰：利刃劃向役男及農夫的咽喉！
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.06.26 02:56 am

民進黨的「大選割喉戰」已經全面發動。所謂「割喉戰」，就是將原本被視為「整體」的選舉，分割成一塊一塊的「區塊」來看待，亦即區分為一個一個不同的「喉嚨」來處理。割喉時，對於每一個「喉嚨」，皆有不一樣的「割」法，刀工亦自不同。

照理說，在國會改選或總統大選這類最高層次的選舉中，應當有一套足以號召全民的綱領性訴求，以反映全民的總體利益與期待，為國家指出全民共同的追求與歸趨。但是，民進黨由於未能建立一個足以號召全民的綱領性訴求，竟將選舉變成了「割喉戰」；用不同的「刀工」，來切斷不同的「喉嚨」。選舉非但不再是政見評比與整合的機制，反而成了撕裂國家的災禍。

例如：一方面用「正名制憲」來「割」深綠的「喉嚨」，這是一種「刀工」；另一方面又用「開發田園社區」去「割」農民的喉嚨，這又是另一種「刀工」。然而，如果民進黨未來贏了選舉，這能證明是台獨贏得了勝利嗎？相對而言，「開發田園社區」這類「廢農政策」，又難道有利於台獨嗎？

其實，只要細究民進黨最近發動的兩種「割喉戰」，即知民進黨的「台獨」根本如李登輝所說是一個「假議題」。一、兵役減為一年；二、開發田園社區。若要台獨，即須有戰爭的準備；但若自廢作戰的準備卻妄言台獨，就是假台獨。然而，兵役減為一年，連「上等兵」亦因役期縮短而可能成為歷史名詞，豈能作戰？開發田園社區，打開了「廢農政策」的潘朵拉魔盒，更不啻是宣示放棄戰爭，亦即放棄了台獨。

這就是「割喉戰」的真實效應：民進黨用「正名制憲」割了深綠的喉嚨，再用「兵役減為一年」割了役男的喉嚨，另用「開發田園社區」割了農民的喉嚨。三個喉嚨分別以三種不同的刀工割斷，而三個被割斷的喉嚨皆變成關鍵的選票；但是，三個斷喉之間並無一致的政策邏輯，且可能相互矛盾；台獨破滅了，國防虛弱了，維護了六十年的國家農業部門也解構了。民進黨即使贏了選舉，國家卻將付出全盤皆輸的代價！

八年來，民進黨盤踞政府之內，濫權縱欲，貪腐自肥；如今又憑藉其執政權力，瘋狂發動以「三中政策」（中南部、中小企業、中下階層）為目標的「割喉戰」。如今回顧，過去老年津貼及老農津貼的「割喉戰」，其實只是小兒科，頂多消耗一些公帑；現今搞到兵役減為一年、開發田園社區的地步，竟是要以弱化國防及停廢農業為代價了！這樣的「政策賄選」，豈不是要「動搖國本」？

尤有甚者，民進黨之台獨訴求也有變化不定的「割喉刀工」。一下子說「四不一沒有」，這是一種「割」法；一下子又說「四要一沒有」，則是另一種「割」法。如今看來，這一波「正名制憲」的亂刀狂割，似已完成了「階段性任務」，割斷了深綠的喉嚨，亦即穩住了陳水扁的權位；現在隨著漸漸進入大選的情勢，台獨論述已不無淡出的可能性，這是為了割「中間選民」的喉嚨。奇怪的是，民進黨以「自欺欺人」的手法割深綠的喉嚨時，深綠甘心被割；回過頭來割「中間選民」的喉嚨時，「中間選民」也一樣伸長脖子被它割！

對深綠「自欺欺人」的台獨號召，加上對「三中階層」的政策賄選，這樣的選舉不能塑造國家政經總路線，亦不能指出國家未來的方向與目標。民進黨若贏得選舉，究竟是「台獨」的勝利？或是政策賄選「割喉」刀工的勝利？再者，一旦勝選以後，難道要以賄選所獲的「三中階層」的支持，來繼續推動正名制憲的台獨路線？

不過，無論如何，民進黨總算有一套大選戰略。就高層次言，以台獨論述為基調；就低層次言，以政策賄選為手段。刀工不同，割喉則一。相對而言，國民黨馬英九方面，在高層次上始終未能建立鮮明的主體論述，就低層次言，亦只能坐視「三中階層」等等一個一個喉嚨被人割斷。兩相對照，消長立見。

當一個一個「區塊」的咽喉被一一割斷，台灣的咽喉也被割斷了！

Cutthroat Island

Cutthroat Island
United Daily News editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
June 26, 2007

Cutthroat Island (1995, directed by Renny Harlin, written by Michael Frost Beckner and James Gorman)

The Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) “Cutthroat Election Campaign” has begun. The DPP’s cutthroat strategy divides the party’s election platform into different planks. When it comes time to cut the throats of political rivals, each is cut using a different technique.

Campaigns for major elections such as legislative elections and presidential elections require political platforms that can rally the people, that reflect their aspirations and goals. The DPP has been unable to offer such a political platform. Therefore it has transformed elections into cutthroat wars. Elections are no longer mechanisms for comparing political perspectives and reaching consensus. They are national catastrophes that tear the nation apart.

The DPP uses the “rectification of names and the authoring of a new constitution” to cut the throats of Deep Green political rivals. The DPP uses “development of rural communities” to go cut the throats of political rivals dependent upon farmers. But even assuming the DPP wins these elections, does that really mean Taiwan independence has scored a victory? By the same token, is the “development of rural communities,” a policy intended to phase out agriculture altogether, truly advantageous to Taiwan independence?

One need only examine two recent campaigns launched by the DPP to realize that Lee Teng-hui was right. The DPP’s brand of Taiwan independence is a fraud. Let’s examine the DPP’s platform for the “reduction of military service to one year” and its platform for the “development of rural communities.” If one truly intends to promote Taiwan independence, one must make preparations for war. If one nullifies one’s ability to wage war while engaging in wild talk about Taiwan independence, that is phony Taiwan independence. If one reduces military service to one year, so that even corporals are a thing of the past, how can one possibly fight a war? To phase out agriculture in order to develop rural communities, is to open a Pandora’s Box. It is nothing less than a declaration of surrender, nothing less than giving up on Taiwan independence.

This is the real consequence of the DPP’s cutthroat campaigns. The DPP’s “rectification of names and authoring of a new constitution” plank has cut the throats of Deep Green political rivals. The “reduction of military service to one year” plank has cut the throats of political rivals dependent upon military servicemen. The “development of rural communities” plank has cut the throats of political rivals dependent upon farmers. Three throats cut using three different techniques, all are critical to the election results, but none have a common denominator, and some even conflict. The Taiwan independence movement has been rendered toothless, its ability to fight a war for independence neutralized. An agricultural policy that endured for 60 years has been repudiated. Even assuming the DPP wins the election, the nation will pay a heavy price, and everyone will be the loser.

For eight years, the DPP has been squatting in the halls of power, abusing its authority to satisfy its power lust, indulging in corruption to line its pockets. Now, relying on its authority as the ruling regime, it has launched its insane “Three Middles Policy,” targeting the central and middle regions of Taiwan, small and middle enterprises, and middle and lower income voters. Previous cutthroat wars promoting the DPP’s “welfare subsidies for the elderly” plank and “welfare subsidies for elderly farmers” plank were small potatoes. At most they consumed some public funds. Today’s “reduction of military service to one year” plank and “development of rural communities” plank will weaken the island’s military capabilities and destroy the island’s agricultural base. How can such pork barrel politics not shake the foundations of the nation?

The DPP’s Taiwan independence agenda boasts constantly evolving cutthroat techniques. One minute it announces its “Five Noes.” The next minute it announces its “Four Imperatives and One Non-Issue.” The current “rectification of names and authoring a new constitution” plank, having cut the throats of the Deep Greens and consolidated Chen Shui-bian’s hold on power, is complete. As we approach election season, the Taiwan independence plank has faded out. Now it is time to cut the throats of swing voters. Oddly enough when the DPP engages in deception to cut the throats of the Deep Greens, they passively acquiesce. Conversely, when the DPP cuts the throats of swing voters, they voluntarily extend their necks as well.

Deceptive Taiwan independence appeals to Deep Greens, in addition to “Three Middles Policy” political patronage, cannot establish a coherent political and economic agenda for the nation, or indicate the direction it ought to go. If the DPP wins the election, would that amount to a victory for Taiwan independence? Or would it amount to a victory for political patronage? Furthermore, once they win the election, do they intend to use “Three Middles Policy” political patronage to promote Taiwan independence and the “rectification of names and the authoring of a new constitution?”

But at least the DPP has a strategy. At the strategic level, it has its Taiwan independence election rhetoric. At the tactical level, it has its pork barrel election techniques. Its cutting techniques may be different, but the throats cut are the same. By contrast, Ma Ying-jeou’s Kuomintang (KMT) has neither fresh concepts, nor effective countermeasures. All it can do is watch passively as the DPP’s “Three Middles Policy” cuts one KMT throat after another. When we look at the two camps side by by side, the winners and losers are obvious.

As each segment of society’s throat is cut, so Taiwan’s throat is cut.

Cutthroat Island

Original Chinese below:

割喉戰：利刃劃向役男及農夫的咽喉！
【聯合報╱社論】
2007.06.26 02:56 am

民進黨的「大選割喉戰」已經全面發動。所謂「割喉戰」，就是將原本被視為「整體」的選舉，分割成一塊一塊的「區塊」來看待，亦即區分為一個一個不同的「喉嚨」來處理。割喉時，對於每一個「喉嚨」，皆有不一樣的「割」法，刀工亦自不同。

照理說，在國會改選或總統大選這類最高層次的選舉中，應當有一套足以號召全民的綱領性訴求，以反映全民的總體利益與期待，為國家指出全民共同的追求與歸趨。但是，民進黨由於未能建立一個足以號召全民的綱領性訴求，竟將選舉變成了「割喉戰」；用不同的「刀工」，來切斷不同的「喉嚨」。選舉非但不再是政見評比與整合的機制，反而成了撕裂國家的災禍。

例如：一方面用「正名制憲」來「割」深綠的「喉嚨」，這是一種「刀工」；另一方面又用「開發田園社區」去「割」農民的喉嚨，這又是另一種「刀工」。然而，如果民進黨未來贏了選舉，這能證明是台獨贏得了勝利嗎？相對而言，「開發田園社區」這類「廢農政策」，又難道有利於台獨嗎？

其實，只要細究民進黨最近發動的兩種「割喉戰」，即知民進黨的「台獨」根本如李登輝所說是一個「假議題」。一、兵役減為一年；二、開發田園社區。若要台獨，即須有戰爭的準備；但若自廢作戰的準備卻妄言台獨，就是假台獨。然而，兵役減為一年，連「上等兵」亦因役期縮短而可能成為歷史名詞，豈能作戰？開發田園社區，打開了「廢農政策」的潘朵拉魔盒，更不啻是宣示放棄戰爭，亦即放棄了台獨。

這就是「割喉戰」的真實效應：民進黨用「正名制憲」割了深綠的喉嚨，再用「兵役減為一年」割了役男的喉嚨，另用「開發田園社區」割了農民的喉嚨。三個喉嚨分別以三種不同的刀工割斷，而三個被割斷的喉嚨皆變成關鍵的選票；但是，三個斷喉之間並無一致的政策邏輯，且可能相互矛盾；台獨破滅了，國防虛弱了，維護了六十年的國家農業部門也解構了。民進黨即使贏了選舉，國家卻將付出全盤皆輸的代價！

八年來，民進黨盤踞政府之內，濫權縱欲，貪腐自肥；如今又憑藉其執政權力，瘋狂發動以「三中政策」（中南部、中小企業、中下階層）為目標的「割喉戰」。如今回顧，過去老年津貼及老農津貼的「割喉戰」，其實只是小兒科，頂多消耗一些公帑；現今搞到兵役減為一年、開發田園社區的地步，竟是要以弱化國防及停廢農業為代價了！這樣的「政策賄選」，豈不是要「動搖國本」？

尤有甚者，民進黨之台獨訴求也有變化不定的「割喉刀工」。一下子說「四不一沒有」，這是一種「割」法；一下子又說「四要一沒有」，則是另一種「割」法。如今看來，這一波「正名制憲」的亂刀狂割，似已完成了「階段性任務」，割斷了深綠的喉嚨，亦即穩住了陳水扁的權位；現在隨著漸漸進入大選的情勢，台獨論述已不無淡出的可能性，這是為了割「中間選民」的喉嚨。奇怪的是，民進黨以「自欺欺人」的手法割深綠的喉嚨時，深綠甘心被割；回過頭來割「中間選民」的喉嚨時，「中間選民」也一樣伸長脖子被它割！

對深綠「自欺欺人」的台獨號召，加上對「三中階層」的政策賄選，這樣的選舉不能塑造國家政經總路線，亦不能指出國家未來的方向與目標。民進黨若贏得選舉，究竟是「台獨」的勝利？或是政策賄選「割喉」刀工的勝利？再者，一旦勝選以後，難道要以賄選所獲的「三中階層」的支持，來繼續推動正名制憲的台獨路線？

不過，無論如何，民進黨總算有一套大選戰略。就高層次言，以台獨論述為基調；就低層次言，以政策賄選為手段。刀工不同，割喉則一。相對而言，國民黨馬英九方面，在高層次上始終未能建立鮮明的主體論述，就低層次言，亦只能坐視「三中階層」等等一個一個喉嚨被人割斷。兩相對照，消長立見。

當一個一個「區塊」的咽喉被一一割斷，台灣的咽喉也被割斷了！

Chiou I-jen’s Sophistry

Chiou I-jen’s Sophistry
China Times editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
June 23, 2007

During the election of the board of directors for the China Development Financial Holding Corp. and the Hua Nan Financial Holding Co., their public shares took a catastrophic beating. People from all walks of life pointed the finger at the Ministry of Finance and the Financial Supervisory Commission for failing to protect the rights and interests of public shareholders. They felt that at the very least, Minister He and Chairman Hu should assume political responsibility. It appears however that Executive Yuan Vice-President Chiou I-jen is attempting to make excuses for the Executive Yuan’s setback. Chiou I-jen claimed that the government lacked the necessary power, that for the government to attempt to seize the directorship would have been “asking for trouble.” His statement was an attempt to intercede on behalf of the two officials. But democratic politics is supposed to be the politics of accountability. These officials, by flagrantly dispensing political pork to favored financial institutions, have been derelict in their duty and have brought dishonor to the nation. They have abused the authority of the executive branch, and must not be allowed to stonewall the public by simply ignoring the accusations leveled against them.

Chiou I-jen, by a narrow margin, holds a controlling interest in the China Development Financial Holding Corp. and the Hua Nan Financial Holding Co. Obviously he has jettisoned the government’s previous policies. Take the China Development Financial Holding Corp for example. When Minister of Finance Lin Chuan allowed the Koo family-owned Chinatrust Commercial Bank to expel Diana Chen, one of the conditions was the Koo family had to own at least 15% of the stock. But according to its latest report to the Financial Supervisory Commission, Koo family shares fell short of the 15% threshold. Instead they joined with others to launch a proxy battle. First, they reneged on their pledge to the Ministry of Finance. Then they evaded the standard review for major stockholder suitability required by the Financial Supervisory Commission. On the one hand they wrung their hands over every detail. On the other hand they displayed utter indifference to their previous pledges and to the requirements of financial oversight. In the eyes of these financial institutions, the nation’s administrative agencies were nothing. What credibility does this administration have to speak of?

Mr. Chiou needs to understand that how many government banks remain is not important. What is important is the process by which public shares are made available, because that is the key to the dispensing of political pork. It is also the current focus of public attention. If the government intends to make shares of Hua Nan Financial Holding Co. or China Development Financial Holding Corp. available to the public, whether by public auction or by feeling out strategic investors, it will receive a considerable sum of money. That money can become income for the state treasury. But if Hua Nan Financial Holding Co. or China Development Financial Holding Corp. (according to proxies) fall into hostile hands due to poor management of public shares, then large sums of income for the state treasury will be lost. The Minister of Transportation was forced tor resign and prosecuted merely on suspicion of accepting a few hundred thousand in cash hidden in tea canisters. In which case, shouldn’t the Ministry of Finance and Financial Supervisory Commission accept responsibility for the loss of tens of billions of from the state treasury?

To allege that the public shares were not enough to allow the government to wage a proxy fight, and that any attempt to seize control of the board of directors would have been “asking for trouble” is amateur talk by someone who does not understand the market. Perhaps Vice-President Chiou has not dabbled in the money markets. Perhaps he did not understand that the recipients of the proxies were the Chang brothers, who are listed as major shareholders in the stockholders’ report. Take Hua Nan Financial Holding Co. for example. The public shares obviously outnumbered those held by Lin Ming-cheng, yet the proxy fight was still a debacle. The only possible explanation is that those holding the public shares were unwilling to kneel down and kow tow to the Chang brothers. When private financial institutions were certain that public shares were not the object of a proxy fight, and wanted to avoid premium payments, the Executive Yuan should have boldly stepped forward to protect the public interest. Protecting the national interest is the solemn duty of all public servants. How can anyone dismiss it as “asking for trouble?”

Chiou I-jen’s views on the Financial Supervisory Commission’s intervention in the review of major stockholder suitability is also amateur talk. According to Articles 16 and 17 of the Financial Holding Company Act, the suitability of major stockholders must be reviewed by the Financial Supervisory Commission. If the Koo family, which controls less than 10% of the company, could evade the suitability requirements of the Financial Holding Company Act, merely because a daughter in law and a sister in law of the Koo family resigned from the board of directors, then the Financial Supervisory Commission may as well close its doors. Such obvious attempts to avoid legal supervision were followed by a coordinated attack on public shares. If the Executive Yuan insists on further restricting the conditions under which the Financial Supervisory Commission is permitted to intervene, then what we would like to know is whether the Financial Supervisory Commission is still a government institution or a vassal of private financial institutions.

We have already mentioned Chiou I-jen’s inappropriate remarks. We must now go back and examine He Chih-chin and Hu Sheng-cheng’s political responsibility. Although Minister He is familiar with US Internal Revenue Service procedures, he failed to understand domestic tax procedures, the political ecology of the legislature, the management of public shares, and even the appointment of the chairman of the board by means of public shares. In the China Development Financial Holding Corp matter, Minister He forfeited the veto that the 1/3 public shares offered him. He thereby made it impossible to use public shares to regulate policy in the future. Financial groups viewed him with contempt during negotiations. We consider his performance not merely a problem of political responsibility, but also of individual dignity.

From early on, in his presidential office report, Financial Supervisory Commission Chairman Hu Sheng-cheng proposed his now infamous “Second Financial Reform,” and defended the policy on television. After that, he followed Tsai Ying-wen’s lead in applying the brakes to financial reform. In response to a long string of China Development Financial Holding Corp. management scandals, he has done absolutely nothing. From beginning to end, he has been constant only in his inconstancy. Taiwan’s financial system in in chaos. That financial groups sit in contempt of the administration is a well known fact. The fundamentals of our financial industry are not good. Our international ranking continues to fall, and could even be termed directionless. Confucius said that “When the Way [of Justice] prevails in your own state, to be poor and obscure is a disgrace. But when the Way does not prevail in your own state, to be rich and honored is a disgrace.” Chairman Hu has hopped from one position in the cabinet to another over the past seven years. From Minister without Portfolio, to Chairman of the Council for Economic Planning and Development, to Chairman of the Financial Supervisory Commission. His government experience is clear for all to see. If he still has an iota of political responsibility in him, he will not need the outside world to remind him of his duty.

By comparison, Minister Ho Chih-chin still resembles an ivory tower intellectual thrown into the political jungle. He is still a rookie, and has not lost his character. To demand that Minister He assume responsibility for public shares policy is actually an affirmation of his character. To demand that scoundrels assume responsibilty for their actions is no longer that important.

Original Chinese below:

中時電子報
中國時報 　2007.06.23
邱義仁的錯辯 不能豁免財金首長政治責任
中時社論

在 開發金、華南金改選董監，官股慘敗之後，社會各界都將矛頭指向維護官股權益不力的財政部與金管會，認為至少何部長與胡主委應該要負起政治責任。但是，日前 行政院副院長邱義仁似乎又在為行政院的挫敗找下台階。邱義仁認為，以往官方實力不夠而要強行爭取董監席位，是「自討苦吃」。這樣的發言，當然有替兩位財金 首長緩頰之意。但是民主政治就是責任政治，我們認為國家的財金首長以幾近喪權辱國的方式豢養財團坐大、踐踏行政權，絕不能以唾面自乾的方式自我安慰。

邱 義仁先生以狹隘的持股比例來評估開發金與華南金的董監爭奪，顯然是把以往政府的延續性政策給刻意切除了。以開發金為例，當初財政部長林全同意中信辜家趕走 陳敏薰的條件之一，就是辜家持股必須達到十五％。但是，此次辜家向金管會申報的股權不及十五％的門檻，卻又聯合其他戰友分進合擊收委託書，一則將當初對財 政部的承諾一腳踢開，再則規避金管會對大股東適格性的審查，首鼠兩端，卻全然視政府政策、先前承諾與金融監理如無物。國家行政機關在財團眼中根本像是垃 圾，這政府還有威信可言嗎？

其次，邱先生要了解：公營行庫最後剩下幾家不重要，但是公股釋出的「過程」，才是利益輸送的關鍵，也才是全民 關注的焦點。如果國家要將華南金或開發金的股權釋出，不論是公開標售或洽詢策略性投資人，都可以得到一筆可觀的溢價金，成為國庫收入。但是，如果華南金或 開發金因為公股管理（如徵委託書）不善而失守，則大筆的國庫收入將因而流失。交通部長只因為涉嫌收下裝有數十萬現金的茶葉罐就下台起訴，那麼流失數百億溢 價國庫收入的財政部與金管會，難道不該負起責任？

若說官股實力不足，去搶委託書、爭董監席次就是「自討苦吃」；這又是不了解市場環境的外 行話。邱副院長可能從來不曾在金融市場上打滾過，也從來不了解收委託書的訣竅是股東名冊與「委託書大戶」張家兄弟。以華南金來說吧，官股持股明顯多於林明 成，但收委託書仍是慘敗，這只能說是官股不善向張家兄弟磕頭下跪而已。事實上，當民間財團吃定官股沒有收委託書之專業，而想逃避溢價支付時，行政院當然應 該挺身護衛全民利益。「護國產」是所有人民公僕的天職，又怎麼能說是自討苦吃呢？

此外，邱義仁對於金管會介入金控股東適格性審查的看法， 也是外行話。依據金控法十六條及十七條，金控大股東的適格性要經過金管會的審查。如果只因辜家二媳婦把中信證券的董事辭去，就以形式上持股不及十％而迴避 金控法的適格性規範，那麼金管會乾脆關門算了。這麼明顯的迴避法律監督，再以分進合擊硬吃官股，行政院如果還要限縮金管會介入的時機，真不知道金管會是公 家機關還是私人財團的附庸。

邱義仁緩頰發言不當既如前述，我們還是要回過頭來檢討何志欽與胡勝正的政治責任。何部長雖然熟悉美國內地稅務 的稽查，但是對於國內的租稅背景、立院的政治生態、公股的管理都極為陌生，甚至公股指派的董事長都管不動。開發金一事，何部長不但失去了官股三分之一董事 的否決勢力，也使以後的公股管理政策完全破功，更在談判過程中被財團看扁。我們認為，這樣的表現，已經不只是負起政治責任的問題，而是個人尊嚴的問題。

至 於金管會主委胡勝正，從他早年在總統府簡報提出二次金改，到電視做政策辯護、而後伴隨著蔡英文踩金改煞車，至今又對開發金的公司治理一長串弊端無所作為， 一路走來始終不一。如今，台灣的金融秩序凌亂、財團坐大而蔑視政府，已經是社會共識。我們的金融業內在環境不佳、國際排名殿後，堪稱無道。孔子曰，「邦無 道，富且貴焉，恥也」。胡主委遊走內閣各部會長達七年，從政務委員、經建會主委到金管會主委，官場練達圓通，大家有目共睹。他如果心中還有一絲政治責任的 觀念，也就不需要外界再多做提醒了。

相對而言，何志欽部長仍然像是從政的學者，雖有白兔的青稚，卻不失性情。我們認為何部長應該為公股政策負去留的責任，其實是肯定之辭。對於多說無益之輩，負不負責任已經不那麼重要了。

Chiou I-jen’s Sophistry

Chiou I-jen’s Sophistry
China Times editorial
translated by Bevin Chu
June 23, 2007

During the election of the board of directors for the China Development Financial Holding Corp. and the Hua Nan Financial Holding Co., their public shares took a catastrophic beating. People from all walks of life pointed the finger at the Ministry of Finance and the Financial Supervisory Commission for failing to protect the rights and interests of public shareholders. They felt that at the very least, Minister He and Chairman Hu should assume political responsibility. It appears however that Executive Yuan Vice-President Chiou I-jen is attempting to make excuses for the Executive Yuan’s setback. Chiou I-jen claimed that the government lacked the necessary power, that for the government to attempt to seize the directorship would have been “asking for trouble.” His statement was an attempt to intercede on behalf of the two officials. But democratic politics is supposed to be the politics of accountability. These officials, by flagrantly dispensing political pork to favored financial institutions, have been derelict in their duty and have brought dishonor to the nation. They have abused the authority of the executive branch, and must not be allowed to stonewall the public by simply ignoring the accusations leveled against them.

Chiou I-jen, by a narrow margin, holds a controlling interest in the China Development Financial Holding Corp. and the Hua Nan Financial Holding Co. Obviously he has jettisoned the government’s previous policies. Take the China Development Financial Holding Corp for example. When Minister of Finance Lin Chuan allowed the Koo family-owned Chinatrust Commercial Bank to expel Diana Chen, one of the conditions was the Koo family had to own at least 15% of the stock. But according to its latest report to the Financial Supervisory Commission, Koo family shares fell short of the 15% threshold. Instead they joined with others to launch a proxy battle. First, they reneged on their pledge to the Ministry of Finance. Then they evaded the standard review for major stockholder suitability required by the Financial Supervisory Commission. On the one hand they wrung their hands over every detail. On the other hand they displayed utter indifference to their previous pledges and to the requirements of financial oversight. In the eyes of these financial institutions, the nation’s administrative agencies were nothing. What credibility does this administration have to speak of?

Mr. Chiou needs to understand that how many government banks remain is not important. What is important is the process by which public shares are made available, because that is the key to the dispensing of political pork. It is also the current focus of public attention. If the government intends to make shares of Hua Nan Financial Holding Co. or China Development Financial Holding Corp. available to the public, whether by public auction or by feeling out strategic investors, it will receive a considerable sum of money. That money can become income for the state treasury. But if Hua Nan Financial Holding Co. or China Development Financial Holding Corp. (according to proxies) fall into hostile hands due to poor management of public shares, then large sums of income for the state treasury will be lost. The Minister of Transportation was forced tor resign and prosecuted merely on suspicion of accepting a few hundred thousand in cash hidden in tea canisters. In which case, shouldn’t the Ministry of Finance and Financial Supervisory Commission accept responsibility for the loss of tens of billions of from the state treasury?

To allege that the public shares were not enough to allow the government to wage a proxy fight, and that any attempt to seize control of the board of directors would have been “asking for trouble” is amateur talk by someone who does not understand the market. Perhaps Vice-President Chiou has not dabbled in the money markets. Perhaps he did not understand that the recipients of the proxies were the Chang brothers, who are listed as major shareholders in the stockholders’ report. Take Hua Nan Financial Holding Co. for example. The public shares obviously outnumbered those held by Lin Ming-cheng, yet the proxy fight was still a debacle. The only possible explanation is that those holding the public shares were unwilling to kneel down and kow tow to the Chang brothers. When private financial institutions were certain that public shares were not the object of a proxy fight, and wanted to avoid premium payments, the Executive Yuan should have boldly stepped forward to protect the public interest. Protecting the national interest is the solemn duty of all public servants. How can anyone dismiss it as “asking for trouble?”

Chiou I-jen’s views on the Financial Supervisory Commission’s intervention in the review of major stockholder suitability is also amateur talk. According to Articles 16 and 17 of the Financial Holding Company Act, the suitability of major stockholders must be reviewed by the Financial Supervisory Commission. If the Koo family, which controls less than 10% of the company, could evade the suitability requirements of the Financial Holding Company Act, merely because a daughter in law and a sister in law of the Koo family resigned from the board of directors, then the Financial Supervisory Commission may as well close its doors. Such obvious attempts to avoid legal supervision were followed by a coordinated attack on public shares. If the Executive Yuan insists on further restricting the conditions under which the Financial Supervisory Commission is permitted to intervene, then what we would like to know is whether the Financial Supervisory Commission is still a government institution or a vassal of private financial institutions.

We have already mentioned Chiou I-jen’s inappropriate remarks. We must now go back and examine He Chih-chin and Hu Sheng-cheng’s political responsibility. Although Minister He is familiar with US Internal Revenue Service procedures, he failed to understand domestic tax procedures, the political ecology of the legislature, the management of public shares, and even the appointment of the chairman of the board by means of public shares. In the China Development Financial Holding Corp matter, Minister He forfeited the veto that the 1/3 public shares offered him. He thereby made it impossible to use public shares to regulate policy in the future. Financial groups viewed him with contempt during negotiations. We consider his performance not merely a problem of political responsibility, but also of individual dignity.

From early on, in his presidential office report, Financial Supervisory Commission Chairman Hu Sheng-cheng proposed his now infamous “Second Financial Reform,” and defended the policy on television. After that, he followed Tsai Ying-wen’s lead in applying the brakes to financial reform. In response to a long string of China Development Financial Holding Corp. management scandals, he has done absolutely nothing. From beginning to end, he has been constant only in his inconstancy. Taiwan’s financial system in in chaos. That financial groups sit in contempt of the administration is a well known fact. The fundamentals of our financial industry are not good. Our international ranking continues to fall, and could even be termed directionless. Confucius said that “When the Way [of Justice] prevails in your own state, to be poor and obscure is a disgrace. But when the Way does not prevail in your own state, to be rich and honored is a disgrace.” Chairman Hu has hopped from one position in the cabinet to another over the past seven years. From Minister without Portfolio, to Chairman of the Council for Economic Planning and Development, to Chairman of the Financial Supervisory Commission. His government experience is clear for all to see. If he still has an iota of political responsibility in him, he will not need the outside world to remind him of his duty.

By comparison, Minister Ho Chih-chin still resembles an ivory tower intellectual thrown into the political jungle. He is still a rookie, and has not lost his character. To demand that Minister He assume responsibility for public shares policy is actually an affirmation of his character. To demand that scoundrels assume responsibilty for their actions is no longer that important.

Original Chinese below:

中時電子報
中國時報 　2007.06.23
邱義仁的錯辯 不能豁免財金首長政治責任
中時社論

在 開發金、華南金改選董監，官股慘敗之後，社會各界都將矛頭指向維護官股權益不力的財政部與金管會，認為至少何部長與胡主委應該要負起政治責任。但是，日前 行政院副院長邱義仁似乎又在為行政院的挫敗找下台階。邱義仁認為，以往官方實力不夠而要強行爭取董監席位，是「自討苦吃」。這樣的發言，當然有替兩位財金 首長緩頰之意。但是民主政治就是責任政治，我們認為國家的財金首長以幾近喪權辱國的方式豢養財團坐大、踐踏行政權，絕不能以唾面自乾的方式自我安慰。

邱 義仁先生以狹隘的持股比例來評估開發金與華南金的董監爭奪，顯然是把以往政府的延續性政策給刻意切除了。以開發金為例，當初財政部長林全同意中信辜家趕走 陳敏薰的條件之一，就是辜家持股必須達到十五％。但是，此次辜家向金管會申報的股權不及十五％的門檻，卻又聯合其他戰友分進合擊收委託書，一則將當初對財 政部的承諾一腳踢開，再則規避金管會對大股東適格性的審查，首鼠兩端，卻全然視政府政策、先前承諾與金融監理如無物。國家行政機關在財團眼中根本像是垃 圾，這政府還有威信可言嗎？

其次，邱先生要了解：公營行庫最後剩下幾家不重要，但是公股釋出的「過程」，才是利益輸送的關鍵，也才是全民 關注的焦點。如果國家要將華南金或開發金的股權釋出，不論是公開標售或洽詢策略性投資人，都可以得到一筆可觀的溢價金，成為國庫收入。但是，如果華南金或 開發金因為公股管理（如徵委託書）不善而失守，則大筆的國庫收入將因而流失。交通部長只因為涉嫌收下裝有數十萬現金的茶葉罐就下台起訴，那麼流失數百億溢 價國庫收入的財政部與金管會，難道不該負起責任？

若說官股實力不足，去搶委託書、爭董監席次就是「自討苦吃」；這又是不了解市場環境的外 行話。邱副院長可能從來不曾在金融市場上打滾過，也從來不了解收委託書的訣竅是股東名冊與「委託書大戶」張家兄弟。以華南金來說吧，官股持股明顯多於林明 成，但收委託書仍是慘敗，這只能說是官股不善向張家兄弟磕頭下跪而已。事實上，當民間財團吃定官股沒有收委託書之專業，而想逃避溢價支付時，行政院當然應 該挺身護衛全民利益。「護國產」是所有人民公僕的天職，又怎麼能說是自討苦吃呢？

此外，邱義仁對於金管會介入金控股東適格性審查的看法， 也是外行話。依據金控法十六條及十七條，金控大股東的適格性要經過金管會的審查。如果只因辜家二媳婦把中信證券的董事辭去，就以形式上持股不及十％而迴避 金控法的適格性規範，那麼金管會乾脆關門算了。這麼明顯的迴避法律監督，再以分進合擊硬吃官股，行政院如果還要限縮金管會介入的時機，真不知道金管會是公 家機關還是私人財團的附庸。

邱義仁緩頰發言不當既如前述，我們還是要回過頭來檢討何志欽與胡勝正的政治責任。何部長雖然熟悉美國內地稅務 的稽查，但是對於國內的租稅背景、立院的政治生態、公股的管理都極為陌生，甚至公股指派的董事長都管不動。開發金一事，何部長不但失去了官股三分之一董事 的否決勢力，也使以後的公股管理政策完全破功，更在談判過程中被財團看扁。我們認為，這樣的表現，已經不只是負起政治責任的問題，而是個人尊嚴的問題。

至 於金管會主委胡勝正，從他早年在總統府簡報提出二次金改，到電視做政策辯護、而後伴隨著蔡英文踩金改煞車，至今又對開發金的公司治理一長串弊端無所作為， 一路走來始終不一。如今，台灣的金融秩序凌亂、財團坐大而蔑視政府，已經是社會共識。我們的金融業內在環境不佳、國際排名殿後，堪稱無道。孔子曰，「邦無 道，富且貴焉，恥也」。胡主委遊走內閣各部會長達七年，從政務委員、經建會主委到金管會主委，官場練達圓通，大家有目共睹。他如果心中還有一絲政治責任的 觀念，也就不需要外界再多做提醒了。

相對而言，何志欽部長仍然像是從政的學者，雖有白兔的青稚，卻不失性情。我們認為何部長應該為公股政策負去留的責任，其實是肯定之辭。對於多說無益之輩，負不負責任已經不那麼重要了。