Does the DPP Dare to Say It Doesn’t Need the Swing Vote?

Does the DPP Dare to Say It Doesn’t Need the Swing Vote?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 21, 2009

From his prison cell, Chen Shui-bian issued the following challenge: “Who in the DPP dares to say it doesn’t need ‘Ah-Bian Men’ (Ah-Bian Crowd) votes in 2012? ” Actually the DPP ought to be asking itself, “Who in the DPP dares to say it doesn’t need the swing vote in 2012?”
The “Ah-Bian Crowd” consists of hardline Deep Green Taiwan independence politicians and supporters. Even though Chen Shui-bian publicly “ceded Taiwan to the United States,” the Ah-Bian Crowd stills back him. They have concluded that Ah-Bian is a Taiwan independence icon who must not fall, no matter what. As for his corruption, they have defined it as a mere “social and cultural crime.” Besides, many in the DPP and the Green Camp have made abundant use of Ah-Bian’s dirty money. These Ah-Bian Crowd members may not constitute a majority within the Green Camp, but they have long been the prime mover within the Green Camp. The Ah-Bian Crowd is a tail with the ability to wag the dog. No wonder Chen Shui-bian said: “Who dares to say he doesn’t need Ah-Bian Crowd votes?”

But if the DPP is bound hand and foot by the Ah-Bian Crowd, how can it attract swing voters during the 2012 Presidential Election? In addition to the above mentioned “Plebian Ah-Bian Crowd,” there is also a “Patrician Ah-Bian Crowd,” consisting of Ma Yung-cheng, Chen Che-nan, and other Ah-Bian cronies. Swing voters cannot tolerate the Patrician Ah-Bian Crowd’s corruption. They disagree with the Patrician Ah-Bian Crowd’s increasingly perverse Taiwan independence agenda. Wang Hsing-nan and Huang Ching-lin are right when they say Chen Shui-bian “ceded Taiwan to the United States.” But they waited too long to say it. Swing voters have yet to see the DPP engage in thorough soul-searching or criticism of the Patrician Ah-Bian Crowd’s corruption. The DPP has failed to criticize or reflect upon the increasingly dubious rationales for Taiwan independence. Swing voters have deep misgivings about the DPP’s inability or unwillingness to re-educate the Plebian Ah-Bian Crowd. The question the DPP should be asking itself is, “Who in the DPP can say it doesn’t need the support of swing voters?”

The key is, as always, Taiwan independence. Chen Shui-bian once held that “Taiwan is an independent country. Its current name is the Republic of China.” When the DPP first failed to distance itself from Ah-Bian, it still had room to maneuver. But Chen Shui-bian’s pro-independence rhetoric has degenerated to the point where he has effectively ceded Taiwan to the United States. He has clearly underscored his opposition to the “backdoor listing” of “Taiwan” under the name “Republic of China.” He now says that unless the Republic of China is terminated, Taiwan cannot become a new and independent country. He has now proclaimed himself the standard bearer for “de jure Taiwan independence.” Some in the DPP and the Patrician Ah-Bian Crowd support him on this. Some in the Plebian Ah-Bian Crowd support him on this. Chen Shui-bian hopes to take advantage of opposition to backdoor listing and insistence upon the “rectification of names and the founding of a new nation.” He hopes to link the Patrician Ah-Bian Crowd to the Plebian Ah-Bian Crowd, and thereby hijack the DPP. If the DPP cannot clarify its position in relation to this degenerate version of Taiwan independence, can it really win the trust of swing voters?

As 2012 approaches, the DPP must rethink its position on Taiwan independence. Over the next two years two themes will emerge. First, once ECFA is signed, cross-Strait relations will become even closer. Second, the Republic of China will celebrate its Centennial. These two themes will force the Democratic Progressive Party to show its hand regarding Taiwan independence. By 2012, direct airline flights will have been in place for four years. ECFA will have been in force for two years. Does the DPP still intend to overturn these policies in the name of Taiwan independence? By 2012, the Republic of China will be one hundred years young. Twenty-three years will have passed since the lifting of martial law and the implementation of full democracy. Does the DPP still intend to demand the establishment of a “Nation of Taiwan?”

The DPP originally demanded the founding of a new and independent nation, in accordance with its “Taiwan Independence Party Constitution.” But later, in order to allow Chen Shui-bian to run for Republic of China president in 2000, it resorted to backdoor listing, in accordance with its “Resolution on Taiwan’s Future.” Later, when the political situation changed in 2008, the DPP reversed itself yet again, and demanded the “rectification of names and the authoring of a new constitution,” in accordance with its “Resolution for a Normal Nation.” Now the international, cross-Strait and domestic scenario is forcing the DPP to choose between backdoor listing or becoming a committed shareholder in the “Republic of China, Inc.”

Chen Shui-bian opposes backdoor listing. But what is the DPP’s position? Moreover, given international, cross-Strait, and domestic developments, is backdoor listing even an option for the Democratic Progressive Party anymore? The DPP’s only realistic option is to come home to the Republic of China. Buy into the business. Stop engaging in the self-contradictory and fraudulent game of backdoor listing. After all, Chen Shui-bian has already made it impossible for the DPP to continue engaging in its hypocritical and self-deluding practice of backdoor listing.

The relationship between the DPP and Chen Shui-bian is the relationship between the DPP and Taiwan independence. The relationship between the DPP and Taiwan independence will determine the relationship between the DPP and swing voters. The DPP has failed to clarify its relationship to Taiwan independence. That is why it remains a political hostage of both the Patrician Ah-Bian Crowd and Plebian Ah-Bian Crowd. If in 2012 the DPP wants the Ah-Bian Crowd’s votes, it will find it impossible to retain the swing vote.

The Democratic Progressive Party should become committed shareholders in the Republic of China, Inc. It should stop entertaining any fantasies about any would-be “Nation of Taiwan.”

兩岸關係：杯子理論與屋頂理論
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.10.20 03:59 am

兩岸關係「以和平取代戰爭」的大勢應當已告確立；現在的互動準則是「先經後政／先急後緩／先易後難」。但是，「政治」雖被置於「後／緩／難」的部位，卻是遲早必須面對及處理的問題。如今雖非處理的時機，但不妨預作思考。

我們曾指出，兩岸關係不可能將「政」與「經」分割成兩個截然區隔的領域；因為，在重大的經濟互動中，必然已經蘊涵了重大的政治效應。例如，三通直航或ＥＣＦＡ，皆不只是經濟事件，同時也是重大的政治事件。雖然如此，兩岸畢竟仍有高層次的政治關係必須處理。

本文嘗試提出的思考是：從杯子理論到屋頂理論。先談杯子理論。中華民國是杯子，台灣是杯子裡面的水。過去北京的思維是，只想取水，而不要杯子。想像中，此法除非訴諸流血戰爭，不可能達成；但若訴諸武力，砸破杯子，恐將面對一灘覆水。

就歷史淵源看，中華民國這一只杯子，曾以辛亥革命締造共和，並主持北伐及抗日戰爭，且台灣亦由中華民國所光復；再就現實看，今天的台灣，在中華民國的杯子裡，是一個自里長至總統皆直選的民主政體。也就是說，「中華民國」這只杯子，是「中國論述」與「民主實踐」的結晶體；無論中共或台獨，誰要砸破這只杯子，誰便須面對一灘覆水。

北京近年來的「思想解放」是值得肯定的。從「中華民國已經滅亡」，改版到「一個中國就是台灣法典中的一個中國」，再到「雖然尚未統一／仍是一個中國」；不啻已默認中華民國的地位。至於所謂「反對法理台獨」及「主張維持現狀」，也就是承認「中華民國體制不是台獨」的意思。

在北京眼中，顯然亦已認知，沒有「中華民國」這只杯子，就沒有水。若沒有中華民國這只杯子，台灣對北京會比西藏及新疆更為棘手萬倍。所以，在可以想像的時空中，「杯水合體」是未來兩岸關係的重要準則之一。

更進一步的思考是「屋頂理論」。兩岸關係可能發展至建立某種政治聯結，如今或許言之過早，但想像中的那種政治聯結，自應建立在一個超越「中華民國」與「中華人民共和國」的「第三概念」或「上位概念」之下。北京近年不再稱「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」，並謂「大陸與台灣同屬中國的一部分」；這些論述都含有「九二共識」的意味，其潛台詞則是「一中各表」。顯易可見，這類論述皆有將「一個中國」逐漸「第三概念化」的跡象。

倘若「一個中國」是「第三概念」，兩岸關係未來即不無可能在「屋頂理論」下討論如何聯結。或許有兩種可能：一、組成邦聯，在邦聯憲法或邦聯基本法下聯結。二、經由「和平協議」的特定條款，作成「維持現狀」的法制架構。這兩種想法，可能仍是過渡方案，但亦可視為終極處理。

以上看法，或許兩岸皆有人會認為不合時宜或異想天開。但是，若想砸破杯子，如何處理覆水？若想留住水，則豈能砸破杯子？

杯子理論也許聽來不順耳，但其實這不啻已然是兩岸當局的現行政策。北京希望以杯保水，台灣當局則是藉水保杯（以台灣的民主體制來維護中華民國）。理由很簡單：兩岸關係唯有賴「和平發展」始能漸進處理；既然和平是主旋律，北京與台北皆不可能砸破杯子。

杯子理論與屋頂理論，其實是一體的兩面。但「杯子理論」著眼於維持「和平發展」的過程；而「屋頂理論」則是對進行政治聯結的可能思考。唯不論未來是否走上「屋頂理論」，但如今已可證實：「杯子理論」是「兩岸關係和平發展」的中心準則，殆無疑義。

Cross-Strait Relations: The Cup and the Roof

Cross-Strait Relations: The Cup and the Roof
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 20, 2009

In cross-Strait relations, peace has replaced war. Now the basis for interaction is “First economics, then politics. First the urgent, then the gradual. First the easy, then the difficult.” Politics has been lumped with “the later, the gradual, and the difficult,” but sooner or later we will have to face these problems and deal with them. It may be too early to solve them, but it is not too early to think about them.
As we have pointed out, cross-Strait relations cannot actually be divided into discrete realms labeled “political” and “economic.” Major economic interactions invariably have major political implications. For example, the establishment of Direct Links or ECFA are not merely economic events, but also major political events. The two sides still have high-level political issues that must be addressed.

We would like to set forth two theories: the Cup Theory, and the Roof Theory. First, the Cup Theory. The Republic of China is the Cup. Taiwan is part of the water in the cup. Beijing has long wanted the water, but not the Cup. As one can imagine, attempting to take the water without the Cup, can only precipitate a bloody war. It is impossible. If one resorts to force, and breaks the Cup, one will merely wind up with a puddle of water.

From an historical perspective, the Republic of China is a Cup. It established a republic during the Xinhai Revolution. It waged the Northern Expedition, fought the Sino-Japanese War, and recovered Taiwan. The reality is that today’s Taiwan is contained within the Republic of China Cup. The Republic of China is a democratic entity whose borough chiefs and president are directly elected. In other words, the “Republic of China” Cup is the crystalization of both Chinese principles and democratic practices. Neither the Chinese Communist Party nor Taiwan independence elements may break this Cup. Anyone who does, will merely wind up with a puddle of water.

Beijing’s recent “liberation of thought” deserves affirmation. It has gone from “The Republic of China has already been destroyed” to “One China is the One China referred to in Taiwan’s laws,” to “Although China has yet to be reunified, it remains One China.” It has in effect tacitly acknowledged the position held by the Republic of China. As for the “Rejection of de jure Taiwan independence” and “Maintenance of the status quo,” these affirm that “The Republic of China political framework is not Taiwan independence.”

Beijing clearly realizes that without the Cup known as the “Republic of China,” there is no water. Without this Cup called the Republic of China, Taiwan will be ten thousand times more difficult to deal with than Tibet and Xinjiang. Therefore, we can imagine a time and a place when “The Cup and the water are one” becomes the key to cross-Strait relations.

The next step is the “Roof Theory.” Will cross-Strait relations lead to the establishment of some sort of political affiliation? That may be too early to say. One can imagine all sorts of political affiliations. But any affiliation should be based on something that transcends both the “Republic of China” and the “People’s Republic of China.” It should be based on a “Third Concept” or “Higher Concept.” In recent years, Beijing no longer refers to One China as the PRC. It says instead that “The mainland and Taiwan are both part of China.” Such arguments smack of the 1992 Consensus, whose subtext is “One China, Different Interpretations.” As we can see, such arguments are gradually subsuming “One China” under a “Third Concept” framework.

If “One China” is a “Third Concept,” then the two sides may be able to consider a cross-Strait political affiliation based on the “Roof Theory.” There are two possibilities. One. Form a confederation. Affiliate the two sides politically under the Basic Law of the confederation or federation. Two. Sign a peace agreement. Have they peace agreement’s provisions “maintain the status quo.” These two ways of thinking may still be in the developmental stages. But they may also constitute eventual solutions.

Some on either side of the Taiwan Strait will consider such views out-dated or whimsical. But if one wishes to shatter the Cup, how will one deal with leftover water? If one wishes to retain the water, how can one shatter the Cup?

The Cup Theory may grate on some people’s ears. But in fact it is nothing more than the policy currently maintained by authorities on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Beijing wants the Cup to preserve the water. Taipei wants the water to preserve the Cup. Taipei wants to use Taiwan’s democratic institutions to preserve the Republic of China. The reason is simple. Only “peaceful development” will allow cross-Strait relations to be resolved gradually. Since peace is the main theme, neither Beijing nor Taipei may shatter the Cup.

The Cup Theory and the Roof Theory are in fact two sides of the same coin. The Cup Theory ensures peaceful development. The Roof Theory is a way of establishing some sort of political affiliation. The future may or may not hold a Roof Theory. But evidence shows that the Cup Theory is the key to the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations. Of that there is no doubt.

兩岸關係：杯子理論與屋頂理論
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.10.20 03:59 am

兩岸關係「以和平取代戰爭」的大勢應當已告確立；現在的互動準則是「先經後政／先急後緩／先易後難」。但是，「政治」雖被置於「後／緩／難」的部位，卻是遲早必須面對及處理的問題。如今雖非處理的時機，但不妨預作思考。

我們曾指出，兩岸關係不可能將「政」與「經」分割成兩個截然區隔的領域；因為，在重大的經濟互動中，必然已經蘊涵了重大的政治效應。例如，三通直航或ＥＣＦＡ，皆不只是經濟事件，同時也是重大的政治事件。雖然如此，兩岸畢竟仍有高層次的政治關係必須處理。

本文嘗試提出的思考是：從杯子理論到屋頂理論。先談杯子理論。中華民國是杯子，台灣是杯子裡面的水。過去北京的思維是，只想取水，而不要杯子。想像中，此法除非訴諸流血戰爭，不可能達成；但若訴諸武力，砸破杯子，恐將面對一灘覆水。

就歷史淵源看，中華民國這一只杯子，曾以辛亥革命締造共和，並主持北伐及抗日戰爭，且台灣亦由中華民國所光復；再就現實看，今天的台灣，在中華民國的杯子裡，是一個自里長至總統皆直選的民主政體。也就是說，「中華民國」這只杯子，是「中國論述」與「民主實踐」的結晶體；無論中共或台獨，誰要砸破這只杯子，誰便須面對一灘覆水。

北京近年來的「思想解放」是值得肯定的。從「中華民國已經滅亡」，改版到「一個中國就是台灣法典中的一個中國」，再到「雖然尚未統一／仍是一個中國」；不啻已默認中華民國的地位。至於所謂「反對法理台獨」及「主張維持現狀」，也就是承認「中華民國體制不是台獨」的意思。

在北京眼中，顯然亦已認知，沒有「中華民國」這只杯子，就沒有水。若沒有中華民國這只杯子，台灣對北京會比西藏及新疆更為棘手萬倍。所以，在可以想像的時空中，「杯水合體」是未來兩岸關係的重要準則之一。

更進一步的思考是「屋頂理論」。兩岸關係可能發展至建立某種政治聯結，如今或許言之過早，但想像中的那種政治聯結，自應建立在一個超越「中華民國」與「中華人民共和國」的「第三概念」或「上位概念」之下。北京近年不再稱「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」，並謂「大陸與台灣同屬中國的一部分」；這些論述都含有「九二共識」的意味，其潛台詞則是「一中各表」。顯易可見，這類論述皆有將「一個中國」逐漸「第三概念化」的跡象。

倘若「一個中國」是「第三概念」，兩岸關係未來即不無可能在「屋頂理論」下討論如何聯結。或許有兩種可能：一、組成邦聯，在邦聯憲法或邦聯基本法下聯結。二、經由「和平協議」的特定條款，作成「維持現狀」的法制架構。這兩種想法，可能仍是過渡方案，但亦可視為終極處理。

以上看法，或許兩岸皆有人會認為不合時宜或異想天開。但是，若想砸破杯子，如何處理覆水？若想留住水，則豈能砸破杯子？

杯子理論也許聽來不順耳，但其實這不啻已然是兩岸當局的現行政策。北京希望以杯保水，台灣當局則是藉水保杯（以台灣的民主體制來維護中華民國）。理由很簡單：兩岸關係唯有賴「和平發展」始能漸進處理；既然和平是主旋律，北京與台北皆不可能砸破杯子。

杯子理論與屋頂理論，其實是一體的兩面。但「杯子理論」著眼於維持「和平發展」的過程；而「屋頂理論」則是對進行政治聯結的可能思考。唯不論未來是否走上「屋頂理論」，但如今已可證實：「杯子理論」是「兩岸關係和平發展」的中心準則，殆無疑義。

The Revolution has yet to Succeed, Ma Ying-jeou must Continue his Struggle

The Revolution has yet to Succeed, Ma Ying-jeou must Continue his Struggle
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 19, 2009

The 18th Kuomintang Party Congress ended a few days ago. Ma Ying-jeou was re-elected party chairman. He reaffirmed the KMT’s commitment to political reform, clean government, and hard work. Ma was elected party chairman for the first time four years ago. Since then Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou has become the head of state. Both times he issued solemn declarations regarding the direction of the nation, using almost the same language. This is not surprising. After all, as Sun Yat-sen once said, “The revolution has yet to succeed, comrades must continue their struggle.” Ma Ying-jeou has twice been elected party chairman. He must carry out his promised reforms. He must also carry out a revolution inside the party, enabling the administration to govern more effectively and ensure a second term in 2012.

Four years ago, the Kuomintang had been in the opposition for five years. The once divided KMT and People First Party joined forces. Lien Chan and James Soong waged a hard fought election campaign. But as a result of the 3/19 Shooting Incident, they failed to unseat the long-discredited Chen Shui-bian. Demands for a recount by protesters camped on Ketegelan Boulevard came to naught. Ever since Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou proposed that the party chairman be directly elected, he has been the standard bearer for Blue Camp political rejuvention. In August 2005, Ma Ying-jeou was elected party chairman. The first thing he did was to announce that he would tie up the controversial issue of party assets before 2008. That check has bounced. The first time Ma Ying-jeou assumed the party chairmanship, during the Central Standing Committee session in February 2007, he made it clear that the party must become an election machine. Party assets must not be used on election campaigns. All elections must be financed by means of fund raising. This check has also bounced.

The first time Ma Ying-jeou assumed the party chairmanship, he failed to fulfill any major campaign promises. The reason is simple. In September 2007, Ma Ying-jeou was indicted in the Discretionary Fund case. He promptly resigned as party chairman. Wu Poh-hsiung, who had been planning to retire, held down the fort in Ma’s absence. Ma Ying-jeou, who was no longer in charge of party affairs, focused on his presidential campaign. He was no longer able to oversee the divestiture of KMT party assets. He was no longer able to oversee the reform of KMT party finances. Given the prevailing mood within society and the party, no one blamed Ma Ying-jeou for this bounced check. Quite the contrary, it underscored society’s feeling that justice had to be done.

Today Ma Ying-jeou is again in charge of the party. He has proudly waved the party flag on behalf of candidates for the year end elections. When Ma Ying-jeou declared his commitment to clean government and political reform, people were inspired. Political momentum accumulated. But he has now declared his intention to enforce strict party discipline. Candidates for political office are lashing out at the party leadership. They doubt Ma will hold up if they give him the cold-shoulder treatment. Ma Ying-jeou has been in charge of the affairs of state for a year and a half. He is being pulled in several directions at the same time. He has not demonstrated sufficient courage and determination. As a result, his leadership has been subjected to constant challenges. Candidates for City Mayor and County Executive offices have thrown their hats in the ring without consulting him. Even incumbents who were elected on the basis of Ma’s endorsement are ignoring the party leadership, and bent on rebellion. During the party chairmanship election, the turnout in many constituencies was low. The percentage of invalid ballots was high. Quite a few former “Team Ma” legislators with reputations for integrity became Central Standing Committee members. These and other outspoken and forceful County Executives and City Mayors have gradually withdraw their candidacies. When asked why, they reply without enthusiasm, and sighed, “Let him (Ma) find out what it’s like to not to have a Central Standing Committee consisting of his people!”

In the year and a half since Ma Ying-jeou became president, this group of party officials, who once stood shoulder to shoulder with him in the trenches, have met with and talked with him less than a handful of times, perhaps only twice. Even party members close to Ma are saying such things. One can imagine what people not so close to Ma are saying. They simply cannot find any way to interact with the party chairman. People everywhere are asking, “Is he (Ma) actually willing to listen to other people’s advice?” Actually some people really don’t care whether Chairman Ma is willing to listen to other people’s advice. They care only about their status as Central Standing Committee members, whether that status will profit them personally. More importantly, the Central Standing Committee lacks career officials and local leaders who can explain what they fighting for. How can such a party leadership help the administration govern efficiently? Ma Ying-jeou wants to tranform the party into an election machine. He wants to turn it into a platform for communications and policy coordination. Based on the current structure of the Central Standing Committee, one can expect a weakening of the party’s policy-making functions. Whether it will be of any help during election campaigns, is hard to say. Ma Ying-jeou will inevitably encounter trouble implementing his personal ideals.

Ma Ying-jeou sees the problem. He has called upon the KMT not to buy votes during election campaigns, not to enage in corruption while in office, and not to abuse its political power. In fact, this is a problem common to both Blue Camp and Green Camp parties. But seeing the problem and talking about the problem is not enough. Now that the president is also the party chairman, he must walk the walk, not just talk the talk.

Four years ago, Ma Ying-jeou was denied the opportunity to make good on his promises. He has now returned as party chairman. He must now accomplish his mission. Only with such an understanding can he avoid future regrets. Voters may have the wisdom, but they may lack the patience to give the KMT another chance.

中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 　2009.10.19
社論－改革尚未成功 英九仍須努力
本報訊

國民黨第十八屆黨代表大會日前落幕，馬英九再度回鍋兼任黨主席，同時也宣示國民黨改革、清廉、勤政路線。對比四年前第一次就任黨主席，馬英九的正職從台北市長一躍而為國家元首；前後兩次就任講話所嚴正宣示的方向，幾近是相同的語言，這一點並不讓人意外，因為「改革尚未完成，同志仍須努力」。馬英九兩度兼任黨主席，一方面要繼續未完成的黨務改革，再方面也要透過黨的改革，強化「輔政」的功能，進一步確保二○一二年的連任順遂。

回顧四年前，國民黨已經在野五年，分裂的國民黨和親民黨在連戰、宋楚瑜攜手合作下，拚搏大選，卻在三一九槍擊案的衝擊下，未能擊敗聲望早已潰跌的陳水扁，凱道驗票抗爭未果，身為台北市長的馬英九，從推動黨主席直選開始，始終背負藍營復興政權大業的深切期待。二○○五年八月任黨主席的馬英九，第一件大事就是宣示：二○○八年以前要將備受爭議的黨產問題處理完畢；這張支票，並未兌現。馬英九第一次就任黨主席時，在二○○七年二月上旬的中常會上，也明確表示，黨要成為選舉機器，黨產不得用於輔選，所有選舉相關財務都要以募款為之；這張支票，也沒兌現。

馬英九首次就任黨主席，沒兌現任何一樁重大政治承諾，原因無它，二○○七年九月，馬英九就因為特別費案遭起訴，毅然辭卸黨主席職務，由原來規畫退休的吳伯雄頂住大局。卸下黨職務的馬英九，專心投入大選，既管不了黨產進度，也無心聞問包括黨財務在內的改革方案。但當時的社會和黨的大氣候，沒有人怪責馬英九支票兌現不了，相反的，卻瀰漫著要討回公道的悲壯氣氛。

如今重回黨中央的馬英九，授旗給年底要參選的公職提名人，揮舞黨旗志得意滿，但是，當年宣示清廉改革的馬英九，令人振奮，有風行景從的氣勢；如今宣示強化黨紀，違紀參選者從嚴議處的馬英九，面對的則是黨內反彈四起，看你能奈我何的冷漠。已經執掌國家大政一年半的馬英九，在多方力量的拉鋸下，未能展現足夠的魄力和決斷，使他的領導威信不斷遭到挑戰。縣市長提名，各路人馬各顯神通，連曾經依靠馬光環才得以當選的多位現任縣市長，都不理黨中央的態度，執意造反。黨主席選舉，許多選區投票率偏低不說，廢票率還格外高；中常委選舉，許多當年以廁身「馬團隊」的形象牌立委、以及在黨內始終敢於直言力諫的縣市長，紛紛退出選局，問到何以致此？他們連熱情都沒有的、只能嘆口氣，「讓他（馬）嘗嘗沒有自己人的中常會是個什麼滋味！」

這群曾經與馬英九一起打天下的黨公職，在馬英九就任總統之後，一年半時間來，面見談話進言次數不必用一個手掌數，三個手指頭數大概都嫌多。與馬關係還算近的黨內人士都這麼說，和馬關係遠的人可以想見，根本找不出與主席互動之道，有人到處問，「他（馬）聽得進建言嗎？」也有人其實並不在乎馬主席聽不聽得下建言，只在乎端著中常委的招牌，能不能有利於自己的企業營生。更重要的，一個缺乏政務官、地方首長、講得出道理的中央民代參與的中常會，能提供黨主席多少「輔政」功能？馬英九要求黨要轉型為選舉機器，並成為政策協調溝通的平台，以眼下中常會的結構，黨決策功能的弱化幾乎可以預期，輔選作用的強化難講能否達到，馬英九難免再次陷入個人理想如何落實的困境。

馬英九不是看不到問題的人，他要求國民黨要做到：選舉不買票、執政不貪汙、問政不腐化，其實已看盡藍綠政黨的通病。然而，看到、說到還不夠，既已總統兼任黨主席，話說出口就要執行到位，否則所有的政治宣示都將是空談。

四年前的支票，馬英九來不及兌現，此番回鍋黨務，就得使命必達，有所警覺，不要留下遺憾，因為選民縱有足夠的智慧，卻可能沒太多耐性再給國民黨太多機會了。

Beijing’s Green Warning Labels at the Frankfurt Book Fair

Beijing’s Green Warning Labels at the Frankfurt Book Fair
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 16, 2009

The two sides of the Taiwan Strait are both participants at the Frankfurt Book Fair. Mainland China has among the books on display at its pavilion volumes published on Taiwan. To these it has attached “Green Warning Labels” reading “We do not endorse any content that violates the One China Principle.” This gesture mirrors the disclaimers shown at the end of many political talk shows on Taiwan declaring that “The above comments do not represent the views of our station.” It is hard not to chuckle at them.

The primary purpose of these Green Warning Labels is to protect the book fair host from potential political fallout. This system is more progressive than checking each book page by page, or worse, blotting out the actual text with black markers. Actually, since the two sides already have a “You can write what you like, but I don’t intend to recognize it” understanding, such Green Warning Labels are superfluous.

Beijing has just displayed its military capabilities at its 60th National Day celebration. As this year’s featured nation, Beijing sees the book fair as an important showcase for its soft power. But beginning last month, Beijing began pressuring dissident authors to withdraw from the book fair. Recently the Taiwan Pavilion was forced to change its name to “Taiwan Publishers.” The Mainland pavilion pasted political warning labels on books published on Taiwan. These are evidence of too much bluster and too little tolerance.

The ice is melting in the Taiwan Strait. The Mainland China Pavilion is displaying books published on Taiwan. This is a praiseworthy move. But the books have been carefully preselected. Mostly they are books on art and decorating. Yet even they require “One China Principle” preventive measures. Isn’t this just a wee bit one-sided? Isn’t this making a mountain out of a molehill? This international book fair has a 600 year history. To handle cultural creations in such a heavy handed manner is markedly at odds with the air of civilization and refinement Beijing wishes to demonstrate.

The Frankfurt Book Fair is not the 10/1 National Day celebration. Beijing cannot force the host nation or participating nations to adopt the framework it applies at home. This is an international activity, with internationally accepted rules of the game. Beijing is a participant. It can participate fully. It can work toward its own goals. But it cannot coerce other participants to play by its rules. That would be contrary to the rules of international competition. Moreover, a book fair is a free market for peaceful and pluralistic cultural exchange. There is no need for hegemonic “rule the roost” attitudes.

The book fair includes over 600 China themed activities, more than enough to allow the West to understand the “New China.” But some of Beijing’s political gestures will merely make unnecessary trouble for the organizers. The world media will focus on these negative developments. This runs counter to the international image Beijing hopes to create.

The main reason for this gap is that political thinking within the Chinese Communist Party has not caught up with the Mainland’s newfound economic prosperity. Those within the bureaucracy still think in terms of Cold War era confrontation and containment. Top officials on both sides have reached a reconciliation. The ice is melting. A consensus is forming. But administrators have yet to change their thinking and standard operating procedures. They have yet to stand down from their diplomatic wars and military preparations. In recent years, The CCP Central Committee has indeed shown signs of “emancipating its thought.” But lower echelon officials have yet to adjust their thinking and behavior accordingly. That is because the safest response is the standard response. Going strictly by the book is least likely to get one into trouble. But a great nation is confident of its own status. If Mainland officials respond confidently and rationality, there is no reason why they can’t change the outside world’s image of an authoritarian power that suppresses freedom of expression?

As a rising power Mainland China’s hard power has indeed attracted the world’s attention. But its soft power remains in doubt. When it comes to recognizing the universal values of human rights, democracy, and freedom, Beijing is still a long way off. It still has much room for improvement. Last year Taipei joined WHA as an observer. This created a win-win scenario. Beijing’s openness won international acclaim. That was a perfect example. During this year’s World Games in Kaohsiung and Deaflympics in Taipei, Beijing respected the right of audience members to wave flags of their own choosing. This was also a highly positive development. By contrast, the Green Warning Labels at the Frankfurt Book Fair run counter to this trend.

The Mainland pavilion at the Frankfurt Book Fair should to remove the little Green Warning Labels on books published on Taiwan. Allowing a diversity of opinions would be an enlightened move, Pasting labels on books merely leave one disillusioned. Removing such labels means removing an old bandage covering China’s self-doubts.

法蘭克福書展 中國館的綠色標籤
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.10.16 04:56 am

兩岸同時參加法蘭克福書展，中國大陸在其展區陳列的台灣圖書上，加貼「違反一中原則的內容一律不予承認」的綠色警語標籤。這個動作像是台灣的叩應節目，在片尾加註「以上言論不代表本台立場」，令人看了不禁莞爾。

這枚綠色標籤的主要作用，是使主持書展者免去萬一發生的政治責任；此制較全書逐頁檢查甚至局部塗黑的舊制自較進步，但既然已有「你寫你的／我不承認」的空間，這張綠色標籤誠屬多此一舉。

剛剛舉辦過軍容壯盛的建國一甲子國慶，身為此次書展的主題國，中國也將這次書展視為重要的文化國力展示場。然而，從上月中共官員因杯葛異議作家與會而集體退席，至近日台灣館被迫更名「台灣出版人」，乃至中國館陳列台灣書籍卻加貼政治宣示標籤，卻都顯得「霸氣」逼人，而「大氣」不足。

從兩岸融冰的角度看，中國館要展出台灣圖書，原本值得積極看待；但展出的書類其實皆經過挑選，大多是藝術、裝潢類書刊，卻也要加註「一中原則」的防範，未免極不對稱，小題大作。在一個有六百年歷史的國際書展，用這麼粗糙的手法對待文化創作產品，實在與北京亟欲誇示的文明和氣質大相逕庭。

與十一國慶不同，在法蘭克福書展，中國不能拿國內那套硬梆梆的手法來框架主辦單位或其他參展組織，因為這是一個國際活動，有國際通行的遊戲規則。中國作為一個參與者，可以在場上全力演出，爭取自己的成功；卻不能以杯葛或壓制其他參與者的方式，來抬高自己，因為那有違國際競賽的規則。何況，書展是文化交流的場域及和平多元的自由市場，實在不必有稱雄、稱霸的居心。

這次書展，計有六百多場以中國為主題的活動，足可吸引許多西方人士認識「新中國」。但中共的一些政治性的小動作，不僅使主辦單位增添了許多不必要的麻煩，也使全球媒體反而聚焦在這些負面報導，這對中國想要營造的國際形象其實是有害無益。

之所以有這樣的落差，主要原因是中共內部尚未形成一套足與經濟崛起相符應的新政治思維；因此，官僚體系所熟悉者仍是那一套冷戰時代的對抗和圍堵思維。雖然兩岸高層對和解、融冰的共識已然形成，但在中共行政體系思維與操作中，外交戰的武裝卻仍未卸除。這幾年來，中共中央令人確有「解放思想」的跡象，但基層人員的思想行為似未隨之調整；因為，最安全的一定是「制式反應」，照著「標準模式」演出最不可能犯錯。但作為一個自許的大國，官員若能秉著自信與理性應對，何致無法改變外界對其「打壓言論自由」的專制印象？

作為一個崛起的大國，中國的「硬實力」確已受到全球矚目，但它的「軟實力」卻仍有爭議；尤其在人權、民主和自由等面向，與普世認可的價值仍有相當距離。在這個廣大的空間中，北京實有極大的進取餘地。去年台北以觀察員身分參加ＷＨＡ，不僅締造了兩岸雙贏，北京的開放作風更贏得國際好評，即是最好的例子。今年的高雄世運及台北聽奧，中共對觀眾的持旗權利亦予尊重，這也頗具正面意義的表徵。兩相對照，法蘭克福書展上的綠色標籤，就顯得似與這個大趨勢背道而馳。

法蘭克福中國館台灣書籍上的那張綠色小標籤其實可以撕掉。容許書中可能存在的多元意見是一開明進步，但貼上一張標籤卻使這種正面的想像幻滅。撕掉這枚標籤，也是撕掉貼在中國自信心創傷上的陳年膏藥。

What the Supreme Court Must Do

What the Supreme Court Must Do
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 15, 2009

The Supreme Court has reversed the High Court’s detention of Chen Shui-bian. By doing so, it has turned the law on its head. Its job is to rule on the constitutionality of the law. Instead, it ruled on whether Chen Shui-bian was a flight risk. By ruling on the facts of the case, instead of on the constitutionality of the law as such, the Supreme Court exceeded its authority. Since the High Court is responsible for ruling on the facts of the case, it has rightly and properly continued to detain Chen Shui-bian.

Successful Supreme Court appeals by defendants charged with felonies are as rare as hen’s teeth. The Chen corruption case is a high profile media case. It is the focus of public attention. The Supreme Court has done the public a disservice. Not only has it failed to assert its authority, it has disgraced itself.

The Supreme Court failed to assert its authority for institutional reasons. Its judges lacked of a sense of mission. They failed to render their best legal opinion. They tarnished the “Supreme” in “Supreme Court.”

Consider the institutional factors. To assert authority, one must speak with one voice. But our Supreme Court has many Chambers, 13 Criminal Courts, and seven Civil Courts. Each is the king of its own hill. Each interprets the law its own way. No one pays any attention to anyone else. Only when serious discrepancies appear, do they convene a criminal court or civil court conference to hammer out a consensus.

Current practice admittedly highlights the existence of judicial independence. Divergent legal opinions have the opportunity to emerge and be heard. But if the process fails to work as expected, if the various courts each go their own way, if they view themselves as discrete entities, they may lose sight of their responsibilty as final arbiters, leaving the public increasing adrift.

For example, the full court sent the case back to the lower courts, rescinding Ah-Bian’s detention, forcing the system to repeat the process a second time. It appeared to be upholding human rights. It appeared to be acting responsibly by re-trying the case. But it failed to offer a convincing legal basis for its opinion. Instead, it merely left people with the impression that it was making light of its duties. It obfuscated the duty of the court, namely, to rule according to the law.

The Supreme Court is responsible for ruling on the constitutionality of the law. It should respect the lower court’s legal decisions. In practice however, it seldom does. The High Court often complains that the Supreme Court exceeds its authority, fussing over individual cases, picking over minor details. The Supreme Court often has objections. But instead of making clear how lower courts ought to rule, it often uses weasel words such as “is apparently,” or “would benefit from further study.” Since the Supreme Court has no confidence in in its own rulings, and is unwilling to assume responsibility, how are lower courts supposed to follow their lead? Over time, this has resulted in a Supreme Court that evades its responsibility instead of asserting its authority.

Therefore, do not blame the full court for rescinding the order to detain Ah-Bian. The judges responsible are the product of long immersion in the unique culture of the Supreme Court. They failed to realize that their legal reasoning would be subjected to close public scrutiny, and that the distinction between the facts of the case, and the letter of the law would suddenly became so clear. They failed to realize that their ruling would be the object of such intense public suspicion.

This legal culture has a long history. It has killed public confidence in the trial process. The aforementioned institutional factors are part of the problem. But judges can make changes. It all depends on how judges see their duty. Judges have no rank. But they do have different responsibilities. Judges in courts of final appeal are authorized to rule on the basis of the law. They must expect much of themselves. They must display boldness and erudition. Only then can they establish a credible justice system.

If judges in courts of final appeal have any self-respect, they will find ways to minimize differences of opinion. They will stop acting like petty despots, and provide lower court concrete legal guidelines worthy of respect. They will consider the views of those making appeals. They will not evade responsibility by automatically sending cases back to lower courts. They will not ignore the suffering endured by people trapped in the legal process. They will look further ahead. They will leave their private offices, their piles of legal documents, and ask themselves how they can render legal judgments that will inspire future generations.

All this will take time. But as long as judges are willing to dive in, the legal culture will gradually change. A virtuous cycle will lead to improvements. An individual case such as this can lead to the establishment of new values. Judges in courts of the third instance must be the cream of the crop. They are the key to the administration of justice. Starting over with such standards, judges in courts of the third instance must not to allow the trial process become an object of public ridicule or worse, public indifference.

The Supreme Court should value its “Supreme” label. It should ensure the quality of the trial process. This is what the Supreme Court must do. Nothing more, and nothing less.

最高法院該做的事
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.10.15 04:17 am

最高法院撤銷高院羈押陳水扁的裁定，栽了一個大筋斗。明明是法律審，卻論及陳水扁可不可能逃亡的事實判斷；既是事實爭議，身為事實審的高院當然不客氣，理直氣壯地繼續羈押陳水扁。

重罪羈押能向最高法院抗告成功的案例鳳毛麟角，扁案又是眾所矚目的大案，最高法院無法令出眾服，不但立威不成，且顏面無光。

最高法院無法建立權威，固有制度上的原因，而法官欠缺承擔責任的使命感，沒有展現「最優」法律見解的的企圖心，益使「最高」的招牌蒙塵。

從制度上的原因探究，要建立權威，就不能一門多調；但我們的最高法院有多個分庭，刑庭十三庭，民庭有七庭，各擁一座山頭，各持法律見解，誰也管不了誰，只有當發現重大歧見，召開刑事庭或民事庭會議討論後，才會形成一致的看法。

現行做法固然彰顯審判獨立的可貴，使各種法律意見有頭角崢嶸的機會，但如運作失靈，各庭各自為政，把自己看成法院的一小部分，容易失去擔起最後把關責任的使命感，而人民則益發無所適從。

正如作成扁撤押裁定的合議庭，發回案件，讓羈押程序重走一遭，好像就盡到了維護人權、重新審查的責任；但因沒有提出擲地有聲的法律見解，反而給人輕忽職能的感覺，也混淆了法院就法論法的功能。

最高法院既是法律審，本應在法律見解上引領下級法院，但在實務運作上卻天差地遠，二審常抱怨最高法院撈過界管太多，老在案件事實上作文章，甚至在枝節上計較。何況，即使表示意見，最高法院法官並不直接挑明該怎麼做，發回的理由書裡常可見到「似乎」、「不無研求餘地」等用語。倘若最高法院自己都沒信心，沒把握，也不想負責任，則下級審如何依循？久而久之，就形成我們最高法院獨有的「求免責多於立威信」的審判文化。

因此，不必苛責作出扁撤押案的合議庭，這些法官早就浸潤在最高法院獨有的文化中多時。他們只是沒有料到：裁定理由會受到社會各界的嚴格檢視，事實和法律的分際會突然被劃得這麼清楚；他們也沒有料到，要為一次發回的裁定面對這麼多的檢視和質疑。

這種審判文化的形成其來有自，成為扼殺審判信度的可怕殺手。前述提及的制度因素雖有影響，法官卻非毫無改變的著力空間，改變的最大動力在於法官怎麼看待自己的審判使命。法官雖無大小之別，然職有分工，終審法官握有案件定讞、法律適用當否的權限，應當自我期許以相當的氣魄和學養，開創出有見解之審判系統。

終審法官如果看重自己，就會想辦法減少見解的歧異，像個老大哥的樣子，給下級審具體而值得敬佩的指引；更會站在訴訟民眾的立場去思考，不要僅為躲避責任而發回案件，無視當事人陷於纏訟的苦痛；進而會把眼光放遠，離開獨居的辦公室、成堆的文書卷證，為如何作出啟發後世的一篇篇經典判決而努力。

這些都需要時間經營，但只要法官們願意投注心力於此，審判文化就會慢慢改變，產生良性的循環，帶動審判的精緻化，由一件件個案重新建立起審判的新價值。三審法官應是法官中的精選，是影響司法審判風氣的重心；由此標準再出發，三審法官著實責無旁貸，不能任由審判笑罵由人，還無動於衷。

最高法院應當看重自己的「最高」品牌，細心呵護審判的品質；最高法院該做的事，莫過於此。

Barack Obama and Wei Jingsheng

Barack Obama and Wei Jingsheng
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 14, 2009

Barack Obama’s awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize was met with a global outcry. Even he did not feel he deserved it. Meanwhile rumors that mainland democratic activist Wei Jingsheng and human rights activist Hu Jia might be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize have receded from public memory.
If one wishes to give one of these the award, Wei Jingsheng is probably more deserving than Hu Jia. Hu Jia’s record is impressive. He is a high school graduate who made his appearance after the 1989 Tiananmen Incident. When Wei Jingsheng first appeared he was an electrician at the Beijing Zoo. Mao Zedong had just died. The ten year long disaster known as the Cultural Revolution had transformed mainland China into a closed society. During the “Beijing Spring” Wei Jingsheng unquestionably issued the most resonant grass roots “hu sheng” (outcry). Wei Jingsheng was born 30 years before Hu Jia. He is more representative of society than Hu Jia.

Wei Jingsheng often uses the term “outcry.” In 1978, on the Xidan democracy wall, he posted a “Fifth Modernization: Democracy etc.” He said that Deng Xiaoping, who resurfaced following the “Smash the Gang of Four” movement “should be grateful for the outcry that restored him to the political arena.”

By outcry, he meant the voice of the people. Those who smashed the Gang of Four, who staged the coup d’etat, and who denounced the late Mao Zedong in 1976, were of course Ye Jianying and Deng Xiaoping. Theirs was an internecine struggle. But according to Wei Jingsheng, the real impetus originated with the people, with their outcry. They were the ones who gave this anti-Maoist coup legitimacy in the eyes of heaven and earth.

To this day, leftists on the mainland insist that the three decade long drama that began with the Smash the Gang of Four movement, and led up to the Reform and Liberalization movement, was all part of “socialism’s superior self-correcting mechanisms.” But the anti-Maoist coup was clearly not part of any “self-correcting mechanism.” Deng Xiaoping and others responded to the people’s outcry. They were compelled by the people’s outcry to smash the Gang of Five (including Mao Tse-tung). That is why Wei Jingsheng said Deng Xiaoping “should be grateful for the outcries that restored him to the political arena.”

Thirty years later, as one reads Wei Jingsheng’s words, such as his “Fifth Modernization: Democracy etc,” and his “Democracy, or a new dictatorship?” one cannot help being moved. Even today, Wei Jingsheng’s personal controversies should not detract from his Beijing Spring era achievements. Wei was a 28 year old electrician and a high school graduate. He had just emerged from the closed society of the Cultural Revolution. Yet he spoke of Rousseau and Locke. He foreshadowed the developments of the next three decades. If a young electrician could hold such views, that meant there was no shortage of people among the vast population of China who held the same views. The only difference was that most of them dared not express their views quite so openly. Thirty years later, grass-roots attitudes in China are probably the same. They dare not speak, but in their hearts they know what they believe. The outcry continues to reverberate.

Today’s China is not the exclusive achievement of the Deng Xiaoping/Hu Jintao “palace coup.” Is is also the achievement of Peng Dehuai, Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao, Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang and millions of other middle and upper level political figures. It was paid for by the tens of millions who died of hunger for the “Three Red Banners,” and the hundreds of millions who were persecuted during the Cultural Revolution as “feudalists, capitalists, and revisionists.” It was paid for by the victims of the 1978 Beijing Spring and the 1989 Tiananmen Incident. The result was an outcry inspired by the people’s suffering. Today’s China is not the result of any “socialist self-correcting mechanisms.” It is the result of the CCP regime’s lack of alternatives. The CCP was forced to forsake class struggle and instead champion a harmonious society.

Today, the sentiments and reasoning behind Wei Jingsheng’s outcry three decades ago may sound somewhat anachronistic. But in fact the buzzword “reform and liberalization” goes back to his “Fifth Modernization.” Today Beijing is taking the path of reform and liberalization. But it still characterizes the reform and liberalization advocated by pro-democracy and human rights activists as heresy. If it is merely indulging in power games, that is understandable. But Beijing’s leaders surely realize that it was precisely such outcries that enabled them to remain in power in order to promote reform and liberalization. The CCP has rehabilitated Peng Dehuai and Liu Shaoqi. The latter died a nameless corpse. The CCP can hardly ignore the outcries from the grass roots during the Beijing Spring and 1989 pro-democracy movement. Without such strong and sustained outcries today’s China would not exist. Peng Dehuai was in fact an insider version of Wei Jingsheng. Wei Jingsheng was conversely, a grass-roots version of Peng Dehuai.

President Ma Ying-jeou’s National Day speech noted that today’s Taiwan must affirm the decades long fight for democracy and human rights waged by Lei Chen with his “Free China” movement and by “party outsiders” during their “Kaohsiung Incident” movement. Hu Jintao and other leaders in Beijing may not be able to openly affirm the views of Wei Jingsheng and Hu Jia. But they must allow their outcries to echo in their hearts.

從歐巴馬想到魏京生
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.10.14 04:32 am

歐巴馬獲得諾貝爾和平獎，舉世譁然，連他自己都覺得受之有愧。於此同時，多年來大陸民運人士魏京生，與維權人士胡佳可能獲獎的傳說，則再次消失在人們的想像中。

若要給獎，魏京生可能較胡佳更有資格。胡佳的表現確屬不易，他是高校畢業生，是八九天安門事件後的人物；魏京生初露面時，則是北京動物園的電工，當時正值毛澤東死，中國大陸仍是文革十年浩劫造成的封閉社會，魏京生的「呼聲」，無疑是當年「北京之春」裡最令人震懾的草根吶喊。魏京生出道比胡佳早三十年，他的社會代表性也比胡佳土，比胡佳深。

「呼聲」是魏京生的用語。他在一九七八年西單民主牆上貼出的《第五個現代化：民主及其他》裡指出：當年在「粉碎四人幫」後復出的鄧小平，「應當感謝那個把他推上台的呼聲」。

呼聲，是指人民的聲音。若依魏京生的看法，一九七六年「粉碎四人幫」對毛澤東的鞭屍政變，固然是葉劍英、鄧小平等發動的黨內鬥爭；然其底層的真正動力，卻是來自人民的「呼聲」，使這場鞭屍政變取得了順天應人的正當性。

一直到今天，大陸的左派仍在說，三十年來從「粉碎四人幫」至「改革開放」的巨劇，是出於「社會主義」內在的「優異的自我糾錯機制」。然而，顯然那是「鞭屍政變」，而不是什麼「糾錯機制」。鄧小平等人是回應了人民的「呼聲」，或迫於人民的「呼聲」，而粉碎了「五人幫」（包括毛澤東）；因而，魏京生說：鄧小平等「應當感謝那個把他推上台的呼聲」。

即使在三十年後展閱魏京生的文字，如《第五個現代化：民主及其他》、《要民主還是要新的獨裁》，仍令人心靈震動。即使今日對魏京生的私行有些議論，但應當無損於他在「北京之春」的表現。當年魏是二十八歲的電工，高中畢業，剛經過文革的封閉社會；但他的吐屬，居然有盧梭、洛克的況味，不啻也預告了嗣後至今三十年的歷史走向。我們可以想像，當年一名青年電工有這種政治見解，其實在中國廣大基層民眾間亦不乏有此見解，只是他們不會或不敢像魏京生這般地表達。我們也相信，三十年後今天的中國草根基層仍是如此；不會說，不敢說，但心知肚明，也就是「呼聲」仍在迴盪。

就此以論，中國有今日，不全緣於自鄧小平至胡錦濤的「宮廷政變」；也是因彭德懷、劉少奇、林彪、胡耀邦、趙紫陽等萬千中上層人物的罹禍；更是因「三面紅旗」數千萬餓殍，及文革數億「封／資／修」被鬥者，以至一九七八「北京之春」，到一九八九天安門事件，所付出的民生苦難及因苦難而發出的「呼聲」。鐵一般的事實是：中國有今日，並非因為「社會主義」的「自我糾錯機制」，而是中共政權已經再也沒有不改弦更張的餘地，必須從「階級鬥爭」走到「和諧社會」。

回顧魏京生在三十年前的「呼聲」，其中的情緒與邏輯雖不免略有時空的落差，但其實不妨逕將「第五個現代化」一詞改作「改革開放」的今日流行語。但是，今日的北京政權，走的是「改革開放」路線，卻仍將主張「改革開放」的民運或維權人士視為異端。這若是緣於統治權謀，尚可理解；但北京主政者卻不可不知，正是這種民間「呼聲」，使當局得以繼續挺住及推動「改革開放」。中共既然漸次平反了犯顏直諫的彭德懷，和死時成為無名屍的劉少奇等；當然也不能抹煞「北京之春」至「八九民運」的民間「呼聲」。沒有這股強大而持續的「呼聲」，中國不會有今日。彭德懷其實是朝廷裡的魏京生，而魏京生則是草根的彭德懷。

馬英九總統在國慶談話中指出，台灣有今日，必須肯定從（雷震）「自由中國」，到（黨外運動）「美麗島」數十年來爭取民主人權的志士。北京當局胡錦濤等領導人，也許一時做不到在口中認同魏京生、胡佳等的見解，但應當常使這類「呼聲」在自己的心中迴盪。

The Politics of Spite and the Democracy of Hatred

The Politics of Spite and the Democracy of Hatred
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 13, 2009

DPP Taipei City Council Member Hung Chien-yi and an FTV reporter are suspected of destroying an entrance gate to the Maokung Cable Car. Their motive? To fabricate an excuse to lambast the Taipei City Government. The city government has reported the crime to the police and supplied evidence in the form of video recordings. That dirty politics has descended to this level is mind-boggling.
The City of Chicago failed to win its bid to hold the 2016 Summer Olympic Games. Amazingly conservatives in the United States were overjoyed. They shouted: “Obama lost! Obama lost!” Nobel laureate in economics Paul Krugman spoke of the “politics of spite.” He likened it to the childish behavior of a 13-year-old child.

Because they hated Obama, conservatives wished his administration ill. They even viewed the U.S. defeat in its bid for the Olympics as an occasion for celebration. The sentiments of some in the Republican party can only be described as twisted. Such scenarios are unfortunately all too familiar to people on Taiwan. People on Taiwan have lived amidst the politics of spite for years. Their plight is a hundred times more serious. After all, the United States’ bid for the Olympics failed. The Republicans had reason to deride Obama. By contrast Hung Chien-yi’s act of sabotage was sheer spite.

Democracy has regressed. Its downward trajectory is not hard to trace. When Obama was elected president, the world felt the United States had reclaimed some of its lost spirit. But the defeated Republican Party began behaving ever more childishly. Its behavior is dong America’s democracy no good whatsoever. On Taiwan, the second change in ruling parties was a big step for democracy. But the defeated Democratic Progressive Party seems to have forgotten that politics is a mission that is supposed to serve the people. Instead it does everything possible to make life difficult for the ruling administration. It even spreads rumors and fabricates incidents. It seems to feel that by doing so it can exact some measure of revenge. What becomes of the national interest when partisan infighting descends to such levels?

Over the past few months, the ruling and opposition parties have seldom reached a consensus on important national issues. They have seldom engaged in shared decision-making. Interaction between the two parties has involved making mountains out of molehills. The most obvious example is how the Green Camp took advantage of the 8/8 Floods to invite the Dalai Lama to Taiwan, hoping to make trouble for the ruling KMT and to undermine cross-Strait relations. In effect it “took advantage of the floods to engage in looting.” Its appetite whetted by the Dalai Lama’s visit, it then invited Rebiyah Kadeer and Li Hongzhi. During the DPP’s eight years in office, it never even mentioned Xinjiang. Now, in an effort to embarrass the Ma administration, it is suddenly trumpeting Rebiyah Kadeer as a champion of human rights, as if by doing so it could add a little shine to the Green Camp’s halo. But such short-sighted moves are just a little too heavy handed.

Democracy requires checks and balances. But checks and balances is not synonymous with obstructionism. That is an outright distortion of the meaning of checks and balances. The purpose of checks and balances to avoid the monopolization of political power by an elite. Taiwan’s current problem is not any lack of checks and balances. Its problem is obstructionism running wild, and the politics of spite running amok. Its problme is political gridlock. Many national policies require rational discussion. But the opposition DPP refuses to engage in dialogue. Instead it invests all its energy in inciting artificial controversies over irrelevancies, squandering the energies of the nation and the people. Over time this has weakened the nation’s momentum. Mutual hatreds and suspicions have been intensified, tarnishing the nation’s reputation.

Such is the damage inflicted by the politics of spite. When politicians’ hearts are consumed with jealousy and hatred, they forget the purpose of democracy. They even forget the value of right and wrong. When Chicago lost its bid for the Olympics, Republicans actually cheered. This is even more frightening than anti-American sentiment. Meanwhile, during the 8/8 Flood on Taiwan, the Green Camp accused the Ma administration of incompetence. The Blue Camp accused Green Camp led local governments of dereliction of duty. Under the politics of spite, who cares about the victims? Who bothers to uncover the causes of the disaster?

Now look at Chen Shui-bian. In order to escape incarceration, he has actually claimed that during his two terms in office, he was “acting on orders from the United States.” He demoted Taiwan to the level of a territory administered by the United States Military Government. The “Son of Taiwan,” after eight years of emptying out the nation’s coffers, has in one fell swoop repudiated the nation’s sovereignty. This sets a new low for the politics of spite.

The DPP was in power for eight years, during which it incited the “democracy of hatred.” Now that it is again in the opposition, it is again resorting to “obstructionism motivated by spite.” It refuses to play a constructive role within the framework of democracy. The Green Camp needs to engage in some serious soul-searching over Hung Chien-yi’s antics. The “politics of spite” and the “democracy of hatred” have now reached new lows.

從「惡意政治」到「仇恨民主」
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.10.13 04:28 am

民進黨籍台北市議員洪健益，涉嫌率同民視記者破壞貓纜門禁，製造假新聞，攻擊台北市政府；市府已檢具錄影證據，向警方報案。政治鬥爭搞到這種地步，簡直匪夷所思。

芝加哥市未能爭取到二○一六年的夏季奧運主辦權，美國保守陣營人士竟大喜過望，歡呼：「歐巴馬輸了！歐巴馬輸了！」諾貝爾經濟獎得主克魯曼把這種現象稱為「惡意政治」，認為是十三歲孩童的幼稚行為。

因為討厭歐巴馬，所以不願看到他施政順利，乃至連美國申奧失利都當成可喜可賀之事，共和黨陣營如此扭曲的心情，只能以「錯亂」形容。然而，這樣的場景，對台灣而言一點都不陌生，民眾生活在這種惡意對立的政治氛圍中已經多年，情況且更嚴重百倍。美國申奧失敗，共和黨所揶揄者畢竟尚有所本；但洪健益製造這樣的「腳尾飯」，卻是居心叵測。

民主會退化，其軌跡不難追尋。歐巴馬當選總統，被世界認為是重拾了遺失的美國精神；但挫敗的共和黨因妒恨而出現幼稚的杯葛行為，而且愈演愈烈，這對美國民主不可能帶來什麼好處。在台灣，政黨兩度輪替原是民主的一大步，但失去政權的民進黨似乎渾然忘了政治志業旨在服務人民，只是千方百計要使對手難堪，甚至不惜造謠做假，彷彿如此自己即有扳回一城的快感。台灣的利益，能靠朝野相互羞辱來維持嗎？

回顧過去數月，朝野兩黨幾乎不曾在國家重要議題上有過共識或形成什麼共同決策；雙方的互動，大都在一些無足輕重的議題上作無謂的消耗。最明顯的例子，就是綠營趁著八八水災邀請達賴來台，為執政黨鋪陳的兩岸關係製造麻煩；「趁水打劫」後食髓知味，又陸續傳出邀訪熱比婭及李洪志訪台的計畫。其實，民進黨執政八年，從未談過新疆；如今只為了給馬政府難堪，立即將熱比婭奉為人權鬥士，好似如此即可誇耀綠營的民主光環。這種短線算計，未免太過粗糙。

的確，民主需要制衡，但若把制衡和杯葛畫上等號，那是完全曲解了制衡。制衡的目的，在避免權力的傾斜，避免政治被少數人壟斷；但台灣目前的問題不在缺乏制衡，而在杯葛氾濫、惡意政治橫行，使民主癱瘓變調。許多需要理性討論的國家政策，在野黨拒絕對話或溝通，卻把全副精神放在一些無足輕重的議題上挑激彼此的差異和對立，耗喪國家和人民的大量心力。久而久之，台灣前進的動力減弱，人民彼此猜忌仇恨的情緒變強，國家的光榮感也日漸消磨了。

「惡意政治」的禍害，便在於此。當政治人物的心志被妒恨、仇視的情緒淹沒，他們不僅會忘掉民主的初衷，有時連基本的是非價值都拋棄。芝加哥申奧失利，共和黨陣營竟鼓掌叫好，這簡直比仇美國家的反應更可怖。再看台灣，八八水患期間，綠營一味指控馬政府領導失利，藍營則歸咎地方綠色政權失職，在惡意政治下，誰真的在乎災民？誰認真追究災害的源頭為何？

再看陳水扁，為了想逃脫自己的牢獄之災，竟妄稱任內皆「聽命美國行事」把台灣貶為美國軍政府的管轄地。這位「台灣之子」八年貪瀆禍國後，竟連台灣主權都一舉否定，這豈不更是「惡意政治」的經典之作。

民進黨執政八年，煽動了仇恨式的民主；如今退居在野，它又頑固地堅守「惡意杯葛」的路線，不願在民主機制上扮演正面及積極角色。綠營應當深切省思洪健益的演出，「惡意政治」、「仇恨民主」將伊於胡底。

Is Former President Chen a Colonial Governor under a U.S. Military Government?

Is Former President Chen a Colonial Governor under a U.S. Military Government?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 12, 2009

According to the U.S. Military Court of Appeals, former President Chen Shui-bian has alleged that a U.S. Military Government has occupied Taiwan since the end of WWII, and continues to occupy Taiwan even today. He pleaded with the U.S. Military Court of Appeals to order the U.S. Military Government to instruct President Ma Ying-jeou to immediately release Chen Shui-bian and countermand his sentence of life imprisonment. His allegations were printed with black ink on white paper. Otherwise many people would have trouble believing that anyone would spout such arrant nonsense. Chen Shui-bian’s latest move offers further proof that in order to escape justice, Chen is willing to do anything.
This differs from previous accounts. Chen Shui-bian did not “sue” U.S. president Barack Obama. Rather he filed a petition with the U.S. Military Court of Appeals. His argument is that according to the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Taiwan remains under United States military occupation, and its status remains undetermined even today. Therefore during his eight years as president, he was in fact an agent of the United States Military Government, he was in effect Taiwan’s Chief Executive/colonial governor.

Chen Shui-bian claimed that during his two terms as president, he was aware of the existence of the U.S. Military Government, and carried out its orders. On Taiwan-related matters, the United States Military Government was “paramount,” and during his two terms he often received orders from the Chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan. Now he faces political persecution. Therefore he is disclosing the existence of this U.S. Military Government to the U.S. Military Court and the world. He is calling upon this military government to come forward and protect him.

When Ah-Bian made these fantastic claims, he was not talking in his sleep. He was not speaking off the cuff. His claims were carefully drafted and formally submitted to the court. He claimed that Taiwan has secretly been occupied by a U.S. Military Government, and asked the true powers behind the throne to come forward and rescue him. Such claims from a former President of the Republic of China are absurd beyond belief, and are an affront to the dignity of the public on Taiwan.

First of all, the San Francisco Peace Treaty may not have specified who would hold sovereignty over Taiwan. But the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty confirmed that Taiwan’s sovereignty belonged to the ROC government. Moreover, Japan and the United States both granted diplomatic recognition to the Republic of China. They United States and the Republic of China may have signed a mutual defense treaty, but the U.S. never occupied, ruled, or even administered Taiwan. So where is this still active U.S. Military Government Ah-Bian speaks of? Where is this military government that has supposedly been in existence for sixty years. Where is this government that nobody has ever heard of?

If this military government that rules over Taiwan exists, where are its officials? Where does its funding come from? Have both houses of congress and the media been kept in the dark, all these years? Have successive U.S. presidents from different political parties kept it a closely guarded secret? Ah-Bian has concocted a fantasy so patently absurd, people all over the world may die laughing.

Chen Shui-bian certainly has an active imagination. That he could concoct such an incredible story, and that he is being ridiculed as a madman is a small matter. That the public on Taiwan is being humiliated along with him is not. From its very inception, the Republic of China’s status as a sovereign and independent nation has remained unchanged. We may have fewer diplomatic allies. We may be squeezed by international organizations. But those are merely incidents of unfair persecution. They are not the result of any deficiencies in the terms and conditions of our national sovereignty. The Republic of China has everything required for full nationhood. It has sovereignty, territory, people, and government. It has a democratically elected legislature and government. No one can deny that we are a sovereign nation, not even a former president who spouts nonsense in his sleep.

In fact Chen Shui-bian’s move was utterly obtuse, because it is something a United States Military Court could not possibly accept. It would never want the specter of a non-existent military government to emerge as an agent of influence. Even assuming Ah-Bian merely wants to generate controversy in order to win popular support, it will not work. People will merely perceive his claims as the ravings of a lunatic. It won’t even be able to delay the legal proceedings against him.

The only impact it will have is to hurt the feelings of the public on Taiwan. Chen Shui-bian once pledged to “fight to safeguard Taiwan’s sovereignty.” Now he is claiming that he was merely the Chief Executive of the United States Military Government, that all his decisions required Uncle Sam’s seal of approval. One has to wonder what happened when he infuriated Washington with his “One Country, Each Side” thesis? Did he forget to obtain Uncle Sam’s approval? The public on Taiwan supported him all the way, and allowed him to become president. They allowed him to rule for two terms and eight years, to exercise immense powers and receive a generous salary and pension. Now it turns out these taxpayer dollars were paid to an agent of colonial rule? If we follow his logic, he should ask the United States to pay his salary. Why is he taking hard-earned taxpayer dollars from citizens of the Republic of China? Ah-Bian embezzled vast sums from the nation’s coffers. He abused the political authority delegated to him by the public to reap huge profits via government-business collusion. Shouldn’t he cough up this money?

Looking back at Chen Shui-bian’s actions, we see he often resorted to any means at his disposal to achieve his own selfish ends. He sacrificed his comrades, his friends, his family confidants, and his servants without a second thought. He even sacrificed the nation’s sovereignty and dignity. Even his former Democratic Progressive Party comrades cannot rationalize away his behavior. Die hard Ah-Bian hero-worshipers support him unconditionally. But has Chen Shui-bian ever demonstrated the same loyalty towards Taiwan?

Chen Shui-bian may spout nonsense. But he and his First Family accomplices in crime must still face the Republic of China justice system and be prosecuted according to the letter of the law. Chen Shui-bian may come up with a whole slew of gimmicks in the future. But the sympathy and solidarity he inspires will be less and less.

中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 　2009.10.12
社論－陳前總統是美國軍政府的行政長官？
本報訊

根據美國軍事上訴法院的資料，前總統陳水扁指稱有個美國軍政府占領台灣至今，他祈求美國軍事上訴法院下令這個美國軍政府指示馬英九總統，立即釋放陳水扁並撤銷無期徒刑判決。如果不是白紙黑字，誰相信會有人如此癡人說夢？而這些白紙黑字，更證明了陳水扁為求脫身，的確可以無所不用其極。

和之前傳出的說法不同，陳水扁並沒有「控告」美國總統歐巴馬，而是向美國軍事上訴法院提出請願。他的說法是，依據《舊金山和約》，美國在台灣行使軍事占領，迄今未變，台灣地位未定，因此八年總統任內，他其實是美國軍政府的代理人，也是實質的台灣民政長官。

陳水扁聲稱，他在擔任總統期間，知悉了美國軍政府存在的事實，也接受軍政府的命令。有關台灣之事，美國軍政府是「至高無上」的，他在任內經常接受美國在台協會主席的指示。如今他面臨政治迫害，因此向美國軍事法院及全世界披露這個美國軍政府的存在，要求軍政府出面保護他。

這些天方夜譚般的陳述，既非發自午夜囈語，也不是衝動胡扯，而是經過一番草擬撰述後正式向法院提交的。說台灣其實一直被一個祕密的美國軍政府占領至今，要求這個藏在幕後的真正主子出面救人，這種話，出自一位中華民國的前總統，不只是荒天下之大唐，更把台灣人的臉都丟光了！

首先，《舊金山和約》雖未言明將台灣主權移交給誰，但接著《中日和約》就已確定了台灣主權屬於中華民國政府，何況日本與美國都給予中華民國外交承認。美國雖然和中華民國政府簽有協防條約，卻從未占領統治過台灣，連託管都不曾，哪來的美國軍政府？而且說現在依然活躍，什麼樣的軍政府能夠既活躍至今又六十年沒人聽說過？

更何況，如果有這個治台軍政府的存在，其運作的人員、經費從何而來？國會參眾兩院與新聞界始終被蒙在鼓裡？美國不同政黨的歷屆總統也都祕而不宣？這種天方夜譚也想得出來，簡直笑掉全世界的大牙！

陳水扁的想像力實在非常人所能及，竟然編造得出如此匪夷所思又不合情理的故事來。他被人家當瘋子事小，台灣跟著一起丟臉事大。從過去到現在，我們的獨立主權國家地位始終未變，即使邦交國數目不多，被國際官方組織排擠，但那是因為受到不合理的打壓，而非我國在主權條件上有任何欠缺。主權、領土、人民、政府，台灣樣樣具備，包括由人民選舉產生的國會與政府，誰也不能否定我們是個主權國家，連前總統的癡人說夢也不能。

其實陳水扁這招笨得可以，因為美國軍事法院絕對不可能接受，遑論真要那個不存在的幽靈軍政府出面干預。即使只是想造成話題爭取聲援，都不會有效果，因為人家只會把這當成喪心病狂的胡扯，連拖延訴訟程序都做不到。

唯一的影響，是傷害了台灣人民的感情。陳水扁曾經信誓旦旦，說要為維護台灣主權而戰，結果現在聲稱自己只是美國軍政府的民政長官，以前做決策還要聽老美的，當年講「一邊一國」時美國氣得跳腳，不知是否忘了請示？台灣人民一路呵護他支持他，讓他能當上總統，兩任八年裡享有優渥薪酬強大權力，卸任後還有終身禮遇，這些民脂民膏，結果都付給了一位治台代理人？如果照他的邏輯，那麼他應該跟美國討薪水才對，幹嘛拿台灣納稅人的血汗錢？而且扁家還Ａ走國庫那麼多錢，外帶利用人民授予的政治權力從政商關係中謀取暴利。這些錢，如今更應該吐出來！

回顧陳水扁的所作所為，往往為達目的不擇手段，為了自己的利益，犧牲同志朋友家臣天下人都在所不惜，而今連台灣主權尊嚴都遭到他的羞辱，昔日民進黨同志，此時恐也無法再為他辯護。而始終情義相挺的死忠扁迷們，有看到阿扁對台灣又是如何有情有義嗎？

無論陳水扁再怎麼癡人說夢，他、以及第一家庭成員的貪瀆行為，都一樣要由中華民國的司法體系來依法處理。也許將來陳水扁還會想出各種奇招怪招，但他能鼓動的同情與認同，已經愈來愈少了。

Self-Confidence and Cross-Strait Relations

Self-Confidence and Cross-Strait Relations
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 9, 2009

The 8/8 Floods occurred two months ago. DPP legislators browbeat Premier Wu Den-yih over the amounts contributed by Mainland China. Premier Wu reportedly replied “eight to nine hundred million NT.” Pan Green legislators were clearly dissatisfied. They demanded that Premier Wu guarantee that the entire amount pledged by the Mainland would actually be received. Premier Wu said he could hardly stand behind the other side’s pledges. He added that some of the contributions from the Chinese Mainland were earmarked for the reconstruction of the Shuang Yuan Bridge. He said it was inappropriate for the Executive Yuan to make such an assessment, therefore he had to decline.
Premier Wu broached this subject on his own initiative. He hoped to prevent Green Camp legislators from villifying him as “pro-China,” and as a “China-lover.” He wanted them to believe that the government would not unconditionally accept Mainland Chinese generosity and goodwill. Elements within the Green Camp have long demagogued such issues. Will Premier Wu’s public declarations make these legislators cease and desist? The answer is still unknown. But Wu’s response reveals two things. The first is that the public on Taiwan has a hard time accepting other people’s goodwill, especially from the other side of the Taiwan Strait. We are always on the defensive. We assume that anything the Mainland does relative to Taiwan, is always done for some ulterior motive. We view the other side through colored glasses. Therefore all we see are problems. If the Mainland fails to contribute, it has no conscience, If the Mainland contributes too little, it has no conscience. If the Mainland’s pledges have yet to be fulfilled, it is guilty of bad faith. If the Mainland wants to earmark its contributions a certain way, then it is meddling in our affairs. In short, we constantly find fault, no matter what they do.

Frankly, there is nothing wrong with earmarking contributions. Contributors all want their contributions to be highly visible and long remembered. This is only human. When ordinary individuals make contributions they too think this way. But as long as the donation meets a real need and people are in fact helped, it is a good thing. Furthermore, earmarking contributions for certain high profile purposes such as major construction projects, makes it easier to solicit contributions. What’s more, part of these contributions came from Taiwan businesses on the Mainland. They wanted to use the Shuang Yuan Bridge project to demonstrate their solidarity with Taiwan. Frankly there is nothing wrong with their way of thinking. When the Republic of China provides aid to other countries, doesn’t it earmark its contributions the same way?

Secondly, regarding cross-Strait issues, isn’t the Ma administration just a wee bit overcautious? It is deathly afraid of falling into traps set by the Green Camp. As a result, it second-guesses itself on every move. For example, the DPP alleged that rebroadcasting Mainland China’s National Day troop review on local television was illegal. It demanded a Government Information Office (GIO) investigation. The GIO consulted experts and scholars, who concluded that it was not illegal. There was no need to impose fines on local rebroadcasters. The entire world has expressed an interest in Mainland China’s National Day ceremonies. The Republic of China enjoys freedom of speech. How can rebroadcasting news footage of a troop review be considered illegal? Elements within the Green Camp are afflicted with a “No to everything Chinese” mentality that has left them bereft of common sense, and even their humanity. The Ma administration meanwhile, is “once bitten, twice shy.” Premier Wu anxiously underscored the administration’s refusal to accept contributions from the Mainland authorities. Clearly the DPP’s Sinophobic propaganda has the Ma administration treading on eggshells. But the more the Ma administration cowers, the more the DPP tastes blood. The more it chomps down and refuses to let go. On cross-Strait issues, the thinnests of pretexts is enough to rally the Green Camp to arms. Why would it pass up any such opportunity? The more the Ma administration trembles before Green Camp intimidation, the more it encourages the DPP to demagogue every issue that comes along.

The Green Camp has repeatedly pummeled the Ma administration on cross-Strait issues. Clearly, it has had an impact. That is why it gleefully persists. Even more worth our attention is a certain collective mentality on Taiwan. Why is it so hard to view the other side with a normal state of mind? Why do we have so many negative feelings towards the Chinese mainland? Leave aside historical factors and the CCP regime’s refusal to respond by removing its missiles. The public on Taiwan also feels unconsciously conflicted and bewildered over the gradual rise of Mainland China. Over the past three decades, Taiwan has experienced economic growth, social prosperity, democracy and freedom, diversity and openness. This has allowed the public to indulge in feelgood optimism in the face of a comparatively backward Mainland China. Now that Taiwan’s economic outlook is less rosy, the public is experiencing confusion, and such feelings have faded.

When self-confidence on Taiwan becomes low, Mainland China’s troop review is especially hard on the eyes. Chen Chao-jung’s remark “China Will Be Strong” is especially hard on the ears. Mainland China’s contribution to the 8/8 Flood relief is especially hard on the feelings. This is both sad and alarming. A lack of self-confidence may inspire some on Taiwan to adopt an Ah-Q “out of sight, out of mind” attitude toward Mainland China. It may encourage society to engage in unwarranted speculation, to constantly feel wounded and vulnerable. Frankly, such a mindset will lead to social contraction, squander energy, and yield nothing in return.

As we watch the massive 60th anniversary celebrations on the other side of the Strait, we hope the public on Taiwan will display the same confidence and proudly move ahead. The public on Taiwan must adopt a healthy attitude towards itself and toward cross-Strait relations. We must work toward a time when we too can walk with the same pride.

中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 　2009.10.09
社論－以更大自信看待自己 看待兩岸
本報訊

八八水災發生近兩個月，民進黨立委質詢行政院院長吳敦義，中國大陸的捐款來了多少，聽到吳揆說收到了八、九億元，綠營民意代表顯然很不滿意，直說要吳揆保證大陸捐的錢會全數到位，吳院長除了表示無法替對岸承諾些什麼之外，還說中國大陸的捐款部分指定要修建雙園大橋，但因行政院評估不適當，因此已予以婉拒。

吳揆主動把這段話說出來的目的，應是希望轉移綠營立委隨時會扣下的「親中」、「媚中」大帽子，讓這些人相信政府不會對中共「來者不拒」的，對岸的好意，台灣也不是照單全收。吳揆公開對民進黨立委做這樣一番表白，究竟能不能讓部分向來喜歡在這種議題上大開殺戒的綠營人士收歛、剎車也還未可知，倒是顯露了兩件事，第一是台灣對別人、特別是對對岸的善心好意，似乎很難心平氣和、很難就事論事的評估，總是帶著一個防衛心，認為中共如果對台灣要做什麼的話，就一定是帶著特定的目的；因為戴著有色眼鏡看對岸，所以看到的都是問題：大陸不捐款是沒良心，捐款太少一樣沒良心；捐款還沒到位是沒誠意，希望捐款用在什麼地方是干預…永遠都在挑剔。

老實講，捐款指定用途也並沒有那麼不對、不應該，一來，捐款做好事的人想做在一些明顯、容易被看見、被記住的事情上，算是人情之常，就是一般人捐款時也難免會有這種心態，只要被捐贈、被幫助的人與地方的確有此需要，就算是好事一樁；其次，捐款做一些明顯可見的事，例如重大工程，比較容易昭信，更何況，這批捐款也有些來自台商，他們希望透過像蓋雙園大橋這種比較大的工程，顯示根留台灣的心意，這種想法和做法，老實講無可厚非；當台灣對其他國家進行援助時，不也常常表明希望參與的是重要的建設嗎？

第二，關乎到兩岸議題的事，馬政府會不自覺有一種過了頭的小心翼翼，因為深怕掉進了綠營設下的陷阱，於是進行嚴格的自我檢查。如民進黨認為電視台轉播中國國慶閱兵違法，要求新聞局查處，新聞局就請了專家學者討論，結論是沒有違法，不需開罰。中國大陸的國慶典禮全世界都關注、轉播，在言論自由的台灣，人民透過新聞畫面看到閱兵畫面，竟然違法？部分綠營人士「逢中必反」的慣性已讓他們愈來愈缺乏常識，甚至於扭曲人性，而馬政府似乎也被「電」得有些矯枉過正，從吳揆主動爆料不接受中共的捐款來向反中勢力表明愛台灣、不受中共制約的心意做法看來，民進黨的反中策略的確已讓馬政府神經緊張；但愈是如此，民進黨食髓知味，愈是會緊咬不放，在兩岸議題上，任何風吹草動、任何蛛絲馬跡，綠營文章會愈做愈起勁，豈肯放手？馬政府愈是害怕，愈是讓民進黨看到出招機會。

綠營人士一再就兩岸議題猛打馬政府，顯然多少有些政治效益，因此才會如此樂此不疲，因此更值得關注的是台灣社會的某種集體心態：為什麼那麼難以平常心來看待對岸，為什麼會對中國大陸有這麼多負面感受？除了歷史性的因素以及中共政權至今仍不肯就台灣人民最在意的飛彈問題等予以正面友善的回應之外，還有一個潛在的心態是台灣面對著逐漸崛起的中國大陸有了種種矛盾和失落。台灣過去三十年因為經濟成長、社會繁榮、民主自由、多元開放，讓台灣在面對相對比較落後的中國大陸時自信樂觀、自我感覺良好；曾幾何時，這種光榮的感覺隨著台灣經濟表現不再那麼亮眼，社會又呈現某種混亂對立，有了轉淡的趨勢。

當台灣的自信心變得低落時，中國大陸的閱兵大典看起來就特別刺眼、陳昭榮的「中國一定強」聽起來就特別刺耳，捐給台灣八八風災的捐款也就特別扎心。可悲也可怕的是，沒有自信心不但會讓台灣一些人對中國大陸的現狀懷有「眼不見為淨」的阿Q心態，還會鼓動社會的集體情緒陷入不必要的敏感猜疑，動輒受傷並且脆弱；老實講，這真的會讓台灣的社會力萎縮，消耗能量、甚至於一事無成。

看到對岸的六十慶典如此聲勢浩大，我們的心裡多麼希望台灣也可以自信滿滿、昂首闊步前進！台灣應該要用健康的態度看待自己、看待兩岸關係，積極地為自己創造下一個走路有風的時代。

Make the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region Part of the ECFA Pilot Program

Make the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region Part of the ECFA Pilot Program
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 8, 2009

The impact of the Dalai Lama’s visit has receded. The Wu cabinet has assumed office. The Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) is again under discussion. The Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region on mainland China will become part of ECFA’s pilot plan. This raises a new issue. The Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Mainland Affairs Council have each announced that ECFA and the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region are separate issues. But that is probably not true. The Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region is closely related to ECFA. Making the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region part of ECFA’s pilot plan may be the key to ECFA’s successful implementation.

The Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region is primarily Fujian, but also includes part of Zhejiang, Guangdong and Jiangxi. It was first proposed in 2004. But it was only officially adopted by the PRC State Council in May this year. Its purpose is to “support economic development in Fujian Province and accelerate the building of a cross-Strait economic zone.” Only then was the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region given a policy basis. Its content is rich and varied. But the key to its economic policy thinking is “total integration with Taiwan’s economic resources, via a comprehensive interface.” Industry, transportation, manpower, and the financial industry have all been mentioned, in an all out effort to attract Taiwan. During the same month, on the eve of the anniversary of President Ma’s inauguration, Mainland China’s Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi announced eight measures to benefit Taiwan. A key element was the promotion of a dedicated service industry pilot program in the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region. This means Beijing intends to allow the Western Taiwan Strait Economic Region to lead the way, regardless of whether it is motivated by the strategic needs of the local economy, or the political implications of a “Fujian-Taiwan interface.” From this perspective, the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region and ECFA are two different things that can be developed independently.

Now let’s take a look at our side’s single-minded promotion of ECFA. According to international trade practices, ECFA is a cross-Strait economic framework that includes a framework for full liberalization. Its ultimate goal is a free trade agreement (FTA). If we can achieve this, Taipei need not be concerned that its political status will be demoted to that of Hong Kong and Macao. In reality, whether Beijing is willing to take such a step remains to be seen. But as far as our side is concerned, we don’t want ECFA to immediately implement such open market principles. For Taipei, this has both advantages and disadvantages. Pfficialdom and private industry may have different expectations, but everyone hopes consultations will result in ECFA. On the mainland, Taipei would enjoy “Super-WTO treatment.” During cross-Strait economic and trade negotiations, Taipei would “get more and give less.” Such contradictory attitudes have led to ECFA’s linkage with the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region.

Another practical obstacle is that the two sides joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) under different auspices. Our side was highly liberalized and highly developed. The Mainland, on the other hand, was a developing economy with a buffer period. Today the two sides have agreed to discuss trade and economic liberalization via ECFA. Taipei must confront its outdated special defense mechanisms. It must fulfill its commitments to liberalization. It can no longer make an exception for Mainland China. Even if the other side “wants too much,” and even it if wants only “normalization” of MFN treatment. Our side may find it difficult to fulfill its obligations regarding sensitive agricultural products. Under the circumstances, linking ECFA with the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region is a necessity.

The Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region’s special regional provisions allow the two sides to avoid the WTO’s MFN provisions. They allows our side to meet our super-WTO treatment obligations. They allow Taipei to establish buffer zones, even as the mainland fully normalizes its economy. When the two sides negotiate ECFA, they can determine how far to carry trade liberalization and normalization. They can gradually expand cooperation within the confines of the SAR. This will reduce the impact of immediate and total liberalization on sensitive industries on Taiwan, giving them time to adjust. The Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region will also provide a low threshold for certain industries, such as financial services. We may not be able to start late and finish first, but these provisions will offer us other advantages. They will at least allow us to regain some of the opportunities lost as a result of prohibitions against “going West.” Therefore, linkage of the Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region with ECFA is eminently worthwhile.

The Western Taiwan Straits Economic Region has undeniably gotten off to a late start relative to the rest of the Mainland’s coastal economic zone. This is the source of its future potential, but it also reflects its comparatively limited resources. Whether Beijing intends to exert extra effort on its behalf remains to be seen. Our side cannot treat it as a limitation. Since it is an SAR, our side should treat it as an SAR, in order to avoid being redefined as another Hong Kong and Macao. In practice, it should be classified as an ECFA cross-Strait economic cooperation pilot project. First, taxes should be lowered. Then trade should be liberalized. This will yield the most favorable outcome.

海西區應可考慮列入ECFA的試點
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.10.08 03:05 am

達賴效應降溫，吳內閣上任。兩岸經濟合作架構協議（ＥＣＦＡ）的討論將重回檯面，中國大陸的海西經濟區會否成為ＥＣＦＡ的先行先試區域，則引出了一條新的話題軸線。經濟部、陸委會異口同聲表示，ＥＣＦＡ和海西區是兩回事；但現實恐非如此，海西區與ＥＣＦＡ的關係不只緊密，海西區成為ＥＣＦＡ的試點，更可能是順利推展ＥＣＦＡ的關鍵之一。

海西經濟區的全稱是海峽西岸經濟區，以福建為主，並跨向浙江、廣東及江西的一部分，最早於二○○四年提出，但直到今年五月中共國務院正式通過「關於支援福建省加快建設海峽經濟區的若干意見」，才賦予發展海西經濟區的政策基礎。這份「若干意見」的內容洋洋灑灑，但其經濟政策的中心思維就是「與台灣經濟的資源整合、全面對接」，因而從產業、交通、人才到金融業，無一不談吸引台灣之法。同月，中共國台辦主任王毅在馬總統就職周年前夕宣布惠台八措施，其要項之一就是推銷特定服務業在海西區的試點。凡此皆說明，無論是基於其自身的地方經濟戰略需要，或隱含「閩台對口」的政治意圖，北京政府確實有意將海西經濟區做為兩岸先行、先試的經貿特區。從這點看，海西試點與ＥＣＦＡ是兩回事，可各自獨立發展。

現在來看看我方一心一意推動的ＥＣＦＡ。從國際經貿實務而言，ＥＣＦＡ是兩岸經濟走向全面自由化的初始框架，終極目標是有朝一日簽定自由貿易協定（ＦＴＡ）；果能如此，台灣自無「港澳化」的政治矮化疑慮。在現實狀態中，北京是否願意走到這一步尚未可知；但就我方而言，ＥＣＦＡ若採立即對等開放市場原則，卻絕非我方所願，對台灣更是利弊參半，因而無論官方或業界的主觀期待，都是希望透過協商所達成的ＥＣＦＡ，在大陸享有「超ＷＴＯ（世貿組織）待遇」，在兩岸經貿開放談判上「多拿少給」。這樣一個矛盾的心態，就讓ＥＣＦＡ與海西經濟區有了連結。

再一個現實的障礙是，當年兩岸加入世貿組織（ＷＴＯ）的身分不同，我方是自由化程度較高的已開發國家，中國大陸則是設有開放緩衝年限的開發中國家，如今兩方要洽商議定經貿自由化時程的ＥＣＦＡ，台灣就無法不面對過去以特別防衛機制，將中國大陸例外排除適用我方自由化承諾的問題；就算對方「要」的不多，只要求最惠國待遇的「正常化」，我方仍可能因涉及多項敏感性農產品而難以完全承諾。在此情況下，ＥＣＦＡ與海西經濟區的連結更成了必要。

海西經濟區的特區化及地區化，讓兩岸間不只可以避開ＷＴＯ的最惠國規定、滿足我方的超ＷＴＯ待遇期待，更可讓台灣在面對大陸的經貿完全正常化要求時，以此建立緩衝的地帶；亦即雙方在協商ＥＣＦＡ時，可評估在限定的特區內進行經貿易自由化、正常化及逐步擴大合作的試點，以降低立即全面自由化對台灣敏感產業的衝擊，爭取產業調適的時間。此外，運用海西經濟區對特定產業如金融業的低門檻、額外優惠等優勢，縱使無法後發先至，至少可追回一部分過往因禁足西進而流失的機會。因此，海西經濟區與ＥＣＦＡ的連結對我方是有其積極意義的，這一點，應予列入考慮。

不可諱言的是，海西經濟區的發展是中國大陸沿海經濟區中相對緩慢的，這固然是它的潛力所在，但相對也凸顯了它的客觀資源限制；北京的政策加持力量仍待觀察，我方自不能以此為限。此外，既是特區，我方也應以特區對應，以避免港澳化疑慮；在作法上，則應將兩岸試點列為ＥＣＦＡ的經濟合作項目，與先期降稅的早期收穫、後續的貿易自由化進程交互運用，爭取最有利的協商結果。